Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-202 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

Dog as deadly or dangerous weapon for purposes of statutes aggravating offenses such as assault and robbery. 124 A.L.R.5th 657.

Parts of Human Body, other than Feet, as Deadly or Dangerous Weapons or Instrumentalities for Purposes of Statutes Aggravating Offenses such as Assault and Robbery. 67 A.L.R.6th 103.

Ark. L. Rev.

Case Note, Criminal Liability for Attempting to Inflict the AIDS Virus: Possibilities in Arkansas' Future, 45 Ark. L. Rev. 505.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislation of the 1983 General Assembly, Juvenile Law, 6 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 631.

Survey of Legislation, 2003 Arkansas General Assembly, Criminal Law, Battery, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 365.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

The provisions of subdivision (a)(4) are of common understanding and practice and thus are not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. Harmon v. State, 260 Ark. 665, 543 S.W.2d 43 (1976).

In General.

The phrase “under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life” contained in § 5-13-201(a)(3) is what distinguishes conduct constituting first-degree battery from that of second-degree battery; giving the phrase its plain meaning, the circumstances of first-degree battery must by necessity be more dire and formidable in terms of affecting human life. Tigue v. State, 319 Ark. 147, 889 S.W.2d 760 (1994).

Collateral estoppel did not preclude the trial court from making a determination under 11 U.S.C.S. § 523(a)(6) on the issues of willfulness and maliciousness. It was not necessary to a criminal conviction for second-degree battery under this section that the debtor's actions be willful and malicious; furthermore, the fact that defendant stipulated to liability in a civil suit did not satisfy the “actually litigated” requirement. Hidy v. Bullard (In re Bullard), 451 B.R. 473 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2011), aff'd, — B.R. —, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 2151 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. June 14, 2011).

Age.

The phrase “twelve years of age or younger,” as used in this section, designates persons whose age is less than or under twelve years, as well as persons who have reached and passed their twelfth birthday, but have not reached their thirteenth birthday. State v. Joshua, 307 Ark. 79, 818 S.W.2d 249 (1991), overruled, Kelly v. Kelly, 310 Ark. 244, 835 S.W.2d 869 (1992), overruled in part, Kelly v. Kelly, 310 Ark. 244, 835 S.W.2d 869 (1992).

This section, requires the State to prove that a defendant have actual knowledge of the victim's age. Sansevero v. State, 345 Ark. 307, 45 S.W.3d 840 (2001).

Cause.

Where defendant choked victim and said he would kill her, causing victim to jump through the window rather than be shot and killed, the defendant caused the injuries the victim sustained in the fall and was guilty of second-degree battery. Jenkins v. State, 60 Ark. App. 122, 959 S.W.2d 427 (1998).

Course of Conduct.

Conduct upon which the state based charges of manslaughter and second degree battery, a car wreck, was not a single, continuous and uninterrupted act out of which the defendant could only be prosecuted for one offense; neither manslaughter nor second degree battery is specifically defined as a continuing course of conduct. Lawrence v. State, 39 Ark. App. 39, 839 S.W.2d 10 (1992).

Crime of Violence.

Defendant's sentence as a career-offender under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1 was vacated because a district court erred by failing to apply the modified categorical approach to determine whether defendant's prior conviction for second-degree battery in violation of subsection (a) of this section was for a crime of violence. United States v. Dawn, 685 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 2012).

Where a defendant appealed his 110-month sentence for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), his battery conviction under subdivision (a)(4) of this section was for a crime of violence and the district court correctly calculated his base offense level under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1. United States v. Rice, 813 F.3d 704 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 137 S. Ct. 59, 196 L. Ed. 2d 59 (2016).

Where a defendant appealed his 15-year sentence for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), he qualified as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1); he acknowledged two qualifying prior convictions, and the lower court did not err in concluding that defendant's conviction for second-degree battery under subdivision (a)(2) of this section was a violent felony and thus a third qualifying offense. United States v. Winston, 845 F.3d 876 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 137 S. Ct. 2201, 198 L. Ed. 2d 265, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 3513 (U.S. May 30, 2017).

