Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-103 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

Defense of mistake of fact as to victim's consent in rape prosecution. 102 A.L.R.5th 447.

Offense of Rape After Withdrawal of Consent. 33 A.L.R.6th 353.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Evidence, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 191.

Legislative Survey, Criminal Law, 4 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 583.

Note, Constitutional Law — Equal Protection — California's Gender Based Statutory Rape Law Upheld. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464. 5 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 315.

Note, Charge of Rape by Sexual Intercourse Sufficient to Convict of Rape by Deviate Sexual Activity, etc., 9 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 397.

“Constitutional Law — Child Hearsay Exception in Sexual Abuse Cases — New Arkansas Supreme Court Rule Conflicts with New General Assembly Rule: Which Controls? Vann v. State, 309 Ark. 303, 831 S.W.2d 126 (1992),” 15 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 143.

Survey of Legislation, 2001 Arkansas General Assembly, Criminal Law, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 429.

Annual Survey of Caselaw, Criminal Law, 25 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 927.

Annual Survey of Caselaw, Criminal Procedure, 25 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 946.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Annual Survey of Case Law: Criminal Law, 29 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 849.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Former statute providing penalty for sodomy was not too vague and too broad in scope, nor did it establish a religion because it regulated acts regarded as sinful by some religious groups. Connor v. State, 253 Ark. 854, 490 S.W.2d 114, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 991, 94 S. Ct. 342, 38 L. Ed. 2d 230 (1973) (decision under prior law).

Enforcement as to defendant of former statute providing penalty for sodomy did not violate any constitutional right of privacy where act was not committed in privacy but in an automobile on a public road adjacent to an interstate highway. Connor v. State, 253 Ark. 854, 490 S.W.2d 114, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 991, 94 S. Ct. 342, 38 L. Ed. 2d 230 (1973) (decision under prior law).

Former section which provided penalty for sodomy when applied to convict two consenting adults of sodomy did not constitute a violation of defendants' rights to privacy or rights under either federal or state constitutions. Carter v. State, 255 Ark. 225, 500 S.W.2d 368 (1973), cert. denied, Carter v. Arkansas, 416 U.S. 905, 94 S. Ct. 1610 (1974) (decision under prior law).

Former statute which clearly prohibited sodomy and buggery was not subject to constitutional attack on the grounds of vagueness, even though the statute did not specifically name fellatio, since the conduct for which defendant was convicted had long been held to be prohibited and defendant was placed on notice that his behavior was illegal. Connor v. Hutto, 516 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929, 96 S. Ct. 278 (1975) (decision under prior law).

Pursuant to a constitutionality challenge under former § 5-14-120, defendant's convictions for 20 counts of violation of a minor in the first degree were all upheld where the statute, in singling out school district employees, did not violate defendant's equal protection rights as the State had an interest in punishing school district employees who abused their positions to facilitate inappropriate relationships with school children. Smith v. State, 354 Ark. 226, 118 S.W.3d 542 (2003).

In General.

Rape is not defined as a continuing offense; it is a single crime that may be committed in either of two ways, by engaging in sexual intercourse or in deviate sexual activity. Tarry v. State, 289 Ark. 193, 710 S.W.2d 202 (1986).

This section controls all prosecutions for the crime of rape involving forcible compulsion, including those instances of forcible rape between spouses. Jones v. State, 348 Ark. 619, 74 S.W.3d 663 (2002).

Where eight days before trial the State amended the information against defendants reducing the charge from rape to sexual assault in the first degree, notwithstanding that the proof under the two charges was not the same, defendants were not prejudiced as to their defense based on the totality of the circumstances test, and the fact they waited until the day before trial to file their motion for continuance was further grounds for denying same. Murphy v. State, 83 Ark. App. 72, 117 S.W.3d 627 (2003).

In the context of a sexual assault against a child charge, an “intimate relationship” is one that is close in friendship or acquaintance, familiar, near, or confidential. Parish v. State, 357 Ark. 260, 163 S.W.3d 843 (2004).

Defendant's conviction for the crime of rape for engaging in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity with a person who was less than fourteen years old was reversed because the trial court repeatedly allowed an investigator to vouch for the credibility of the nine-year-old victim. Cox v. State, 93 Ark. App. 419, 220 S.W.3d 231 (2005).

Age of Defendant.

The plain wording of subdivision (a)(3) uses the limiting language of “not more than” so that any months or days beyond twenty-four months takes the defendant out of the affirmative-defense period. W.D. v. State, 55 Ark. App. 88, 931 S.W.2d 790 (1996).

Trial court erred in granting a defense motion to transfer a rape case to the juvenile division where (1) defendant was 17 when he committed the rape, (2) he caused a tear in the 14 year-old victim's vaginal area requiring surgery and hospitalization, and (3) he had previously been adjudicated a juvenile offender for first-degree criminal mischief, which involved destruction or causing damage to property: there had been an increase in the seriousness of the alleged offenses, indicating a lack of rehabilitation. State v. Graydon, 86 Ark. App. 319, 184 S.W.3d 476 (2004).

Age of Victim.

It is clear from §§ 5-14-104, 5-14-106 and this section that the legislature intended the age of the victim to control the severity of the penalty and, in the enactment of two of the degrees of carnal abuse, the taking into account of the relative ages of the participants as well as the absolute age of the victim evidences an intent to exclude from their ambit such conduct between contemporaries or near contemporaries. James v. State, 11 Ark. App. 1, 665 S.W.2d 883 (1984).

It is not necessary, where a child under the age of 14 is involved, that any degree of force be employed. Daffron v. State, 318 Ark. 182, 885 S.W.2d 3 (1994).

Our public policy, as fixed by the General Assembly, is manifest that victims younger than age 14 are beneath the age of consent and cannot be willing accomplices to sexual intercourse. Miller v. State, 318 Ark. 673, 887 S.W.2d 280 (1994).

Where child victim testified that defendant had sexual intercourse with her on at least five occasions, that testimony, standing alone, constituted substantial evidence to support the conviction for a violation of subdivision (a)(3) of this section. Miller v. State, 318 Ark. 673, 887 S.W.2d 280 (1994).

Evidence of violation of subdivision (a)(3) of this section held sufficient. Caldwell v. State, 319 Ark. 243, 891 S.W.2d 42 (1995).

The statutory rape provisions, subdivision (a)(4) of this section (superseded) and § 5-14-108(a)(4) (repealed) (now § 5-14-125(a)(3)), are subject to a specific statute, § 5-14-102(b), that eliminates knowledge, or even a reasonable belief, of the victim's age as a defense. Short v. State, 349 Ark. 492, 79 S.W.3d 313 (2002).

Section 5-1-109(h) extended the statute of limitations for offenses involving minors and applied retroactively to allow prosecution of violations of this section and former § 41-104; charges may not be barred by the six-year statute of limitations. Dye v. State, 82 Ark. App. 189, 119 S.W.3d 513 (2003).

Defendant's due process rights were not violated by trial court's decision to refuse to allow the introduction of a mistake-of-age defense in a rape trial because the legislature had the authority to define crimes and defenses; moreover, there were exceptions to the rule that every crime was required to contain a mens rea element. Gaines v. State, 354 Ark. 89, 118 S.W.3d 102 (2003).

