Ark. Code Ann. § 28-50-101 (2026)

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Haught, 1988 Update to the Arkansas Probate System: An Overview of Recent Developments in Arkansas Probate Practice, 42 Ark. L. Rev. 631.

Note, The Requirement of Notice in Probate Proceedings: Recent Changes in Arkansas Law, 43 Ark. L. Rev. 945.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Subsection (f) of this section is constitutional. Callaghan v. Coberly, 927 F. Supp. 332 (W.D. Ark. 1996).

Construction.

A creditor of an estate must be subject to identification during the three month statute of nonclaim under subsection (a) of this section; if this were not the case, then all matters of estate would be left open for two years under § 28-40-111(a) and subsection (h) of this section, which was certainly not the intent of the legislature. Brasel v. Estate of Harp, 317 Ark. 379, 877 S.W.2d 923 (1994).

Subsection (f) of this section does not repeal by implication either § 28-53-119 or § 28-50-102. Callaghan v. Coberly, 927 F. Supp. 332 (W.D. Ark. 1996).

If the defendant is deceased, the three-year limit on wrongful death actions provided by § 16-62-102(c)(1) may be shortened by subsection (a) of this section. Callaghan v. Coberly, 927 F. Supp. 332 (W.D. Ark. 1996).

Purpose.

Under former similar statute, it was intended that an administration should be closed and final settlement made after one year if there were no outstanding debts or claims against the estate. State Nat'l Bank v. Fisher, 186 Ark. 42, 52 S.W.2d 51 (1932) (decision under prior law).

The legislative intention of this section is to require assertion of all claims against a decedent's estate, including those sounding in tort, within the period prescribed. Wolfe v. Herndon, 234 Ark. 543, 353 S.W.2d 540 (1962).

The purpose of this section's requirements in filing of claims against estates is to effect and facilitate the payment of just claims against the estate within the specified time and not to defeat a just claim on a technicality that might entrap the claimant. Jones v. Arkansas Farmers Ass'n, 232 Ark. 186, 334 S.W.2d 887 (1960); Parham v. Pelegrin, 468 F.2d 719 (8th Cir. 1972); Moore v. Moore, 21 Ark. App. 165, 731 S.W.2d 215 (1987).

Two purposes of subsection (f) of this section are to provide certainty and closure to estate administration, and to prevent the elimination of depletion of estate assets by claims not filed timely; and also to provide redress for personal injury victims. Callaghan v. Coberly, 927 F. Supp. 332 (W.D. Ark. 1996).

Applicability.

Time limitations in subsection (a) of this section do not apply to claims by illegitimate children under § 28-9-209(d); therefore, the trial court did not err by finding that an illegitimate son was a pretermitted heir. Taylor v. Hamilton, 90 Ark. App. 235, 205 S.W.3d 149 (2005).

—Claims.

This section does not refer to claims of title or for the recovery of property, for the reason that claims of such a character cannot, in any sense, be said to be claims against the estate of the deceased. Morton v. Yell, 239 Ark. 195, 388 S.W.2d 88 (1965); Moore v. Moore, 21 Ark. App. 165, 731 S.W.2d 215 (1987).

A compensation carrier is not required to file a claim against the estate of an employee killed in an auto accident arising out of, and in the course of, his employment in order to enforce its subrogation rights against the sum paid under the uninsured motorist provision of the deceased employee's automobile insurance policy. Boehler v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 290 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Ark. 1968). But see Heiss v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 250 Ark. 474, 465 S.W.2d 699 (1971).

A claim against an estate for attorney's fees awarded against the personal representative in an action commenced by the personal representative was an administrative claim and, therefore, was not subject to the statute of nonclaim. Eddins v. Style Optics, Inc., 71 Ark. App. 102, 35 S.W.3d 315 (2000).

—Guardianships.

The claim of a ward against the estate of a deceased guardian had to be presented to his administrator within the time prescribed after the grant of letters of administration, whether there has been a final settlement of the guardianship or not. Connelly v. Weatherford, 33 Ark. 658 (1878) (decision under prior law).

—Infants.

Infants have been held not excepted from the statute of nonclaim. Padgett v. State, 45 Ark. 495 (1885) (decision under prior law).

