Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-101 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

What constitutes “public place” within meaning of state statute or local ordinance prohibiting indecency or commission of sexual act in public place. 95 A.L.R.5th 229.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2001 Arkansas General Assembly, Criminal Law, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 429.

Case Notes

Deviate Sexual Activity.

Where the defendant put the child's penis in his mouth, the defendant could properly be tried and convicted for deviate sexual activity, despite the defendant's contention that the criminal statutes as written did not include his actions, in that only the body of the accused was penetrated, and not the body of the victim. Hoggard v. State, 277 Ark. 117, 640 S.W.2d 102 (1982), cert. denied, Hoggard v. Arkansas, 460 U.S. 1022, 103 S. Ct. 1273 (1983).

Evidence held insufficient to sustain the charge of rape by deviate sexual activity. Peebles v. State, 305 Ark. 338, 808 S.W.2d 331 (1991).

Evidence of sexual contact was sufficient to show the commission of rape by deviate sexual activity. Harris v. State, 15 Ark. App. 58, 689 S.W.2d 353 (1985).

It is not necessary for the state to provide direct proof that an act is done for sexual gratification if it can be assumed that the desire for sexual gratification is a plausible reason for the act, or when persons, other than physicians or other persons for legitimate medical reasons, insert something in another person's vagina or anus. Warren v. State, 314 Ark. 192, 862 S.W.2d 222 (1993).

An 11-year-old boy's testimony that defendant touched his penis inside his underwear and hugged him, asked him to perform oral sex, and the boy's description in graphic detail how defendant performed oral sex on him on at least two separate occasions was sufficient to prove rape by deviate sexual behavior. Laughlin v. State, 316 Ark. 489, 872 S.W.2d 848 (1994).

Evidence sufficient to support giving “deviate sexual activity” portion of the jury instruction. Clark v. State, 323 Ark. 211, 913 S.W.2d 297 (1996).

Evidence held sufficient to establish that defendant had engaged in deviant sexual activity. Johnson v. State, 328 Ark. 526, 944 S.W.2d 115 (1997).

Substantial evidence proved defendant raped his 14-year old stepdaughter where (1) according to trial testimony defendant digitally penetrated the victim numerous times before she was 14 years old, (2) the DNA extracted from the victim's mattress, where the abuse occurred, tested positive for defendant's DNA, (3) an expert testified that the victim did not have a hymen, which indicated chronic or long-term sexual contact, and (4) the victim testified that she had been raped by her stepfather and she did not report the abuse because she was scared and was afraid that defendant would not love her anymore. Pinder v. State, 357 Ark. 275, 166 S.W.3d 49 (2004).

Sufficient evidence supported a rape conviction under § 5-14-103(a)(1)(A) where the victim testified that defendant sexually assaulted her with his fingers and there was ample DNA evidence linking defendant to the crime; the victim's testimony established that defendant engaged in deviate sexual activity with the victim, as defined in subdivision (9) of this section, by forcible compulsion, as defined in subdivision (2). Walters v. State, 358 Ark. 439, 193 S.W.3d 257 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to prove defendant engaged in deviate sexual behavior where the victim testified that he performed oral sex on defendant after being threatened and that defendant performed oral sex on him. Williams v. State, 363 Ark. 395, 214 S.W.3d 829 (2005).

Where the victim testified that defendant touched her “in a bad way” on ten occasions beginning when she was six and stated that on four occasions he made her touch his “weeny” and “go up and down on it”, the testimony was sufficient to find that defendant engaged in “deviate sexual activity”. Cox v. State, 93 Ark. App. 419, 220 S.W.3d 231 (2005).

Defendant's conviction for rape was upheld where the 16-year-old victim's testimony about her physical symptoms, when coupled with the testimony of the other witnesses, provided circumstantial evidence of penetration, which was an element of both rape by sexual intercourse and rape by deviate sexual activity. Marshall v. State, 94 Ark. App. 34, 223 S.W.3d 74 (2006).

Defendant's conviction for rape of his infant daughter was affirmed as the child showed signs of sexual abuse, including tears to the labia majora and minora that were consistent with trauma, immediately after being left with defendant, and defendant's semen was found on the child's diaper; thus, evidence was sufficient to find defendant engaged in deviate sexual activity. Terry v. State, 366 Ark. 441, 236 S.W.3d 495 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's rape conviction because defendant admitted that the six-year-old victim put her mouth on his penis and gave him oral sex, and a hair found on defendant's underwear was found to be microscopically similar to the sample provided by the victim. Bell v. State, 371 Ark. 375, 266 S.W.3d 696 (2007).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant under 18 U.S.C.S. § 2422(b) of attempting to persuade a minor to engage in sexual activity for which defendant could have been charged with a criminal offense, which under § 5-14-127(a)(1) and subdivision (1)(A) of this section included oral sex (which constituted “deviate sexual activity”) with a person under age 16; evidence was offered that defendant discussed sexual activity with a 15-year-old victim, and there was sufficient evidence to establish that defendant knew that the victim was under 16 given defendant's behavior indicating a consciousness of guilt, the victim's testimony, and the transcript of an online chat between defendant and a detective posing as the victim. United States v. Langley, 549 F.3d 726 (8th Cir. 2008).