Defendant's convictions as an accomplice to two counts of rape were proper as there was no doubt that defendant was aware that two men who had resided with her raped her daughter at various times when the girl was between eight or nine and 15 years of age, yet defendant concealed her knowledge of the rapes and failed to protect her daughter. Hutcheson v. State, 92 Ark. App. 307, 213 S.W.3d 25 (2005).

Assistance of Counsel.

Defendant's conviction was reversed because of ineffective assistance of counsel. Lasiter v. State, 290 Ark. 96, 717 S.W.2d 198 (1986).

Appellee was convicted of the rape of a minor under subdivision (a)(4) of this section based on the victim's statements that appellee engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim when she was between four and seven years old; in the victim's recorded police statements, she asserted that her grandparents were asleep downstairs during the incident, despite the fact that her grandmother had died. In postconviction proceedings, the circuit court did not err in granting appellee a new trial because trial counsel was ineffective in failing to use the victim's recorded statements to impeach her credibility. State v. Estrada, 2013 Ark. 89, 426 S.W.3d 405 (2013).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying postconviction relief because trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to move for dismissal of the charge of second-degree sexual assault on double jeopardy grounds, as the State presented evidence of separate impulses comprising separate acts conforming with the definitions of rape and second-degree sexual assault. Sorum v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 354, 582 S.W.3d 18 (2019).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying postconviction relief because trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to inform the jury that rape included the element of sexual gratification; there was testimony that counsel did not do away with the element of sexual gratification but instead chose to focus the jury's attention on the element of penetration as a matter of trial strategy. Sorum v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 354, 582 S.W.3d 18 (2019).

Attempt.

When the proof of the commission of rape was complete, its grade could not be reduced to assault with intent to commit rape. Holmes v. State, 210 Ark. 574, 196 S.W.2d 922 (1946) (decision under prior law).

Where defendant had taken sexual liberties with his twelve-year-old daughter, even though he had not forced intercourse or prevented her from leaving the bedroom, the evidence of criminal attempt to rape was sufficient. Daffron v. State, 318 Ark. 182, 885 S.W.2d 3 (1994).

District court properly denied habeas petition alleging violation of due process where substantial evidence supported attempted rape as the underlying felony for capital felony murder; review of the historical facts showed that the inmate unbuckled the victim's belt, unzipped her jeans, and removed her shirt and socks, and the inmate was seen by other witnesses in a state of partial undress. Nance v. Norris, 392 F.3d 284 (8th Cir. 2004), rehearing denied, — F.3d —, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 3898 (8th Cir. Mar. 8, 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 133, 163 L. Ed. 2d 136 (U.S. 2005).

Deviate Sexual Activity.

Information charging defendant with unnatural sexual relations with nine-year-old boy charged an offense of sodomy. Mangrum v. State, 227 Ark. 381, 299 S.W.2d 80 (1957) (decision under prior law).

Allegation that former statute providing penalty for sodomy did not cover the act of fellatio was without merit. Connor v. State, 253 Ark. 854, 490 S.W.2d 114, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 991, 94 S. Ct. 342, 38 L. Ed. 2d 230 (1973) (decision under prior law).

Where the defendant fondled victim and put the victim's penis in his mouth, the defendant could properly be tried and convicted for deviate sexual activity, despite the defendant's contention that the criminal statutes as written did not include his actions, in that only the body of the accused was penetrated, and not the body of the victim. Hoggard v. State, 277 Ark. 117, 640 S.W.2d 102 (1982), cert. denied, Hoggard v. Arkansas, 460 U.S. 1022, 103 S. Ct. 1273 (1983).

Evidence sufficient to establish that defendant had engaged in deviant sexual activity. Johnson v. State, 328 Ark. 526, 944 S.W.2d 115 (1997).

The testimony of the three children was more than sufficient to sustain the four counts of rape involving deviate sexual activity. Rains v. State, 329 Ark. 607, 953 S.W.2d 48 (1997).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for rape by engaging in “deviate sexual activity” with a child less than 14 where the testimony of the rape victim alone was sufficient to sustain a rape conviction; in addition, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude without resorting to suspicion or conjecture that oral and anal sex was deviate sexual activity and that the victim was 13 years old when he and defendant engaged in this activity. McDuffy v. State, 359 Ark. 180, 196 S.W.3d 12 (2004).

Directed Verdict.

Sufficient evidence supported the denial of a directed verdict motion on defendant's rape charge, even though: (1) the victim had a prior felony conviction and had consumed multiple beers and cocaine on the night of the incident; (2) the victim willingly went to defendant's house and did not contact police because of outstanding warrants for her arrest; (3) there was no bruising on the victim; and that no hair from defendant was found by the forensic serologist; (4) a third person could not be excluded from the vaginal swab; and (5) intercourse could not be conclusively shown between the victim and defendant from the swab. Williams v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 675, 386 S.W.3d 609 (2011).

—Lesser Included Offenses.

Defendant did not preserve a sufficiency of the evidence challenge because defendant's trial court argument was based on whether an element of rape was proved, but defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offense of second-degree sexual assault; and defendant failed to move for a directed verdict on second-degree sexual assault either by name or by a specific element of the offense. King v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 309 (2018).

Evidence.

Where defendant was charged with the anal rape of a nine-year-old, the trial court erred, at a rape-shield hearing, in granting defendant's request to introduce evidence of the victim's allegations of sexual abuse against three others in order to show that the victim obtained sexual knowledge from a source other than defendant where the victim's descriptions of the prior abuse and the charged act were very dissimilar. State v. Blandin, 370 Ark. 23, 257 S.W.3d 68 (2007).

Where it was shown that defendant acted as a stepfather toward the 15-year-old daughter of his girlfriend, he stood in the position of a guardian since he spoke of the victim as his daughter and attended school functions as a parent. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction for rape under subdivision (a)(4)(A)(i) of this section based on his sexual intercourse with the child. White v. State, 370 Ark. 284, 259 S.W.3d 410 (2007).

Where a victim testified that defendant put something inside of her body after he touched her private area, and she saw him covering up his private area when she turned around, a motion for a directed verdict was properly denied since there was sufficient evidence to support a rape conviction under subdivision (a)(1)(C)(i) of this section. Other evidence supporting the conviction included a videotape of the victim's minor sister entering and exiting a shower, along with evidence of defendant's flight after being named a suspect. Ward v. State, 370 Ark. 398, 260 S.W.3d 292 (2007).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's rape conviction because defendant admitted that the six-year-old victim put her mouth on his penis and gave him oral sex, and a hair found on defendant's underwear was found to be microscopically similar to the sample provided by the victim. Bell v. State, 371 Ark. 375, 266 S.W.3d 696 (2007).

Where the evidence showed that defendant assumed the role of a father figure by paying bills, taking children on outings, and taking the victim to the emergency room, the evidence was sufficient to show that he was a guardian under § 5-14-101(3) for purposes of a rape conviction under subdivision (4)(a)(A)(i) of this section. Thompson v. State, 99 Ark. App. 422, 262 S.W.3d 193 (2007).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's rape conviction because the child victim testified that defendant put his “bad spot” in her mouth and “peed” in her mouth. She described his “bad spot” as looking like an elephant trunk and his “pee” as looking like “chicken noodle soup without the noodles or the chicken.” Lamb v. State, 372 Ark. 277, 275 S.W.3d 144 (2008).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain rape convictions because the victim's testimony that she was fifteen years of age at the time of the two charged rapes, that she grew up in defendant's home and considered him her father, and that defendant engaged in sexual intercourse with her was sufficient. Moreover, the victim's testimony was corroborated by other reliable evidence including a forensic DNA analyst's testimony that the semen found on the sock and the underwear matched the DNA sample provided by defendant, along with the nurse practitioner's testimony that the victim's injuries were consistent with sexual abuse. Strong v. State, 372 Ark. 404, 277 S.W.3d 159 (2008).

