Ark. Code Ann. § 3-4-201 (2026)
Number of permits restricted — Definition
- The public policy of the state is to restrict the number of permits in this state to dispense vinous (except small farm wines), spirituous, or malt liquor.
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- The Alcoholic Beverage Control Board shall determine whether public convenience and advantage will be promoted by issuing a permit and by increasing or decreasing the number of permits the board issues.
- The number of permits issued by the board shall be restricted.
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The board has the discretion to determine the number of permits to be granted in each county of this state or within the corporate limits of any municipality of this state and to determine the location and the persons to whom the permits shall be issued, under the following conditions:
- The number of permits allowing the off-premises sale of vinous (except small farm wines), spirituous, or malt liquor in the State of Arkansas shall not exceed a ratio of one (1) permit for every seven thousand five hundred (7,500) population residing in the county or political subdivision of the county;
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- The number of permits allowing the off-premises sale of vinous (except small farm wines), spirituous, or malt liquor in a county or political subdivision of the county that permits the sale shall not exceed a ratio of one (1) permit for every seven thousand five hundred (7,500) population residing in that county or political subdivision of the county.
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Population of the county or political subdivision of the county shall:
- Be determined according to the most recent federal decennial census; and
- Count all residents of the county or political subdivision of the county, including without limitation the residents of a dry political subdivision of a county;
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A new permit that is issued in a county or political subdivision of the county following the most recent federal decennial census shall be issued under the following restrictions:
- Additional permits may be issued at a ratio of one (1) permit for every additional seven thousand five hundred (7,500) population within the county or political subdivision of the county; and
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- A qualified applicant may apply for a permit.
- Qualifications are to be set by the board and the board's determination of the public convenience and advantage;
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- If it is determined that a county or political subdivision of the county is entitled to additional permits when warranted by the most recent federal decennial census, the board shall announce before the last date for applications the number of new permits, if any, that may be issued in the county or political subdivision of the county.
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In the event that the most recent federal decennial census population figures decline in a county or political subdivision of the county:
- Existing permits shall not be cancelled or revoked for the decline in population;
- The quota ratio shall not be applied to the county or political subdivision of the county until the population in the county or political subdivision of the county reaches a number equaling one (1) permit to every seven thousand five hundred (7,500) population; and
- A new permit shall not be issued in the county or political subdivision of the county until the population warrants.
- A transfer of locations from one county to another county is not allowed.
- If a holder of a permit for the sale of vinous (except small farm wines), spirituous, or malt liquor surrenders the permit in a county or political subdivision of the county where the ratio no longer meets the requirement of one (1) permit for every seven thousand five hundred (7,500) population, new applications shall not be accepted until that ratio is reestablished at a subsequent federal decennial census;
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- If a permit holder does not conduct business under a permit issued for a period of more than thirty (30) days, the permit shall be surrendered to the Director of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Division and shall be placed on inactive status.
- The permit may remain inactive for three (3) months.
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To secure the return of the permit, the permit holder shall file with the director a written statement showing:
- That all taxes and fees owing to the state have been paid;
- The reason for the suspension of business activities; and
- The date business activity will resume.
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- The permit holder may petition the board for an extension of inactive status for an additional three-month period.
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The board may grant an initial extension upon a showing by the permit holder and a finding by the board that:
- Business circumstances exist to justify an extension;
- The delay to return to business was not due to mere deferral or inattention on the part of the permit holder; and
- The inactive status should be extended.
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- The permit holder may appeal to the board for a second extension of inactive status for an additional six-month period, but only upon a showing by the permit holder and a finding by the board that emergency circumstances exist to justify a final extension.
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“Emergency circumstances” means delays in return to business that are beyond the control, planning, or foresight of the permit holder, including without limitation:
- A delay due to a natural or man-made disaster;
- The pending adjudication of a lawsuit;
- A building construction problem; and
- A contested or delayed insurance claim or settlement.
- A permit remaining on inactive status for a period of more than twelve (12) months or which has not been granted an extension under this subdivision (c)(5) shall expire; and
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- This section and §§ 3-4-202 and 3-4-208, except with regard to a permit on inactive status for more than twelve (12) months after the provisions of subdivision (c)(5) of this section have become effective or a permit that has expired in accordance with subdivision (c)(5) of this section, do not divest any permit holder holding the permit on September 1, 2019, regardless of the quota ratio, of his or her permit.
