Ark. Code Ann. § 18-61-101 (2020)

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Exemption Under the Statute of Limitations for Adverse Possession, 6 Ark. L. Rev. 37.

Real Property — Easements — Prescription Originating in Private Permissive Use, 6 Ark. L. Rev. 234.

Real Property — Adverse Possession in Arkansas — Actual Possession of Land, 14 Ark. L. Rev. 181.

Color of Title and Payment of Taxes: The New Requirements Under Arkansas Adverse Possession Law, 50 Ark. L. Rev. 489.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Property, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 223.

Survey of Arkansas Law: Decedent’s Estates, 4 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 199.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Annual Survey of Caselaw, Property Law, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 969.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section applies to actions to recover lands and does not govern suits to foreclose mortgages. White v. White, 198 Ark. 740, 131 S.W.2d 4 (1939).

Where heir of deceased was not a party to the determination of heirship proceedings and was not aware of decedent's death until several years later, limitation for filing an action for recovery of interest in land was governed by this section and not the statute of limitation for probate of estates (§ 28-53-101). McBroom v. Clark, 252 Ark. 372, 480 S.W.2d 947 (1972).

Adverse Possession.

For cases discussing adverse possession of mortgaged property, see Ringo v. Woodruff, 43 Ark. 469 (1884); Whittington v. Flint, 43 Ark. 504 (1884); Smith v. Woolfolk, 115 U.S. 143, 5 S. Ct. 1177, 29 L. Ed. 357 (1885); Duke v. State, 56 Ark. 485, 20 S.W. 600 (1892); Wilson v. Rogers, 97 Ark. 369, 134 S.W. 318 (1911); Norris v. Scroggins, 175 Ark. 50, 297 S.W. 1022 (1927); Cupp v. Cady, 190 Ark. 700, 81 S.W.2d 417 (1935); Foster-Grayson Lumber Co. v. Bond, 197 Ark. 1003, 125 S.W.2d 106 (1939).

Neither conveyances, nor color of title, nor payment of taxes, nor all combined can give title under this section since there must be actual possession for the requisite period. Calloway v. Cossart, 45 Ark. 81 (1885).

For cases discussing actual and constructive possession, see Brown v. Bocquin, 57 Ark. 97, 20 S.W. 813 (1892); Haggart v. Ranney, 73 Ark. 344, 84 S.W. 703 (1904); Hardie v. Investment Guar. & Trust Co., 81 Ark. 141, 98 S.W. 701 (1906); Poole v. Oliver, 89 Ark. 578, 117 S.W. 747 (1909); Thornton v. McDonald, 167 Ark. 114, 266 S.W. 946 (1924); Moore v. McHenry, 167 Ark. 483, 268 S.W. 858 (1925); Reddin v. Cottrell, 178 Ark. 1178, 13 S.W.2d 813 (1929); Dierks Lumber & Coal Co. v. Vaughn, 131 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Ark. 1954), aff'd, 221 F.2d 695 (8th Cir. 1955).

To amount to an investiture of title there must be open, notorious, peaceful, continuous, and adverse possession for more than the statutory period. Jeffery v. Jeffery, 87 Ark. 496, 113 S.W. 27 (1908).

For cases discussing adverse possession by cotenants, see Hill v. Cherokee Constr. Co., 99 Ark. 84, 137 S.W. 553 (1911); Singer v. Naron, 99 Ark. 446, 138 S.W. 958 (1911); Bowers v. Rightsell, 173 Ark. 788, 294 S.W. 21 (1927); Elrod v. Elrod, 192 Ark. 458, 92 S.W.2d 211 (1936); Toomer v. Murphy, 198 Ark. 610, 129 S.W.2d 937 (1939); Blake v. Denman, 218 Ark. 351, 236 S.W.2d 433 (1951); Minton v. McGowan, 253 Ark. 945, 490 S.W.2d 136 (1973).

In order that one may acquire a private right of way across another's land, the use must be under a claim of right and not permissive and must be used openly, continuously and adversely for the statutory period. Medlock v. Owen, 105 Ark. 460, 151 S.W. 995 (1912).

The possession which will bar the right of a former owner of land must be an open, notorious, continuous and exclusive possession under claim of title. Young v. Knox, 165 Ark. 129, 263 S.W. 52 (1924); Smart v. Murphy, 200 Ark. 406, 139 S.W.2d 33 (1940).

In order that adverse possession may ripen into ownership, possession for seven years must have been actual, open, notorious, continuous, hostile and exclusive, and it must be accompanied with an intent to hold against the true owner. Terral v. Brooks, 194 Ark. 311, 108 S.W.2d 489 (1937); Stricker v. Britt, 203 Ark. 197, 157 S.W.2d 18 (1941); Montgomery v. Wallace, 216 Ark. 525, 226 S.W.2d 551 (1950); Dierks Lumber & Coal Co. v. Vaughn, 131 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Ark. 1954), aff'd, 221 F.2d 695 (8th Cir. 1955); Harrison v. Collins, 247 Ark. 210, 444 S.W.2d 861 (1969).

Mere possession, without color of title, for the statutory period is sufficient to vest title in the disseisor, if such possession is actual, adverse, continuous, open, notorious, exclusive, and hostile, and for the statutory period. Rye v. Baumann, 231 Ark. 278, 329 S.W.2d 161 (1959).

—Acquisition of Title.

The statute of limitations is not defensive alone but confers a title which can be enforced by suit. Jacks v. Chaffin, 34 Ark. 534 (1879); Logan v. Jelks, 34 Ark. 547 (1879); Wilson v. Spring, 38 Ark. 181 (1881); Worthen v. Rushing, 228 Ark. 445, 307 S.W.2d 890 (1957).

Once title has vested in adverse possessor by running of statute of limitations, his recognition of validity of another's claim to land does not divest the adverse possessor of title. Hudson v. Stillwell, 80 Ark. 575, 98 S.W. 356 (1906); Hutt v. Smith, 118 Ark. 10, 175 S.W. 399 (1915); Stroud v. Snow, 186 Ark. 550, 54 S.W.2d 693 (1932); Dierks Lumber & Coal Co. v. Vaughn, 131 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Ark. 1954), aff'd, 221 F.2d 695 (8th Cir. 1955).

One in adverse possession of land under color of title for more than seven years acquires title. Fletcher v. Josephs, 105 Ark. 646, 152 S.W. 293 (1912).

Where adverse possessor had possession of land for over seven years, the title would become vested in him unless he unconditionally acknowledged the title to be in person from whom he later contracted to rent the land. Turquett v. McMurrain, 110 Ark. 197, 161 S.W. 175 (1913).