In an action by an executor for damages sustained by the decedent in an automobile accident between decedent and defendant where defendant filed a cross-complaint for damages against estate, the fact that the guardian ad litem of the defendant was not appointed in strict compliance with the applicable statute was of no consequence since there is no savings clause in favor of infants in the statute of nonclaim; therefore, it was incumbent upon defendant to present his claim in compliance with this section by filing a copy of the cross-complaint with the probate court. Wolfe v. Herndon, 234 Ark. 543, 353 S.W.2d 540 (1962).

—Nonresidents.

Former similar statute applied to and ran against nonresidents as well as resident claimants. Erwin v. Turner, 6 Ark. (1 English) 14 (1845) (decision under prior law).

—State Claims.

The statute of nonclaim was held a bar to the claims of the state if not presented within the time prescribed as in the case of individuals. Hill v. State, 23 Ark. (10 Barber) 604 (1861) (decision under prior law).

Amendment of Claims.

Where the original claim against an estate was filed within the statutory period, an amendment filed after the expiration of the time allowed for the filing of claims was not a new cause of action but merely a clarification of the original claim which contained allegations upon which the amended claim was predicated; therefore, it related back to the original filing of the claim. Gober v. Baker, 239 Ark. 692, 393 S.W.2d 620 (1965).

Bank Stock Assessments.

A claim by the state bank commissioner against the executor of a deceased stockholder to recover the assessment on bank stock was not to be dismissed for failure to comply with former similar statute. Berlin v. Rainwater, 174 Ark. 66, 294 S.W. 368 (1927) (decision under prior law).

Claims Barred.

A claim presented more than 15 years after decedent's death and first publication of notice to creditors was barred under subsections (a) and (b) of this section. Brooks v. Baker, 242 Ark. 128, 412 S.W.2d 271 (1967).

An action to recover for injuries sustained in an automobile collision involving a vehicle driven by the decedent was barred under this section where it was not instituted until more than six months after the administratrix' first notice to creditors was published. Lopez v. Waldrum Estate, 249 Ark. 558, 460 S.W.2d 61 (1970) (decision under prior law).

Circuit court did not clearly err when it determined that the creditor was not a known or reasonably ascertainable creditor, and thus its decision that the creditor's claims were untimely was upheld. CMS Inv. Holdings, LLC v. Estate of Wilson, 2016 Ark. App. 545, 506 S.W.3d 292 (2016).

Claims Timely Filed.

Where a claim against an estate reached a county clerk and, though not filed separately, was placed in the case file of deceased's estate within the statutory period for filing, the claim was deemed timely filed under this section. Edwards v. Brimm, 236 Ark. 588, 367 S.W.2d 433 (1963).

Contingent Claims.

A contingent claim filed under § 28-50-110 which does not become absolute until a ruling by a court is made and is then filed within six months after becoming absolute is not barred because it was not filed within the time required by this section. Whitener v. Whitener, 227 Ark. 1038, 304 S.W.2d 260 (1957).

A contingent claim against an estate, which becomes absolute six months prior to the final order of distribution, must be filed within six months after becoming absolute or it is unenforceable. Huff v. Bruce, 261 Ark. 498, 549 S.W.2d 282 (1977).

Cosureties.

In a suit on the bond of an insurance agent, the failure to proceed against the estate of one surety prior to the bar of former similar statute did not release cosurety where the statutory bar attached prior to the accrual of a cause of action. Oliver v. Franklin Fire Ins. Co., 195 Ark. 840, 114 S.W.2d 1071 (1938) (decision under prior law).

Exhibition of Claims.

All demands existing at the time of the death of a testator or intestate, whether matured or not, capable of being asserted in a court of justice, whether of law or equity, had to be exhibited within the period prescribed as did also all claims coming into existence at any time after the death of the testator or intestate, and before the expiration of this period. Bennett v. Dawson, 18 Ark. (5 Barber) 334 (1857); Stewart v. Thomasson, 94 Ark. 60, 126 S.W. 86 (1910) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Federal Question Rule.

A defendant was not entitled to dismissal of an action based on federal rights where the plaintiff complied with the federal rule of substitution of parties rather than this conflicting statute relating to the assertion of claims against estates. Downie v. Pritchard, 309 F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1962).

