Ark. Code Ann. § 21-9-301 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

Comment Note: Governmental Liability for Failure to Reduce Vegetation Obscuring View at Railroad Crossing or at Street or Highway Intersection. 50 A.L.R.6th 95.

Municipal Liability for Damage Resulting from Obstruction or Clogging of Drain or Sewer. 54 A.L.R.6th 201.

Ark. L. Rev.

Case Notes, Bly v. Young, Beaulieu v. Gray, and Carter v. Bush: The Arkansas State Employee Immunity Trilogy, 41 Ark. L. Rev. 893.

“Taking” a Look at Inverse Condemnation in Arkansas: Robinson v. City of Ashdown, 44 Ark. L. Rev. 519.

Thomas Christoph Keller, Comment: ABC's and AR-15's: Arming Arkansas's Teachers, 67 Ark. L. Rev. 687 (2014).

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Notes, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 — Civil Rights — Municipalities Liable for Money Damages. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978), 2 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 419.

Survey — Torts, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 609.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Sovereign immunity to tort suit did not violate Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 13, in action where administratrix had other recourse for victim's suffocation in unattended jail. Hardin v. City of DeValls Bluff, 256 Ark. 480, 508 S.W.2d 559 (1974).

This section is not unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of U.S. Const. Amend. 14 because the effect of this section is to restore the tort immunity of cities that had been abolished and to reaffirm the tort immunity of school districts, special improvement districts, and all other political subdivisions. Lacey v. Bekaert Steel Wire Corp., 619 F. Supp. 1234 (W.D. Ark. 1985), aff'd, 799 F.2d 434 (8th Cir. 1986).

The statutory scheme which provides that local governments are immune from tort liability is a valid legislative effort to provide a method and manner of relief to some victims of governmental tortfeasors; thus, the district court did not err in sustaining these sections as rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Lacey v. Bekaert Steel Wire Corp., 799 F.2d 434 (8th Cir. 1986).

Constitutionality of this section upheld. Plaintiffs are not denied recourse for their damage, only the right to proceed in tort. Chestnut v. Norwood, 292 Ark. 498, 731 S.W.2d 200 (1987).

This section is constitutional and does not violate Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 13 or Ark. Const., Art. 5, § 32. White v. City of Newport, 326 Ark. 667, 933 S.W.2d 800 (1996).

In an action filed against a school district and a bus driver after the rape of a student, the provision of limited immunity under this section did not violate Ark. Const. art. 2, § 13, and an appellate court was unable to overturn caselaw to the extent that it shielded a school district from accountability under the Arkansas Public Education Act, §§ 6-15-1001 to 1007, because judicial precedent from the Arkansas Supreme Court had to be followed. Young v. Blytheville Sch. Dist., 2013 Ark. App. 50, 425 S.W.3d 865 (2013).

In General.

The former distinction between governmental and proprietary actions was abolished by this section. Augustine v. City of W. Memphis, 281 Ark. 162, 662 S.W.2d 813 (1984).

Since statutes granting political subdivisions immunity or denying them immunity are legal; statutes which limit that liability are legal for the same reasons — to make these government entities bear some responsibility for wrongs to individuals harmed by their negligence, but also to prevent these same entities from exposure to high judgments which would destroy them. Thompson v. Sanford, 281 Ark. 365, 663 S.W.2d 932 (1984).

This section prevents a person from recovering for the negligence of a political subdivision, or for its employees' negligent performance of their official duties. Davis v. Fulton County, 884 F. Supp. 1245 (E.D. Ark. 1995).

The grant of immunity contained in § 21-9-301 is not as comprehensive as the constitutional prohibition established by Article 5, Section 20, of the Arkansas Constitution; specifically, the immunity granted by statute for tortious conduct is limited to any recovery in excess of insurance coverage, whereas the constitutional prohibition against bringing an action against the state is far-reaching and applies to all circumstances where the state's treasury could be tapped for the payment of damages. Dermott Special Sch. Dist. v. Johnson, 343 Ark. 90, 32 S.W.3d 477 (2000).