Title of purchasers from adverse possessor may be perfected by the running of the statute. Brinkley v. Taylor, 111 Ark. 305, 163 S.W. 521 (1914).

A title acquired by adverse possession is a title in fee simple and is as perfect as a title by deed from the original owner. Smart v. Murphy, 200 Ark. 406, 139 S.W.2d 33 (1940); Stricker v. Britt, 203 Ark. 197, 157 S.W.2d 18 (1941); Hart v. Sternberg, 205 Ark. 929, 171 S.W.2d 475 (1943); Palmer v. Sanders, 233 Ark. 1, 342 S.W.2d 300 (1961).

Adverse possession maintained for the statutory seven year period vests title in adverse possessor as completely as would a conveyance from the holder of a valid record title. Montgomery v. Wallace, 216 Ark. 525, 226 S.W.2d 551 (1950); Dierks Lumber & Coal Co. v. Vaughn, 131 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Ark. 1954), aff'd, 221 F.2d 695 (8th Cir. 1955); Palmer v. Sanders, 233 Ark. 1, 342 S.W.2d 300 (1961); Buckhannan v. Nash, 216 F. Supp. 843 (E.D. Ark. 1963); Neyland v. Hunter, 282 Ark. 323, 668 S.W.2d 530 (1984).

Title cannot be acquired by adverse possession of less than the statutory period. Webb v. Miller, 236 Ark. 245, 365 S.W.2d 450 (1963).

This section means that when one is in possession of land, no one may question his claim of ownership except within seven years after the cause of action first accrues. Utley v. Ruff, 255 Ark. 824, 502 S.W.2d 629 (1973).

—Color of Title.

Color of title is not necessary to maintain the bar of the statute of limitations to the extent of actual possession. Ferguson v. Peden, 33 Ark. 150 (1878).

For cases discussing particular conveyances as constituting color of title, see Logan v. Jelks, 34 Ark. 547 (1879); Bradbury v. Dumond, 80 Ark. 82, 96 S.W. 390 (1906); Brinneman v. Scholem, 95 Ark. 65, 128 S.W. 584 (1910); Parsons v. Sharpe, 102 Ark. 611, 145 S.W. 537 (1912); Fletcher v. Josephs, 105 Ark. 646, 152 S.W. 293 (1912); Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, 204 Ark. 452, 162 S.W.2d 897 (1942); Dierks Lumber & Coal Co. v. Vaughn, 131 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Ark. 1954), aff'd, 221 F.2d 695 (8th Cir. 1955); Worthen v. Rushing, 228 Ark. 445, 307 S.W.2d 890 (1957).

While color of title is not necessary to give title by limitations, it is necessary to extend the title so acquired beyond the limits of the actual possession. Bradbury v. Dumond, 80 Ark. 82, 96 S.W. 390 (1906); Dierks Lumber & Coal Co. v. Vaughn, 131 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Ark. 1954), aff'd, 221 F.2d 695 (8th Cir. 1955); Buckhannan v. Nash, 216 F. Supp. 843 (E.D. Ark. 1963).

Possession of land for the statutory period will not ripen into title unless it is accompanied by a claim of title in fee. Hardin v. Watson, 104 Ark. 641, 148 S.W. 506 (1912).

One who without color of title enters upon a tract of unoccupied real property and takes visible, open and notorious possession of a part cannot extend his possession so as to embrace the whole tract merely by subsequently obtaining color of title to the entire tract and continuing to occupy only the part of the land of which he originally took actual possession. Sanderson v. Thomas, 192 Ark. 302, 90 S.W.2d 965 (1936).

Without color of title, it is necessary that adverse possessor have actual possession in order to claim the benefits of this section. National Property Owners Ass'n v. Hogue, 229 Ark. 743, 318 S.W.2d 151 (1958).

To prevail on a claim of adverse possession not under color of title, one must show actual possession for the statutory period. Coons v. Lawler, 237 Ark. 350, 372 S.W.2d 826 (1963); Hill v. Surratt, 240 Ark. 122, 398 S.W.2d 225 (1966); DeClerk v. Johnson, 268 Ark. 868, 596 S.W.2d 359 (Ct. App. 1980).

—Continuity of Possession.

An interruption of the possession is a new point from which the statute of limitations must run. Byers v. Danley, 27 Ark. 77 (1871); Pulaski County v. State, 42 Ark. 118 (1883).

The possession must be continuous for the full limitations period; if there is a break in the continuity, the adverse holding before and since the break cannot be tacked in computing the period. Brown v. Hanauer, 48 Ark. 277, 3 S.W. 27 (1886), overruled in part, Price v. Price, 253 Ark. 1124, 491 S.W.2d 793 (1973); Nicklace v. Dickerson, 65 Ark. 422, 46 S.W. 945 (1898).

Fitful, disconnected acts of possession accompanied with a claim of title is not sufficient to establish title. Brown v. Bocquin, 57 Ark. 97, 20 S.W. 813 (1892).

Continuity of adverse possession held not to have been broken. Robinson v. Nordman, 75 Ark. 593, 88 S.W. 592 (1905); McComb v. Saxe, 92 Ark. 321, 122 S.W. 987 (1909); Wilson v. Rogers, 97 Ark. 369, 134 S.W. 318 (1911); Cupp v. Cady, 190 Ark. 700, 81 S.W.2d 417 (1935).

Continuity of possession held to have been broken. Chicago Mill & Lumber Co. v. Matthews, 163 Ark. 571, 260 S.W. 963 (1924).

A prescriptive easement may be created over a ditch or waterway and the circuit court did not err by finding that the adjoining landowner proved the elements of a prescriptive easement as to the road and the ditch, despite the ditch being used only when the road flooded; even a member of the appellant hunting club admitted that the adjoining landowner had continuously used the road and “regularly” used the ditch, the adjoining landowner took steps to maintain the property, and there was no evidence of attempted obstruction of the use between 2005 and 2014, a period in excess of the seven-year prescriptive period required. Five Forks Hunting Club, LLC v. Nixon Family P'ship, 2019 Ark. App. 371, 584 S.W.3d 685 (2019).

— —Tacking.

An executed parol agreement by one to surrender possession to another is sufficient to constitute such continuity of possession and privity between the parties as to authorize the tacking of possession and completion of title by limitation. Horseman v. Hincha, 138 Ark. 415, 211 S.W. 385 (1919).

Although no color of title exists, possession of claimant's predecessors may be tacked to claimant's possession. Dierks Lumber & Coal Co. v. Vaughn, 131 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Ark. 1954), aff'd, 221 F.2d 695 (8th Cir. 1955).

—Cotenants.