- In a county or political subdivision of the county that has a ratio lower than the permit quota ratio of one (1) permit for every seven thousand five hundred (7,500) population, the permit holder shall be allowed to continue under subdivision (c)(4)(B) of this section.
History. Acts 1935, No. 108, Art. 3, § 1; 1937, No. 80, § 1; Pope's Dig., § 14106; Acts 1955, No. 360, § 1; 1983, No. 812, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 48-301; Acts 1991, No. 714, § 1; 1991, No. 1179, § 1; 1993, No. 779, § 2; 2013, No. 1068, § 1; 2019, No. 571, § 1.
Amendments. The 2013 amendment, in (a), deleted “It is declared to be” preceding “The public”, substituted “is to restrict” for “that”, inserted “small farm” preceding “wines”, and deleted “shall be restricted” following “liquor”; rewrote (b) and (c); and, in (d), deleted “The provisions of” preceding “This section” and inserted “small farm” preceding “wines”.
The 2019 amendment substituted “the board issues” for “it issues” in (b)(1); rewrote (c); deleted (d); updated internal references; and made stylistic changes.
Research References
U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.
Justin Wayne Harper, Note: A Spirited Revolution: Local Option Elections and the Impending Death of Prohibition in Arkansas, 38 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 527 (2016).
Case Notes
Constitutionality of Emergency Clause.
The effect of Acts 1983, No. 812 which amended this section was to establish a special privilege for people residing in the more populous counties, to the exclusion of others; therefore, the emergency clause appended to that act was unconstitutional under Ark. Const. Amend. 7, which prohibits emergencies in acts granting special privileges. Marshall v. Singleton, 282 Ark. 167, 666 S.W.2d 399 (1984).
Discretion of Board and Director.
Action of the Commissioner of Revenues (now the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board) in refusing to grant a retail permit in a certain area is discretionary and when not arbitrary or discriminatory cannot be controlled by mandamus. Hardin v. Cassinelli, 204 Ark. 1016, 166 S.W.2d 258 (1942).
The Director of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Division and the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board are given broad discretionary powers to decide the number of permits and to issue them only when it is determined that public convenience and advantage would be promoted. Carder v. Hemstock, 5 Ark. App. 115, 633 S.W.2d 384 (1982); Ark. ABC Bd. v. Muncrief, 308 Ark. 373, 825 S.W.2d 816 (1992).
The “public convenience and advantage” language of this section invests the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board with much discretionary leeway in deciding whether to approve an application for a transfer of a retail liquor outlet, and therefore where substantial evidence supports the board's decision, the Supreme Court must defer to the board's expertise and experience. Fayetteville School Dist. No. 1 v. ABC Bd., 279 Ark. 89, 648 S.W.2d 804 (1983).
Factors Considered.
Factors to be considered by the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board before issuing a permit to operate a private club include: (1) the number and types of alcoholic permits in the area; (2) economic impact; (3) traffic hazards; (4) remoteness of the area; (5) degree of law enforcement available; (6) input from law enforcement or other public officials in the area; and (7) comments from area residents in opposition or support of the permit. Moore v. King, 56 Ark. App. 21, 937 S.W.2d 677 (1997).
In finding that the area was adequately served by the existing liquor stores nearby, the board was entitled to rely on the opinion of area residents and public officials that the existing liquor stores already served the public convenience, obviating the need for another. Vallaroutto v. ABC Bd., 81 Ark. App. 318, 101 S.W.3d 836 (2003).
Grant or Denial of Permits.
The failure to grant any permits in a city during a period of 12 years was not in and of itself arbitrary, where there was no evidence to indicate that the board had systematically denied applications in the area or even that such applications had been made. Carder v. Hemstock, 5 Ark. App. 115, 633 S.W.2d 384 (1982).
Even if the board could or should have found that due to economic expansion an additional outlet was desirable, it was not required to grant a particular application for a specific location where the board found the location would disadvantage not only those utilizing the facility but the general public. Carder v. Hemstock, 5 Ark. App. 115, 633 S.W.2d 384 (1982).