District court did not err in considering defendant's previous conviction for aiding and abetting distribution of methamphetamine as a controlled substance offense for purposes of career offender sentencing enhancement under federal law because aiding and abetting offenses are included in enhancement. In addition, the record of conviction demonstrated that defendant was convicted for accomplice to second-degree battery under subdivision (a)(1) of this section, which includes as an element the use of physical force. United States v. Garcia, 946 F.3d 413 (8th Cir. 2019).

Deadly Weapon.

Evidence was sufficient to find that the object used in a stabbing was a deadly weapon in the manner of its use, even though it was not identifiable, because it was sharp, pointy, and when stabbed at the victim was capable of penetrating his torso and puncturing his lung. Medlock v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 609 (2013).

Defense or Justification.

Where a conductor, assaulted by a passenger, used force to repel such assault, the burden was on the railroad company to show that the conductor used no more force than appeared to him, as a reasonable man, necessary to repel the assault. Saint Louis S.W. Ry. v. Berger, 64 Ark. 613, 44 S.W. 809 (1898) (decision under prior law).

The defendant had to be free from all carelessness in reaching the conclusion that his own safety demanded the action he took against the plaintiff. Downey v. Duff, 106 Ark. 4, 152 S.W. 1010 (1912) (decision under prior law).

Court did not err in instructing jury that no one was allowed to exercise right of self defense, if he willingly entered into a fight, where defendant did not request clarification, and made no specific objection to the instruction. Hadaway v. State, 215 Ark. 658, 222 S.W.2d 799 (1949) (decision under prior law).

Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a charge of murder in the first degree or to a charge of battery in the second degree; voluntary intoxication is not available as a defense for purposes of negating specific intent. Gilkey v. State, 41 Ark. App. 100, 848 S.W.2d 439 (1993).

Because second-degree battery has as one of its elements the infliction of serious physical injury, it is a “felony involving force or violence”; thus, in a second-degree murder case, the trial court erred by failing to give a jury instruction for justification that had both second-degree battery and unlawful deadly physical force alternatives since both were warranted by evidence that defendant was confronted by three men in an attack before he stabbed one of them in the heart with a pocket knife. Hamilton v. State, 97 Ark. App. 172, 245 S.W.3d 710 (2006).

Defendant's conviction for battery in the second degree was proper because he did not have a justification defense under § 5-2-608(a) since defendant's version of the events was unbelievable; any reasonable person would have realized that the victim was acting on behalf of a repossession agency and therefore, defendant could not have been acting on a reasonable belief that he was preventing a criminal trespass. Further, there was no evidence to indicate that the victim used force against defendant or threatened him with force. Washington v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 339, 374 S.W.3d 822 (2010), review denied, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Ark. LEXIS 379 (June 24, 2010).

Evidence.

Evidence held sufficient to support conviction. Henry v. State, 125 Ark. 237, 188 S.W. 539 (1916); Hadaway v. State, 215 Ark. 658, 222 S.W.2d 799 (1949); Dickson v. State, 230 Ark. 491, 323 S.W.2d 432 (1959); Williams v. State, 257 Ark. 8, 513 S.W.2d 793 (1974) (preceding decisions under prior law); Lum v. State, 281 Ark. 495, 665 S.W.2d 265 (1984); Middleton v. State, 14 Ark. App. 92, 685 S.W.2d 182 (1985); Lair v. State, 19 Ark. App. 172, 718 S.W.2d 467 (1986); Mann v. State, 291 Ark. 4, 722 S.W.2d 266 (1987); Shells v. State, 22 Ark. App. 62, 733 S.W.2d 743 (1987); Williams v. State, 298 Ark. 317, 766 S.W.2d 931 (1989); Cole v. State, 33 Ark. App. 98, 802 S.W.2d 472 (1991).

