Ark. Code Ann. § 21-1-603 (2026)
Public employer conduct prohibited — Good faith communication
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A public employer shall not take adverse action against a public employee because the public employee or a person authorized to act on behalf of the public employee communicates in good faith to an appropriate authority:
- The existence of waste of public funds, property, or manpower, including federal funds, property, or manpower administered or controlled by a public employer; or
- A violation or suspected violation of a law, rule, or regulation adopted under the law of this state or a political subdivision of the state.
- The communication shall be made at a time and in a manner which gives the public employer reasonable notice of need to correct the waste or violation.
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A public employer shall not take adverse action against a public employee because the public employee or a person authorized to act on behalf of the public employee communicates in good faith to an appropriate authority:
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- For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, a public employee communicates in good faith if there is a reasonable basis in fact for the communication of the existence of waste or of a violation.
- Good faith is lacking when the public employee does not have personal knowledge of a factual basis for the communication or when the public employee knew or reasonably should have known that the communication of the waste or of the violation was malicious, false, or frivolous.
- A public employer shall not take an adverse action against a public employee because the employee participates or gives information in an investigation, hearing, court proceeding, legislative or other inquiry, or in any form of administrative review.
- A public employer shall not take an adverse action against a public employee because an employee has objected to or refused to carry out a directive that the employee reasonably believes violates a law or a rule or regulation adopted under the authority of laws of the state or a political subdivision of the state.
- A public employer shall not take an adverse action against a public employee because of a report of a loss of public funds under § 25-1-124.
History. Acts 1999, No. 1523, § 3; 2003, No. 601, § 1; 2015, No. 1103, § 1.
Amendments. The 2003 amendment added the subdivision designations in (a); in present (a)(1), inserted “public” preceding the third occurrence of “employee” and added “to an appropriate authority” at the end; in present (a)(1)(A), substituted “including” for “excluding” and inserted “administered or controlled by a public employer”; and deleted “to an appropriate authority” from the end of present (a)(1)(B).
The 2015 amendment added (e).
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR.
What constitutes activity of employee protected under state whistleblower protection statute covering employee's “report,” “disclosure,” “notification,” or the like of wrongdoing—Sufficiency of report. 10 A.L.R.6th 531.
What constitutes activity of employee, other than “reporting” wrongdoing, protected under state whistleblower protection statute. 13 A.L.R.6th 499.
What Constitutes Activity of Private-Sector Employee Protected under State Whistleblower Protection Statute Covering Employee's “Report,” “Disclosure,” “Notification,” or the Like of Wrongdoing — Nature of Activity Reported. 36 A.L.R.6th 203.
What Constitutes Activity of Public or State Employee Protected under State Whistleblower Protection Statute Covering Employee's “Report,” “Disclosure,” “Notification,” or the Like of Wrongdoing — Nature of Activity Reported. 37 A.L.R.6th 137.
Ark. L. Notes.
Norwood, The At-Will Doctrine Twenty Years After Gladden and Sterling Drug, 2008 Ark. L. Notes 55.
Case Notes
Affirmative Defense.
Because the circuit court previously ruled that the employee violated multiple rules and policies, it was clear that his termination was the result of that misconduct and not related to any communication between the employee and the city administrator; that previous ruling did, in fact, establish the city's affirmative defense to the whistle-blower claim. Barrows v. City of Fort Smith, 2010 Ark. 73, 360 S.W.3d 117 (2010).
Teacher did not have a cause of action against a school district under the Arkansas Whistle-Blower Act, § 21-1-601 et seq., because the teacher was terminated for misconduct — insubordination, inappropriate and offensive behavior, and making defamatory statements, rather than for any statements he made under the Act. The teacher offered no proof whatsoever of any retaliation or that the reasons given for his termination were a pretext. Hollis v. Fayetteville Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2015 Ark. App. 544, 473 S.W.3d 45 (2015).
Circuit court erred in denying a university's motion to dismiss because a terminated employee failed to state facts that would entitle him to relief under the Arkansas Whistle-Blower Act (AWBA), § 21-1-601 et seq., and that would constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity under that statute. Because the complaint did not identify any conduct attributable to the university's board of trustees that violated the AWBA, no exception to sovereign immunity existed, and the suit was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Johnson v. Butler, 2016 Ark. 253, 494 S.W.3d 412 (2016).
Circuit court properly granted a city and police officers summary judgment because an employee failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact that he was not terminated for poor job performance; the city and officers presented the employee's deposition testimony in which he admitted to various performance issues, and the chief of police stated he terminated the employee based on information he received from the employee's chain of command. Entmeier v. City of Fort Smith, 2016 Ark. App. 517 (2016).
Causal Connection.
Summary judgment on an employee's claim under the Arkansas Whistle-Blower Act, § 21-1-601 et seq., was improper because reasonable minds could determine there was evidence connecting the employee's whistle-blowing communication to the adverse actions he incurred; the employee became the subject of internal investigations almost immediately after his whistle-blowing communication and he presented evidence supporting a causal connection. Bales v. City of Fort Smith, 2016 Ark. App. 491 (2016) (substituted op. on reh'g).
Circuit court erred in granting a city and the chief of the police department summary judgment on an employee's claim under the Arkansas Whistle-Blower Act because reasonable minds could conclude that the adverse actions the employee suffered were a result of his whistle-blowing communication; evidence showed that the chief may not have been a neutral arbiter during the investigatory proceedings against the employee. Bales v. City of Fort Smith, 2016 Ark. App. 491 (2016) (substituted op. on reh'g).
Although the third employee had established an issue of fact as to whether he was a whistle-blower in connection with his report on improper overtime usage, summary judgment was properly granted against him as he failed to offer evidence linking his formal reprimand to his alleged whistle-blowing communication; the employee therefore failed to meet defendants' evidence that the disciplinary measures he received were the result of employee misconduct or poor work performance and were not retaliatory. Bales v. City of Fort Smith, 2016 Ark. App. 491 (2016) (substituted op. on reh'g).
Public Employee.
There was sufficient evidence that the employee was a public employee, because the employee was a person, and it was undisputed that he performed part-time services in exchange for wages from the Arkansas Department of Career Education, a public employer. State v. Means, 2013 Ark. 173, 426 S.W.3d 922 (2013).
Public Employer.
Law professor's Arkansas Whistle-Blower Act (AWBA) individual-capacity claims against state university officials were properly dismissed because the AWBA does not provide for suits against individuals. Steinbuch v. Univ. of Ark., 2019 Ark. 356, 589 S.W.3d 350 (2019).