Victim's testimony alone supported appellant's conviction for rape and sexual assault; moreover, the victim's testimony illustrated that there were several different actions of sexual assault and rape—acts that could each be separated in time as involving distinct impulses. Bryant v. State, 2010 Ark. 7, 377 S.W.3d 152 (2010).

Although appellant offered testimony that conflicted with the victim's testimony and the evidence presented at trial, the supreme court only needed to limit its review to those facts supporting the verdict to conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction of rape; the victim testified that she was forced to engage in deviate sexual activity with appellant and, after the attack, she ran from the house where she was eventually found by police. Although a semen sample collected during an examination did not match the DNA of appellant, but, rather that of the victim's fiance, the victim's testimony need not be corroborated; furthermore, it was for the jury to decide whether the testimony was credible. Hickey v. State, 2010 Ark. 109 (2010).

Defendant's conviction for attempted rape of his 13-year-old stepdaughter was supported by the evidence because the victim testified that defendant, who wanted oral sex from her, a deviate sexual activity under subdivision (1) of this section, thrust himself upon her while she was in the shower until her grandmother, who lived next door, appeared at the front door. Forrest v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 686 (2010).

Defendant's conviction for raping his seven-year-old daughter was proper because the victim's testimony that he “put his private part in her butt” was sufficient to sustain the conviction under § 5-14-103(a)(3)(A) and subdivision (1)(A) of this section; a nurse corroborated the victim's testimony in that the nurse found that the injuries to the victim's anus and hymen were consistent with penetration. Harlmo v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 314, 383 S.W.3d 447 (2011).

In a rape case, an appellate court did not reach the merits of defendant's sufficiency of the evidence argument because defendant's argument made before the trial court relating to sexual gratification was significantly different from the argument made on appeal. Even if the argument was considered on appeal, the evidence was sufficient to prove the crime of rape since the five-year-old victim testified that defendant put his hand in her panties and tickled her private part. Matar v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 243, 492 S.W.3d 106 (2016).

Victim's testimony that, when she was seven years old, defendant put his penis in her butt and that he forced her to suck on his penis while they were in the bathtub was sufficient to meet the definition of “deviate sexual activity”. King v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 572, 564 S.W.3d 563 (2018).

Endangerment Offense.

The offense of endangering the welfare of a minor does not encompass allegations of sexual misconduct, and should not be used as an alternative to sexual offense charges. Leheny v. State, 307 Ark. 29, 818 S.W.2d 236 (1991).

Evidence.

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's rape conviction because the child testified that defendant put his finger inside her body on what she described as her “private part,” and to prove rape, the state was required to show that there was penetration, however slight, of the labia majora of the victim. McLish v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 275 (2012).

Substantial evidence supported defendant's conviction for rape in violation of § 5-14-103(a)(3)(A), because the child victim testified that when she was seven years old, defendant forced her onto the bed, touched her chest, and sexually penetrated her vagina under subdivision (1)(B) of this section. Therefore, the circuit court properly denied his motion for directed verdict. Fields v. State, 2012 Ark. 353 (2012).

Victim's testimony relating to her grade level and place of residency at the time of assaults was sufficient proof for a jury to determine when certain assaults occurred under subdivision (1)(B) of this section and § 5-14-103(a)(3)(A). Mashburn v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 621 (2012).

Defendant's rape convictions were appropriate because the trial court did not err by denying his motions for a directed verdict. The victim's testimony alone was substantial evidence of rape and the evidence specifically established that defendant raped his daughter at least four times while they were living in the county. Richey v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 382 (2013).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of rape and sexual assault where both victims testified that defendant penetrated their vaginas with his penis; the credibility of the witnesses was for the jury to decide. Moreover, an officer's testimony established that defendant was between 17 and 20 years old over the course of time that he sexually abused one of the victims, so the jury could have reasonably concluded that at least two of the sexual assaults occurred after defendant turned 18. Thompson v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 275, 461 S.W.3d 368 (2015).