Evidence relating to defendant's activities in moving his car and leaving the scene of an accident held admissible as being relevant to the issue of recklessness of defendant's conduct. Harmon v. State, 260 Ark. 665, 543 S.W.2d 43 (1976).

Evidence held sufficient to sustain the jury's finding of recklessness. Harmon v. State, 260 Ark. 665, 543 S.W.2d 43 (1976).

The jury's finding that an automobile driven by defendant was a deadly weapon was supported by evidence showing how defendant's vehicle left the road and struck a boy in a roadside ditch. Harmon v. State, 260 Ark. 665, 543 S.W.2d 43 (1976).

Testimony held not to support the defendant's conviction for first degree battery; evidence only justified, at most, a conviction of second-degree battery. Bolden v. State, 267 Ark. 504, 593 S.W.2d 156 (1980).

There was substantial evidence from which the fact finder could find that the injuries to the law enforcement officers caused them substantial pain. Armstrong v. State, 35 Ark. App. 188, 816 S.W.2d 620 (1991).

Evidence held insufficient to support a finding that the physical force used by the defendant in disciplining her grandchild rose to the degree of second-degree battery. Sykes v. State, 57 Ark. App. 5, 940 S.W.2d 888 (1997).

Evidence was sufficient to support the conviction of the defendant inmate for second degree battery on a corrections officer where (1) the defendant armed himself with a table leg as he went down a hall in the prison, (2) when he approached a doorway, two officers entered and confronted him, (3) the defendant swung the table leg at one officer and struck him in the face, (4) the officer testified that the blow was very painful, and it was so strong that he almost blacked out, and (5) another officer testified that the defendant swung the table leg like he was trying to smash a watermelon or pumpkin. Jones v. State, 72 Ark. App. 271, 35 S.W.3d 345 (2000).

Defendant's conviction for battery in the second degree was appropriate under §§ 5-13-202(a)(4)(C) and 5-2-202(2) because the evidence was clear that defendant intended to restrain the victim. The victim, defendant's mother-in-law, testified that defendant grabbed her, threw her into a chair, and pushed her down anytime the victim had tried to stand up. LaFort v. State, 98 Ark. App. 202, 254 S.W.3d 27 (2007).

Teacher's testimony alone was sufficient evidence of physical injury to support defendant juvenile's adjudication for second degree in violation of this section for striking the teacher in the arm because the teacher testified that after appellant hit her, the pain she suffered in her arm was of a sufficient nature to cause her to seek medical treatment, and she also testified that her arm was “very sore” for at least a week; while medical treatment is not required in order to establish a physical injury, the fact the pain was of a sufficient nature to cause the victim to seek medical care constitutes evidence that she experienced “substantial pain.” M.T. v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 761, 350 S.W.3d 792 (2009).

Substantial evidence supported defendant's conviction for second-degree battery against a police officer in violation of subdivision (a)(4)(A)(i) of this section because a police officer testified that she injured her hand when defendant tackled her, and although the officer surmised that the injury could have occurred during her pursuit of defendant, it was for the fact-finder to weigh the evidence and to determine when the injury occurred; the trier of fact could find that the officer injured her hand during the altercations with defendant and not during the foot chase. Lee v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 15 (2010).

Defendant's conviction for battery in the second degree in violation of subdivision (a)(2) of this section was appropriate because there was substantial evidence presented to support the determination that, with the purpose of causing physical injury to the victim, defendant caused physical injury to the victim by means of a deadly weapon other than a firearm, specifically, a metal steering wheel theft-protection device. Washington v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 339, 374 S.W.3d 822 (2010), review denied, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2010 Ark. LEXIS 379 (June 24, 2010).

Evidence that defendant struck the victim in head with a chain-saw blade with the purpose of causing physical injury, supported a finding of second-degree battery. Dooly v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 591, 377 S.W.3d 471 (2010).