When a co-tenant executes a deed to a stranger to the title, describing the entire land, and such grantee enters into exclusive possession under such deed, then the deed constitutes color of title, and such entry commences the running of limitation in favor of the grantee and against all co-tenants of the grantor. Marshall v. Gadberry, 303 Ark. 534, 798 S.W.2d 99 (1990).

—Notice of Adverse Claim.

For cases discussing what constitutes an “adverse claim,” see Livingston v. Cochran, 33 Ark. 294 (1878); Dowdle v. Wheeler, 76 Ark. 529, 89 S.W. 1002 (1905); Doniphan Lumber Co. v. Case, 87 Ark. 168, 112 S.W. 208 (1908); Davis v. Harrell, 101 Ark. 230, 142 S.W. 156 (1911); Keith v. Wheeler, 105 Ark. 318, 151 S.W. 284 (1912); Briggs v. Jones, 132 Ark. 455, 201 S.W. 118 (1918); Boyd v. Epperson, 149 Ark. 527, 232 S.W. 939 (1921); Sadler v. Campbell, 150 Ark. 594, 236 S.W. 588 (1921); McGraw v. Berry, 152 Ark. 452, 238 S.W. 618 (1922); Grayson-McLeod Lumber Co. v. Duke, 160 Ark. 76, 254 S.W. 350 (1923); Roach v. Knappenberger, 172 Ark. 417, 288 S.W. 912 (1927); Goodrich v. Mitchell, 177 Ark. 842, 7 S.W.2d 979 (1928); Sanderson v. Thomas, 192 Ark. 302, 90 S.W.2d 965 (1936); Jones v. Morgan, 196 Ark. 1153, 121 S.W.2d 96 (1938); Stricker v. Britt, 203 Ark. 197, 157 S.W.2d 18 (1941); Brandon v. Bryeans, 203 Ark. 1117, 160 S.W.2d 205 (1942); Dierks Lumber & Coal Co. v. Vaughn, 131 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Ark. 1954), aff'd, 221 F.2d 695 (8th Cir. 1955).

Notice of adverse holding not shown. Cleveland v. Aldridge, 94 Ark. 51, 125 S.W. 1016 (1910); Massey v. Price, 252 Ark. 617, 480 S.W.2d 337 (1972); Pascall v. Smith, 263 Ark. 428, 569 S.W.2d 89 (1978).

Statute of limitations ran against owner until it had knowledge of the adverse holding, even though it had knowledge of the possession; however, where possession was in fact adverse for more than seven years, title was perfected against the record owner whether it had knowledge of the adverse possession or not. Little Rock & Ft. Smith Ry. v. Rankin, 107 Ark. 487, 156 S.W. 431 (1913).

In order for adverse possessor to set the statute of limitations in motion, it was necessary for adverse possessor to hold the title adversely and to have exercised such acts of ownership as to indicate an intention to hold the land adversely to the son, who was the remainderman. Miller v. Miller, 130 Ark. 28, 195 S.W. 1071 (1917).

To establish title by adverse possession in one who acquired possession under license, he must have given notice that he was holding adversely or his possession must have been so notoriously hostile as to constitute notice. Meador v. Weathers, 167 Ark. 264, 267 S.W. 787 (1925).

If the claimant so acts as to attract notice to his claim and persists in such action for the statutory period of time, knowledge of his hostile claim of title may be inferred as a matter of fact. Dierks Lumber & Coal Co. v. Vaughn, 131 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Ark. 1954), aff'd, 221 F.2d 695 (8th Cir. 1955).

— —Permissive Possession.

For cases discussing what constitutes permissive possession, which will not start the running of the statute, in particular cases, see Whittington v. Flint, 43 Ark. 504 (1884); Ringo v. Woodruff, 43 Ark. 469 (1884); Smith v. Woolfolk, 115 U.S. 143, 5 S. Ct. 1177, 29 L. Ed. 357 (1885); Duke v. State, 56 Ark. 485, 20 S.W. 600 (1892); Kell v. Butler, 147 Ark. 521, 227 S.W. 774 (1921); Dial v. Armstrong, 195 Ark. 621, 113 S.W.2d 503 (1938); Stricker v. Britt, 203 Ark. 197, 157 S.W.2d 18 (1941); Mikel v. Development Co., 269 Ark. 365, 602 S.W.2d 630 (1980).

When an entry is permissive, the statute will not begin to run against the legal owner until an adverse holding is declared and notice of such change is brought to the knowledge of the owner. Britt v. Berry, 133 Ark. 589, 202 S.W. 830 (1918); United States Bond & Mtg. Co. v. Reddick, 199 Ark. 82, 133 S.W.2d 23 (1939); St. Louis Sw. Ry. v. Wallace, 217 Ark. 278, 229 S.W.2d 659 (1950).

The holding of land begun by permission will not ripen into an adverse or hostile right until notice of such adverse holding is brought home to the owner and the holding has continued for the statutory period. Fulcher v. Dierks Lumber & Coal Co., 164 Ark. 261, 261 S.W. 645 (1924); Oliver v. Howie, 170 Ark. 758, 281 S.W. 17 (1926).

Where possession, in its incipiency, is permissive, the presumption is, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that subsequent possession is permissive also and such possession will not start the running of the statute of limitations. Dial v. Armstrong, 195 Ark. 621, 113 S.W.2d 503 (1938).

—Public Thoroughfares.

Adverse possession of a street of an incorporated town for the statutory period will give title to the occupant and bar the town. Town of El Dorado v. Ritchie Grocery Co., 84 Ark. 52, 104 S.W. 549 (1907) (decision prior to enactment of § 22-1-201).

Owners of lots abutting on a platted street have notice of the dedication and can build up no right by continued occupancy on account of delay of the city in opening the streets to public use. City of Paragould v. Lawson, 88 Ark. 478, 115 S.W. 379 (1908).

The right to a public highway once established by prescription or limitation may be abandoned by nonuser, and if so abandoned for a period of more than seven years, the right of the owner of the fee to re-enter and exclude the public from the use of the highway is restored. McLain v. Keel, 135 Ark. 496, 205 S.W. 894 (1918); Johnston v. Verboon, 269 Ark. 126, 598 S.W.2d 752 (1980).

Use of an alley for more than seven years by adjoining lot owners under circumstances showing that the use was made as a matter of right and not of permission was held to establish adverse use so as to ripen into title by limitation. McGill v. Miller, 172 Ark. 390, 288 S.W. 932 (1926).

The period for acquiring a prescriptive right-of-way over road is analogous to the statutory period for the acquiring of title by adverse possession. Neyland v. Hunter, 282 Ark. 323, 668 S.W.2d 530 (1984).