Forcible Compulsion.

Evidence held insufficient to show forcible compulsion. Nelson v. State, 262 Ark. 391, 557 S.W.2d 191 (1977).

Evidence held sufficient to show forcible compulsion. Fink v. State, 265 Ark. 865, 582 S.W.2d 3 (1979); Jennings v. State, 268 Ark. 216, 594 S.W.2d 855 (1980); Beed v. State, 271 Ark. 526, 609 S.W.2d 898 (1980); Banks v. State, 277 Ark. 28, 639 S.W.2d 509 (1982); Canard v. State, 278 Ark. 372, 646 S.W.2d 3 (1983); Puckett v. State, 324 Ark. 81, 918 S.W.2d 707 (1996).

Where both victims were children and they were alone every day after school with the defendant, who was their mother's brother and the only adult male living in the house, the jury was justified in finding that their submission was induced through the forcible coercion of the defendant, who stood in loco parentis to the girls. Griswold v. State, 290 Ark. 79, 716 S.W.2d 767 (1986).

Where the 13-year-old victim testified that she asked the defendant not to have intercourse with her and that it upset her when he did and the 10-year-old victim testified the defendant told her to “do it or else,” there was sufficient proof for the jury to find the acts were consummated against the will of the girls. Griswold v. State, 290 Ark. 79, 716 S.W.2d 767 (1986).

The quantum of force need not be considered as long as the act is committed against the will of the victim. West v. State, 27 Ark. App. 49, 766 S.W.2d 22 (1989).

“Forcible compulsion” under the rape statute is defined as “physical force,” which is further defined as any bodily impact, restraint or confinement, or the threat thereof. Strawhacker v. State, 304 Ark. 726, 804 S.W.2d 720 (1991); Skiver v. State, 37 Ark. App. 146, 826 S.W.2d 309 (1992).

“Physical force,” as used in subdivision (2) of this section, means any bodily impact, restraint or confinement, or the threat thereof. Dillon v. State, 317 Ark. 384, 877 S.W.2d 915 (1994).

The test for determining whether there was force is whether the act was against the will of the party upon whom the act was committed. Mosley v. State, 323 Ark. 244, 914 S.W.2d 731 (1996).

Evidence was sufficient to establish forcible compulsion where the defendant abducted the victim at gunpoint, robbed her, took her to a storage facility, and sexually assaulted her, and where there was no evidence of any consensual conduct by the victim. Williams v. State, 338 Ark. 97, 991 S.W.2d 565 (1999).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of rape where the victim, who had physical limitations, testified that defendant forced her to have sexual intercourse and to perform sexual acts on him after he entered her home under the pretext of using the telephone. Ellis v. State, 364 Ark. 538, 222 S.W.3d 192 (2006).

Rape victim's testimony was more than sufficient to show that the sex acts were against her will, and, thus, substantial evidence existed to support the element of forcible compulsion under subdivision (a)(1) of this section. Rounsaville v. State, 2009 Ark. 479, 346 S.W.3d 289 (2009).

Where the victim testified that defendant drove her to an unfamiliar area, poured each of them a shot glass of liquor, and forced her to have sexual intercourse with him against her will, the victim's testimony was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for rape in violation of subdivision (a)(1) of this section. The element of “forcible compulsion,” as set forth in subdivision (2), was established by the victim's testimony that she told defendant that she “didn't want to do it;” she pushed him off her; and she fought him as he removed her clothes, but defendant's strength was such that she was unable to keep him from removing her clothes. Goodman v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 262, 306 S.W.3d 443 (2009).

After their relationship had ended, the victim testified that defendant forced her into the bedroom, removed their clothing, and forced her to have sexual relations while she either attempted to leave or kicked and pushed him; defendant told a detective that he knew the victim did not want to have sex with him. The Court of Appeals of Arkansas held that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for two counts of rape under § 5-14-103(a)(1); the state did prove the element of forcible compulsion for purposes of subdivision (2) of this section. Henson v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 464, 320 S.W.3d 19 (2009).

At the hearing to revoke defendant's suspended imposition of sentence (SIS), the victim testified that defendant expressed his desire to touch and caress her, pinned her down despite her protests, and inserted his finger in her vagina. Because the victim's testimony reached all of the elements of rape described in this section, the trial court did not err by revoking defendant's SIS. Ray v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 679 (2009).

Circuit court's decision to revoke probation on the ground that defendant had committed rape under § 5-14-103(a)(1) was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence because defendant's pointing of a firearm at the victim was evidence of an implied threat of death or physical injury, and thus was forcible compulsion, as defined in subdivision (2) of this section. Craig v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 309 (2010).