Qualified immunity afforded by this section had to be asserted and proven as an affirmative defense; it was incumbent upon the school district to plead and prove that it was entitled to the immunity due to a lack of insurance, and the student's complaint did not have to allege the absence of insurance in order to state a cause of action. Vent v. Johnson, 2009 Ark. 92, 303 S.W.3d 46 (2009).

Arkansas Legislature did not intend to partially repeal this section when it enacted the Arkansas Public Education Act, §§ 6-15-1001 to 1007. Young v. Blytheville Sch. Dist., 2013 Ark. App. 50, 425 S.W.3d 865 (2013).

Construction.

While the pleading distinction between “official capacity” liability and “individual capacity” liability remains relevant in federal actions alleging official misconduct by public officials, this distinction is of no moment when determining the scope of the immunity afforded by this section in any analogous tort actions. Davis v. Fulton County, 884 F. Supp. 1245 (E.D. Ark. 1995).

Purpose.

It was the intent of the General Assembly in enacting this section to grant immunity to municipal agents and employees for acts of negligence committed in their official capacities. Autry v. Lawrence, 286 Ark. 501, 696 S.W.2d 315 (1985).

Applicability.

Claims under the torts of outrage (also known as intentional infliction of emotional distress), battery, assault, false imprisonment, and intentional torts fall outside the purview of this section. Davis v. Fulton County, 884 F. Supp. 1245 (E.D. Ark. 1995).

Mayor was entitled to summary judgment on police chief's claim under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1993, § 16-123-101 et seq., because the mayor was entitled to qualified immunity; the mayor could not have reasonably known that his termination of the police chief's employment, which was done upon the discovery of missing or incomplete police reports 15 days after the police chief made a statement at a city council meeting, would violate the police chief's constitutional right to free speech under Ark. Const. art. 2, § 6. Smith v. Brt, 363 Ark. 126, 211 S.W.3d 485 (2005).

Although the former police chief alleged a violation of the right to freedom of speech under Ark. Const. art. 2, § 6, he failed to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether the mayor would have known that his termination of the chief's employment as police chief violated that clearly established right; because the chief did not raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether the mayor would have known that the dismissal violated the chief's clearly established constitutional right, the mayor was entitled to qualified immunity under § 21-9-301. Smith v. Brt, 363 Ark. 126, 211 S.W.3d 485 (2005).

Educational cooperative, unless covered by liability insurance for the damages alleged in a complaint against it, was immune from liability and from suit for damages under this section because it was an agency of a school district. Ark. River Educ. Servs. v. Modacure, 371 Ark. 466, 267 S.W.3d 595 (2007).

This section provides city employees with immunity from civil liability for negligent acts, but not for intentional acts. City of Fayetteville v. Romine, 373 Ark. 318, 284 S.W.3d 10 (2008).

Trial court erred in denying a city's motion for summary judgment in an action by property owners for damage to their property because at no point did the complaint mention breach of a contract; because the city put forth proof that it did not have insurance coverage for the claim alleged, it was entitled to immunity under subsection (a) of this section as to the tort cause of action. City of Malvern v. Jenkins, 2013 Ark. 24, 425 S.W.3d 711 (2013).

Civil Rights Actions.

A county is a unit of local government and does not share in the state's immunity from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights actions, thus, where the violation of policies by a sheriff over a period of time were overlooked, the county as an entity was responsible for injuries caused. Mosier v. Robinson, 722 F. Supp. 555 (W.D. Ark. 1989).

Trial court erred in denying a city employee's motion for summary judgment in a property owner's action for violation of civil rights where the employee established that the employee was entitled to qualified immunity; because sewer lines were not owned by the city, but were instead private lines, the city, and by extension, the employee, owed no duty to the owner. City of Fayetteville v. Romine, 373 Ark. 318, 284 S.W.3d 10 (2008).

In a former inmate's action for damages stemming from a rape by a county jailer, a county judge was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the civil rights claims under § 16-123-105 on immunity grounds under this section because the inmate failed to establish that the County acted with deliberate indifference when it hired the jailer where the inmate only offered unsupported allegations that the jailer had previously inappropriately hugged and kissed a 16-year-old female inmate; an unwanted hug and kiss were not nearly identical enough to the inmate's allegations to constitute deliberate indifference. Gentry v. Robinson, 2009 Ark. 634, 361 S.W.3d 788 (2009).