Board's decision denying permit was supported by substantial evidence. Johnson v. Ark. ABC Bd., 6 Ark. App. 366, 642 S.W.2d 335 (1982).
There was substantial evidence to support board's action granting permit. Green v. Carder, 282 Ark. 239, 667 S.W.2d 660 (1984).
Denial of application upheld, where predicated on the fact that the proposed location was unsuitable for transfer of the liquor and beer permits. Edwards v. ABC Div. Bd., 307 Ark. 245, 819 S.W.2d 271 (1991).
Inactive Permits.
The 1993 amendment of this section set forth detailed procedures for the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board to use in handling inactive permits; nothing in the amendment is inconsistent with the implementation of ABC Reg. § 1.80. Blann v. ABC Bd., 317 Ark. 97, 876 S.W.2d 258 (1994).
New Permits.
The term “new permits” in subdivision (c)(2) of this section applies to a permit which increases the overall number of permits. Blann v. ABC Bd., 317 Ark. 97, 876 S.W.2d 258 (1994).
On-Premises Consumption.
Under this section no provision is made for dispensing liquors at retail for on-premises consumption and the issuance of such permits by the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board was unauthorized by law and invalid. Hinton v. State ex rel. Purcell, 246 Ark. 341, 438 S.W.2d 57 (1969).
Public Convenience and Advantage.
There was not substantial evidence on the record to support a finding that the public convenience and advantage would not be served by issuance of retail liquor permit under this section. Snyder v. ABC Bd., 1 Ark. App. 92, 613 S.W.2d 126 (1981).
Mere numbers of persons being either for or against the issuance of retail liquor permits is of no significance under this section and is insufficient to allow the board to conclude that the granting of permits would not be to the public convenience and advantage. Stringfellow v. ABC Bd., 3 Ark. App. 124, 623 S.W.2d 213 (1981).
As security and public safety are factors to be considered in determining whether public convenience and advantage are to be promoted, the board properly considered testimony regarding the difficulty of police protection at a specific location. Carder v. Hemstock, 5 Ark. App. 115, 633 S.W.2d 384 (1982).
The words “public convenience and advantage” should not be restricted to a colloquial sense as synonymous with “handy or easy of access” but construed in that sense which connotes suitable and fitting to supply the public needs to the public advantage. Carder v. Hemstock, 5 Ark. App. 115, 633 S.W.2d 384 (1982); Ark. ABC Bd. v. Muncrief, 308 Ark. 373, 825 S.W.2d 816 (1992).
The reference to the “public convenience and advantage” in this section means that the interest of the general public is to be considered, not merely that of the applicant. Fayetteville School Dist. No. 1 v. ABC Bd., 279 Ark. 89, 648 S.W.2d 804 (1983); Ark. ABC Bd. v. Muncrief, 308 Ark. 373, 825 S.W.2d 816 (1992).
The number of persons who object to, or support, the issuance of retail liquor permits is not significant under the statute; the reasons for the support or opposition may be very significant. Ark. ABC Bd. v. Muncrief, 308 Ark. 373, 825 S.W.2d 816 (1992).
Rules and Regulations.
In a case where an application to operate a retail liquor store was conditionally granted, the Arkansas Alcoholic Beverage Control Board had the statutory authority to enact rules and regulations. Therefore, the board had the authority to impose conditions on the approval of applications. Sheppard v. Ark. ABC Bd., 2014 Ark. App. 604, 447 S.W.3d 614 (2014).
Trial De Novo.
Former provision authorizing the circuit court in a trial de novo to redetermine or disregard the factual base upon which the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board relied to issue a liquor license was unconstitutional because such a trial sanctioned judicial encroachment into an area constitutionally reserved to the executive branch of government in the exercise of its executive discretion pursuant to this section. Goodall v. Williams, 271 Ark. 354, 609 S.W.2d 25 (1980).
Cited: Ark. ABC Bd. v. King, 275 Ark. 308, 629 S.W.2d 288 (1982); Westerman v. Singleton, 9 Ark. App. 120, 653 S.W.2d 152 (1983); Marshall v. ABC Bd., 15 Ark. App. 255, 692 S.W.2d 258 (1985).