Because the only rulings adverse to defendant were the denials of defendant's motions for a directed verdict, and because the victim's testimony that defendant hit, choked, and raped the victim was supported by physical evidence, there was substantial evidence under subdivision (2) of this section and § 5-14-103 to support defendant's conviction. Russell v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 479 (2011).

Challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a rape case would have been without merit because of the overwhelming evidence of guilt; the victim testified that defendant inserted his penis into her vagina against her will, and the DNA evidence identified defendant as the perpetrator. Burris v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 126 (2015).

Evidence was sufficient to convict under § 5-14-103 where the victim testified that the juvenile and codefendant had forced her into a fieldhouse and that codefendant had touched her on the inside with his finger while the juvenile restrained her by the waist and grabbed her hands, and there was nothing inherently improbable or physically impossible about the testimony. K.B. v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 478, 531 S.W.3d 420 (2017).

In a rape case, the circuit court did not err in denying appellant's motion for a directed verdict on the issue of forcible compulsion given that it found the victim's testimony about the incident credible, and her testimony was not so inherently improbable, physically impossible, or so clearly unbelievable that reasonable minds could not have differed about it. Hillman v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 89, 569 S.W.3d 372 (2019).

Guardian.

Where it was shown that defendant acted as a stepfather toward the 15-year-old daughter of his girlfriend, he stood in the position of a guardian since he spoke of the victim as his daughter and attended school functions as a parent. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction for rape under § 5-14-103(a)(4)(A)(i) based on his sexual intercourse with the child. White v. State, 370 Ark. 284, 259 S.W.3d 410 (2007).

Where the evidence showed that defendant assumed the role of a father figure by paying bills, taking children on outings, and taking the victim to the emergency room, the evidence was sufficient to show that he was a guardian under subdivision (3) of this section for purposes of a rape conviction under § 5-14-103(4)(a)(A)(i). Thompson v. State, 99 Ark. App. 422, 262 S.W.3d 193 (2007).

Evidence produced by the state at trial was sufficient for the jury to reasonably conclude that, by virtue of the living arrangement, appellant was placed in an apparent position of power or authority over the minor victim and that appellant was thus the victim's guardian for the purposes of subdivision (3) of this section and §§ 5-14-103(a)(4)(A)(i) and 5-14-125(a)(4)(A)(iii), thus the jury verdict was supported by substantial evidence. Pack v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 82 (2010).

Trial court did not clearly err by rejecting without a hearing defendant’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to charging language and jury instructions on the ground that the definition of “guardian” found in this section did not specifically include a step-grandparent, because there was sufficient evidence that defendant was both the victim’s guardian and step-grandparent where defendant did not contest the fact that he was the victim’s step-grandfather and the victim had spent a great deal of time at defendant’s home. McDaniels v. State, 2014 Ark. 181, 432 S.W.3d 644 (2014).

Penetration.

Penetration can be shown by circumstantial evidence, and if that evidence gives rise to more than a mere suspicion, and the inference that might reasonably have been deduced from it would leave little room for doubt, that is sufficient. Jackson v. State, 290 Ark. 375, 720 S.W.2d 282 (1986).

Evidence of penetration held sufficient, even though the attacker did not have an erection, where victim testified that he “smushed it in.” Stewart v. State, 331 Ark. 359, 961 S.W.2d 750 (1998).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a second-degree sexual assault conviction where defendant digitally penetrated the 15 year old victim while the victim was entrusted to defendant's care. Bowker v. State, 363 Ark. 345, 214 S.W.3d 243 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's rape conviction because the child victim testified that defendant put his “bad spot” in her mouth and “peed” in her mouth. She described his “bad spot” as looking like an elephant trunk and his “pee” as looking like “chicken noodle soup without the noodles or the chicken.” Lamb v. State, 372 Ark. 277, 275 S.W.3d 144 (2008).

Defendant's conviction for rape was supported by the evidence because the 84-year-old victim testified that she awoke to find a young, nude, black man standing over her and that the man raped her; although the victim did not testify specifically about the penetration that occurred, the circumstantial evidence, specifically the testimony from an emergency room physician, established the element of penetration, as defined in subdivision (10) of this section. Young v. State, 374 Ark. 350, 288 S.W.3d 221 (2008).

