Ark. Code Ann. § 28-48-103 (2020)

Case Notes

Appeal.

No appeal is allowed from an order refusing to appoint a special administrator. In re Estate of McLaughlin, 306 Ark. 515, 815 S.W.2d 937 (1991).

Under § 28-1-116, any order of a probate court is generally appealable, but under subsection (f) of this section, there can be no appeal from an order appointing or refusing to appoint a special administrator; however, the denial or granting of a petition to remove an executor or administrator, other than a special administrator, is an appealable order. Pickens v. Black, 316 Ark. 499, 872 S.W.2d 405 (1994).

There can be no appeal from an order refusing to appoint a special administrator. Harwood v. Monroe, 65 Ark. App. 57, 984 S.W.2d 93 (1999).

Appointment for Appeal.

A trial court was authorized to appoint a special administrator to appeal a decision setting aside the will of a deceased where the executor, due to relationship to parties concerned, did not want to take an appeal. Thiel v. Mobley, 223 Ark. 167, 265 S.W.2d 507 (1954).

Insurance Claims.

A special administrator cannot be appointed solely to assert such rights as a claimant might have had against a decedent's insurance carrier. Doepke v. Smith, 248 Ark. 511, 452 S.W.2d 627 (1970).

There is no authority for the appointment of a special administrator solely for the purpose of receiving proceeds in an action for damages alleged to have resulted from the negligence of a decedent where the prospective plaintiff alleged that the insurance carrier of the decedent fraudulently induced him to delay prosecution of his claim until the time for filing a claim against the estate had expired by falsely representing that it would settle the claim as soon as plaintiff's injuries could be evaluated. Doepke v. Smith, 248 Ark. 511, 452 S.W.2d 627 (1970).

There was no question that the probate court had jurisdiction to appoint a special administrator in order to perform the particular acts of litigating wrongful death and life insurance actions. Douglas v. Holbert, 335 Ark. 305, 983 S.W.2d 392 (1998), US Supreme Court cert. denied, Bates v. Arkansas, 526 U.S. 1064, 119 S. Ct. 1454, 143 L. Ed. 2d 541 (1999).

Jurisdiction to Appoint.

Where the heirs at law attacked probate of a will and filed petitions asking for the removal of the executor on the ground that he failed to include certain assets in the inventory and while matters were pending, the probate court granted a petition for appointment of a special administrator for purpose of filing proceedings against executors and others, the appointment of the special administrator was proper since the probate court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to appoint a special administrator. Breshears v. Williams, 223 Ark. 368, 265 S.W.2d 956 (1954).

Nonresident Appointees.

This section authorizes a court to appoint a nonresident as a special administrator. Evans v. Cano Del Castillo, 220 Ark. 350, 247 S.W.2d 947 (1952).

The appointment of Mexican counsel for purpose of filing a wrongful death action on behalf of a deceased was an appointment of a special administrator. Evans v. Cano Del Castillo, 220 Ark. 350, 247 S.W.2d 947 (1952).

An order appointing a nonresident as a special administrator is not appealable. Evans v. Cano Del Castillo, 220 Ark. 350, 247 S.W.2d 947 (1952).

Receipt of Service.

The appointment of a special administrator for the purpose of service in order to fix venue in damage suit based on the negligence of deceased was erroneous, but was valid until order of appointment was vacated, since order was voidable. Nickles v. Wood, 221 Ark. 630, 255 S.W.2d 433 (1953).

Service in a damage suit on a special administrator appointed for that purpose was valid though the special administrator was thereafter removed and a general administrator appointed. Nickles v. Wood, 221 Ark. 630, 255 S.W.2d 433 (1953).

Standing.

Order appointing the administratrix on April 11, 2003, as special administratrix specifically stated that the term was for six months; thus, her term expired on October 11, 2003, before she filed complaints against all of the appellees except for the medical center; unless a person was the personal representative or executor of the estate at the time of filing, he had no standing to file a complaint on behalf of the estate and any complaint filed was a nullity, and because the administratrix's complaint was a nullity, her nonsuit on December 6, 2004, did not dismiss these complaints; it dismissed only the properly filed complaint against the medical center, and because the first complaints filed were nullities, the November 17, 2005 complaint was the first complaint filed by a properly appointed personal representative and no savings statute applied; thus, the administratrix's complaint against the medical personnel was barred by the statute of limitations. Brown v. Nat'l Health Care of Pocahontas, Inc., 102 Ark. App. 148, 283 S.W.3d 224 (2008).

Tort Claims.

Probate division of the circuit court had the authority under § 28-53-119 and this section to appoint a special administrator for the limited purpose of pursuing unliquidated tort claims that were not addressed before the estate of the special administrator's parent was closed. Although the circuit court did not use the word “reopen” in its order, its intent was clear enough because it found that the decedent's estate was opened and closed without resolving wrongful death or survival claims and that a special administrator was necessary to pursue the claims. Arman v. Chi St. Vincent Hot Springs, 2019 Ark. App. 187, 574 S.W.3d 731 (2019).

Cited: Constitution State Ins. Co. v. Passmore, 18 Ark. App. 247, 713 S.W.2d 255 (1986); Guess v. Going, 62 Ark. App. 19, 966 S.W.2d 930 (1998); Filyaw v. Bouton, 87 Ark. App. 320, 191 S.W.3d 540 (2004); Heritage Props. Ltd. P'ship v. Walt & Lee Keenihan Found., Inc., 2019 Ark. 371, 584 S.W.3d 685 (2019).