Where defendant was charged with raping his three-year-old daughter in violation of this section, the victim was incompetent to testify; the trial court did not violate defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation rights by allowing the child's mother and social worker were permitted to testify as to the child's hearsay statements of abuse. The child's statements were nontestimonial. Seely v. State, 373 Ark. 141, 282 S.W.3d 778 (2008), cert. denied, Seely v. State, — U.S. —, 129 S. Ct. 218, 172 L. Ed. 2d 169 (2008).

In a child rape case, defendant's half-brother's testimony regarding possibly consensual oral sex that occurred 17 years previously should have been excluded under Ark. R. Evid. 404(b) as too dissimilar in character and temporally removed from the crimes charged, which involved repeated anal sex with a girl from ages four to eight. The pedophile exception did not apply. Efird v. State, 102 Ark. App. 110, 282 S.W.3d 282 (2008), review denied, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Ark. LEXIS 571 (Sept. 4, 2008).

Trial court did not err in permitting the state to introduce videotapes depicting defendant engaged in sexual acts with his minor victims and with each other because the video footage was relevant to proving the elements of both the charges of rape and the charges of engaging children in the production of child pornography and because it could not be said that the video served no valid purpose other than to inflame the passions of the jury. Williams v. State, 374 Ark. 282, 287 S.W.3d 559 (2008), rehearing denied, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Ark. LEXIS 589 (Oct. 30, 2008).

Where defendant was charged with numerous counts of rape and engaging children in the production of child pornography, the probative value of a DVD depicting defendant engaged in sexual contact with the young boys was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice because the state had the burden of proving the elements of all of the charges against defendant and because the state was entitled to prove the elements of the charges with its best evidence and the videos were certainly the state's best evidence. Williams v. State, 374 Ark. 282, 287 S.W.3d 559 (2008), rehearing denied, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2008 Ark. LEXIS 589 (Oct. 30, 2008).

Defendant's conviction for the rape of a seven-year-old boy, in violation of subdivision (a)(3)(A) of this section, was proper because there was substantial evidence upon which the jury could have inferred that defendant's actions were motivated by a desire for sexual gratification, as defined in § 5-14-101(1)(B); the jury could have found sexual gratification even if the only evidence presented was that defendant put his finger in the victim's anus. Rounsaville v. State, 374 Ark. 356, 288 S.W.3d 213 (2008).

Defendant's conviction for rape, in violation of subdivision (a)(1) of this section, was supported by the evidence because the 84-year-old victim testified that she awoke to find a young, nude, black man standing over her and that the man raped her; a forensic DNA analyst testified that a semen sample found on the victim's nightgown contained DNA that matched the DNA of defendant. Young v. State, 374 Ark. 350, 288 S.W.3d 221 (2008).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict as there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction for the rape of a nine-year-old, in violation of subdivision (a)(3)(A) of this section; the victim's testimony constituted substantial evidence that defendant penetrated her vagina with his penis. Kelley v. State, 375 Ark. 483, 292 S.W.3d 297 (2009).

Rape victim's testimony was more than sufficient to show that the sex acts were against her will, and, thus, substantial evidence existed to support the element of forcible compulsion under subdivision (a)(1) of this section. Rounsaville v. State, 2009 Ark. 479, 346 S.W.3d 289 (2009).

Where the victim testified that defendant drove her to an unfamiliar area, poured each of them a shot glass of liquor, and forced her to have sexual intercourse with him against her will, the victim's testimony was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for rape in violation of subdivision (a)(1) of this section. Goodman v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 262, 306 S.W.3d 443 (2009).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict during his trial for the rape of his niece through marriage, in violation of subdivision (a)(4)(A)(ii) of this section, because the familial relationship extended to a relationship by affinity as well as a blood relationship; DNA testing confirmed that defendant was the biological father of the 15-year-old niece's child. Wade v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 346, 308 S.W.3d 178 (2009), rehearing denied, — Ark. App. —, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Ark. App. LEXIS 674 (June 3, 2009), review denied, — Ark. —, — S.W.3d —, 2009 Ark. LEXIS 576 (Sept. 10, 2009).

On two separate occasions after their relationship had ended, the victim testified that defendant forced her into the bedroom, removed their clothing, and forced her to have sexual relations while she either attempted to leave or kicked and pushed him; defendant told a detective that he knew the victim did not want to have sex with him. The Court of Appeals of Arkansas held that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for two counts of rape under subdivision (a)(1) of this section. Henson v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 464, 320 S.W.3d 19 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a rape conviction because the victim gave unequivocal testimony that defendant engaged in acts of sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, or fellatio with her several times a week beginning when she was thirteen or fourteen years old. Keck v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 559 (2009).

Defendant's eight-year-old daughter testified that he put cherry oil on her private parts and licked it off; she also testified that he put his private parts into her mouth. This testimony alone was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for rape in violation of subdivision (a)(3)(A) of this section. Rouzer v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 658 (2009).

At the hearing to revoke defendant's suspended imposition of sentence (SIS), the victim testified that defendant expressed his desire to touch and caress her, pinned her down despite her protests, and inserted his finger in her vagina. Because the victim's testimony reached all of the elements of rape under subsection (a) of this section, the trial court did not err by revoking defendant's SIS. Ray v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 679 (2009).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for rape where the victim's testimony, although uncorroborated, stated that defendant inserted his finger into her vagina, which clearly satisfied the statutory elements of rape under subdivision (a)(4)(A)(i) of this section. Gilliland v. State, 2010 Ark. 135, 361 S.W.3d 279 (2010).

Victim's testimony that defendant raped the victim, the testimony of the victim's mother positively identifying defendant as the perpetrator, and DNA evidence that conclusively linked defendant to the victim constituted sufficient evidence to support defendant's rape conviction under subdivision (a)(1) of this section. Witcher v. State, 2010 Ark. 197, 362 S.W.3d 321 (2010).

Defendant's convictions for rape as a habitual offender were appropriate pursuant to subdivision (a)(3)(A) of this section and § 5-14-101(10) because the uncorroborated testimony of a rape victim alone was sufficient to sustain a conviction and the victim's testimony was substantial evidence supporting defendant's convictions. The victim testified consistently and with sufficient detail that defendant raped her and therefore, substantial evidence supported the convictions. Price v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 111, 377 S.W.3d 324 (2010).

Defendant's convictions for rape in violation of subdivision (a)(3)(A) of this section and sexual assault were appropriate because his sufficiency challenge was not preserved for review. In order to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, defendant was required to make a specific motion for a directed verdict that advised the trial court of the exact element of the crime that the state failed to prove; for that reason, his sufficiency challenge was not preserved. Stidam v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 278, 374 S.W.3d 246 (2010).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for the rape of a person who was under the age of fourteen, a violation of subdivision (a)(3)(A) of this section, because the victim testified to at least two specific times when defendant had sex with her prior to her fourteenth birthday. The rape victim's testimony did not have to be corroborated, and scientific evidence was not required to support a rape conviction. Moss v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 395 (2010).