In a case in which defendant appealed his conviction for rape of a 20-year old woman with a mental defect or mental incapacity, he unsuccessfully argued that there was insufficient evidence that penetration occurred. In addition to the testimony, there was also circumstantial medical evidence admitted that constituted substantial evidence to support the conviction; testimony from a nurse describing the procedure for taking the medical samples from inside the anus and vagina, together with evidence from the forensic experts concerning the presence of defendant's Y-chromosomal DNA on the victim's rectal swab, clearly gave rise to more than a mere suspicion and left little room for doubt that penetration occurred. Fernandez v. State, 2010 Ark. 148, 362 S.W.3d 905 (2010).

Victim's testimony was sufficient to convince the jury that there was penetration under subdivision (1)(B) of this section, as there was testimony from the victim's parent and a social worker that the victim told them that defendant touched the victim's “privates” under the victim's panties, and the victim testified that defendant touched the victim with defendant's fingers and knuckles and described the act of using them to separate the victim's labia majora. Montgomery v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 501 (2010).

Because a 12-year old child victim's uncorroborated testimony of penetration and vaginal and anal intercourse was sufficient to satisfy the statutory elements for rape, and because any inconsistencies were for the jury to resolve, defendant was properly convicted of violating subdivision (1) of this section and § 5-14-103(a)(3)(A). Hawkins v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 164 (2011).

Defendant's conviction for raping his daughter under § 5-14-103(a)(4)(A)(i) was appropriate because the evidence was sufficient. The minor victim's testimony constituted substantial evidence that defendant had raped her and a doctor had testified that the daughter's examination revealed findings consistent with penetration under subdivision (11) of this section. Vance v. State, 2011 Ark. 392, 384 S.W.3d 515 (2011).

Defendant's confession that he had his penis out and touched his five-year-old niece's mouth with it, and that she might have opened her mouth, coupled with the child's statement to her mother within seconds or minutes of the incident that defendant had put his pee-pee in her mouth, was sufficient to convict defendant of rape. Davis v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 686, 386 S.W.3d 647 (2011).

Motion for a directed verdict as to one rape charge against appellant relating to penetration by a penis was insufficient to challenge the sufficiency of a conviction for rape by digital penetration under Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1(c); even if the issue was preserved, a victim's testimony was sufficient and substantial evidence to support a conviction. Clayton v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 199 (2012), appeal dismissed, 2013 Ark. 453 (2013).

Victim's oral cavity does not have to be fully entered in order for penetration to occur under subdivision (1)(A) of this section; rather, slight penetration, such as that of the lips, can be sufficient to constitute rape. Therefore, a directed verdict was properly denied because there was sufficient evidence of penetration under subdivision (1)(A) where the victim testified that appellant pushed her head down on his penis, which touched her lips; appellant was unable to push it further in the victim's mouth because she had her teeth clenched. Henderson v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 485 (2012).

Suspended sentence was properly revoked because the evidence showed that appellant committed rape under § 5-14-103(a)(1); penetration was shown by the circumstantial evidence where the victim sustained wounds to her body, appellant admitted to having intercourse, and debris was found inside of the victim's vagina. Moreover, appellant's semen was found on the victim's inner thigh. Edwards v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 551 (2012).

In a rape case, the State should not have been allowed to add the charge of second-degree sexual assault to an information at trial; defendant was unfairly surprised because he did not learn that the State intended to amend the information until after he made a motion to dismiss for failure to prove penetration.Defendant was prepared to defend against the essential element of penetration, and the amendment came after the State's witnesses were able to testify about acts that did not go to the elements of the rape charge. Martinez v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 182, 432 S.W.3d 689 (2014).

Defendant's claim that there was insufficient evidence of penetration lacked merit; the semen protein found inside the victim's mouth and vaginal canal was matched to either defendant or someone who shared his parental lineage, plus there was also proof that a sperm cell found on the victim matched defendant's personal DNA profile within all scientific certainty. Sharp v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 718, 479 S.W.3d 568 (2015).

In a rape case, an appellate court declined to address a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence due to the lack of specificity in defendant's directed verdict motions; even if the issue had been addressed, a rape victim's testimony alone could have been sufficient to sustain the conviction. The victim gave specific testimony relating to penetration, and defendant was permitted to cross-examine the victim about previous lies. Tatum v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 80 (2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's rape conviction, given that the minor child alleged penetration when defendant placed a black pole-like object inside her vaginal area, which was red and consistent with sexual abuse as per the nurse practitioner who examined the child, and defendant's polygraph responses in this regard were found to be deceptive. Thomas v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 195, 487 S.W.3d 415 (2016).

Physically Helpless.

A fifty-three-year-old nursing home patient who was blind, mentally impaired, partially handicapped, and unable to speak was “physically helpless” as defined by subdivision (5) of this section. Dabney v. State, 326 Ark. 382, 930 S.W.2d 360 (1996).