Once jury concluded that defendant's account of events was not truthful and that a hot instrument, not hot water, was what caused the burns to defendant's daughter, the evidence was consisted with defendant's conviction for second-degree battery. McKnight v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 598, 378 S.W.3d 173 (2010).

Defendant convicted of the lesser-included offense of second-degree battery waived a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction where he did not argue in his motions for directed verdict that an element of second-degree battery was not proven. Chestang v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 222 (2012).

Defendant's conviction for second-degree battery, in violation of subdivison (a)(4)(C) of this section, was supported by the evidence because the number of bruises on his girlfriend's 23-month-old son and the unusual force necessary to cause them, as testified to by an emergency room pediatrician, provided proof that he knowingly caused physical injury under § 5-2-202(2)(B). Hahn v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 297 (2012).

Substantial evidence supported a juvenile's second-degree battery disposition, in violation of § subdivisions (a)(1)-(3) of this section, based on accomplice liability because a codefendant testified that the juvenile solicited and encouraged the plan to beat her boyfriend, who she suspected of cheating; the juvenile could be found guilty of the conduct of her accomplices who threw the punches. L.C. v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 666, 424 S.W.3d 887 (2012).

Defendant's actions in following the victims, driving toward the victims in his car at full speed, and running from the scene after hitting one of the victims constituted substantial evidence supporting his second-degree battery conviction. Guana-Lopez v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 204 (2014).

Healthcare Provider.

In a bench trial, the State sufficiently proved each necessary element of second-degree battery under subdivision (a)(4)(E)(iv) of this section and thus the circuit court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss; the victim, a hospice nursing assistant, returned to the decedent's house to provide postmortem care, and her supervisor testified that the victim's employment duties were to take care of the decedent and provide comfort to the family, and thus she was in the course of “other employment relating to her medical training” when defendant struck her. Warren v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 33, 567 S.W.3d 105 (2019).

Instructions.

Where the instruction given properly set forth three sets of acts and circumstances any one of which constituted battery in the second degree and only one of which involved the word recklessly and where there was no showing that the jury necessarily found the appellant guilty under the section of the statute requiring the action to be done recklessly, the failure to instruct on the meaning of the word “recklessly” was not error. Viar v. State, 269 Ark. 772, 601 S.W.2d 579 (Ct. App. 1980).

Court held to have properly instructed the jury as to the burden of proof and elements required before the jury could convict for battery in the second degree, and lesser included charges, and refusal of the court to give requested instruction which concerned the state's burden to prove that defendant knowingly used physical force against a law enforcement officer held proper. Breeden v. State, 270 Ark. 90, 603 S.W.2d 459 (1980).

Where, in prosecution for second-degree battery, there was testimony from which the jury could find that there had been previous problems between the defendant and the officer, that the defendant had in the past been harrassed by the officer, that the officer had provoked the altercation by using abusive language to describe the defendant and the defendant's family, and that the defendant struck the officer in self-defense only after the officer had himself pushed and struck the defendant, the evidence was sufficient to raise a question of fact regarding the defense of justification; therefore, the trial court erred in not allowing the defendant's proferred jury instruction on justification. Lair v. State, 19 Ark. App. 172, 718 S.W.2d 467 (1986).

In second degree battery prosecution, court erred in refusing to give instruction on lesser included offense of third degree battery where the jury could rationally have found that the defendant “recklessly” caused the injury. Johnson v. State, 28 Ark. App. 256, 773 S.W.2d 450 (1989).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that defendant, charged with first-degree battery, was not entitled to a second-degree battery instruction under subdivision (a)(1) of this section because defendant provided no rational basis for a second-degree battery instruction, as (1) the victim's bullet wounds creating a substantial risk of death were a serious injury, (2) defendant's claim that the victim's injury was not serious was no basis for the instruction, as first- and second-degree battery both required a serious physical injury, and (3) evidence that defendant shot the victim in the neck and in the back as the victim fled showed intent to inflict serious physical injury. Dixon v. State, 2019 Ark. 245, 581 S.W.3d 505 (2019).

