Ark. Code Ann. » Title 18 Chapter 60
Arkansas Code Annotated

Ark. Code Ann. § 18-60-510 (2020)

Setting aside decree

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  1. Any person may appear within three (3) years and set aside the decree if he or she shall offer to file a meritorious defense.
  2. Every person laboring under the disability of infancy or individuals with mental illness or intellectual disabilities, and those claiming under them, may set aside the decree at any time within three (3) years after the removal of their disability.

History. Acts 1899, No. 79, § 7, p. 133; C. & M. Dig., § 8370; Pope's Dig., § 10966; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-1910.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section does not apply to parties mentioned in § 18-60-508(b). Hargis v. Lawrence, 135 Ark. 321, 204 S.W. 755 (1918).

Provision of this section requiring that suit to vacate confirmation decree be brought within statutory period does not apply where heirs of former owner were not made parties defendant, as provided for in § 18-60-502. Welch v. Burton, 221 Ark. 173, 252 S.W.2d 411 (1952).

Summary judgment was improperly granted to an operator and a lessee as they failed to show evidence of entitlement to litigate the validity of a 1976 quiet-title decree based on potential claimants; thus, the limitations in this section applied, and a collateral attack was improper since there were no jurisdictional defects. Verkamp v. Floyd E. Sagely Props., 96 Ark. App. 61, 238 S.W.3d 619 (2006).

Action to set aside a 1991 decree was not barred by the three-year statute of limitations because it did not apply where notice was not given to a person claiming an interest in property or minerals. Wright v. Viele, 2013 Ark. App. 471, 429 S.W.3d 314 (2013).

Case was a direct, not collateral, attack on a quiet title decree because a lessee brought the case for the very purpose of having the quiet title decree declared void ab initio. XTO Energy, Inc. v. Thacker, 2015 Ark. App. 203, 467 S.W.3d 161 (2015).

Meritorious Defenses.

Motion to vacate decree showed a meritorious defense. Abbott v. Butler, 211 Ark. 681, 201 S.W.2d 1001 (1947).

Original owner of land who remained in possession for period of years after date of tax sale was entitled to file petition to set aside decree quieting title in United States based on invalidity of tax sale due to overcharge of five cents against land sold. United States v. Williams, 109 F. Supp. 456 (W.D. Ark. 1952).

Even if all the requirements of this subchapter are met and complied with and the decree entered is a perfectly valid decree, the defendants have the statutory period from the entry of the decree to appear and set aside the decree by offering to file a meritorious defense. Ingram v. Luther, 244 Ark. 260, 424 S.W.2d 546 (1968).

Perfecting Title.

A record title is perfected at the end of statutory period. Dalton v. Lybarger, 152 Ark. 192, 237 S.W. 694 (1922).

Cited: Hall v. Blanford, 254 Ark. 590, 494 S.W.2d 714 (1973).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 6 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 2006–2022 · leading case: XTO Energy, Inc. v. Thacker, 2015 Ark. App. 203, 467 S.W.3d 161.
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XTO Energy, Inc. v. Thacker, 2015 Ark. App. 203, 467 S.W.3d 161. · cites it 6× “Moreover, the three-year limitation period found in section 18-60-510 does not apply where notice was not given to persons claiming an interest in the property or minerals.”
Wright v. Viele, 2013 Ark. App. 471, 429 S.W.3d 314. · cites it 4× “Moreover, the limitation found in section 18-60-510 does not apply where notice was not given to persons claiming an interest in the properly or minerals.”
Pulaski Choice, L.L.C. v. 2735 Villa Creek, L.P., 376 S.W.3d 500 (Ark. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 6× “Whether Rule 55 su-percedes section 18-60-510 is not relevant for the purposes of this appeal, because the decree could properly have been set aside under Rule 55 as well.”
Stephanie Stanfield & Dr. Calvin A. Stanfield v. Lloyd Dee Willis, 2022 Ark. App. 427, 654 S.W.3d 93. · cites it 2× “Citing Arkansas Code Annotated section 18-60-510 (Repl. 2015), she claimed that she timely moved to set aside the quiet-title decree.”
Stephanie Stanfield & Dr. Calvin A. Stanfield v. Lloyd Dee Willis, 2022 Ark. App. 427, 654 S.W.3d 93. · cites it 2× “Citing Arkansas Code Annotated section 18-60-510 (Repl. 2015), she claimed that she timely moved to set aside the quiet-title decree.”
Verkamp v. Floyd E. Sagely Props., Ltd., 238 S.W.3d 619 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 6× “1 On appeal, Verkamp raises two points: first, the trial court erred in not applying the three-year statute of limitations found in Ark. Code Ann. § 18-60-510 (Repl. 2006); and second, the trial court erred in setting aside the prior decree without any evidence that the prior…”
Ark. Code Ann. § 18-60-510(a): 3 cases
XTO Energy, Inc. v. Thacker, 2015 Ark. App. 203, 467 S.W.3d 161. “Moreover, the three-year limitation period found in section 18-60-510 does not apply where notice was not given to persons claiming an interest in the property or minerals.”
Wright v. Viele, 2013 Ark. App. 471, 429 S.W.3d 314. “Moreover, the limitation found in section 18-60-510 does not apply where notice was not given to persons claiming an interest in the properly or minerals.”
Pulaski Choice, L.L.C. v. 2735 Villa Creek, L.P., 376 S.W.3d 500 (Ark. Ct. App. 2010). “Whether Rule 55 su-percedes section 18-60-510 is not relevant for the purposes of this appeal, because the decree could properly have been set aside under Rule 55 as well.”
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