Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-301 (2026)

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

Killenbeck, And Then They Did ? Abusing Equity in the Name of Justice, 44 Ark. L. Rev. 235.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Notes, Constitutional Law — The Domestic Abuse Act of 1989 — An Impermissible Expansion of Chancery Jurisdiction. Bates v. Bates, 303 Ark. 89, 793 S.W.2d 788 (1990), 13 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 537.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

The mere overlapping of the provisions of this section and the assault statutes does not render this section unconstitutional. Warren v. State, 272 Ark. 231, 613 S.W.2d 97 (1981).

Communication of Threat.

There is no language in the statute indicating the threat must be communicated by the accused directly to the person threatened to constitute a violation. Richards v. State, 266 Ark. 733, 585 S.W.2d 375 (Ct. App. 1979).

The conduct prohibited by this section is the communication of threat with the purpose of terrorizing another. It is not necessary that the recipient of the threat actually be terrorized. Smith v. State, 296 Ark. 451, 757 S.W.2d 554 (1988).

It would defy common sense to maintain that threatening to punch a woman hard enough to kill her unborn child does not carry with it a threat to cause serious physical injury to the woman personally. Hagen v. State, 47 Ark. App. 137, 886 S.W.2d 889 (1994).

Defendant's conviction for first-degree terroristic threatening pursuant to subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section could not stand because there was no evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that it was defendant's conscious object that his threatening statements, made to his girlfriend, be communicated to the victim, his former wife. Turner v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 214 (2010).

Defenses.

The fact that a threat is conditioned in such a way as is calculated to coerce another person to abstain from a course of action he has a legal right to pursue is not a valid defense. Richards v. State, 266 Ark. 733, 585 S.W.2d 375 (Ct. App. 1979).

Because terroristic threatening requires a purposeful mental state, the defense of voluntary intoxication is available to a defendant charged with such crime. Davis v. State, 12 Ark. App. 79, 670 S.W.2d 472 (1984).

The defendant in a prosecution for terroristic threatening was required to show that he was incapacitated by drinking alcohol — not merely that he drank alcohol — to obtain an instruction on voluntary intoxication as a defense. Davis v. State, 12 Ark. App. 79, 670 S.W.2d 472 (1984).

Trial court did not err in sustaining state's objection that the terms of the civil dispute regarding a loan and the collateral for the loan were irrelevant and in refusing to permit defendant to question the victim concerning the property that had been collateral for the loan because, even if the victim had lied regarding the terms of the loan, that would be no defense to the crimes for which he was convicted, which included kidnapping, terroristic threatening, and aggravated assault. Tarpley v. State, 97 Ark. App. 122, 245 S.W.3d 192 (2006).

Evidence.

Evidence held sufficient to support the conviction. Davis v. State, 12 Ark. App. 79, 670 S.W.2d 472 (1984); Jones v. State, 72 Ark. App. 271, 35 S.W.3d 345 (2000).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction where the victim, who was the defendant's stepdaughter, testified that the defendant raped her and told her not to tell anyone or he would beat her. Johnson v. State, 71 Ark. App. 58, 25 S.W.3d 445 (2000).

Where the victim testified that defendant threatened to kill her, a witness corroborated the victim's testimony, and defendant's threats had been reported to officers, the erroneous admission of the unavailable officer's testimony was harmless as to the offense of first-degree terroristic threatening, subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section. Proctor v. State, 349 Ark. 648, 79 S.W.3d 370 (2002).

Evidence presented supported a conviction of first-degree terroristic threatening where defendant threatened to kill both the kidnapping victim and his girlfriend and to blow up their house if the victim did not later return to defendant's home with more money. Carter v. State, 360 Ark. 266, 200 S.W.3d 906 (2005), vacated, Carter v. Arkansas, 126 S. Ct. 65, 163 L. Ed. 2d 32 (U.S. 2005).

Evidence that the victim was in a fight, was being forced out of the house, was threatened with death, and pleaded for her life constituted substantial evidence in support of defendant's conviction for first-degree terroristic threatening because there was substantial evidence that the necessary threat was made, as well as an intent that the victim be terrorized by the threat. Mason v. State, 361 Ark. 357, 206 S.W.3d 869 (2005).