Prescriptive easement to use road not established. Neyland v. Hunter, 282 Ark. 323, 668 S.W.2d 530 (1984).

Road in question had been maintained by the highway department for a number of years and by the public for 55 to 60 years to gain access to a nearby river, and the landowners' predecessor in interest made no effort to close the road or to deny the public access; thus, there was sufficient evidence to show that the public openly and continuously used the roadway in question for seven years or more, and that the facts and circumstances surrounding the usage were such that the landowners knew or should have known it was adverse. Carson v. County of Drew, 354 Ark. 621, 128 S.W.3d 423 (2003).

—Sufficiency of Evidence.

Evidence held not sufficient to establish title by adverse possession under statute of limitations. Scott v. Mills, 49 Ark. 266, 4 S.W. 908 (1887); Culver v. Gillian, 160 Ark. 397, 254 S.W. 681 (1923); Roberts v. Billingsley, 218 Ark. 311, 236 S.W.2d 79 (1951); Carpenter v. Franklin, 228 Ark. 512, 308 S.W.2d 829 (1958); National Property Owners Ass'n v. Hogue, 229 Ark. 743, 318 S.W.2d 151 (1958); Weston v. Hilliard, 232 Ark. 535, 338 S.W.2d 926 (1960); Laney v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 233 Ark. 645, 348 S.W.2d 826 (1961); Coons v. Lawler, 237 Ark. 350, 372 S.W.2d 826 (1963); Reed v. Black, 247 Ark. 768, 447 S.W.2d 660 (1969); Pate v. Junkin, 253 Ark. 923, 489 S.W.2d 802 (1973); Utley v. Ruff, 255 Ark. 824, 502 S.W.2d 629 (1973).

Evidence held sufficient to establish acquisition of title by adverse possession for statutory period. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. v. Martin, 104 Ark. 274, 149 S.W. 69 (1912); Stewart v. Pelt, 198 Ark. 776, 131 S.W.2d 644 (1939); Smart v. Murphy, 200 Ark. 406, 139 S.W.2d 33 (1940); McWilliams v. Toups, 202 Ark. 159, 150 S.W.2d 34 (1941); Hart v. Sternberg, 205 Ark. 929, 171 S.W.2d 475 (1943); Bridwell v. Davis, 206 Ark. 445, 175 S.W.2d 992 (1943); Roberts v. Burgett, 209 Ark. 536, 191 S.W.2d 579 (1946); Howell v. Baskins, 213 Ark. 665, 212 S.W.2d 353 (1948); Fort Smith v. France, 250 Ark. 294, 465 S.W.2d 315 (1971); Ralston v. Powers, 269 Ark. 63, 598 S.W.2d 410 (1980).

Public prescriptive easement existed in the landowners' roadway, turnaround, landing, and parking area where the public had used property for more than seven years and landowners knew or should have known of adverse possession; because there was an acquiescence to longtime use, it operated to put landowners on sufficient notice of a claim of right. Carson v. County of Drew, 354 Ark. 621, 128 S.W.3d 423 (2003).

Neighboring land owner, who asserted a claim for an easement to use a gravel drive, failed to show the elements necessary to establish an easement by prescription because the land owner only showed that he had been continuously using the gravel drive for less than seven years, and when he was told to stop using the drive, he did. Drummond v. Shepherd, 97 Ark. App. 244, 247 S.W.3d 526 (2007).

Boundary Lines.

When a landowner takes possession under belief that he owns land without recognition of the possible right of another on account of mistake in the boundary line, the former owner's title will be divested after the running of the statute. Shirey v. Whitlow, 80 Ark. 444, 97 S.W. 444 (1906); Goodwin v. Garibaldi, 83 Ark. 74, 102 S.W. 706 (1907); O'Neal v. Ross, 100 Ark. 555, 140 S.W. 743 (1911); Butler v. Hines, 101 Ark. 409, 142 S.W. 509 (1912); Turner v. Thomason, 126 Ark. 568, 191 S.W. 222 (1917).

When a landowner, through mistake as to his boundary line, takes possession of land of an adjacent owner, intending to claim only to the true boundary, such possession is not adverse and, though continued for the statutory period, does not divest title. Shirey v. Whitlow, 80 Ark. 444, 97 S.W. 444 (1906); O'Neal v. Ross, 100 Ark. 555, 140 S.W. 743 (1911); Waters v. Madden, 197 Ark. 380, 122 S.W.2d 554 (1938).

Where there is doubt or uncertainty or a dispute as to the true location of a boundary line, the parties may, by parol, fix a line which will at least, when followed by possession with reference to the boundary so fixed, be conclusive upon them although the possession is not for the full statutory period. Turquett v. McMurrain, 110 Ark. 197, 161 S.W. 175 (1913).

Adjoining landowners may, by parol, fix a boundary line that will bind them and their grantees, though their possession under such agreement may not continue for the statutory period. Turquett v. McMurrain, 110 Ark. 197, 161 S.W. 175 (1913); Furlow v. Dunn, 201 Ark. 23, 144 S.W.2d 31 (1940).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow an individual to amend his pleadings under Ark. R. Civ. P. 15(b) to include a counterclaim for a prescriptive easement because the proof did not establish a prescriptive easement, given that there was no evidence of overt, adverse use for the statutory period under this section. Myers v. Yingling, 372 Ark. 523, 279 S.W.3d 83 (2008).

Burden of Proof.

The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to prove that the right of action accrued within the statutory period. McNeil v. Garland & Nash, 27 Ark. 343 (1871); Yell v. Lane, 41 Ark. 53 (1883); Ouachita County v. Tufts, 43 Ark. 136 (1884); Brown v. Hanauer, 48 Ark. 277, 3 S.W. 27 (1886), overruled in part, Price v. Price, 253 Ark. 1124, 491 S.W.2d 793 (1973); Watkins v. Martin, 69 Ark. 311, 65 S.W. 103 (1901).

The burden of establishing adverse possession is on the party claiming it. Brown v. Bocquin, 57 Ark. 97, 20 S.W. 813 (1892); Newman v. Peay, 117 Ark. 579, 176 S.W. 143 (1915); Pate v. Junkin, 253 Ark. 923, 489 S.W.2d 802 (1973).

A party claiming title by limitation has the burden of proof and where the testimony is not disputed, it is error to take the case from the jury and direct a verdict. Maney v. Dennison, 110 Ark. 571, 163 S.W. 783 (1914).

The burden of proof is upon one who pleads the statute of limitations. Reaves v. Davidson, 129 Ark. 88, 195 S.W. 19 (1917).