Intent.

The only specific intent required by this section is the intent to cause physical injury. Holmes v. State, 288 Ark. 72, 702 S.W.2d 18 (1986).

Evidence held sufficient to indicate defendant's intent to commit physical injury. Holmes v. State, 288 Ark. 72, 702 S.W.2d 18 (1986); Hundley v. State, 22 Ark. App. 239, 738 S.W.2d 107 (1987).

The plain wording of subdivision (a)(4)(C) imparts that knowledge on the part of the defendant must be personal to him. The test is whether, from the circumstances in the case at bar, defendant, not some other person or persons, knew that his victim was 60 years of age or older. Hubbard v. State, 20 Ark. App. 146, 725 S.W.2d 579 (1987).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction under this section where the victim, after he was stabbed by the defendant reported chest pains, difficulty breathing, and faintness. Hundley v. State, 22 Ark. App. 239, 738 S.W.2d 107 (1987).

The state presented evidence that the defendant fired a shotgun directly at the crowd of which the injured victim was a member, and based on this evidence, a jury could certainly conclude that defendant possessed the necessary intent to cause injury as required by the second degree battery statute. Purifoy v. State, 307 Ark. 482, 822 S.W.2d 374 (1991).

Where defendant held child-victim's hands under hot water for long enough to cause second- and third-degree burns, victim suffered a “serious physical injury,” as defined in § 5-1-102(19), but because defendant lacked the mental state required for first-degree battery, defendant was guilty of second-degree battery. Tigue v. State, 319 Ark. 147, 889 S.W.2d 760 (1994).

Evidence sufficient to find that defendant purposely engaged in conduct that created a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to victim. Carter v. State, 324 Ark. 249, 921 S.W.2d 583 (1996).

Evidence was sufficient to show intent where a physician testified that the defendant was able to control his physical actions and could understand options when presented to him. K.M. v. State, 335 Ark. 85, 983 S.W.2d 93 (1998).

Law Enforcement Officer.

The appropriate test is whether or not, from the circumstances defendant — and not some other person or persons — knew that his victim was a law enforcement officer. Gibson v. State, 316 Ark. 705, 875 S.W.2d 58 (1994).

Trial court did not err by refusing to instruct a jury on third-degree battery as a lesser included offense of second-degree battery where there was no evidence tending to disprove that the victim was an employee of a correctional facility; there was testimony that referred to the victim as a “detention officer” and “jailer.” Davis v. State, 97 Ark. App. 6, 242 S.W.3d 630 (2006).

Lesser Included Offenses.

Court held not obligated to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of assault. Harmon v. State, 260 Ark. 665, 543 S.W.2d 43 (1976).

Courts failure to instruct jury on lesser included offenses held error as to one defendant, but proper as to the other. Sbabo v. State, 264 Ark. 497, 572 S.W.2d 585 (1978).

Because battery in the second degree is a lesser included offense of battery in the first degree, there was no inconsistency in holding one codefendant guilty of being an accomplice to the former offense while holding the other codefendant guilty of the latter offense. Blann v. State, 15 Ark. App. 364, 695 S.W.2d 382 (1985).

Battery in the second degree and battery in the third degree require proof that a deadly weapon was used; in contrast, use of a deadly weapon is not necessary for the commission of manslaughter. Since battery in the second degree and third degree require proof of an element not an element of proof of manslaughter, they are not lesser included offenses of manslaughter. Tackett v. State, 298 Ark. 20, 766 S.W.2d 410 (1989), overruled in part, McCoy v. State, 347 Ark. 913, 69 S.W.3d 430 (2002).

