Ark. Code Ann. § 18-60-501 (2020)

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section may apply to improved lands which have been permitted to return to a state of nature. Moore v. Morris, 118 Ark. 516, 177 S.W. 6 (1915).

There was no basis in bankruptcy law or equity for granting a Chapter 13 debtor's request for a judgment declaring that the debtor was the legal owner of a home she had used as her residence for over 11 years and requiring two individuals who signed a land sale contract with the debtor in 2005 to deliver a deed to the debtor. The evidence established that the debtor did not fulfill the terms of the land sale contract, which allowed her to acquire title to her residence if she obtained adequate financing within a year of the date the contract was signed, and she had an adequate remedy under the Arkansas quiet title statute, §§ 18-60-501 to 18-60-511, to resolve her claim that she owned the property. In re Cole, No. 6:14-bk-71968, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 2445 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. Aug. 29, 2017).

Attack on Decree.

Title confirmed in proceedings under this section is not subject to collateral attack. Kulbeth v. Drew County Timber Co., 125 Ark. 291, 188 S.W. 810 (1916).

A confirmation decree rendered pursuant to this section is immune from collateral attack, except for jurisdictional defects apparent on the face of the record. Buckhannan v. Nash, 216 F. Supp. 843 (E.D. Ark. 1963).

A confirmation rendered pursuant to this section may be attacked directly on any meritorious ground by the filing of a petition in the original proceeding within the period provided by § 18-60-510 or by a plenary suit having for its specific purpose the setting aside of the decree for fundamental errors such as fraud or lack of jurisdiction, which would render the decree void ab initio. Buckhannan v. Nash, 216 F. Supp. 843 (E.D. Ark. 1963).

Action to set aside and vacate decree of confirmation of title brought by claimants who had not been made parties defendant to quiet title action was a direct attack on the decree, not an impermissible collateral attack. Hall v. Blanford, 254 Ark. 590, 494 S.W.2d 714 (1973).

Attorney's Fees.

Circuit court erred in awarding a son attorney's fees because the litigation did not concern a breach of a contract but alleged a quiet title action; the quiet-title statutes do not authorize attorney's fees, and in the absence of statutory authority, attorney's fees are not available. Stokes v. Stokes, 2016 Ark. 182, 491 S.W.3d 113 (2016).

Bond.

Bond is not necessary. Champion v. Williams, 165 Ark. 328, 264 S.W. 972 (1924).

Color of Title.

Trial court properly quieted title in an individual, as the tax deed to the individual was sufficient and could properly have been considered color of title, and a particular quitclaim deed was also sufficient because it contained proper metes-and-bounds descriptions of the tracts in question; furthermore, the description contained in the exchange of quitclaim deeds had been used to assess the property since 1997 and the taxes had been paid on this assessment since that time. J. Michael Enters. v. Oliver, 101 Ark. App. 48, 270 S.W.3d 388 (2007).

Jurisdiction.

Chancery court of county where greater portion of land involved lies has jurisdiction. Bowen v. Frank, 179 Ark. 1004, 18 S.W.2d 1037 (1929).

Fact that quieting title in plaintiff would destroy some of the defenses to a suit for possession did not lessen the power of the chancery court to remove clouds from title. Patterson v. McKay, 199 Ark. 140, 134 S.W.2d 543 (1939).

Where land claimed by plaintiff in suit to quiet title was either in plaintiff's possession or was wild and unimproved, equity had jurisdiction to quiet title. Ball v. Messmore, 226 Ark. 256, 289 S.W.2d 183 (1956).

Notice of Conveyances.

Petitioner is charged with notice of all conveyances in his chain of title. Union Sawmill Co. v. Rowland, 178 Ark. 372, 10 S.W.2d 858 (1928).

Pleading.

Complaint alleged facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Dodson v. Abercrombie, 218 Ark. 50, 234 S.W.2d 30 (1950).

Possession.

Only when plaintiff holds title and possession can equity be invoked to quiet title. Gibbs v. Bates, 150 Ark. 344, 234 S.W. 175 (1921).

Plaintiffs not shown to have possession which legally would entitle them to maintain action. Calvert v. Haley, 218 Ark. 752, 238 S.W.2d 664 (1951).

—Adverse.

One who acquired title to lands by adverse possession lost such title when he abandoned the land, the land was wild, and the original owner complied with the terms of this subchapter. Moore v. Morris, 118 Ark. 516, 177 S.W. 6 (1915).

Title cannot be quieted where land is held adversely to the plaintiff. Simmons v. Turner, 171 Ark. 96, 283 S.W. 47 (1926).

If a person takes possession of land and holds the same under a claim of ownership continuously, openly, adversely, for more than seven years, such person acquires title by adverse possession and will prevail in an action to quiet title. Gibbs v. Bates, 215 Ark. 646, 222 S.W.2d 805 (1949).

Plaintiff's title quieted as against the grantee on the basis of adverse possession. Gibbs v. Bates, 215 Ark. 646, 222 S.W.2d 805 (1949).

—Constructive.

Where land was wild and unimproved, and holders of tax title never had actual possession of land, confirmation decree in favor of holders of tax title was void, as person holding legal title to the land is in constructive possession. Hensley v. Phillips, 215 Ark. 543, 221 S.W.2d 412 (1949).

In an action to quiet title of a tract of land, the grantees' evidence that they were in actual possession of the tract of land gave them the constructive possession of the entire tract included in the description in the warranty. Carter v. Stewart, 149 Ark. 189, 231 S.W. 887 (1921); Stolz v. Franklin, 258 Ark. 999, 531 S.W.2d 1 (1975).

Cited: Frank v. Frank, 175 Ark. 285, 298 S.W. 1026 (1927); Lollar v. Appleby, 213 Ark. 424, 210 S.W.2d 900 (1948); White v. Thornbrough, 229 Ark. 96, 313 S.W.2d 384 (1958).