Where the victim's physical condition made it impossible for her to be “aware” of defendant's intentions before he actually commenced the rape, it is likely that the victim was unaware of what was about to occur and of her need to indicate her lack of consent; under these circumstances, the victim was unable to consent due to her physical helplessness. Dabney v. State, 326 Ark. 382, 930 S.W.2d 360 (1996).

Defendant's conviction for rape was upheld where there was ample testimony that the 16-year-old victim was at times unconscious, inebriated, “out of it,” unable to stand, unable to walk, and unable to sit on a couch without falling off; there was also testimony that she had consumed approximately 12 shots of alcohol in a 20-minute period and, hence, was “physically helpless,” as defined by subdivision (6) of this section. Marshall v. State, 94 Ark. App. 34, 223 S.W.3d 74 (2006).

Substantial evidence existed to revoke defendant's suspended sentence for sale of cocaine based on a finding that he committed a new criminal offense because his sister-in-law testified defendant sexually assaulted her after she consumed alcohol and fell asleep; therefore, she was physically helpless for purposes of subdivision (7)(A) of this section. Wilson v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 566 (2012).

Public Place.

Drunk tank of the city jail was a “public place” as defined by this section. State v. Black, 260 Ark. 864, 545 S.W.2d 617 (1977).

The definition of a “public place” does not exclude establishments that limit their fare only to consenting adults and forewarned viewers. Young v. State, 286 Ark. 413, 692 S.W.2d 752 (1985), cert. denied, Young v. Arkansas, 474 U.S. 1070, 106 S. Ct. 830 (1986).

Sexual Contact.

Testimony held sufficient to show that defendant engaged in sexual contact with victim. Green v. State, 7 Ark. App. 175, 646 S.W.2d 20 (1983); Magar v. State, 308 Ark. 380, 826 S.W.2d 221 (1992).

A rational juror could reasonably conclude that putting the mouth on the penis constitutes penetration. Chambers v. Lockhart, 872 F.2d 274 (8th Cir. 1989), rehearing denied, — F.2d —, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 7394 (8th Cir. May 19, 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 938, 110 S. Ct. 335 (1989).

When persons, other than physicians or other persons for legitimate medical reasons, insert something in another person's vagina or anus, it is not necessary that the state provide direct proof that the act was done for sexual gratification. Williams v. State, 298 Ark. 317, 766 S.W.2d 931 (1989).

When construed in accordance with their reasonable and commonly accepted meaning, and in context with the specific acts described in subsection (8), the words “sexual gratification” leave no doubt as to what behavior is prohibited under the statute. McGalliard v. State, 306 Ark. 181, 813 S.W.2d 768 (1991).

Court may assume that the appellant had sexual contact with the victim for sexual gratification, and it is not necessary for the state to prove that he was so motivated. Holbert v. State, 308 Ark. 672, 826 S.W.2d 284 (1992).

The touching of the side of girls' breasts constituted sexual contact under this section, and the court could assume that defendant's purpose in touching the girls was for sexual gratification without specific proof that he was so motivated. Holloway v. State, 312 Ark. 306, 849 S.W.2d 473 (1993).

Trial court properly denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict during his trial for sexual assault of his daughter because the testimony of the victim that defendant “would rub my behind,” and that he put his private part “in my behind,” was substantial evidence of sexual contact under subdivision (9) of this section to support the guilty verdict. Brown v. State, 374 Ark. 341, 288 S.W.3d 226 (2008).

Where defendant advertised “erotic services” on the Internet, she met an undercover officer at a hotel, and stroked his penis during the course of performing a massage; the officer's testimony was sufficient to show sexual activity through sexual contact as defined by this section. Defendant was properly convicted of prostitution under § 5-70-102, and sentenced to non-reporting probation for six months. Arrigo v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 568, 337 S.W.3d 560 (2009).

Defendant's convictions for rape as a habitual offender were appropriate pursuant to § 5-14-103(a)(3)(A) and subdivision (10) of this section because the uncorroborated testimony of a rape victim alone was sufficient to sustain a conviction and the victim's testimony was substantial evidence supporting defendant's convictions. The victim testified consistently and with sufficient detail that defendant raped her and therefore, substantial evidence supported the convictions. Price v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 111, 377 S.W.3d 324 (2010).

To support a second-degree sexual assault conviction, pursuant to § 5-14-125(a)(3), the state did not have to provide direct proof that the act was done for sexual gratification because it could be assumed that the desire for sexual gratification was a plausible reason for sexual contact, as defined by subdivision (10) of this section. Ross v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 129 (2010).