In a first-degree battery case, a trial court did not err by refusing to give an instruction on second-degree battery because it was not a lesser included offense; both alternatives given in the proffered instruction required an additional element, serious physical injury, that was not required in the first-degree battery instruction that was given, which only required physical injury when the injury was caused by a firearm. Further, the proffered instruction was not a lesser included offense because the offense was not an attempt offense, and the proffered instruction did not differ from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious injury to the same person sufficed to establish the offense's commission. Spight v. State, 101 Ark. App. 400, 278 S.W.3d 599 (2008).

To the extent that defendant convicted of second-degree battery attempted to argue that the jury should have been instructed on third-degree battery as a lesser-included offense because the jury could have rationally found him to have recklessly caused the injuries to the victim, his argument was not preserved, because although he proffered an instruction on third-degree battery based on the first definition of third-degree battery in § 5-13-203(a), which involved purposely causing physical injury, there was no indication that he requested an instruction based on the second definition in the statute, which involved recklessness. Defendant was thus procedurally barred from raising an argument based on an element of recklessness. Lytle v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 246 (2012).

Revocation of defendant's suspended sentence was appropriate; even though the evidence did not establish any physical injury to the victim to support the allegation of second-degree battery on a law enforcement officer, the Court of Appeals without invitation held that the evidence was sufficient to support the lesser-included offense of second-degree assault under § 5-13-206. Caldwell v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 588, 565 S.W.3d 539 (2018).

Physical Injury.

Where victim was hit with a pistol, the trial court did not err when it submitted a charge on second degree battery to the jury since subdivision (a)(2) only requires that a person cause another physical injury by means of a deadly weapon. Foster v. State, 275 Ark. 427, 631 S.W.2d 7 (1982).

Evidence of injuries to victim held sufficient to support a finding of serious physical injury. Lum v. State, 281 Ark. 495, 665 S.W.2d 265 (1984).

The difference between the crime of second-degree battery and the crime of third-degree battery is that third-degree battery concerns “physical injury” rather than “serious physical injury.” Hall v. State, 11 Ark. App. 53, 666 S.W.2d 408 (1984).

Injuries which involved serious bruising of child would support only the lesser included offense of battery in the third degree and not conviction of second-degree battery. Hall v. State, 11 Ark. App. 53, 666 S.W.2d 408 (1984).

Where the jury reasonably could have found that defendant acted purposely, and injury to a person was occasioned by use of a deadly weapon, only “physical injury” need have been shown, and it was not necessary for the state to show “serious physical injury” to obtain a conviction under (a)(2). Cole v. State, 33 Ark. App. 98, 802 S.W.2d 472 (1991).

This section requires “physical injury” if the victim is a law enforcement officer acting in the line of duty. Armstrong v. State, 35 Ark. App. 188, 816 S.W.2d 620 (1991).

Where the jury could have reasonably found defendant acted purposely, and where the injury was occasioned by the use of a deadly weapon, only physical injury, not serious physical injury, need have been shown. Gilkey v. State, 41 Ark. App. 100, 848 S.W.2d 439 (1993).

Evidence that victim was hit repeatedly in the head and face with defendant's fist, was kicked repeatedly, has a permanent scar on her forehead, and remained in the hospital for thirty-six to forty-eight hours, held sufficient to support defendant's conviction for second degree battery. Black v. State, 50 Ark. App. 42, 901 S.W.2d 849 (1995).

The physical injury sustained by a police officer while attempting to arrest the defendant was insufficient to support a conviction where the officer testified that he did not even notice his injury until after the defendant had been subdued and other officers called his attention to it. Allen v. State, 64 Ark. App. 49, 977 S.W.2d 230 (1998).

Evidence was sufficient to establish that the victim sustained physical injury where he experienced pain from bruises and scrapes on his hands, face, elbows, and knees, and testified that he had a painful bruise on the side of his face from a blow received from the defendant. Pettigrew v. State, 64 Ark. App. 339, 984 S.W.2d 72 (1998).