Defendant's conviction for rape of a minor grandchild in violation of this section was proper because the victim's testimony was sufficient to convince the jury that there was penetration to substantiate the charge of rape; the victim testified that the defendant touched the victim with defendant's fingers and knuckles and described the act of using them to separate the victim's labia majora. Montgomery v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 501 (2010).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's rape conviction, under subdivision (a)(3)(A) of this section, because (1) the victim, who was less than 14 years old at the time, explicitly testified about two instances of sexual intercourse and at least three instances of deviate sexual activity with defendant, and (2) this testimony alone was sufficient to sustain a conviction. Coleman v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 597 (2010).

Defendant's conviction for attempted rape of his 13-year-old stepdaughter, in violation of subdivision (a)(3)(A) of this section and § 5-3-201(b), was supported by the evidence because the victim testified that defendant, who wanted oral sex from her, thrust himself upon her while she was in the shower until her grandmother, who lived next door, appeared at the front door. Forrest v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 686 (2010).

Where a victim testified that the man who had intercourse with her on the night in question, who was identified by the forensic evidence as defendant, did so by forcible compulsion, the testimony of the victim was, by itself, substantial evidence to support a conviction on a charge of rape. Walker v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 688 (2010).

There was sufficient evidence for a jury to convict defendant of rape. The victim testified that defendant had sexual intercourse with her several times from the time she was four years old until she was seven years old, and the victim's testimony alone was sufficient evidence to prove rape without corroboration or forensic findings. Estrada v. State, 2011 Ark. 3, 376 S.W.3d 395 (2011).

Because a 12-year old child victim's uncorroborated testimony of penetration and vaginal and anal intercourse was sufficient to satisfy the statutory elements for rape, and because any inconsistencies were for the jury to resolve, defendant was properly convicted of violating § 5-14-101(1) and subdivision (a)(3)(A) of this section. Hawkins v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 164 (2011).

Defendant's conviction for raping his seven-year-old daughter was proper because the victim's testimony that he “put his private part in her butt” was sufficient to sustain the conviction under subdivision (a)(3)(A) of this section and § 5-14-101(1)(A); a nurse corroborated the victim's testimony in that the nurse found that the injuries to the victim's anus and hymen were consistent with penetration. Harlmo v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 314, 383 S.W.3d 447 (2011).

Defendant's conviction for raping his daughter under subdivision (a)(4)(A)(i) of this section was appropriate because the evidence was sufficient. The minor victim's testimony constituted substantial evidence that defendant had raped her and a doctor had testified that the daughter's examination revealed findings consistent with penetration under § 5-14-101(11). Vance v. State, 2011 Ark. 392, 384 S.W.3d 515 (2011).

Thirteen-year old victim's uncorroborated testimony that the victim and defendant had sex was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for rape under subdivision (a)(3)(A) of this section. Vance v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 413 (2011).

Because the only rulings adverse to defendant were the denials of defendant's motions for a directed verdict, and because the victim's testimony that defendant hit, choked, and raped the victim was supported by physical evidence, there was substantial evidence under § 5-14-101(2) and this section to support defendant's conviction. Russell v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 479 (2011).

Motion for a directed verdict as to one rape charge against appellant relating to penetration by a penis was insufficient to challenge the sufficiency of a conviction for rape by digital penetration under Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1(c); even if the issue was preserved, a victim's testimony was sufficient and substantial evidence to support a conviction. Clayton v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 199 (2012), appeal dismissed, 2013 Ark. 453 (2013).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's rape conviction because the child testified that defendant put his finger inside her body on what she described as her “private part,” and to prove rape, the state was required to show that there was penetration, however slight, of the labia majora of the victim. McLish v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 275 (2012).

At defendant's trial for rape under this section, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in determining that evidence of his prior convictions for carnal abuse of a child, arson, terroristic threatening, and failure to register as a sex offender were admissible under Ark. R. Evid. 609 to impeach defendant. The prior convictions were highly probative of his credibility, which was at issue because he chose to testify at trial and claimed in defense that the victim offered to pay him to have sex with her. Jordan v. State, 2012 Ark. 277, 412 S.W.3d 150 (2012).

Substantial evidence supported defendant's conviction for rape under subdivision (a)(3)(A) of this section, because the child victim testified that when she was seven years old, defendant forced her onto the bed, touched her chest, and sexually penetrated her. Therefore, the circuit court properly denied his motion for directed verdict. Fields v. State, 2012 Ark. 353 (2012).

At defendant's trial for rape under subdivision (a)(3)(A) of this section, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony from three witnesses who had prior sexual contact with defendant pursuant to the pedophile exception to Ark. R. Evid. 404(b). Like the victim, the witnesses were young children at the time they had an intimate relationship with defendant. Fields v. State, 2012 Ark. 353 (2012).

In defendant's prosecution for rape of a physically helpless victim who was unable to consent, defendant's prior conviction of lewd molestation of a child was admissible under the pedophile exception to Ark. R. Evid. 404(b) as probative of defendant's motive, intent, and plan to assault the victim because, in each case, defendant placed himself in a position of authority, isolated the victim from parents or other adults while engaging the victim in a favored activity, removed the victim's pants, performed oral sex on the victim, and then told the victim not to tell and, in both cases, defendant cultivated a relationship close in acquaintance based on common interests and enjoyed a position of authority over the victims. The differences in age and gender between the two victims did not render the pedophile exception inapplicable; nor did the passage of 17 years between the events render the earlier event too remote to be admissible under Rule 404(b) because defendant's prior conviction, despite its age, tended to prove defendant's depraved sexual instinct. Craigg v. State, 2012 Ark. 387, 424 S.W.3d 264 (2012).

Notwithstanding testimony that the alleged rape victim was a heavy drinker whose personality and memory changed when she was under the influence, the jury was entitled to believe the victim's testimony describing an assault and act of sexual intercourse by defendant that continued after she told him to quit, particularly where there was testimony by others that defendant admitted he had sexual intercourse with the victim and admitted he had raped her. The believability of the victim was a function for the jury as the fact-finder, not the reviewing court. Harris v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 651 (2012).

Victim's testimony relating to her grade level and place of residency at the time of assaults was sufficient proof for a jury to determine when certain assaults occurredunder subdivision (a)(3)(A) of this section and § 5-14-101(1)(B). Mashburn v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 621 (2012).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for rape under subdivision (a)(3)(A) of this section, because the thirteen-year-old victim's testimony that defendant had sexual intercourse with her while they were living in various houses satisfied the statutory elements of rape. Christian v. State, 2013 Ark. 86 (2013).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for one count of rape in violation of this section, because he admitted to engaging in sexual relations with his biological daughter when she was 10-years-old and a sexual-assault nurse examiner discovered injuries to the victim that were indicative of sexual assault or trauma. Breeden v. State, 2013 Ark. 145, 427 S.W.3d 5 (2013).