In a case in which defendant appealed his conviction for sexual assault in the second degree, in violation of § 5-14-125(a)(4)(A)(iii), he argued unsuccessfully that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict. The victim's testimony alone was sufficient to support defendant's conviction, and the jury was not required to believe defendant's testimony that he had not touched the victim's breast. Chavez v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 161 (2010).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of second-degree sexual assault under § 5-14-125(a)(3) because the child victim told a detective about a magic thumb game she played with defendant, pointed to the genitalia area of an anatomically correct doll when describing the magic thumb, and said that when it got big, she made it little again. King v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 253 (2012).

Revocation of probation was proper, because the appellate court was bound to defer to the trial court on issues of credibility, and the victim's testimony established each of the elements for committing second-degree sexual assault under subdivision (a)(1) of this section, when she indicated that the petitioner had her up against the wall and touched her buttocks and vagina. Boykins v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 263 (2012).

Trial court's delinquency adjudications finding that a juvenile committed three acts of sexual assault in the second degree, in violation of § 5-14-125(a)(1), were appropriate because the trial court found that the testimony of each of the three victims as to the juvenile's making sexual contact with them, as defined by subsection (10) of this section, by inappropriately touching the victims in separate incidents was credible, and because the uncorroborated testimony of each of the victims of a sexual offense constituted sufficient evidence to support a finding of guilt. D.D. v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 637 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of second-degree sexual assault because a victim’s testimony was substantial evidence to sustain the conviction; even if defendant was checking on the victim’s welfare, this did not explain why he touched her breast or put his hands in her pants when she fell asleep in his truck. Harris v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 264 (2014).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of second-degree sexual assault as it could be assumed that defendant's sexual contact with the victim was for sexual gratification because he entered the victim's home and touched her breast and vagina while she was in the bathtub. Holland v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 49, 510 S.W.3d 311 (2017).

Sexual Gratification.

Sexual gratification is not defined in this section, but the words have been construed in accordance with their reasonable and commonly accepted meanings. Warren v. State, 314 Ark. 192, 862 S.W.2d 222 (1993).

There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction of rape for performing an act of oral sex upon a nine-year-old boy, in violation of § 5-14-103(a)(1)(C)(i) and subdivision (1) of this section, as “sexual gratification” did not have to be proved by the state and could be inferred from the circumstances; accordingly, defendant's claim that she performed the act in order to obtain drugs and that there was no showing by the state of any sexual gratification in her actions lacked merit. Eaton v. State, 85 Ark. App. 320, 151 S.W.3d 15 (2004).

Defendant's conviction for the rape of a seven-year-old boy, in violation of § 5-14-103(a)(3)(A), was proper because there was substantial evidence upon which the jury could have inferred that defendant's actions were motivated by a desire for sexual gratification, as defined in subdivision (1)(B) of this section; the jury could have found sexual gratification even if the only evidence presented was that defendant put his finger in the victim's anus. Rounsaville v. State, 374 Ark. 356, 288 S.W.3d 213 (2008).

Where defendant admitted that he inappropriately touched an eleven-year-old girl while she was sleeping, the jury could infer that his actions were motivated by a desire for sexual gratification within the meaning of subdivision (9) of this section. The evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for sexual assault in the second degree in violation of § 5-14-125(a)(3); the trial court did not err by denying his motion for a directed verdict. Davis v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 753, 386 S.W.3d 647 (2009).

Conviction for sexual assault in the second degree for violating § 5-14-125(a)(3) was supported by sufficient evidence because it was at least plausible that defendant's act of touching the victim's vaginal area with his foot, after which he ordered her not to tell anyone and later wrote a letter of apology, was done for the purpose of sexual gratification, pursuant to subdivision (10) of this section. Elliott v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 185 (2010).

Credibility arguments relating to a conviction for second-degree sexual assault were not preserved for appellate review because appellant presented different arguments at the trial court level; appellant argued that the charge was a lesser-included offense of rape and that the element of sexual gratification was not proven. Arguments not raised at trial were not addressed for the first time on appeal, and appellant was not able to change the grounds for his directed verdict motion on appeal. Clayton v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 199 (2012), appeal dismissed, 2013 Ark. 453 (2013).

Sexual Intercourse.

By defining sexual intercourse as penetration, however slight, of a vagina by a penis, the draftsmen of the 1975 Criminal Code did not intend to change the crime of rape by requiring a deeper penetration into the body than penetration of the labia, as was formerly necessary; therefore, penetration within the labia up to as far as the hymen held sufficient penetration of the vagina to sustain the defendant's conviction of rape. Hice v. State, 268 Ark. 57, 593 S.W.2d 169 (1980).