In plaintiff's lawsuit against defendants, the school district and school officials, in which he asserted that his disabled child was subjected to multiple incidents of sexual abuse in his classroom in the presence of teachers, the district court held that defendants were immune from suit for negligence under this section. Braden v. Mt. Home Sch. Dist., 903 F. Supp. 2d 729 (W.D. Ark. 2012).

Police officer was entitled to qualified immunity on appellee's claim for violation of the right to remonstrate; the lack of precedent made it clear that appellee's right to remonstrate was not clearly established at the time of appellee's arrest. Graham v. Cawthorn, 2013 Ark. 160, 427 S.W.3d 34 (2013).

County Judge.

In a case alleging abuse of process and false light, a county judge was entitled to qualified immunity under this section; the factual recitations within the body of the complaint indicated that the suit was against the judge only in his official capacity, and it did not identify or plead facts sufficient to show that he violated an established statutory or constitutional right. In addition, the county judge was entitled to judicial immunity when he entered an order requiring a county clerk to retain employees who had filed a grievance because he was performing a quasi-judicial function. Blevins v. Hudson, 2016 Ark. 150, 489 S.W.3d 165 (2016), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 137 S. Ct. 239, 196 L. Ed. 2d 134 (2016).

Deceit.

An action against a city by a landowner who alleged that his execution of a deed granting the city an easement across his property for the installation of sewer lines was induced by deliberate fraud was a cause of action for deceit which would be precluded by this section. Harrington v. City of Greenbrier, 262 Ark. 773, 561 S.W.2d 302 (1978).

De Novo Review.

Where plaintiff's tort claim against county was denied by county judge and plaintiff sought a de novo review in the circuit court in accordance with § 16-67-207, the circuit judge held that the provisions of this section immunized the county from the tort claim and properly dismissed the claim. The circuit court thus did, in the de novo review pursuant to § 16-67-207, exactly as it would have had to do if the case had been brought “as other cases at law.” Bigelow v. Union County, 287 Ark. 486, 701 S.W.2d 125 (1985).

Insurance Coverage.

State employees are not immune from suit for negligence to the extent they are covered by other viable liability insurance. Deitsch v. Tillery, 309 Ark. 401, 833 S.W.2d 760 (1992).

Construction company was not an insurer for the purposes of administrator's wrongful death action, notwithstanding that it agreed to indemnify the city against damages and obtained insurance to do so. Cherry v. Tanda, Inc., 327 Ark. 600, 940 S.W.2d 457 (1997).

Administrator's action against insurance carrier as a quasi-insurer of the city under this section was without merit where the insurance contract was carried by the employer construction company, not the city. Cherry v. Tanda, Inc., 327 Ark. 600, 940 S.W.2d 457 (1997).

A city is not immune to the extent that it has liability insurance. City of Caddo Valley v. George, 340 Ark. 203, 9 S.W.3d 481 (2000).

Summary judgment was improperly granted in favor of a city and its employee in a negligence action based on governmental immunity where there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the operation of the loader on public roads was frequent and regular or merely incidental and, thus, whether the front-end loader was exempted from the statutory definition of “motor vehicle.” Spears v. City of Fordyce, 351 Ark. 305, 92 S.W.3d 38 (2002).

Immunity for negligent torts afforded to school districts and employees was qualified, and an employee or district could be sued to the extent that applicable coverage existed under a policy of insurance; however, the appellate court could not determine whether there was insurance coverage because the actual policy was not included for review and, as the school district had the burden to make the insurance policy a part of the record, the denial of the school district's motion for summary judgment on parent's negligence claim was affirmed. Helena-West Helena Sch. Dist. v. Monday, 361 Ark. 82, 204 S.W.3d 514 (2005).

Under this section, the city and its employees enjoy immunity from liability and from suits for damages, except to the extent that the city is covered by liability insurance, or acts as a self-insured for certain amounts as provided by statute. City of Farmington v. Smith, 366 Ark. 473, 237 S.W.3d 1 (2006).