Adverse possession is an affirmative defense, and the burden of proof rests upon one asserting his claim of adverse possession to establish its essential elements by a preponderance of the evidence. Dierks Lumber & Coal Co. v. Vaughn, 131 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Ark. 1954), aff'd, 221 F.2d 695 (8th Cir. 1955).

Conflict of Laws.

Questions arising upon the statute of limitations must be settled according to the law of the forum. Burgett v. Williford, 56 Ark. 187, 19 S.W. 750 (1892).

Counterclaim.

Appellee's counterclaim for quiet title was not barred by § 16-56-126(a)(1) as a prior court did not treat appellee's affirmative defense of adverse possession as a counterclaim under subsection (a) of this section, and the nonsuit of the prior action did not affect the statute of limitations, which had not begun to run on the quiet title claim as appellee was still in possession of the property. Sutton v. Gardner, 2011 Ark. App. 737, 387 S.W.3d 185 (2011).

Dower and Curtesy.

The statute of limitations runs against the widow's dower in favor of a stranger from date of the husband's death. Stidham v. Matthews, 29 Ark. 650 (1874).

The statute of limitations does not run in favor of a grantee of the tenant by curtesy and against the heir until the expiration of the curtesy. Banks v. Green, 35 Ark. 84 (1879).

The statute of limitations does not run against a widow's dower until seven years after the purchase of the land by a stranger. Webb v. Smith, 40 Ark. 17 (1882); McWhirter v. Roberts, 40 Ark. 283 (1883).

Where a widow conveyed her dower interest in land before it was assigned to her, the heir may recover the land from her vendee, but the statute of limitations is not in motion against the heir when the widow's vendee enters into possession. Brinkley v. Taylor, 111 Ark. 305, 163 S.W. 521 (1914).

The right of the heirs does not accrue until after the death of the widow to whom the land was assigned as dower and the limitations do not begin to run against them until their right accrues. Kennedy v. Burns, 140 Ark. 367, 215 S.W. 618 (1919).

The possession of a husband as tenant by the curtesy, or of his grantee, is not adverse to his wife's heirs, and limitation does not run against such heir until the death of the life tenant. Smith v. Maberry, 148 Ark. 216, 229 S.W. 718 (1921).

Where a widow executed a conveyance of a decedent's homestead, the fact that she had an unassigned right of dower did not bar the right of entry of the decedent's heirs so as to prevent the statute of limitations from running against such heirs. Murphy v. Graves, 170 Ark. 180, 279 S.W. 359 (1926).

A widow's unassigned dower will not bar the right of reentry by heirs so as to prevent the statute of limitations from running in favor of an adverse occupant. Clark v. Friend, 174 Ark. 26, 295 S.W. 392 (1927).

The statute of limitations does not run against a widow in favor of heirs whose duty it is to assign dower to her. Wood v. Wood, 203 Ark. 344, 157 S.W.2d 36 (1941).

Effect of Amendment.

Where the statutory bar was complete, subsequent amendment of this section did not revive the claim since the rights of the parties had become vested before amendment. Davidson v. Hartsfield, 250 Ark. 1072, 468 S.W.2d 774 (1971).

Equity.

At law the statute of limitations must be pleaded to be available, but in equity it has always been considered as affecting the equity of a bill, upon the principle that the court will not interfere to enforce rights upon which claimants have too long slept. Riley v. Norman, 39 Ark. 158 (1882).

When applicable in equity, the statute is as binding as at law. McGaughey v. Brown, 46 Ark. 25 (1885); Millington v. Hill, 47 Ark. 301, 1 S.W. 547 (1886).

In the absence of some intervening equity calling for application of the doctrine of laches, equity by analogy follows the law and will not divest the owner of title by lapse of time shorter than the period of limitations. Earle Imp. Co. v. Chatfield, 81 Ark. 296, 99 S.W. 84 (1907).

For cases discussing equitable doctrine of laches in actions to recover lands, see City of Stuttgart v. John, 85 Ark. 520, 109 S.W. 541 (1908); Anders v. Roark, 108 Ark. 248, 156 S.W. 1018 (1913); Inman v. Quirey, 128 Ark. 605, 194 S.W. 858 (1917); Toomer v. Murphy, 198 Ark. 610, 129 S.W.2d 937 (1939); Kitchens v. Wheeler, 200 Ark. 671, 141 S.W.2d 34 (1940); Eades v. Joslin, 219 Ark. 688, 244 S.W.2d 623 (1951).

Homestead Rights.

As the right of an adult child to enter upon the homestead of his parent does not accrue until the homestead right of the youngest child has ceased on his coming of age, the statute of limitations will not run until that time. Harris v. Brady, 87 Ark. 428, 112 S.W. 974 (1908); Smith v. Scott, 92 Ark. 143, 122 S.W. 501 (1909); Lesser v. Reeves, 142 Ark. 320, 219 S.W. 15 (1920); Brownfield v. Bookout, 147 Ark. 555, 228 S.W. 51 (1921).

Suit by children to hold the surviving husband liable for rents of the homestead during their minority is barred unless brought by them within the statutory period after reaching their majority. Carroll v. Carroll, 92 Ark. 625, 121 S.W. 947 (1909).

Suit by child to recover parents' homestead not barred. Krow v. Bernard, 152 Ark. 99, 238 S.W. 19 (1922); Hart v. Wimberly, 173 Ark. 1083, 296 S.W. 39 (1927).

In view of the fact that a husband may abandon his homestead, a right-of-way over it may be acquired by adverse user for the statutory period. Neil v. Neil, 172 Ark. 381, 288 S.W. 890 (1926).

The statute of limitations began to run in favor of the heirs when spouse abandoned homestead. Smart v. Murphy, 200 Ark. 406, 139 S.W.2d 33 (1940).

Improvement Districts.

The proviso that the section shall not extend to any improvement district is also available to a purchaser from an improvement district. Davidson v. Hartsfield, 250 Ark. 1072, 468 S.W.2d 774 (1971).

The clear intention of the 1945 amendment to this section was to permit an improvement district to hold title without taking possession from the landowner but not at the risk of bar of a prospective sale by the limitations period. Davidson v. Hartsfield, 250 Ark. 1072, 468 S.W.2d 774 (1971).

Where title to a piece of property had vested in an improvement district as the result of foreclosure, title was in one who had purchased from the improvement district rather than one who claimed to have acquired the land by adverse possession. Davidson v. Hartsfield, 250 Ark. 1072, 468 S.W.2d 774 (1971).

Where the quitclaim deed to the defendant conveyed all right and title of the improvement district, this section could have been relied upon by the defendant in the plaintiff's action to quiet title. Davidson v. Hartsfield, 250 Ark. 1072, 468 S.W.2d 774 (1971).

