Ark. Code Ann. § 28-1-102 (2026)

Case Notes

Child.

The General Assembly did not intend for a grandchild to be defined as a child under subdivision (a)(1) of this section. McCoy v. Walker, 317 Ark. 86, 876 S.W.2d 252 (1994).

Because there is no comma separating “illegitimate child” and the modifier “except such as would inherit under the law of descent and distribution” in subdivision (a)(1) of this section, the General Assembly intended for “except such as would inherit…” to modify only “illegitimate children.” McCoy v. Walker, 317 Ark. 86, 876 S.W.2d 252 (1994).

The phrase “except such as would inherit under the law of descent and distribution” in subdivision (a)(1) of this section does not modify the word “grandchild.” McCoy v. Walker, 317 Ark. 86, 876 S.W.2d 252 (1994).

The minor grandchildren of a decedent who would inherit from the decedent under the laws of descent and distribution do not have homestead rights under § 28-39-201, because they do not fall within the definition of “child” in subdivision (a)(1) of this section. McCoy v. Walker, 317 Ark. 86, 876 S.W.2d 252 (1994).

Decedent's illegitimate, pretermitted child was not entitled to inherit from decedent as he was required to meet requirements of § 28-39-407(b), subdivision (a)(1) of this section, and the six requirements of § 28-9-209(d), but he failed to show that he had been recognized by the decedent or by a court and he failed to file his action within 180 days of decedent's death. Shelton v. Keathley, 367 Ark. 568, 242 S.W.3d 223 (2006).

Claims.

Definition of word “claims” used in Probate Code to include estate taxes applies to “claims” only as it is used in Probate Code and has nothing to do with the apportionment of estate taxes. Williamson v. Williamson, 224 Ark. 141, 272 S.W.2d 72 (Ark. 1954).

Where a lawsuit pending in a circuit court was not a claim against the estate, but was a suit against the executor individually, the court did not err in closing the estate since there was no pending claim against the estate as defined by subdivision (2) of this section. Bostic v. Bostic Estate, 281 Ark. 167, 662 S.W.2d 815 (1984).

Distributees.

Both the widow and heirs at law are distributees of a solvent intestate estate under this section and § 28-53-113 and therefore secured debts are to be discharged out of the general estate, unpledged personal property, where the creditor does not pursue the security which gives the widow a dower right in the entire security free from the debt. Wilcox v. Brewer, 224 Ark. 546, 274 S.W.2d 777 (1955).

Interested Persons.

Where administrator is removed for failure to qualify and physical incapacity, it is unnecessary for the court to determine whether person bringing matter to court's attention was an interested party. Davis v. Adams, 231 Ark. 197, 328 S.W.2d 851 (1959).

Since, under § 28-25-102, an attesting witness to be “interested” must receive a beneficial interest by way of devise, an attorney signing will as attesting witness was not “interested,” although the firm with which he was associated was named to represent the estate. Rosenbaum v. Cahn, 234 Ark. 290, 351 S.W.2d 857 (1961).

One claiming damages for the alleged negligence of the decedent is not an interested person within the definition of this section. Doepke v. Smith, 248 Ark. 511, 452 S.W.2d 627 (1970).

Where plaintiffs filed an action against the administrator prior to his resignation as administrator, plaintiffs were “interested parties” within the meaning of this section and “aggrieved parties” within the meaning of § 28-1-116 for purposes of appealing from probate orders that affected those proceedings. However, as such a resignation is ordinarily a matter of discretion for the probate judge and in this case had no effect on venue and § 28-48-107 gives plaintiffs a remedy for the appointment of another administrator, there was no abuse of discretion in allowing the resignation to stand. Barkley v. Cullum, 252 Ark. 474, 479 S.W.2d 535 (1972).

Once a trial judge rejects the report on the public sale of estate land, the status of the parties who had bid for the land can no longer be described as interested parties; at best, their position is that of potential bidders at any future sale, and hence they have no standing to contest a petition on behalf of the heirs of an estate. Estate of Hodges v. Wilkie, 14 Ark. App. 297, 688 S.W.2d 307 (1985).