Even though this section provided immunity to a public school district with regard to a mother's claim, that it negligently failed to provide adequate supervision for her disabled child, which resulted in the child's being sexually assaulted by a fellow special needs student at school, the school district was denied summary judgment as to that claim because it failed to present any evidence showing that its liability insurance policy did not cover that claim: (1) the statute granted immunity to the school district, except to the extent that it was covered by liability insurance; (2) therefore, in order to establish its immunity as a matter of law, the school district had to show that the mother's negligence claim was not covered by its insurance policy; and (3) the school district did not prove that it did not have insurance coverage with regard to the mother's claim because it did not present a copy of its insurance policy to support its summary judgment motion. Finch v. Texarkana Sch. Dist. No. 7, 557 F. Supp. 2d 976 (W.D. Ark. 2008).

Circuit court properly denied a city and its employees summary judgment on a citizen's negligence claims because they did not show that they were entitled to assert the affirmative defense of statutory immunity; under this section, it was incumbent on the city and its employees, and not on plaintiff, to plead and prove entitlement to immunity due to a lack of insurance. City of Little Rock v. Dayong Yang, 2017 Ark. 18, 509 S.W.3d 632 (2017).

When a defendant pleads an affirmative defense of immunity, that defendant must plead and prove no liability coverage under this section for purposes of summary judgment. City of Little Rock v. Dayong Yang, 2017 Ark. 18, 509 S.W.3d 632 (2017).

Although the defendant city and its employees admitted in their intial answer the averment in the first complaint that they lacked insurance coverage, those pleadings were superseded by the third amended complaint and the answer to that complaint, which did not incorporate previous pleadings. City of Little Rock v. Dayong Yang, 2017 Ark. 18, 509 S.W.3d 632 (2017).

It was error for the circuit court to deny Metropolitan Emergency Medical Services (MEMS) summary judgment for statutory immunity beyond its insurance coverage because plaintiff placed in the record two insurance policies as evidence of MEMS's insurance coverage, and the policies established facts that MEMS did not dispute, thus leaving only a matter of statutory interpretation. City of Little Rock v. Dayong Yang, 2017 Ark. 18, 509 S.W.3d 632 (2017).

Circuit court properly denied a police officer and dog handler's motion for summary judgment in his injured neighbor's action for negligence and strict liability for housing an animal known to have dangerous tendencies, where the officer maintained the police dog at his residence and remained on call 24 hours a day as part of his duties; the officer was not entitled to summary judgment because he failed to plead and prove that the city lacked liability coverage. Harris v. Beth, 2017 Ark. App. 186, 518 S.W.3d 126 (2017).

Intentional Torts.

While public officials named under this section are immune from tort liability for negligent acts committed in the performance of their official duties, that immunity does not include intentional torts committed by those officials. Battle v. Harris, 298 Ark. 241, 766 S.W.2d 431 (1989).

The immunity granted in this section does not apply to intentional torts. Almand v. Benton County, 145 B.R. 608 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1992).

The tort of outrage is an intentional tort for which a cause of action lies where the conduct is so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society; this section does not provide immunity for the intentional acts of school districts. Deitsch v. Tillery, 309 Ark. 401, 833 S.W.2d 760 (1992).

Intentional actions by board members are not protected by statutory immunity. West Memphis Sch. Dist. No. 4 v. Circuit Court, 316 Ark. 290, 871 S.W.2d 368 (1994).

This section does not shield intentional torts such as battery. Morris v. Crawford County, 173 F. Supp. 2d 870 (W.D. Ark. 2001), aff'd, 299 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2002).

Although this section did not apply to give a public school district immunity as to the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim (IIED) asserted by a disabled child's mother, arising from the fact that the child was sexually assaulted by a fellow special needs student at school, because IIED was an intentional tort of outrage and this section did not provide immunity as to intentional torts, the district court was nevertheless granted summary judgment as to the mother's IIED claim because she did not show that a material factual dispute existed as to whether its conduct was so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and to be utterly intolerable in a civilized society. Finch v. Texarkana Sch. Dist. No. 7, 557 F. Supp. 2d 976 (W.D. Ark. 2008).

Trial court erred in failing to dismiss a property owner's claim against a city for reimbursement for construction of a retaining wall on his property in order to maintain a ditch on an adjacent city right-of-way because recovery on a negligence or trespass claim would be statutorily barred. City of Alexander v. Doss, 102 Ark. App. 232, 284 S.W.3d 74 (2008).