Where an executor chose a federal forum to litigate all claims against an estate under rights conferred by 46 U.S.C. §§ 182-189, and matters of procedure under the federal statutes were in conflict with provisions of this section and § 28-50-104, the federal statutes governed. Parham v. Pelegrin, 468 F.2d 719 (8th Cir. 1972).

Where an executor chose a federal forum to litigate all claims against an estate under 46 U.S.C. Appx. §§ 182-189, and federal district court issued an injunction barring all actions, suits, and proceedings against the estate other than those filed with the federal district court clerk, the failure by claimants against estate to comply with this section by presenting claims to personal representative of the estate was not ground for dismissal of the claims, since, under § 28-50-104, claims presented to the personal representative must thereafter be filed with the court and such a proceeding was expressly forbidden by the federal district court's injunction. Parham v. Pelegrin, 468 F.2d 719 (8th Cir. 1972).

Final and Appealable Order.

An order disallowing a claim for failure to file within the time and manner required by this section is a final and appealable order and cannot be attacked on appeal of a denial of a motion to set aside the order where there is no showing of error in the order denying the motion. Boyd v. Matthews, 239 Ark. 112, 388 S.W.2d 102 (1965).

Judgments.

A delay of 13 years barred the enforcement of a judgment. Johnson v. Peck, 58 Ark. 580, 25 S.W. 865 (1894) (decision under prior law).

It was not necessary for the validity of a judgment against the estate of a deceased administrator that it be presented to his executors or referred to a probate court. McLain v. Sprigg, 174 Ark. 1052, 298 S.W. 870 (1927) (decision under prior law).

—Ancillary Administration.

A judgment against an ancillary administrator in another state was not binding on the original administrator in this state; nor could the judgment-creditor pursue the assets of the estate here which had descended to heirs or distributees after the expiration of the time for presentation of claims. Turner v. Risor, 54 Ark. 33, 15 S.W. 13 (1890) (decision under prior law).

—No Notice.

Where judgment of allowance of a claim was rendered without notice to the executor, it was subject to attack for unavoidable casualty preventing the executor from appearing and making her defense. Withers v. Merritt, 212 Ark. 91, 204 S.W.2d 881 (1947) (decision under prior law).

Notice of Filing Claims.

Statutory notice of the filing of a claim against an estate was not waived because of the lack of diligence of the counsel for the executor in complying with a court order to file an inventory. Withers v. Merritt, 212 Ark. 91, 204 S.W.2d 881 (1947) (decision under prior law).

The fact that an executor had knowledge of the existence of a claim against the estate did not waive the statutory provisions concerning notice of filing the claim. Withers v. Merritt, 212 Ark. 91, 204 S.W.2d 881 (1947) (decision under prior law).

Preservation for Review.

Argument that a wife's declaratory judgment action in a probate case was time barred under this section was not heard on appellate review because the issue was not raised before the trial court. Cloud v. Brandt, 370 Ark. 323, 259 S.W.3d 439 (2007).

Promissory Notes.

A promissory note that stipulates that it was to be “paid at once after my funeral expenses and debts are paid” was not void and was not in conflict with former similar statute. Simon v. Pine Bluff Trust Co., 99 Ark. 523, 138 S.W. 986 (1911) (decision under prior law).

Reasonable Notice.

Where a passenger injured in an airplane crash filed a negligence suit against the estate of the deceased pilot, the insurer of the airplane was entitled to notice of, and had the right to intervene in, the proceedings; the method of giving notice had to be reasonably calculated to apprise the insurance company of the pendency of the action, and the attempted notice by a letter mailed to the wrong address was insufficient. Ideal Mut. Ins. Co. v. McMillian, 275 Ark. 418, 631 S.W.2d 274 (1982).

Right to Intervene.

Under the provisions of subsection (f) of this section, an insurance company which insures a deceased tortfeasor is the only party financially interested in the outcome of the case, since, although the estate is the named defendant, it is not financially liable under the statute; therefore, the peculiar nature of the statute, in effect, confers an unconditional right to intervene on the insurance carrier under ARCP 24(a), and the insurance carrier is entitled to notice of the proceedings. Ideal Mut. Ins. Co. v. McMillian, 275 Ark. 418, 631 S.W.2d 274 (1982).

Statute of Nonclaim.