Jury Questions.

It was error to take question of adverse possession from jury. Bayles v. Daugherty, 77 Ark. 201, 91 S.W. 304 (1905); Goodwin v. Garibaldi, 83 Ark. 74, 102 S.W. 706 (1907); Couch v. Adams, 111 Ark. 604, 164 S.W. 728 (1914).

Whether adverse possession has been established is a question of fact for the jury. Montgomery v. Wallace, 216 Ark. 525, 226 S.W.2d 551 (1950); Palmer v. Sanders, 233 Ark. 1, 342 S.W.2d 300 (1961).

Mineral Rights.

Where the title to minerals is separated from the title to the surface, the statute of limitations does not run against the right to the minerals unless there is an actual adverse holding which constitutes an invasion of these particular rights. Bodcaw Lumber Co. v. Goode, 160 Ark. 48, 254 S.W. 345 (1923).

Persons Against Whom Statute Runs.

While the state, in the exercise of its sovereign powers, is not barred by the statute of limitations, the public itself, in the assertion of rights through other agencies, is barred by the statute of limitations where there are no limitations in its favor. Town of Madison v. Bond, 133 Ark. 527, 202 S.W. 721 (1918).

The statute of limitations as to real estate is one of repose and intended to quiet titles and it operated in favor of or against religious societies as well as natural persons and private corporations. Young v. Knox, 165 Ark. 129, 263 S.W. 52 (1924).

—Married Women.

Note. Section 9-11-501 et seq., enacted in 1915, removed all disabilities of married women.

Action by married woman not barred by limitations. Rowland v. Taylor, 134 Ark. 183, 203 S.W. 1034 (1918).

Action by married woman held barred by statute of limitations. Holloway v. Eagle, 135 Ark. 206, 205 S.W. 113 (1918).

An action by a married woman to recover land is barred by a lapse of more than seven years after her cause of action accrued. Hoggard v. Mitchell, 164 Ark. 296, 261 S.W. 643 (1924).

—Minors.

Infancy of the plaintiff is no protection to the bar of the statute of limitations when it begins to run in the lifetime of his ancestor. Bender v. Bean, 52 Ark. 132, 12 S.W. 180, modified, 52 Ark. 146, 12 S.W. 241 (1889); Bowen v. Black, 170 Ark. 237, 279 S.W. 782 (1926).

Statutes of limitations are not applicable to suits for redemption of land sold for taxes brought within two years of the reaching of majority. Hodges v. Harkleroad, 74 Ark. 343, 85 S.W. 779 (1905).

Statute held not to run against minor. Rowe v. Allison, 87 Ark. 206, 112 S.W. 395 (1908).

The right of an infant against one who takes possession of its land is barred three years after the infant reaches his majority in the absence of any showing of fraud practiced on the infant by the other party or those under whom he claims. Reed v. Money, 115 Ark. 1, 170 S.W. 478 (1914).

Adverse possession of land will bar recovery by an infant only when he fails to sue within three years after attaining his majority. Jackson v. Cole, 146 Ark. 565, 226 S.W. 513 (1920).

Action by minor held barred. Cunningham v. Dellmon, 151 Ark. 409, 237 S.W. 450 (1922); Ulrich v. Coleman, 218 Ark. 236, 235 S.W.2d 868 (1951); Norwood v. Allen, 240 Ark. 232, 398 S.W.2d 684 (1966).

—Municipal Corporations.

Statute runs against a municipal corporation. Ft. Smith v. McKibbin, 41 Ark. 45 (1883); City of Little Rock v. Wright, 58 Ark. 142, 23 S.W. 876 (1893); City of Helena v. Hornor, 58 Ark. 151, 23 S.W. 966 (1893).

Where an incorporated town ceased to elect officers or exercise its functions as such, this would not bar the running of the statute against it as to one occupying a portion of a public street since, in spite of the nonuser of the corporate franchise, it still existed and the town possessed the right to sue. Town of Madison v. Bond, 133 Ark. 527, 202 S.W. 721 (1918).

—Non Compos Mentis.

This section does not run against a non compos seeking to establish a will that has been concealed. Arrington v. McLemore, 33 Ark. 759 (1878).

Adverse possession cannot run against one who is non compos mentis. Woodall v. Wilkerson, 233 Ark. 28, 342 S.W.2d 405 (1961).

Running of period of adverse possession against alleged true owner was not interrupted when alleged owner was declared mentally incompetent. Sparks v. Shepherd, 255 Ark. 969, 504 S.W.2d 716 (1974).

—Railroads.

The statute of limitations runs against a railroad company whose right-of-way is held adversely by another. Saint Louis & S.F.R.R. v. Ruttan, 90 Ark. 178, 118 S.W. 705 (1909).

It is well established that the statute of limitations operates against railroad corporations where land is held adversely as well as against individuals and this applies to rights-of-way. St. Louis Sw. Ry. v. Wallace, 217 Ark. 278, 229 S.W.2d 659 (1950).

—Remaindermen.

The statute of limitations does not run against a remainderman until the death of the life tenant. Watson v. Hardin, 97 Ark. 33, 132 S.W. 1002 (1910); Rogers v. Ogburn, 116 Ark. 233, 172 S.W. 867 (1915); Le Sieur v. Spikes, 117 Ark. 366, 175 S.W. 413 (1915); Hamilton v. Farmer, 173 Ark. 341, 292 S.W. 683 (1927); Heustess v. Oswalt, 253 Ark. 730, 488 S.W.2d 707 (1973); Raborn v. Buffalo, 260 Ark. 531, 542 S.W.2d 507 (1976).

The remainderman alone can protect possession prior to the assignment of dower and as the remainderman is entitled to immediate possession, the statute of limitation will begin to run against him. Hayden v. Hill, 128 Ark. 342, 194 S.W. 19 (1917).

There is an exception to the rule that seven years' delay after the death of the decedent bars an application to sell his lands for debts, where his estate in the land was that of a remainderman and the life tenant survived him in which case the statute of limitations did not run until the death of the life tenant. Field v. Tyner, 163 Ark. 373, 261 S.W. 35 (1924).

While a valid tax sale bars the right of all interested parties, including those holding remainder interests as well as the life tenant, yet when the sale is void, one who enters under a void sale is a trespasser and the statute of limitations does not run against the remainderman until the expiration of the life estate. Jones v. Fowler, 171 Ark. 594, 285 S.W. 363 (1926).

—Trusts.

When a trustee holding legal title is barred, his beneficiaries are likewise barred. Chase v. Cartwright, 53 Ark. 358, 14 S.W. 90 (1890).