Battery claim against a police officer survived a motion for summary judgment because this section provided city employees with immunity from civil liability for negligent acts but not for intentional acts. Martin v. Hallum, 2010 Ark. App. 193, 374 S.W.3d 152 (2010).

In an action against a school district and a bus driver arising from a student's rape, although the student was a victim of intentional torts when she was pulled into a bathroom and raped, there was no facts indicating that the school district or the bus driver committed those acts or any other intentional torts. Therefore, immunity was provided under this section. Young v. Blytheville Sch. Dist., 2013 Ark. App. 50, 425 S.W.3d 865 (2013).

It is a deliberate, knowing trespass that bars application of the doctrine of qualified immunity; appellant's proof failed to show that appellees trespassed on her property deliberately and with knowledge that they were doing so, and summary judgment for appellees was proper. Williams v. Pate, 2015 Ark. App. 327, 463 S.W.3d 734 (2015).

Circuit court erred by denying summary judgment to a police officer based on immunity, where the officer did not commit the intentional torts of false arrest or false imprisonment; the officer had arrested appellee based on an outstanding warrant that had in fact been issued against a different person. Trammell v. Wright, 2016 Ark. 147, 489 S.W.3d 636 (2016).

Jurisdiction.

Where a landowner's action could be taken as a suit for damages for trespass, the chancery court had no jurisdiction since equity will not take jurisdiction of an action to recover unliquidated damages for tort and since the county is immune from suit for damages in a tort action. Chamberlain v. Newton County, 266 Ark. 516, 587 S.W.2d 4 (1979).

This section establishes an immunity defense; that does not mean that the circuit court is without jurisdiction to hear a motion to dismiss on statutory immunity grounds. West Memphis Sch. Dist. No. 4 v. Circuit Court, 316 Ark. 290, 871 S.W.2d 368 (1994).

Malicious Prosecution.

A city police officer acting in his official capacity when he presented evidence to the prosecutor which resulted in plaintiff's arrest was immune from an action for malicious prosecution. Autry v. Lawrence, 286 Ark. 501, 696 S.W.2d 315 (1985).

City collector was entitled to qualified immunity in a malicious prosecution action by a receiver who was prosecuted for payment of taxes owed by a corporation with a worthless check. Culpepper v. Biggers, 742 F. Supp. 528 (E.D. Ark. 1990).

Negligence.

A suit against county for damages for death which resulted when vehicle left county public road on an allegedly unmarked curve was barred on the basis of the county's immunity from tort liability. Sullivan v. Pulaski County, 247 Ark. 259, 445 S.W.2d 94 (1969).

A suit against county for negligence which resulted in injuries to appellant from an automobile accident allegedly caused by the county's negligence in failing to erect certain warning signs and speed limit signs was barred on the basis of the county's immunity from tort liability. Chandler v. Pulaski County, 247 Ark. 262, 445 S.W.2d 96 (1969).

Municipal officers and employees are immune from tort liability for negligent acts they may commit in the performance of their official duties; accordingly, a city fire chief, a city director of planning, and a city manager were immune from an action brought against them in their official capacities alleging that, due to the officers' negligence, the plaintiffs' residence burned because of the city fire department's refusal to respond to a call for assistance. Matthews v. Martin, 280 Ark. 345, 658 S.W.2d 374 (1983).

City and its public utility commission were immune from suit to recover for personal injuries suffered by plaintiff when she was struck by a falling limb that had been cut by an employee of the city or of the commission while engaged in cutting tree limbs along a public street. Augustine v. City of W. Memphis, 281 Ark. 162, 662 S.W.2d 813 (1984).

Where school district built house as vocational education project, action for fire loss was one in tort for negligence and was barred by this section. Bankston v. Pulaski County School Dist., 281 Ark. 476, 665 S.W.2d 859 (1984).

Where employees were performing their official duties for the school district that employed them at the time of their alleged acts of negligence, they and the school district are immune from tort liability under this section. Cousins v. Dennis, 298 Ark. 310, 767 S.W.2d 296 (1989).

