Ark. Code Ann. § 18-50-101 (2026)
Definitions
As used in this chapter:
- “Beneficiary” means the person named or otherwise designated in a deed of trust as the person for whose benefit a deed of trust is given or his or her successor in interest;
- “Deed of trust” means a deed conveying real property in trust to secure the performance of an obligation of the grantor named in the deed or an obligor that is secured by the deed of trust to a beneficiary and conferring upon the trustee a power of sale for breach of an obligation of the grantor or obligor contained in the deed of trust;
- “Grantor” means the person conveying an interest in real property by a mortgage or deed of trust as security for the performance of an obligation secured by the mortgage or deed of trust;
- “Mortgage” means the grant of an interest in real property to be held as security for the performance of an obligation by the mortgagor or other person;
- “Mortgage company” means any private, state, or federal entity that in the usual course of its business is either the mortgagee or beneficiary of a deed of trust or mortgage;
- “Mortgage loan servicer” means an entity that holds itself out as being able to service loans secured by liens or mortgages encumbering real property;
- “Mortgagee” means the person holding an interest in real property as security for the performance of an obligation secured by a mortgage or his or her attorney-in-fact appointed pursuant to this chapter;
- “Mortgagor” means the person granting an interest in real property as security for the performance of an obligation secured by a mortgage;
- “Obligor” means a person owing an obligation that is secured by a mortgage or deed of trust;
- “Sale” means the public auction conducted pursuant to § 18-50-107;
- “Trust property” means the property encumbered by a mortgage or deed of trust; and
- “Trustee” means any person or legal entity to whom legal title to real property is conveyed by deed of trust or his or her successor in interest.
History. Acts 1987, No. 53, § 1; 1989, No. 532, § 1; 1999, No. 983, § 1; 2011, No. 885, § 1; 2011, No. 901, § 1.
Amendments. The 1999 amendment rewrote (5); in (7), inserted “as the context requires”, and added “or his attorney in fact appointed pursuant to this chapter”; added (10); and made stylistic changes.
The 2011 amendment by No 885 inserted “or her” in (1); in (2), deleted “or any other person” preceding “named in the deed”, inserted “or an obligor that is secured by the deed of trust”, and inserted “or obligor”; added “secured by the mortgage or deed of trust” in (3); inserted “secured by a mortgage” in present (7) and (8); added the definition for “Obligor” and redesignated the remaining subdivisions accordingly; and deleted “and shall be deemed concluded when the highest bid is accepted by the person conducting the sale” at the end of present (10) [see now § 18-50-107(d)].
The 2011 amendment by No. 901 inserted “or her” in (1); in (2), deleted “or any other person” preceding “named in the deed”, inserted “or an obligor that is secured by the deed of trust”, and inserted “or obligor”; added “secured by the mortgage or deed of trust” in (3); inserted “secured by a mortgage” in present (7) and (8); inserted the definitions for “Mortgage loan servicer” and “Obligor” and redesignated the remaining subdivisions accordingly; and deleted “and shall be deemed concluded when the highest bid is accepted by the person conducting the sale” at the end of present (10) [see now § 18-50-107(d)].
Case Notes
Irregularities in Foreclosure.
Irregularities in a foreclosure proceeding under this subchapter may be grounds to set the sale aside. Matlock v. Lomas Mtg. U.S.A., Inc., 154 B.R. 721 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1993); In re Henson, 157 B.R. 867 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1993).
Judicial Review.
A statutory foreclosure is subject to a judicial review. Matlock v. Lomas Mtg. U.S.A., Inc., 154 B.R. 721 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1993).
Production of Original Note.
Arkansas statutes governing foreclosure of property through a private sale do not specifically require that the foreclosing party produce a physical copy of the original promissory note; apart from there being no requirement that the creditor produce the original note, the creditor submitted an affidavit stating that the original note was in the creditor's possession, and given this, and the fact that the borrowers failed to create an issue of fact, the circuit court correctly granted summary judgment to the creditor on the borrowers' claim to void any interest the creditor might have in the mortgage and note. Anderson v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 2014 Ark. App. 683, 450 S.W.3d 251 (2014).
Sale.
Bankruptcy debtor was entitled to cure a mortgage default under 11 U.S.C.S. § 1322(c)(1) where the foreclosure sale was not completed before debtor's bankruptcy, even though this section deemed the sale complete upon bid acceptance which occurred prior to the debtor's bankruptcy, since a sale under bankruptcy law required an irrevocable transfer of the property through the completed foreclosure process; under state law, after bid acceptance the foreclosure trustee could reject the bid up to the time of delivery of the trustee's deed for any reason and the successful bidder's right to possession could not be enforced until the deed was recorded, and thus the sale was not complete until the trustee's deed was delivered and recorded. In re Jenkins, 422 B.R. 175 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2010).
Cited: Hickman v. Union Nat'l Bank, 154 B.R. 730 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1993); In re Cook, 253 B.R. 249 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2000); In re Brown, 282 B.R. 880 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2002); In re Sugarloaf Props., Inc., 286 B.R. 705 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2002).