Arkansas Code Annotated

Ark. Code Ann. § 28-53-105 (2020)

Order of final distribution — Conclusiveness

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  1. The order of final distribution shall be a conclusive determination as to the persons who are the successors in interest to that part of the estate of the decedent passing through the hands of the personal representative and as to the extent and character of their interests therein, subject only to the right of appeal and the right to reopen the order.
  2. The order shall not affect the rights of third parties acquired from or through a distributee, as against the distributee.

History. Acts 1949, No. 140, § 161; 1959, No. 190, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 62-2902.

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law: Decedents' Estates, 6 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 139.

Case Notes

Continuing Duty of Personal Representative.

The duty of a personal representative to account is a continuing one, not subject to the statute of limitations, until such time as he is finally discharged and final distribution approved. Where the proceeding is still pending in a probate court, the original objections and exceptions of a plaintiff will be considered as continuing as long as the purported account filed has not been approved, and a lapse of time between the filing of the plaintiff's objections and the petition to cite him to render an accounting would not be a sufficient basis for estoppel. Price v. Price, 253 Ark. 1124, 491 S.W.2d 793 (1973).

Res Judicata.

A widow's heirs were not bound by a distribution order entered in the estate of her husband under the doctrine of res judicata, for they were not parties to that proceeding nor were they concluded by the principle of virtual representation since it could not be said that the widow fairly represented the same interest as theirs in the uncontested proceeding, the distribution order being that she was the sole beneficiary of her husband's estate, there being no other distributees under the terms of the will regardless of husband stating that by any undisposed of properties husband meant to be distributed to both his heirs and his wife's heirs. Collie v. Tucker, 229 Ark. 606, 317 S.W.2d 137 (1958).

Cited: Keenan v. Peevy, 267 Ark. 218, 590 S.W.2d 259 (1979); Arman v. Chi St. Vincent Hot Springs, 2019 Ark. App. 187, 574 S.W.3d 731 (2019).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 2 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 2019–2021 · leading case: Keith Magness v. Joy Kaye Simmons Graddy, 2021 Ark. App. 119, 619 S.W.3d 878.
Keith Magness v. Joy Kaye Simmons Graddy, 2021 Ark. App. 119, 619 S.W.3d 878. · cites it 2× “Citing Arkansas Code Annotated section 28-53-105 (Repl. 2012), appellee further argued that the order of final distribution was a final adjudication of the matter and served as a bar to any subsequent attacks of the probate court’s order.”
Arman v. Chi St. Vincent Hot Springs, 2019 Ark. App. 187, 574 S.W.3d 731. · cites it 2× “Ark. Code Ann. § 28-53-105 (a) (Repl. 2012).”
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