In order that persons injured by a political subdivisions' vehicles may have redress for negligence, § 21-9-303 requires political subdivisions to carry liability insurance on their motor vehicles. King v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 301 Ark. 148, 782 S.W.2d 574 (1990).

A school choir director was immune from a cause of action for negligence, and a school district was immune from a cause of action for negligence in hiring and supervising, instructing, and training personnel. Wallace ex rel. Wallace v. Bryant Sch. Dist., 46 F. Supp. 2d 863 (E.D. Ark. 1999), aff'd without op., 208 F.3d 219 (8th Cir. 2000).

Judge sued for damages following an automobile accident was not entitled to immunity where the evidence did not establish that he was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident; in addition, because the judge failed to make a motion for a directed verdict on the issue of immunity, the issue was waived for appellate review. Carlew v. Wright, 356 Ark. 208, 148 S.W.3d 237 (2004).

According to this section, city employees have immunity from civil liabiltiy for negligent acts, but not for intentional acts. City of Farmington v. Smith, 366 Ark. 473, 237 S.W.3d 1 (2006).

In a case arising from the removal of gravel from the owners' property, a negligence claim against the county failed because it was precluded and foreclosed by this section. Finch v. Carroll County, 2014 Ark. App. 564, 445 S.W.3d 535 (2014).

Two affidavits sufficiently established that the city did not possess general-liability insurance at the time of the accident to cover plaintiff's negligence claims; moreover, plaintiff did not meet proof with proof to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact on this issue, and thus the city was entitled to municipal immunity. Yang v. City of Little Rock, 2019 Ark. 169, 575 S.W.3d 394 (2019).

Political Subdivision.

Corporation which expressly stated in its articles of incorporation that its purpose was to aid educational institutions inside the city, but whose activities far exceeded its declared purpose, operated outside of the statutory boundaries of a utility commission as permitted by the code and thus, corporation was not entitled to immunity as a political subdivision under this section. Masterson v. Stambuck, 321 Ark. 391, 902 S.W.2d 803 (1995).

Counties are expressly included within the class of “political subdivisions” protected by this section. Davis v. Fulton County, 884 F. Supp. 1245 (E.D. Ark. 1995).

The Quorum Court is a “political subdivision” which benefits from any immunity afforded by this section. Davis v. Fulton County, 884 F. Supp. 1245 (E.D. Ark. 1995).

Cited: Williams v. Jefferson Hospital Ass'n, 246 Ark. 1231, 442 S.W.2d 243 (1969); Reeme v. Natural Gas Imp. Dist., 247 Ark. 983, 448 S.W.2d 647 (1970); Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922 (1970); Lassiter v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 371 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. Ark. 1974); Collier v. City of Springdale, 733 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1984); Delta Special Sch. Dist. No. 5 v. State Bd. of Educ., 745 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1984); Helms v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 281 Ark. 450, 664 S.W.2d 870 (1984); Harrison v. Springdale Water & Sewer Comm'n, 780 F.2d 1422 (8th Cir. 1986); Little Rock Port Auth. v. McCain, 296 Ark. 130, 752 S.W.2d 44 (1988); Conway Corp. v. Construction Engineers, Inc., 300 Ark. 225, 782 S.W.2d 36 (1989); Dumond v. Conlee, 710 F. Supp. 1270 (E.D. Ark. 1988); Buttolph Trust v. Jarnagan, 302 Ark. 393, 789 S.W.2d 466 (1990); Almand v. Benton County, 145 B.R. 608 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1992); Waire v. Joseph, 308 Ark. 528, 825 S.W.2d 594 (1992); 65th Ctr., Inc. v. Copeland, 308 Ark. 456, 825 S.W.2d 574 (1992); Vinson Elec. Supply v. Poteete, 321 Ark. 516, 905 S.W.2d 831 (1995); Brown v. Fountain Hill Sch. Dist., 67 Ark. App. 358, 1 S.W.3d 27 (1999); Rudd v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 341 Ark. 794, 20 S.W.3d 310 (2000); Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Spears, 360 Ark. 200, 200 S.W.3d 436 (2004); Passmore v. Hinchey, 2010 Ark. App. 581, 379 S.W.3d 497 (2010); Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Fort Smith Sch. Dist., 2015 Ark. 81, 455 S.W.3d 294 (2015).