Evidence was sufficient to show that the victim sustained a physical injury, even though he was not hospitalized, where she testified that she was stabbed in the shoulder, back, and arm and that the knife penetrated the muscle in her shoulder area, that she felt faint and “felt this warmness run down my body,” that she was scarred as a result of the attack, and that she continued to receive treatment for those scars. Farrelly v. State, 70 Ark. App. 158, 15 S.W.3d 699 (2000).

The evidence failed to show that defendant caused a victim serious physical injury as required by § 5-13-201(a)(1) or § 5-1-102(19) or physical injury by means of a firearm as required by § 5-13-201(a)(7), even though defendant hit the victim with the butt of a pistol, where the injury did not require stitches, and striking a person in such a manner did not constitute injury to another person by means of a firearm under § 5-13-201(a)(7); this injury was covered by § 5-13-202(a)(1). Smith v. State, 352 Ark. 92, 98 S.W.3d 433 (2003).

In determining whether a “physical injury” occurred, the trier of fact may consider the sensitivity of the area of the body to which the injury is inflicted and the severity of the attack; thus, where victim testified that defendant beat him repeatedly with a steel pipe, resulting in his face and nose being “busted up” as well as considerable facial bleeding, the trial court did not err in finding that defendant's purpose was to inflict substantial pain with the pipe. Stultz v. State, 92 Ark. App. 204, 212 S.W.3d 42 (2005).

Trial court did not err in refusing to direct the verdicts where defendant took actions to conceal the harm to the child, and failed to take action to secure appropriate care for the child; the jury could conclude that defendant rubbing a substance known to cause skin irritation on the face of a toddler where Superglue had already adhered would cause, at the very least, the impairment of physical condition or a visible mark associated with the physical trauma. Price v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 664, 344 S.W.3d 678 (2009).

Circuit court did not err in denying defendant's motion for directed verdict on the charge of battery in the second degree because the victim, a jailer, testified he suffered an abrasion on his forehead during the altercation with defendant; scratches and abrasions are sufficient to meet the definition of physical injury, and the jury was entitled to give credit to the victim's testimony. Chambers v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 54 (2020).

Separate Offenses.

Where the evidence displayed defendant's impulse to kidnap the victim and additional impulses to batter and threaten to kill her when she resisted the kidnapping, convictions for the separate offenses of first-degree terroristic threatening (§ 5-13-301), second-degree battery, and attempted kidnapping (§ 5-3-201) were upheld because defendant's criminal acts were not all part of the attempted kidnapping and were not a continuing course of conduct. Hagen v. State, 318 Ark. 139, 883 S.W.2d 832 (1994).

Trial court did not err in determining that consecutive sentencing for aggravated robbery, § 5-12-103(a)(1), first-degree terroristic threatening, § 5-13-301(a)(1)(A), and second-degree battery, under subdivision (a)(2) of this section, did not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy in Ark. Const. Art. 2, § 8 and the Fifth Amendment because neither first-degree terroristic threatening nor second-degree battery was a lesser-included offense of aggravated robbery since both crimes required proof of additional facts not required by aggravated robbery; the offense of first-degree terroristic threatening requires the elements of threatening to cause the death of the victim and the purpose of terrorizing the victim, and a conviction for second-degree battery requires proof of purposely causing physical injury to the victim. Walker v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 61, 389 S.W.3d 10 (2012).

Cited: Crenshaw v. State, 271 Ark. 484, 609 S.W.2d 120 (Ct. App. 1980); Barnes v. State, 4 Ark. App. 84, 628 S.W.2d 334 (1982); Van Sickle v. State, 16 Ark. App. 143, 698 S.W.2d 308 (1985); Jernigan v. State, 38 Ark. App. 102, 828 S.W.2d 864 (1992); Kelley v. State, 75 Ark. App. 144, 55 S.W.3d 309 (2001); Hayes v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 663 (2009); Ross v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 243 (2012); Washington v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 122 (2014).