Where the decedent died testate and left them nothing under the will, the decedent's surviving children were not heirs and were not creditors, and were thus not “interested persons” as that term is used in subdivision (a)(11) of this section, § 28-48-105(a)(2), or § 28-48-107(a). Pickens v. Black, 316 Ark. 499, 872 S.W.2d 405 (1994).

On petition to probate court to set aside order authorizing sale of decedent's land, where petitioners were not heirs or creditors, where their petition did not assert any claim against the estate or declare any interest in the estate's property, and where they did not indicate any entitlement to proceeds which might be distributed by the estate, but in fact were persons against whom the estate had sought relief, the petitioners were not interested persons as defined by subdivision (a)(11) and had no standing to question the issuance of the court's order. White v. Welsh, 323 Ark. 479, 915 S.W.2d 274 (1996).

Appellant was an “interested person” as defined in subdivision (a)(11) where appellant was specifically named in the will as a beneficiary of a trust; the fact that appellant was a beneficiary of the trust meant that appellant had “an interest in the estate.” Spicer v. Estate of Spicer, 55 Ark. App. 267, 935 S.W.2d 576 (1996).

Appellants were interested persons entitled to seek removal of an estate's personal representative where they were potential heirs of the intestate estate. Snowden v. Riggins, 70 Ark. App. 1, 13 S.W.3d 598 (2000).

Although appellant argued that there was no evidence that anyone received notice of the hearing set on the final accounting, which appellant claimed violated § 28-1-112, the argument was without merit, given the notices that the trial court sent out after excluding appellant from distribution of the estate, and appellant conceded to having received actual notice in any event and possibly not having been entitled to notice in the first place; because appellant had been excluded, she was not an interested person under subdivision (11) of this section and so there was no legal requirement that she be served notice, and she lacked standing to complain about the failure to send notice to others who had not appealed. Seymour v. Biehslich, 371 Ark. 359, 266 S.W.3d 722 (2007).

Appellee was not an “interested person” as defined in subdivision (a)(11) of this section with standing to petition the probate court. Appellee failed to offer any testimony that there was a service contract between the decedent and herself, and there was no evidence that the services she provided for the decedent were of any extraordinary character. Lucas v. Wilson, 2011 Ark. App. 584, 385 S.W.3d 891 (2011).

Because appellant, an heir of the decedent and devisee under the will, was made a party to the probate action when the circuit court granted his motion to intervene under Ark. R. Civ. P. 24, the circuit court erred by determining that he was not entitled to notice of a hearing on a motion to remove the estate executrix. The Court of Appeals of Arkansas held that appellant was an “interested person” as defined in subdivision (11) of this section. Maxwell v. Estate of Maxwell, 2012 Ark. App. 174 (2012).

Person.

Probate court erred in finding that the limited liability company lacked standing to bring a petition for the determination of heirship, because the limited liability company alleged in the petition that it was a legal entity, so it was a person and could bring the petition; “person” was defined under subdivision (18) of this section to include a corporation, partnership, or other legal entity. McVesting, LLC v. Heirs of Macie McGoon, 2012 Ark. App. 541 (2012).

Personal Representative.

The term “personal representative” includes both general and special administrators. Nickles v. Wood, 221 Ark. 630, 255 S.W.2d 433 (1953).

Tests.

While a prosecuting attorney clearly has a duty to disclose all pertinent test on tangible items pursuant to ARCrP 17.1, the prosecutor is not required to make certain scientific tests on all materials seized. State v. Pulaski County Circuit Court, 316 Ark. 514, 872 S.W.2d 414 (1994).

Cited: Holt v. Moody, 234 Ark. 245, 352 S.W.2d 87 (1961); Doepke v. Smith, 248 Ark. 511, 452 S.W.2d 627 (1970); Sutton v. Milburn, 289 Ark. 421, 711 S.W.2d 808 (1986); Sanders v. Ryles, 318 Ark. 418, 885 S.W.2d 888 (1994); Dunklin v. Ramsay, 328 Ark. 263, 944 S.W.2d 76 (1997); Tatro v. Langston, 328 Ark. 548, 944 S.W.2d 118 (Ark. 1997); Barrera v. Vanpelt, 332 Ark. 482, 965 S.W.2d 780 (1998).