Defendant's rape convictions were appropriate because the trial court did not err by denying his motions for a directed verdict. The victim's testimony alone was substantial evidence of rape and the evidence specifically established that defendant raped his daughter at least four times while they were living in the county. Richey v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 382 (2013).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of rape of his minor stepdaughter because the victim testified that on 15 occasions between August 2011 and March 2012, when the victim was 12 years old, defendant put his fingers in her privates; a child rape victim's uncorroborated testimony describing penetration could constitute substantial evidence to sustain a conviction of rape; and the rape victim's testimony need not be corroborated, and scientific evidence was not required. Woods v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 739, 431 S.W.3d 343 (2013).

Trial court did not err in finding that the prejudicial value of defendant's prior child molestation convict was outweighed by its probative value based on the similarities of the current rape charge and the prior child molestation conviction. Woods v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 739, 431 S.W.3d 343 (2013).

There were sufficient similarities between the current rape offense and defendant's 1998 Missouri conviction for first-degree child molestation to satisfy the pedophile exception and to admit evidence of the prior molestation conviction because both victims were his minor stepdaughters at the time of rapes with whom he had lived; he touched the breasts and privates of both victims with his hands; he created opportunities for the abuse by waiting until the victims' mothers were away and by intentionally isolating them from their siblings; and he threatened both victims not to report the abuse. Woods v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 739, 431 S.W.3d 343 (2013).

In a second-degree sexual assault and attempted rape case, a trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence from the victim's former classmates because the classmates' testimony about what the victim did in public would not have been similar to the testimony that the victim gave detailing what defendant did to her. The allegations against defendant did not occur in public places; moreover, the evidence that the victim was the aggressor was not relevant since the victim could not have consented. Bean v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 107, 432 S.W.3d 87 (2014).

Substantial evidence supported the finding that defendant raped the victim sometime during 1999, which supported defendant's rape conviction; it was the jury's duty to determine the victim's credibility, and the victim gave great detail about what happened when she was four years old, and as her testimony alone constituted substantial evidence, the circuit court properly denied his motion for a directed verdict. T.N. v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 186 (2014).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of rape and sexual assault where both victims testified that defendant penetrated their vaginas with his penis; the credibility of the witnesses was for the jury to decide. Moreover, an officer's testimony established that defendant was between 17 and 20 years old over the course of time that he sexually abused one of the victims, so the jury could have reasonably concluded that at least two of the sexual assaults occurred after defendant turned 18. Thompson v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 275, 461 S.W.3d 368 (2015).

—In General.

Where a state information charged the defendant with rape by engaging in sexual intercourse by forcible compulsion, evidence by the prosecution need not be restricted to that allegation without mentioning any allegation regarding deviate sexual activity, since this section includes deviate activity in its definition of rape. Browning v. State, 274 Ark. 13, 621 S.W.2d 688 (1981).

Where the defendant was being prosecuted for the rape and incest of his children, a mistrial was not required on the ground that the prosecutor said the relevancy of the discussion of the child support payments had to do with the love and concern of the defendant for his children; the admonition to the jury was sufficient. Poyner v. State, 288 Ark. 402, 705 S.W.2d 882 (1986).

The court should not have permitted the victim to testify about the effect the rape had upon her marriage; however, the state's proof was so strong that the cause of justice would not be served by the granting of a new trial. Thomas v. State, 289 Ark. 72, 709 S.W.2d 83 (1986).

Lay jurors were fully competent to determine whether the history given by the victim was consistent with sexual abuse. Russell v. State, 289 Ark. 533, 712 S.W.2d 916 (1986).

In prosecution for rape, the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion in limine to prevent his being asked on cross-examination, should he have elected to take the stand, whether he had been previously convicted of the crime of rape was not subject to review where the defendant did not assert he would take the stand and made no record of what his testimony would be, even though the trial court took the motion under advisement until the state had rested. Johnson v. State, 290 Ark. 166, 717 S.W.2d 805 (1986).

Intent to rape might be proved by circumstances surrounding the assault from which the intent may be inferred. Summerlin v. State, 296 Ark. 347, 756 S.W.2d 908 (1988).

Proof of an assailant's intention to have sexual intercourse with the victim is not sufficient, unless an intention to accomplish that purpose by force may be ascertained from acts or words connected with the assault and there is some overt act toward the accomplishment of that purpose. Summerlin v. State, 296 Ark. 347, 756 S.W.2d 908 (1988).

Victim's inability to fix definite date of rape does not defeat the charge, and any discrepancies in the testimony concerning the date of the offense were for the jury to resolve. Yates v. State, 301 Ark. 424, 785 S.W.2d 199 (1990).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance so a DNA expert could be appointed where results from the state's test samples were available to defendant four months prior to the trial date and defendant waited until one week before trial to request a DNA expert. Munoz v. State, 340 Ark. 218, 9 S.W.3d 497 (2000).

There was sufficient evidence to sustain a rape conviction under subdivision (a)(1)(C)(i) of this section where the evidence showed that a child had a life threatening injury to her vaginal wall that was consistent with an intentional injury due to penetration, and the scenarios proffered by defendant did not explain the injuries. Turbyfill v. State, 92 Ark. App. 145, 211 S.W.3d 557 (2005).

—Admissibility.

Evidence as to victim's prior sexual conduct held inadmissible. Houston v. State, 266 Ark. 257, 582 S.W.2d 958 (1979); Pruitt v. State, 8 Ark. App. 350, 652 S.W.2d 51 (1983).

The offense of rape is committed if the person engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity with another person by forcible compulsion and, therefore, prior sexual conduct of the victim has no relevancy to the issue. Brewer v. State, 269 Ark. 185, 599 S.W.2d 141 (1980).

Where prosecutor in rape case elicited from the victim testimony that she had been a virgin prior to the rape, the question and answer were not so prejudicial as to require mistrial and trial court acted properly in continuing the trial after admonishing the jury to disregard the improper question and answer. Brewer v. State, 269 Ark. 185, 599 S.W.2d 141 (1980).

The rape shield statute only excludes evidence of prior sexual conduct of the victim, and the defendant may testify at trial as to the actions of the prosecuting witness on the night of the alleged rape. Kemp v. State, 270 Ark. 835, 606 S.W.2d 573 (1980).

For cases discussing admissibility of photographic or video taped evidence, see French v. State, 271 Ark. 445, 609 S.W.2d 42 (1980); Bliss v. State, 282 Ark. 315, 668 S.W.2d 936 (1984).

While generally a rape victim's report to a third party that a rape occurred is admissible to prove that she did not remain silent, or sometimes as an excited utterance, the details of her report are not normally admissible, except when admitted to rehabilitate a witness whose testimony is seriously questioned or impeached. Urquhart v. State, 273 Ark. 486, 621 S.W.2d 218 (1981).

For cases discussing the introduction into evidence of defendant's prior convictions, see Williams v. State, 6 Ark. App. 410, 644 S.W.2d 608 (1982); Bryan v. State, 288 Ark. 125, 702 S.W.2d 785 (1986).

Where the defendant's counsel had elicited the initial testimony from the emergency room doctor about the mental processes of the children who were allegedly victims of rape and incest, it was not error to allow the admission of the testimony. Poyner v. State, 288 Ark. 402, 705 S.W.2d 882 (1986).

Evidence of prior sexual contact between the defendant stepfather and the stepdaughter rape victim was admissible as probative of both the victim's fear of the defendant and the fact that a rape could have occurred in the bathroom of a house which might have been full of people, after the accused merely shoved the victim to the floor. Sullivan v. State, 289 Ark. 323, 711 S.W.2d 469 (1986).