Whenever the right of action of a trustee is barred by limitations, the right of the cestui que trust thus represented is barred also. Little v. McGuire, 113 Ark. 497, 168 S.W. 1084 (1914).

The statute of limitations does not bar a trust unless the circumstances raise a presumption of the extinguishment of the trust or unless there has been an open denial or repudiation of the trust. Clark v. Clark, 191 Ark. 461, 86 S.W.2d 937 (1935).

—Vendor-Vendee.

Statute of limitations does not run in favor of a vendor who is under obligations to convey the legal title until he has given the vendee notice of such intention. Coleman v. Hill, 44 Ark. 452 (1884).

The statute does not run against a vendor in favor of a vendee holding under a contract for sale and purchase; nor does it run where the original possession of the holder seeking to plead the statute was in privity with the rightful owner. Tillar v. Clayton, 76 Ark. 405, 88 S.W. 972 (1905).

The statute of limitations does not run against a vendor in favor of a vendee holding under a contract of purchase, nor does it run where the original possession of the holder was in privity with the rightful owner until there is an open and explicit disavowal and disclaimer of holding under that title brought home to the other party. Perry v. Arkadelphia Lumber Co., 83 Ark. 374, 103 S.W. 724 (1907).

Where a vendor of land takes possession to enforce his lien, in order to set the statute of limitations running by adverse possession, there must be either express notice to the owners or acts of such notorious hostility as to put the owners on notice. McGinnis v. Less, 147 Ark. 211, 227 S.W. 398 (1921).

Pleading.

The statute of limitations pleaded by one defendant does not inure to the benefit of another. Hall v. Bonville, 36 Ark. 491 (1880).

An answer pleading the seven year statute of limitations without alleging that the seven years were before the commencement of the action is insufficient. Gates v. Solomon, 73 Ark. 8, 83 S.W. 348 (1904).

Answer held sufficient to raise the defense of the general statute of limitations. McKewen v. Allen, 80 Ark. 181, 96 S.W. 392 (1906).

When the defense of adverse possession is pleaded, such plea will be treated as a confession of ouster in ejectment suits. Bradley Lumber Co. v. Burbridge, 213 Ark. 165, 210 S.W.2d 284 (1948).

Where an action is brought in the name of a nonexisting plaintiff, an amendment of complaint substituting the proper party to the action as plaintiff will be regarded as the institution of a new action for purposes of this section. White v. Welsh, 327 Ark. 465, 939 S.W.2d 299 (1997).

Running of Statute Generally.

In computing the time of limitations, the day on which the action accrued must be included and the day the summons is issued excluded. Shinn v. Tucker, 33 Ark. 421 (1878).

Where a nonsuit was taken in an action to recover land and a subsequent action begun relying upon a different chain of title from that relied upon in the first action, the running of the statute was not stopped by the commencement of the first action. Covington v. Berry, 76 Ark. 460, 88 S.W. 1005 (1905).

The statute of limitations continues to run as to a cause of action not included in the original complaint but first set up in an amendment thereto until the filing of such amendment. Cottonwood Lumber Co. v. Walker, 106 Ark. 102, 152 S.W. 1005 (1912).

Owners of land used by a city as a dump did not have a viable cause of action against the city for inverse condemnation because the seven-year statute of limitations had expired; the city's use of the land as a dump since the 1950s showed an intent to possess adversely, and no action had been filed previously. Daniel v. City of Ashdown, 94 Ark. App. 446, 232 S.W.3d 511 (2006).

Brother was unable to challenge the validity of a deed supposedly executed by his mother in 1984 because his action was filed 20 years later; the seven-year statute of limitations in this section began to run at the mother's death in 1992. Moreover, laches applied since the purported owner's position was detrimentally changed where witnesses were unavailable. Jaramillo v. Adams, 100 Ark. App. 335, 268 S.W.3d 351 (2007).

In a case where heirship was being determined, the action was not barred by the limitations periods in this section and § 16-56-115 because the time period did not begin to run until a pecuniary consequence arose; there had been no demand for the trust property that would have triggered the limitations period. Moreover, the case was filed within the limitations period if it began to run when mineral leases were executed. Scroggin v. Scroggin, 103 Ark. App. 144, 286 S.W.3d 758 (2008).

Circuit court correctly concluded that the claims to the island were barred under this section where the city had asserted ownership rights since at least 1999, the city had claimed exclusive ownership since December 2003 at the latest, and the claimants had not asserted their rights until more than seven years after the seven-year statute of limitations had expired. Blackwood's Island v. Stodola, 2018 Ark. App. 357, 552 S.W.3d 62 (2018).

—Accrual of Action.

The statute does not begin to run against an estate until an administrator is appointed. McCustian v. Ramey, 33 Ark. 141 (1878); Word v. West, 38 Ark. 243 (1881).

The statute began to run against an action to declare a deed absolute to be a mortgage and intended to secure a note from the time the note matured. Stebbins v. Clendenin, 136 Ark. 391, 206 S.W. 681 (1918).

Where a purchaser of land, finding himself unable to pay for the land, directed his tenant to attorn to the vendor, which was done, and the purchaser died before executing a reconveyance, the attornment by the tenant formed a point from which the statute of limitations would run against the heirs of the purchaser. Freer v. Less, 159 Ark. 509, 252 S.W. 354 (1923).

—Bar of Claims.

A verbal promise to pay a debt barred by limitation will not revive the debt or remove the bar. Worthington v. De Bardlekin, 33 Ark. 651 (1878).

A vendor's lien is barred when the debt is barred. Chase v. Cartwright, 53 Ark. 358, 14 S.W. 90 (1890).

There must be an actual adverse holding for the statutory period before a creditor is barred of his right to set aside a fraudulent conveyance and subject the property to the payment of his debt. James v. Mallory, 76 Ark. 509, 89 S.W. 472 (1905).

Action to recover interest in land held barred. Landman v. Fincher, 196 Ark. 609, 119 S.W.2d 521 (1938); Grogan v. Weatherby, 196 Ark. 705, 119 S.W.2d 552 (1938); Brandon v. Bryeans, 203 Ark. 1117, 160 S.W.2d 205 (1942).

Defendant in action to quiet title held barred from asserting claim to land. Manier v. Hodges, 217 Ark. 481, 230 S.W.2d 960 (1950).

Action to recover interest in land held not barred. Eades v. Joslin, 219 Ark. 688, 244 S.W.2d 623 (1951).

This section does not prohibit a person in possession from suing to remove a cloud on his title even though the cloud has been in existence and within the knowledge of the possessor for more than the statutory period since there is no necessity for resorting to legal remedies until there is an interference with possession. Dotson v. Aldridge, 246 Ark. 456, 438 S.W.2d 464 (1969).