Circuit court erred when it held that a father's claim was barred by the statute of nonclaim, subsections (a) and (f) of this section; because the father was a known or reasonably ascertainable creditor within the nonclaim period and did not receive actual notice of the nonclaim deadline, subsection (h) of this section extended the nonclaim period for two years. Massey v. Fulks, 2011 Ark. 4, 376 S.W.3d 389 (2011), rehearing denied, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2011 Ark. LEXIS 364 (Ark. Feb. 17, 2011).

—Applicability.

Where an action on note was commenced in January 1937, and an administrator was appointed in December 1936, and the administrator's answer admitted that note, duly verified by both the assignor and assignee, had been presented to him and his attorney admitted in open court at the trial that this had been done before commencement of the suit, the court was warranted in finding that the statute of nonclaim did not apply. Potts v. Brotherton, 197 Ark. 556, 124 S.W.2d 5 (1939) (decision under prior law).

The statute of nonclaim did not apply where a deceased before her death failed to terminate a year-to-year tenancy relationship with appellee bygiving the required notice, where the appellee was ousted from the leased premises by the administrator of the decedent's estate prior to the end of the term, and where the appellee obtained a judgment against the estate for wrongful ouster, which arose as a cost of administration of the estate. Brickey v. Lacy, 247 Ark. 906, 448 S.W.2d 331 (1969).

—Claims Barred.

Where a bank by mistake permitted a customer to overdraw his account and the overdraft was not discovered until after the statutory period of nonclaim ran against the customer's estate, the claim was barred. Lawrence County Bank v. Arendt, 80 Ark. 523, 98 S.W. 356 (1906) (decision under prior law).

—Claims Not Barred.

A secured creditor retains the right to enforce a lien against real or personal property pledged as collateral, notwithstanding the creditor's failure to file a probable claim against the debtor's estate within the nonclaim limitations period. United States v. Dawson, 929 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1991).

—Commencement.

The statute of nonclaim began to run on a demand against the estate of a deceased person from the grant of letters of administration thereon. Ross v. Frick Co., 73 Ark. 45, 83 S.W. 343 (1904) (decision under prior law).

—Federal Actions.

A minor and his mother could maintain tort actions against the estate of a decedent after the expiration of the statute of nonclaim when there was in force a policy of liability insurance on decedent's vehicle which had been depleted through the use of a bill of interpleader in the federal district court. Johnson v. Poore, 266 Ark. 601, 587 S.W.2d 44 (1979).

—Mortgages.

A mortgage was held enforceable after the mortgagor's death, so long as the debt was not barred, regardless of the statute of nonclaim. Burlingham v. Hutchins, 184 Ark. 764, 43 S.W.2d 362 (1931) (decision under prior law).

A mortgagee was not required to file a verified demand within the period of the statute of nonclaim for proceeds of fire insurance on decedent's property insured for benefit of mortgagee, inasmuch as these proceeds had not come into the administrator's hands as an asset of the estate, but as a trust fund. Sharp v. Pease, 193 Ark. 352, 99 S.W.2d 588 (1936) (decision under prior law).

—Personal Injuries.

The statute of nonclaim and not § 16-62-101 governs claims for personal injuries resulting from an automobile collision alleged to have been caused by the negligence of a decedent. Lopez v. Waldrum Estate, 249 Ark. 558, 460 S.W.2d 61 (1970).

Injury and death claims must be filed with the estate within six months from the date of the first publication of notice in order for the probate estate to be liable; otherwise, they are barred. Dodson v. Charter Behavioral Health Sys., 335 Ark. 96, 983 S.W.2d 98 (1998).

The service of a complaint against an estate for personal injuries does not satisfy the statutory requirement for filing a claim with the estate. Dodson v. Charter Behavioral Health Sys., 335 Ark. 96, 983 S.W.2d 98 (1998).

—Revival of Claims.

A claim against an estate once barred by the statute of nonclaim could not be revived by the actions of the administrator in making payments on account. Rhodes v. Cannon, 112 Ark. 6, 164 S.W. 752 (1914) (decision under prior law).

—Rule of Limitations.

The statute of nonclaim, and not the general statute of limitations, gave the rule of limitation to claims against the estates of deceased persons not barred at the time of the death of the debtor. Biscoe v. Madden, 17 Ark. (4 Barber) 533 (1856) (decision under prior law).

—Tolled.