While the psychologist should not have been allowed to testify that the history given by the victim was consistent with sexual abuse, the testimony merely provided the jurors with a hint of the testimony which they would receive from the victim; therefore, the error was harmless and did not affect the judgment. Russell v. State, 289 Ark. 533, 712 S.W.2d 916 (1986).

The trial court did not err in admitting a physician's testimony that the alleged victim told the physician that her father, the defendant, had intercourse with her, because statements by a child abuse victim to a physician during an examination that the abuser is a member of the victim's immediate household are reasonably pertinent to treatment. Stallnacker v. State, 19 Ark. App. 9, 715 S.W.2d 883 (1986).

Where, in prosecution for rape, the victim was unemployed and unmarried, but an in-chambers proffer showed that the victim was supported by her fiance, the victim's manner of support of herself and a daughter was of no consequence. Johnson v. State, 290 Ark. 166, 717 S.W.2d 805 (1986).

Where the defendant was charged with rape of his stepdaughter, and on direct examination he testified he had not raped her or any of the other children who had been living with him and their now deceased mother, it was not error to permit the prosecution to present rebuttal testimony from another, younger stepdaughter that she too had been raped by the defendant. McFadden v. State, 290 Ark. 177, 717 S.W.2d 812 (1986).

Evidence of marginal relevance admitted. Dumond v. State, 290 Ark. 595, 721 S.W.2d 663 (1986); Barrett v. State, 23 Ark. App. 144, 744 S.W.2d 741 (1988).

Where there was abundant evidence of the defendant's guilt of rape, other testimony was held harmless error. Jarreau v. State, 291 Ark. 60, 722 S.W.2d 565 (1987).

Testimony of girls concerning defendant's sexual acts with them was admissible, in rape case involving other victims, under Evid. Rule 404(b) to show motive, intent, or plan; the evidence was especially probative since defendant denied having any sexual contact with the victims, blamed another person, and stated that it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse. Morgan v. State, 308 Ark. 627, 826 S.W.2d 271 (1992).

Sexually explicit photograph was relevant to show that the photographed female was indeed the victim and to corroborate the victim's testimony that defendant raped her. Watson v. State, 308 Ark. 643, 826 S.W.2d 281 (1992).

The instrumentality used to inflict fear is patently relevant to crimes of rape, kidnapping and aggravated robbery, all of which include an element of force for perpetration. Brooks v. State, 308 Ark. 660, 827 S.W.2d 119 (1992).

Knife found at crime site was relevant to corroborate the testimony of the victim concerning stabbings and no prejudice resulted to the defendant from its admission into evidence. Brooks v. State, 308 Ark. 660, 827 S.W.2d 119 (1992).

Evidence of rape victim's fear and repulsion was relevant to the issue of compulsion and was properly admitted. Skiver v. State, 37 Ark. App. 146, 826 S.W.2d 309 (1992).

Several photographs depicting the act of sexual intercourse were admissible over objection to their duplicative effect since photographic evidence is not inadmissible on grounds that it is cumulative or unnecessary due to admitted or proven facts. Watson v. State, 308 Ark. 643, 826 S.W.2d 281 (1992).

Modus operandi evidence is admissible in rape cases to prove a common plan. Dillon v. State, 311 Ark. 529, 844 S.W.2d 944 (1993).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that the proffered testimony regarding child victim's prior inconsistent statements was inadmissible, as the statements that victim had been sexually abused by her stepfather were properly excluded under the rape-shield statute. Butler v. State, 349 Ark. 252, 82 S.W.3d 152 (2002).

In a juvenile proceeding, where the juvenile sought to introduce evidence of the victim's sexual history, and the victim was under the age of 14, the child's sexual past was completely irrelevant to the question of whether or not the juvenile engaged in sexual activity with the victim. M. M. v. State, 350 Ark. 328, 88 S.W.3d 406 (2002).

Defendant was convicted of rape based on the victim's testimony, along with the testimony of a doctor that the victim's hymen had an injury consistent with sexual abuse; however, his conviction was reversed on appeal because the circuit judge erred by admitting hearsay statements that defendant was accused of rape in another state without any direct proof of the prior offense. Hanlin v. State, 356 Ark. 516, 157 S.W.3d 181 (2004).

In defendant's trial for raping his step-granddaughter when she was six years old, the circuit court abused its discretion by granting defendant's motion to introduce evidence that his step-granddaughter was sexually assaulted by someone else when she was four years old; defendant's step-granddaughter's descriptions of the two incidents were substantially dissimilar and, because there was little evidence that the prior incident resembled the acts defendant allegedly committed, information about the prior incident was not relevant to the allegations against defendant. State v. Townsend, 366 Ark. 152, 233 S.W.3d 680 (2006).

Trial court did not err in refusing to admit the alleged testimony of the victim under Ark. R. Evid. 804(b)(5); the statement that another man put his finger in a hole in her jeans, which bothered her, was found not to carry substantial guarantees of trustworthiness, and there appeared to be little if any probative value to the evidence, as whether the man made the advance was not material to the question of whether the victim was raped and if defendant was the perpetrator, and DNA evidence completely excluded the man as a source of the semen found on the victim's body. Sharp v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 718, 479 S.W.3d 568 (2015).

Rape-shield statute, § 16-42-101, was intended to protect victims from the humiliation of having their personal conduct, unrelated to the charges pending, paraded before the jury; in this case, evidence that the victim was asking defendant for sex, offering him oral sex, attempting to undo his shorts, and touching his penis through his shorts, all within approximately 10 minutes of penetration, was conduct related to the charges pending and therefore relevant to the issue of consent, such that excluding the evidence was prejudicial. Herren v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 528, 563 S.W.3d 606 (2018).

Even though the trial court violated defendant's right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment by allowing a substitute analyst to testify regarding the results of a DNA test performed by another analyst, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; the victim's vivid description of being raped repeatedly and painfully by defendant constituted sufficient evidence to sustain his convictions of rape and second-degree sexual assault. Alejandro-Alvarez v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 450, 587 S.W.3d 269 (2019).

—Codefendants.

Evidence of kidnapping and rape held sufficient, even though a co-defendant actually committed the rape, where defendant entered victim's house first while brandishing a gun, tackled her, permitted her to be restrained with duct tape, and threatened to kill her if she looked at them. Harrell v. State, 331 Ark. 232, 962 S.W.2d 325 (1998).

—Confessions.

Where the officers testified that the defendant had not wanted to make a statement when he was arrested, but after three or four days he said he wanted to see the sheriff and make a statement, at the hearing the defendant admitted the truth of parts of the statement, relating to his childhood and his first job, and his description of the criminal incident was the same as that given by the child in her testimony at the trial, the defendant's signed confession was voluntary. Huffman v. State, 288 Ark. 321, 704 S.W.2d 627 (1986).

The trial court was correct in not deleting portions of the defendant's confession which implied that he had previously engaged in similar sexual conduct with the victim, since direct proof of the defendant's earlier sexual relations with the victim would have been admissible in evidence. Wall v. State, 289 Ark. 570, 715 S.W.2d 208 (1986).