Offense of terroristic threatening required no more than the communication of a threat - by word or deed - with the purpose of terrorizing the victim, and the offense of aggravated assault was accomplished when defendant displayed the gun and pointed it at the victim; given the testimony that defendant kept the doorway blocked for several minutes after performing those acts and that the victim was prevented from summoning assistance during that time, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the kidnapping conviction. Tarpley v. State, 97 Ark. App. 122, 245 S.W.3d 192 (2006).

While defendant was staying with his girlfriend's family, he engaged in a verbal and physical altercation with the homeowner and his brother; during the melee, defendant pointed a gun at the victims, threatened to kill them, broke the kitchen window, and repeatedly struck the sliding-glass door. The Court of Appeals of Arkansas held that sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for first-degree terroristic threatening in violation of subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section; the evidence presented to the jury was sufficient to show that defendant's purpose in wielding the gun was to terrorize both victims. Mullins v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 570 (2009).

State produced evidence that defendant pointed a gun at the victim and indicated more than one time that he would kill her, and the natural and probable result of such acts was that the person toward whom they were directed would be filled with intense fright; the state produced substantial evidence to support a finding that defendant acted with the intent of terrorizing the victim. Lasker v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 591 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for second-degree terroristic threatening in violation of subdivision (b)(1) of this section because the victim's testimony that defendant said, “Give me the gun, I'll shoot him,” constituted sufficient evidence to support the conviction. Sims v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 133 (2010).

Pregnant wife's testimony that appellant pushed and threatened her — causing red marks on her neck and arm — was sufficient to prove by a preponderance that appellant violated the conditions of his suspended sentence by committing the criminal offenses of domestic battery in third degree, pursuant to § 5-26-305(b)(2)(A), and terroristic threatening in the second degree, under subdivision (b)(1) of this section. Autrand v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 245 (2010).

Evidence was sufficient to revoke defendant's suspended sentences due to his violation of conditions by second-degree terroristic threatening because the victim testified that defendant threatened to “get” her, which she interpreted as a threat to kill her. Brown v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 336 (2010).

As defendant hit the victim (his ex-wife's mother) in the head with the baseball bat and cut the victim's throat, threatened his ex-wife, and forced her to go with him from the scene of the crime, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of first-degree murder, kidnapping, and terroristic threatening under §§ 5-10-102(a)(2), 5-11-102(a), and subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section. Alvard v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 160 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of terroristic threatening because a dispatcher testified that the dispatcher received a 911 call from defendant's wife regarding a domestic disturbance; the wife said that defendant choked her and threatened to kill her and “take her out.” Mathis v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 285, 423 S.W.3d 91 (2012).

Notwithstanding testimony that the alleged victim of terroristic threatening was a heavy drinker whose personality and memory changed when she was under the influence, the jury was entitled to believe the victim's testimony that defendant threatened to kill her if she reported that he had raped her and that she was scared to report the crime due to defendant's threat, particularly where there was testimony by another that defendant had admitted to having threatened the victim that he would kill her if she told anyone about the rape. The believability of the victim was a function for the jury as the fact-finder, not the reviewing court. Harris v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 651 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to revoke defendant's probation on the basis of terroristic threatening because the victim testified that he heard a noise outside his bedroom window, he received a phone call from defendant threatening to cut his throat with the same knife he used to cut his window screen, and while the screen had not been cut, it had been tampered with and was loose in its frame. Coupey v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 446 (2013).

Record contained substantial evidence that defendant had the intent to commit the crime of terroristic threatening, as he made statements that he would destroy anyone who got in his way, and he tried to call his father to talk him out of “it,” and this particular statement was made after defendant loaded or cocked a rifle while pacing; taken in context, the statements were not innocuous, but given the parties' volatile relationship, gave rise to the level sufficient to support a conviction of terroristic threatening. Cauffiel v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 642 (2013).

Defendant was properly convicted of terroristic threatening because it could not be said on the record that the jury could not reasonably find defendant's threat to kill a judge was in fact intended to terrorize a law firm's secretary or that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the secretary to testify concerning her state of mind after hearing defendant's threat. Foshee v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 315 (2014).

—Admission.

Where cross-examination of the victim at trial revealed that the State's exhibit of text messages between the defendant and victim was incomplete and that the victim had deleted some of the messages, the appellate court did not have to decide whether the circuit court erred in failing to strike the exhibit because any error that existed was harmless given the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt that remained. Farmer v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 148, 571 S.W.3d 78 (2019).

—Insufficent.

Evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant's juvenile adjudication for terroristic threatening in the first degree; the appellate court found that a hit list found by a teacher in defendant's school notebook was not sufficient to find that he had the “purpose of terrorizing another.” Roberts v. State, 78 Ark. App. 103, 78 S.W.3d 743 (2002).

—Sufficient.

Evidence that two independent witnesses stated that they heard defendant threaten the victims, telling the victims defendant would find out where the victims lived and kill them, and that defendant's objective was to frighten the victims with death or serious injury by threatening them, was sufficient to support a conviction for terroristic threatening in the first degree under subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section. Tatum v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 80, 381 S.W.3d 124 (2011).

Defendant's convictions for residential burglary and terroristic threatening, in violation of § 5-39-201(a) and subdivision (b)(1) of this section were supported by sufficient evidence, as he entered his ex-wife residence with the intent or purpose of assaulting her or of threatening either her or her boyfriend. Cash v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 493 (2011).

Evidence supported defendant's conviction for having made terroristic threats because defendant broke into the victim's home, broke into the bathroom where the victim retreated, physically assaulted the victim, took the victim's cell phone away and broke it, and threatened that, if the victim had called the police, defendant would kill the victim. Adams v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 308, 435 S.W.3d 520 (2014).

There was substantial evidence to support defendant's first-degree-terroristic-threatening conviction, given that the text message defendant sent the victim contained statements that he would “do a 187” on her, which stood for homicide, and he would chop up her parents' house with bullets, and he would knock her teeth out. Rodriguez v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 660, 449 S.W.3d 306 (2014).

Defendant argued that a text also contained derogatory comments directed toward the victim's friend, and thus it constituted evidence of other bad acts that were not relevant and were prejudicial, but this argument was rejected because the comments directed toward the friend also supported the charge of terroristic threatening. Rodriguez v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 660, 449 S.W.3d 306 (2014).

Deputy's testimony that defendant threatened to kill him and his family, assault him, and infect him with AIDS, all while defendant was behaving violently and erratically, even kicking the plexiglass barrier in the patrol vehicle so hard it caused the shotgun mount to break and the shotgun to fall on the deputy and injure him, was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for terroristic threatening. Wright v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 404, 499 S.W.3d 683 (2016).

Defendant's conviction for terroristic threatening was supported by evidence that defendant threatened to “do” the victim and specifically threatened to kill her. Armour v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 612, 509 S.W.3d 668 (2016).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for first-degree terroristic threatening under subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section, where the evidence showed that she chased the victim around their home with a knife and stabbed him multiples times. Stockstill v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 29, 511 S.W.3d 889 (2017).

Based on the record before the appellate court, which included the victim's testimony in the bench trial about what transpired, and the standard of review, the State sufficiently established that defendant committed the crime of first-degree terroristic threatening. Holmes v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 384, 586 S.W.3d 183 (2019).

In defendant's trial for first-degree terroristic threatening arising from a workplace incident, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that defendant threatened the victim in order to terrorize him, in violation of subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section, where multiple witnesses testified that defendant had pointed a pistol at the victim, the victim testified that as defendant aimed, he told him that he was “fixing to shoot”, and the jurors were entitled to rely on their common knowledge and life experiences to infer that, given the circumstances, defendant acted with the conscious objective to cause the victim terror. Hughes v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 114 (2020).

Failure to Preserve for Appeal.

In a case in which a jury convicted defendant on two counts of threatening a judicial officer and one count of terroristic threatening, defendant's challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence against him were not preserved for review. Radford v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 89, 538 S.W.3d 894 (2018).

While the juvenile was charged with second-degree terroristic threatening and the circuit court in effect sua sponte amended the charge when it found the juvenile guilty of second-degree assault, and second-degree assault is not a lesser-included offense of second-degree terroristic threatening, the juvenile failed to raise the due process issue at the circuit court level and therefore failed to preserve the issue for appellate review. I.K. v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 584, 564 S.W.3d 579 (2018).

Fright.

Under this section, it is an element of the offense that the defendant act with the purpose of terrorizing another person, i.e., it must be his “conscious object” to cause fright. Knight v. State, 25 Ark. App. 353, 758 S.W.2d 12 (1988).

To be found guilty of threatening, the defendant must intend to fill the victim with intense fright. Knight v. State, 25 Ark. App. 353, 758 S.W.2d 12 (1988).

Jury Instructions.