The exhibition of a claim, properly authenticated, to an administrator arrested the statute of nonclaim, and the law did not thereafter limit the time of presentment of the rejected claim to the court for classification. Randolph v. Ward, 29 Ark. 238 (1874) (decision under prior law).

Although the statute of nonclaim was tolled as to the elements of damage for which a serviceman, as husband and father, pursuant to the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, was entitled to recover from the estate of decedent for injuries sustained in an automobile collision involving a vehicle driven by the decedent, it was not tolled with respect to the action brought by the serviceman, in a representative capacity on behalf of his wife and minor child, as to recovery of damages to which they were entitled, each in their own personal right. Lopez v. Waldrum Estate, 249 Ark. 558, 460 S.W.2d 61 (1970).

—Waiver.

The requirement that a claim be presented to the administrators within the time fixed by law or be barred under the nonclaim statute was waived when the administrators failed to plead the nonclaim statute at the time the claim was allowed by the court, so that the administrators could not later have the order approving the claim set aside, because the claim was not filed within the statutory time. Southern Furn. Co. v. Morgan, 214 Ark. 182, 214 S.W.2d 905 (1948) (decision under prior law).

The failure of an administrator to deny a claim filed in behalf of the wrong claimant until after the statute of nonclaims has run against the claim of the proper claimant does not constitute a waiver of the right to resist the claim filed. Chronister v. Custer, 237 Ark. 522, 374 S.W.2d 357 (1964).

Time for Filing.

Where a claimant filed a claim against the estate of a deceased more than six months after the first notice to creditors but less than six months after the heirs had filed their waivers of notice, the claim was properly disallowed. Chamberlain v. Crawford, 236 Ark. 468, 366 S.W.2d 897 (1963) (decision under prior law).

An action against the estate of a decedent for personal injury committed by him must be filed within the period of limitation prescribed by this section even though the plaintiff is looking not to the assets of the estate but to the decedent's liability insurer for payment of his judgment. Swan v. Estate of Monette ex rel. Monette, 265 F. Supp. 362 (W.D. Ark. 1967), aff'd, 400 F.2d 274 (8th Cir. Ark. 1968).

Where the Arkansas trial court made no finding regarding the solvency of the decedent's estate, it was improper for the trial court to grant summary judgment on the Tennessee creditors' claims against the estate. There was no evidence to indicate that the creditors properly presented their claims in the ancillary action in the manner required by Arkansas law and within the time permitted by subdivision (a)(1) of this section. Ellingsen v. King, 2009 Ark. App. 655 (2009).

Tort Claims.

Under subsection (f) of this section, two litigants may have absolutely identical causes of action, but only one litigant can bring suit if only that litigant will be able to sue on applicable insurance coverage; the litigant who is not lucky enough to be able to sue against an insurance policy will be time-barred. Callaghan v. Coberly, 927 F. Supp. 332 (W.D. Ark. 1996).

Action for wrongful death brought against the personal representative of the estate of defendant to recover insurance proceeds from a policy held by the estate would have been time-barred by subsection (a) of this section were it not for the fact that tort claims that can be recovered entirely from insurance proceeds are exempt from subsection (a) pursuant to subsection (f). Callaghan v. Coberly, 927 F. Supp. 332 (W.D. Ark. 1996).

The court denied a writ of prohibition on the plaintiffs' tort claims against an estate, because subsections (a) and (f) of this section authorize and extend tort actions for personal injuries where there was a liability insurance policy in force on the decedent's vehicle at the time of the accident, even though the statute of nonclaim has expired. Tatro v. Langston, 328 Ark. 548, 944 S.W.2d 118 (Ark. 1997).

Wrongful Ouster.

Where a lessor failed to terminate a year-to-year tenancy relationship with the lessee by giving the required notice before her death, but lessee was nevertheless ousted from the leased premises by the deceased lessor's administrator prior to the end of the term of the lease, a judgment against the estate for wrongful ouster arose as a cost of administration and was not barred by this section. Brickey v. Lacy, 247 Ark. 906, 448 S.W.2d 331 (1969).

Cited: Bostic v. Bostic Estate, 281 Ark. 167, 662 S.W.2d 815 (1984); In re Estate of Spears, 314 Ark. 54, 858 S.W.2d 93 (1993); Wingate-Mickles v. Harris, 2016 Ark. App. 253 (2016).