Where the defendant was warned of his Miranda rights, both the deputy prosecutor and the police officer who were present when the statement was taken testified that the defendant cried at times and appeared to be upset, but he freely admitted his guilt and said he was ready to take his punishment, and the verbatim transcription of the statement confirmed the other proof of voluntariness, the Supreme Court found no basis for disagreeing with the trial judge's conclusion that the defendant's confession was voluntary. Wall v. State, 289 Ark. 570, 715 S.W.2d 208 (1986).

Where defendant confessed to police that he raped victim on two occasions and at trial there was no substantive proof of a second rape, it was error not to grant defendant's motion for acquittal as to one count of rape. Yates v. State, 301 Ark. 424, 785 S.W.2d 199 (1990).

The fact that defendant was twenty years old, had an I.Q. of 77, and was reading on a third-grade level were factors to be considered, but they alone did not suffice to warrant the suppression of defendant's confession. Diemer v. State, 340 Ark. 223, 9 S.W.3d 490 (2000).

—Corroboration.

It was competent for the state to prove the fact that the prosecuting witness made complaint of her injury but not the details as to what she said, unless the defense undertook to impeach her testimony on that point, in which case the particular facts stated by her could be proved in corroboration of her testimony. Skaggs v. State, 88 Ark. 62, 113 S.W. 346 (1908); Sexton v. State, 91 Ark. 589, 121 S.W. 1075 (1909) (preceding decisions under prior law).

The testimony of prosecuting witness who did not consent, need not be corroborated. Hummel v. State, 210 Ark. 471, 196 S.W.2d 594 (1946); Havens v. State, 217 Ark. 153, 228 S.W.2d 1003 (1950) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Testimony of victim standing alone was legally sufficient under indictment. McDonald v. State, 225 Ark. 38, 279 S.W.2d 44 (1955); Sales v. State, 291 Ark. 338, 724 S.W.2d 469 (1987); McCoy v. State, 293 Ark. 49, 732 S.W.2d 156 (1987).

Corroboration of victim's testimony was not necessary to a conviction of rape. McDonald v. State, 225 Ark. 38, 279 S.W.2d 44 (1955); Bailey v. State, 227 Ark. 889, 302 S.W.2d 796 (preceding decisions under prior law); Smith v. State, 277 Ark. 64, 639 S.W.2d 348 (1982); Lackey v. State, 283 Ark. 150, 671 S.W.2d 757 (1984); Jackson v. State, 290 Ark. 375, 720 S.W.2d 282 (1986); Cope v. State, 292 Ark. 391, 730 S.W.2d 242 (1987); Stewart v. State, 297 Ark. 429, 762 S.W.2d 794 (1989); Skiver v. State, 37 Ark. App. 146, 826 S.W.2d 309 (1992).

Trial court properly allowed articles of the defendant's clothing to be introduced into evidence together with testimony that there were human bloodstains on the clothing, where this evidence tended to corroborate the testimony of the rape victim, the police officers, and the medical examiner. Brewer v. State, 269 Ark. 185, 599 S.W.2d 141 (1980).

In a prosecution for rape, the testimony of the rape victim does not have to be corroborated by other testimony, since it is the jury's function to decide whether to believe the alleged victim or the defendant. Urquhart v. State, 273 Ark. 486, 621 S.W.2d 218 (1981).

Uncorroborated testimony of victim held sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for rape. Sanders v. State, 277 Ark. 159, 639 S.W.2d 733 (1982); Cope v. State, 292 Ark. 391, 730 S.W.2d 242 (1987); Golston v. State, 26 Ark. App. 176, 762 S.W.2d 398 (1988).

The testimony of the prosecutrix alone provided substantial evidence to support the conviction. Gunter v. State, 313 Ark. 504, 857 S.W.2d 156 (1993), cert. denied, Gunter v. Arkansas, 510 U.S. 948, 114 S. Ct. 391 (1993).

Testimony of the rape victim alone suffices and need not be corroborated to sustain a conviction. Puckett v. State, 324 Ark. 81, 918 S.W.2d 707 (1996).

The testimony of a rape victim does not have to be corroborated by other testimony. Sherrill v. State, 329 Ark. 593, 952 S.W.2d 134 (1997).

The evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of rape of his estranged wife where defendant's admissions corroborated the victim's testimony. Jones v. State, 348 Ark. 619, 74 S.W.3d 663 (2002).

—DNA.

The denial of a continuance which would deprive an accused of the chance to have an independent review of DNA analysis must be closely examined. Citing Swanson v. State, 308 Ark. 28, 823 S.W.2d 812 (1992). Munoz v. State, 340 Ark. 218, 9 S.W.3d 497 (2000).

In a rape case, although defendant argued that a blood sample had been illegally taken from him when he was incarcerated in 1997 for non-payment of child support, which was not a qualifying offense named in the State Convicted Offenders DNA Database Act, § 12-12-1101 et seq., and it was based on that sample that the State obtained a “hit,” because defendant had submitted to another blood sample in 2000 when incarcerated for burglary, pursuant to § 12-12-1109(a), the appellate court found that the State met its burden of proof in establishing that the DNA evidence was admissible, pursuant to the inevitable discovery doctrine. Haynes v. State, 354 Ark. 514, 127 S.W.3d 456 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1047, 124 S. Ct. 2168, 158 L. Ed. 2d 740 (2004).

—Identification.

Identification testimony and the physical evidence accidentally dropped at the scene by the defendant were admissible, and evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction of rape, burglary, and robbery. Monk v. State, 320 Ark. 189, 895 S.W.2d 904 (1995).

Photographic array identification evidence held sufficient. Phillips v. State, 327 Ark. 1, 936 S.W.2d 745 (1996).

Identification evidence, based on victim's testimony, DNA matching, and a palm print, held sufficient. Stewart v. State, 331 Ark. 359, 961 S.W.2d 750 (1998).

Although codefendant gave varying statements about defendant's participation and the victim was unable to identify the defendant, the identification evidence held sufficient in view of the scientific evidence and the testimony of the codefendant. Wilson v. State, 332 Ark. 7, 962 S.W.2d 805 (1998).

Where victim testified that she was working at the hospital during the night shift when defendant, her supervisor, pushed her to the ground and raped her, the evidence of rape was sufficient to support revocation of defendant's probation; although the victim had difficulty identifying defendant at the rape trial because he changed his hairstyle, added facial hair, and gaining weight since the time of the rape, during the revocation proceeding the victim positively identified defendant as the rapist and the medical director for the hospital also recognized defendant in the courtroom. Stewart v. State, 88 Ark. App. 110, 195 S.W.3d 385 (2004).

—Impeachment.

Because theft crimes involve dishonesty and are automatically admissible for impeachment purposes, it was unnecessary for defendant to proffer the factual circumstances underlying one victim's conviction, and the circuit court abused its discretion by refusing to admit this evidence; the error was not harmless because the case against defendant rested solely on the victims' credibility, and his three rape convictions were reversed and remanded for a new trial (sub. op. on reh'g). Rogers v. State, 2018 Ark. 309, 558 S.W.3d 833 (2018).

—Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts.