This statute of limitation governs the right to challenge another in actual or adverse possession of a tract of land for seven years; accordingly, where developer was in possession of property for more than the statutory period prior to power company's suit for title to the property, such suit was untimely. Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Arkansas Communities, Inc., 33 B.R. 800 (W.D. Ark. 1983), aff'd, 741 F.2d 185 (8th Cir. 1984).

Trial court did not err in denying the neighbors' claim of a prescriptive easement across an owner's real property because testimony that other persons had occasionally used the road at issue to access the property behind the owner's property for various reasons was not sufficient to show such use was adverse to the owner's interests, and the neighbors' use of the owner's driveway did not commence until 2005 and was discontinued in 2010 when the owner put up the pipe fence and a locked gate, which time fell short of the seven-year period required to obtain an easement by prescription. Kelley v. Williams, 2015 Ark. App. 609, 474 S.W.3d 884 (2015).

—Knowledge.

Mere ignorance of the existence of a cause does not prevent the running of the statute of limitations. Hibben v. Malone, 85 Ark. 584, 109 S.W. 1008 (1908).

The statute of limitations will not run in favor of parties to a forged deed until a discovery of the forgery by the true owners of the land. Walden v. Blassingame, 130 Ark. 448, 197 S.W. 1170 (1917).

The statute of limitations does not run against the grantee of land until he knows of the existence of a deed in his favor, where the deed was intentionally withheld from him by the party holding possession of the land. Peters v. Priest, 134 Ark. 161, 203 S.W. 1042 (1918).

Mere ignorance on the part of a cotenant concerning her right to land adversely occupied by another tenant or even a joint mistake of law on the part of both cotenants as to their respective rights to the land did not affect the running of the statute of limitations under which title by adverse possession is claimed, the mistake not being caused by fraudulent concealment or misrepresentation. McKinney v. Beattie, 157 Ark. 356, 248 S.W. 280 (1923).

Mere ignorance of one's rights does not prevent the running of the statute of limitations or laches against him unless the ignorance is due to the fraudulent concealment or misrepresentations on the part of those invoking the benefit of the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches. Landman v. Fincher, 196 Ark. 609, 119 S.W.2d 521 (1938).

Suspension.

This statute of limitations was suspended in wartime. Metropolitan Nat'l Bank v. Gordon, 28 Ark. 115 (1872); Eidins v. Graddy, 28 Ark. 500 (1873); Hall v. Denckla, 28 Ark. 506 (1873), overruled, Whittington v. Flint, 43 Ark. 504 (1884); Worthington v. De Bardlekin, 33 Ark. 651 (1878).

This statute of limitations does not run while the title to land is in the United States. Nichols v. Council, 51 Ark. 26, 9 S.W. 305 (1888).

The statute of limitations does not run against claims existing between husband and wife during the continuance of marital relations. Hamby v. Brooks, 86 Ark. 448, 111 S.W. 277 (1908).

Where, after a suit to quiet title was begun, the parties agreed to let the ownership abide the decision of the United States Department of the Interior, the agreement operated to prevent the running of statute of limitations till the decision of the United States Department of the Interior was made and the plaintiff's action brought within time thereafter was not barred. Webb v. Spann, 157 Ark. 328, 248 S.W. 285 (1923).

Where adverse possessor took possession of land under an agreement entitling him to do so in the lifetime of the original owner, this adverse holding put the statute of limitations in motion against him and its running was not arrested by his death. Arnold v. Arnold, 193 Ark. 109, 97 S.W.2d 634 (1936).

Waiver.

Where an absolute deed was executed to secure payment of a note and creditor accepted payment of the debt after expiration of statute of limitations, the creditor has waived the right to invoke the statute of limitations in a suit by the debtor to revest title in himself. Stebbins v. Clendenin, 136 Ark. 391, 206 S.W. 681 (1918).

Because appellant never raised the statute of limitations as a defense below, the issue was waived. Osborn v. Tennison, 2014 Ark. App. 175, 434 S.W.3d 1 (2014).

Wild and Unimproved Land.

Section 18-11-102, when coupled with this section, works to invest title in one who has paid taxes on wild and unenclosed lands for a period in excess of seven years. Broadhead v. McEntire, 19 Ark. App. 259, 720 S.W.2d 313 (1986).

The purchaser of the land was not entitled to have his title confirmed by actual physical possession of the property for more than seven years, where there was evidence that he had only been on the property four or five times during the seven-year period and his other acts of possession were merely fitful, and it was stipulated by the parties that the property was wild and unimproved and not occupied by anyone. Broadhead v. McEntire, 19 Ark. App. 259, 720 S.W.2d 313 (1986).

Cited: Clements v. Lampkin, 34 Ark. 598 (1879); Clements v. Cates, 49 Ark. 242, 4 S.W. 776 (1887); Brake v. Sides, 95 Ark. 74, 128 S.W. 572 (1910); Tegarden v. Hurst, 123 Ark. 354, 185 S.W. 463 (1916); Carter v. Stewart, 149 Ark. 189, 231 S.W. 887 (1921); Hinton v. Martin, 151 Ark. 343, 236 S.W. 267 (1922); Shelby v. Shelby, 182 Ark. 881, 32 S.W.2d 1071 (1930); Daniels v. Moore, 197 Ark. 727, 125 S.W.2d 456 (1939); Dill v. Snodgress, 213 Ark. 526, 211 S.W.2d 440 (1948); Dodson v. Thomason, 217 Ark. 747, 233 S.W.2d 395 (1950); Coulter v. Anthony, 228 Ark. 192, 308 S.W.2d 445 (1957); Stevens v. French, 227 Ark. 864, 302 S.W.2d 286 (1957); Rindeikis v. Coffman, 231 Ark. 422, 329 S.W.2d 550 (1959); Vesper v. Woolsey, 231 Ark. 782, 332 S.W.2d 602 (1960); Mason v. Morel, 234 Ark. 660, 354 S.W.2d 19 (1962); Fuller v. Fuller, 240 Ark. 475, 400 S.W.2d 283 (1966); Eubanks v. Zimmerman, 255 Ark. 53, 498 S.W.2d 655 (1973); Weston v. Bachman, 682 F.2d 202 (8th Cir. 1982); Mitchell v. Hammons, 31 Ark. App. 180, 792 S.W.2d 333 (1990); Smith v. MRCC Partnership, 302 Ark. 547, 792 S.W.2d 301 (1990); McKenzie v. City of White Hall, 112 F.3d 313 (8th Cir. 1997); Dohle v. Duffield, 2012 Ark. App. 217, 396 S.W.3d 780 (2012).