In defendant's trial for rape and terroristic threatening in the first degree in violation of subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section, in which the victim testified that after defendant raped her for the first time, he told her if she said anything about the rape he would kill her, the evidence did not authorize a jury instruction on the offense of terroristic threatening in the second degree. Green v. State, 2012 Ark. 19, 386 S.W.3d 413 (2012).

Defendant's words and actions clearly showed both that he had a purpose of terrorizing and that he threatened to cause death or serious physical injury; because there was no rational basis for acquitting him of first-degree terroristic threatening, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of second-degree terroristic threatening. Campbell v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 171, 432 S.W.3d 673 (2014).

Length of Threat.

There is no language in this section which requires terrorizing over a prolonged period of time. Warren v. State, 272 Ark. 231, 613 S.W.2d 97 (1981); Davis v. State, 12 Ark. App. 79, 670 S.W.2d 472 (1984).

Sentence.

Because defendant received 15 years for first-degree terroristic threatening, as enhanced under § 5-4-501, his sentence was above the statutory range and therefore illegal. Radford v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 89, 538 S.W.3d 894 (2018).

Separate Offenses.

Where the evidence displayed defendant's impulse to kidnap the victim and additional impulses to batter and threaten to kill her when she resisted the kidnapping, convictions for the separate offenses of first-degree terroristic threatening, second-degree battery (§ 5-13-202), and attempted kidnapping (§ 5-3-201) were upheld because defendant's criminal acts were not all part of the attempted kidnapping and were not a continuing course of conduct. Hagen v. State, 318 Ark. 139, 883 S.W.2d 832 (1994).

Trial court did not err in determining that consecutive sentencing for aggravated robbery, § 5-12-103(a)(1), first-degree terroristic threatening, under subdivision (a)(1)(A) of this section, and second-degree battery, § 5-13-202(a)(2), did not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy in Ark. Const. Art. 2, § 8 and the Fifth Amendment because neither first-degree terroristic threatening nor second-degree battery was a lesser-included offense of aggravated robbery since both crimes required proof of additional facts not required by aggravated robbery; the offense of first-degree terroristic threatening requires the elements of threatening to cause the death of the victim and the purpose of terrorizing the victim, and a conviction for second-degree battery requires proof of purposely causing physical injury to the victim. Walker v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 61, 389 S.W.3d 10 (2012).

Sufficient Threats.

The threat to shoot another is a threat to cause such serious physical injury to another person as to constitute terroristic threatening. Richards v. State, 266 Ark. 733, 585 S.W.2d 375 (Ct. App. 1979).

This section criminalizes not only present threats, but future threats as well. Walker v. State, 13 Ark. App. 124, 680 S.W.2d 915 (1984).

Testimony of witnesses to defendant's statements that “he'd kill everyone in the building” was sufficient to sustain his conviction of terroristic threatening. A jury could easily conclude that he meant anyone or all. Smith v. State, 296 Ark. 451, 757 S.W.2d 554 (1988).

This section does not require that it be shown that the accused has the immediate ability to carry out the threats. Knight v. State, 25 Ark. App. 353, 758 S.W.2d 12 (1988).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's stalking conviction where there was evidence of terroristic threats to “burn” the victim, along with numerous incidents of harassment, vandalism, and other hostile acts directed toward the victim and her family. Lowry v. State, 90 Ark. App. 333, 205 S.W.3d 830 (2005), rev'd, 364 Ark. 6, 216 S.W.3d 101 (2005).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for making terroristic threats based on defendant's Facebook posts threatening the lives of employees of the Veterans Administration because it was reasonable to take defendant's posts as a true threat, given defendant's military training. Lilly v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 88 (2020).

Cited: Wade v. Tomlinson, 284 Ark. 432, 682 S.W.2d 751 (1985); United States v. Rapert, 813 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1987); Parker v. State, 300 Ark. 360, 779 S.W.2d 156 (1989); Bates v. Bates, 303 Ark. 89, 793 S.W.2d 788 (1990); Thomas v. State, 315 Ark. 79, 864 S.W.2d 835 (1993); Wesson v. State, 320 Ark. 380, 896 S.W.2d 874 (1995); Sanders v. State, 326 Ark. 415, 932 S.W.2d 315 (1996); Jones v. State, 347 Ark. 409, 64 S.W.3d 728 (2002); Lowry v. State, 364 Ark. 6, 216 S.W.3d 101 (2005); Ta v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 220, 459 S.W.3d 325 (2015).