Nine-year-old victim's testimony that defendant put his penis inside her body, along with her description of defendant's acts, was sufficient evidence of penetration. United S. Assurance Co. v. Beard, 320 Ark. 115, 894 S.W.2d 948 (1995).

There was sufficient evidence to sustain a rape conviction under § 5-14-103(a)(1)(C)(i) where the evidence showed that a child had a life threatening injury to her vaginal wall that was consistent with an intentional injury due to penetration, and the scenarios proffered by defendant did not explain the injuries. Turbyfill v. State, 92 Ark. App. 145, 211 S.W.3d 557 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a rape conviction because the victim gave unequivocal testimony that defendant engaged in acts of sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, or fellatio with her several times a week beginning when she was thirteen or fourteen years old. Keck v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 559 (2009).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for rape, because the thirteen-year-old victim's testimony that defendant had sexual intercourse with her under subdivision (11) of this section while they were living in various houses satisfied the statutory elements of rape. Christian v. State, 2013 Ark. 86 (2013).

Defendant was convicted for one count of rape because he admitted to engaging in sexual relations with his biological daughter when she was 10-years-old and a sexual-assault nurse examiner discovered injuries to the victim that were indicative of sexual assault or trauma. Defendant's statement to police provided sufficient evidence that he engaged in “sexual intercourse” with a person less than fourteen years of age within the meaning of subdivision (11) of this section. Breeden v. State, 2013 Ark. 145, 427 S.W.3d 5 (2013).

Cited: Whitmore v. State, 263 Ark. 419, 565 S.W.2d 133 (1978); Mills v. State, 270 Ark. 141, 603 S.W.2d 416 (1980); Harper v. State, 1 Ark. App. 190, 614 S.W.2d 237 (1981); United States v. Lemons, 697 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1983); Kramer v. State, 283 Ark. 36, 670 S.W.2d 445 (1984); Harris v. State, 15 Ark. App. 58, 689 S.W.2d 353 (1985); Mallett v. State, 17 Ark. App. 29, 702 S.W.2d 814 (1986); Speer v. State, 18 Ark. App. 1, 708 S.W.2d 94 (1986); Chappell v. State, 18 Ark. App. 26, 710 S.W.2d 214 (1986); Flurry v. State, 18 Ark. App. 64, 711 S.W.2d 163 (1986); Perkins v. State, 298 Ark. 322, 767 S.W.2d 514 (1989); Davis v. State, 308 Ark. 481, 825 S.W.2d 584 (1992); Vann v. State, 309 Ark. 303, 831 S.W.2d 126 (1992); Parrish v. Luckie, 963 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1992); D.D. v. State, 40 Ark. App. 75, 842 S.W.2d 62 (1992); Logan v. Lockhart, 994 F.2d 1324 (8th Cir. 1993); Clark v. State, 315 Ark. 602, 870 S.W.2d 372 (1994); Gadberry v. State, 46 Ark. App. 121, 877 S.W.2d 941 (1994); Mills v. State, 322 Ark. 647, 910 S.W.2d 682 (1995); Weber v. State, 326 Ark. 564, 933 S.W.2d 370 (1996); Ricks v. State, 327 Ark. 513, 940 S.W.2d 422 (1997); Sherrill v. State, 329 Ark. 593, 952 S.W.2d 134 (1997); Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657 (W.D. Ark. 1997); Freeman v. State, 331 Ark. 130, 959 S.W.2d 400 (1998); Jameson v. State, 333 Ark. 128, 970 S.W.2d 785 (1998); Clem v. State, 351 Ark. 112, 90 S.W.3d 428 (2002); Benson v. State, 357 Ark. 43, 160 S.W.3d 341 (2004); Dep't of Human Servs. v. Parker, 88 Ark. App. 222, 197 S.W.3d 33, 2004 Ark. App. LEXIS 769 (2004); Davis v. State, 362 Ark. 34, 207 S.W.3d 474 (2005); Ward v. State, 370 Ark. 398, 260 S.W.3d 292 (2007); Rouzer v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 658 (2009); Stidam v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 278, 374 S.W.3d 246 (2010); Estrada v. State, 2011 Ark. 3, 376 S.W.3d 395 (2011); Bean v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 107, 432 S.W.3d 87 (2014); Europe v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 460, 468 S.W.3d 792 (2015); Lowe v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 389, 500 S.W.3d 176 (2016); Allen v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 537, 506 S.W.3d 278 (2016); Duck v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 596, 509 S.W.3d 5 (2016); Bynum v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 41, 511 S.W.3d 860 (2017); Wiseman v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 371 (2017).