Permitting an eight-year-old child to develop a severe case of trench foot is a form of neglect by the parent and such neglect of a child's physical needs is necessarily a form of abuse; hence, a father's perpetration of child abuse by neglect is relevant to a case of sexual abuse against that same child, when both forms of abuse are occurring at the same time. Such evidence is pertinent in that it establishes an intentional pattern of abusive behavior on the part of the parent toward the child — the first by neglecting her basic hygienic needs and the second by soliciting her to engage in sexual activity. A contemptible lack of caring for a child's essential healthcare needs easily intertwines with sexual abuse of the child; both forms of abuse are intentional, and evidence of the lack of care, concern, and respect for a child's well-being is admissible under Evid. Rules 403 and 404(b). Lindsey v. State, 319 Ark. 132, 890 S.W.2d 584 (1994).

In trials for incest or carnal abuse, the State may show other acts of intercourse between the same parties. Mosley v. State, 325 Ark. 469, 929 S.W.2d 693 (1996).

Evidence of prior conviction of a sexual offense involving his stepdaughter held admissible in defendant's trial for rape of his daughter, given the similarity of the prior conviction to the current charges and the parental relationship of the defendant with the two victims. Mosley v. State, 325 Ark. 469, 929 S.W.2d 693 (1996).

Prisoner's argument, that the State Supreme Court improperly relied upon evidence of the prisoner's transgressions on another occasion with the date-rape victim as evidence of guilt in violation of Ark. R. Evidence 404(b) was without basis as the evidence showed plan and modus operandi by demonstrating that the prisoner had gone through a similar sequence with the date-rape victim — taking the victim on a drive to another town, drugging the victim with Rohypnol such that the victim was unconcious, taking the victim to a bed and breakfast, and removing the victim's clothes. Sera v. Norris, 400 F.3d 538 (8th Cir. 2005), rehearing denied, — F.3d —, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 7401 (8th Cir. Apr. 28, 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 283, 163 L. Ed. 2d 250 (U.S. 2005).

In a rape case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting testimony under Ark. R. Evid. 404(b) regarding two prior alleged rapes of two other victims. The trial court found enough similarities between the incidents to make the testimony relevant as evidence of defendant's intent, motive, or plan; and while the evidence might have been prejudicial, its probative value was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under Ark. R. Evid. 403. Carter v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 57, 568 S.W.3d 788 (2019).

—Pedophile Exception.

Evidence of previous sexual contact with juvenile victim held admissible under the “pedophile exception” to Evid. Rule 404. Dougan v. State, 330 Ark. 827, 957 S.W.2d 182 (1997).

Where the charges against defendant had been severed because the rape counts that were the subject of the appeal involved one victim and the violation-of-a-minor charges involved two other girls, the trial court properly allowed the testimony of the two other girls in defendant's trial for rape under the so-called “pedophile exception” to Ark. R. Evid. 404(b) to show motive, intent, or plan and to help prove the depraved sexual instinct of the accused. Butler v. State, 349 Ark. 252, 82 S.W.3d 152 (2002).

Circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted a witness's testimony under the pedophile exception because the testimony established a sufficient degree of similarity with the accusations made in the case that defendant raped his daughter; the admission of the evidence helped to show that defendant's impulses and behavior were far outside the expected range of a normal father. Duvall v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 155, 544 S.W.3d 106 (2018).

No abuse of discretion occurred by admitting a witness's testimony under the pedophile exception because the testimony was independently relevant to the unique signature and methods defendant used to plan his assaults; the victim's testimony and the witness's testimony showed similarities in that defendant had the proclivity to lure and sexually violate young girls, he made efforts to be alone with them, he showed sexually explicit videos, and he had a planned method for obtaining oral sex. Duvall v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 155, 544 S.W.3d 106 (2018).

Circuit court did not abuse its discretion by admitting a witness's testimony under the pedophile exception because the similarities in defendant's conduct towards the victim and the witness, who were of very similar ages, demonstrated a depraved sexual instinct. Duvall v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 155, 544 S.W.3d 106 (2018).

—Sexual Gratification.

Evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant's assault upon his wife was for purposes of sexual gratification, notwithstanding his wife's testimony that she did not think that the attack was sexual in nature or that it was the defendant's intent to be sexually gratified by it, where the wife testified (1) that he put his hand inside her vagina and squeezed her, (2) that while he was doing this, he was lying on top of her, ripping at her panties and pantyhose, and (3) that he told her more than one time that if she did not want to be with him, he would fix it so that she could not be with another man. Farmer v. State, 341 Ark. 220, 15 S.W.3d 674 (2000).

There was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction of rape for performing an act of oral sex upon a nine-year-old boy, in violation of subdivision (a)(1)(C)(i) and § 5-14-101(1), as “sexual gratification” did not have to be proved by the state and could be inferred from the circumstances; accordingly, defendant's claim that she performed the act in order to obtain drugs and that there was no showing by the state of any sexual gratification in her actions lacked merit. Eaton v. State, 85 Ark. App. 320, 151 S.W.3d 15 (2004).

—Sufficiency.

Evidence held sufficient to support conviction of rape by deviate sexual activity. Woolford v. State, 202 Ark. 1010, 155 S.W.2d 339 (1941); Mangrum v. State, 227 Ark. 381, 299 S.W.2d 80 (1957) (preceding decisions under prior law); Harris v. State, 15 Ark. App. 58, 689 S.W.2d 353 (1985); Conley v. State, 20 Ark. App. 56, 723 S.W.2d 841 (1987); Peebles v. State, 305 Ark. 338, 808 S.W.2d 331 (1991).

Evidence held sufficient to support conviction of rape. Stevens v. State, 231 Ark. 734, 332 S.W.2d 482 (1960); Maxwell v. State, 236 Ark. 694, 370 S.W.2d 113 (1963) (preceding decisions under prior law); McCraw v. State, 262 Ark. 707, 561 S.W.2d 71 (1978); Jeffers v. State, 268 Ark. 329, 595 S.W.2d 687 (1980); Canard v. State, 278 Ark. 372, 646 S.W.2d 3 (1983); Cope v. State, 292 Ark. 391, 730 S.W.2d 242 (1987); McCoy v. State, 293 Ark. 49, 732 S.W.2d 156 (1987); Houston v. State, 293 Ark. 492, 739 S.W.2d 154 (1987); Lewis v. State, 295 Ark. 499, 749 S.W.2d 672 (1988); Jones v. State, 297 Ark. 499, 763 S.W.2d 655 (1989); Lilly v. State, 300 Ark. 53, 776 S.W.2d 347 (1989); Curtis v. State, 301 Ark. 208, 783 S.W.2d 47 (1990); Phills v. State, 301 Ark. 265, 783 S.W.2d 348 (1990); Vick v. State, 301 Ark. 296, 783 S.W.2d 365 (1990); Cash v. State, 301 Ark. 370, 784 S.W.2d 166 (1990); Wilson v. State, 307 Ark. 21, 817 S.W.2d 203 (1991); Franklin v. State, 308 Ark. 539, 825 S.W.2d 263 (1992); Lukach v. State, 310 Ark. 38, 834 S.W.2d 642 (1992); Bishop v. State, 310 Ark. 479, 839 S.W.2d 6 (1992); Skiver v. State, 37 Ark. App. 146, 826 S.W.2d 309 (1992); Dillard v. State, 313 Ark. 439, 855 S.W.2d 909 (1993); Chenowith v. State, 321 Ark. 522, 905 S.W.2d 838 (1995); Russey v. State, 336 Ark. 401, 985 S.W.2d 316 (1999); Johnson v. State, 71 Ark. App. 58, 25 S.W.3d 445 (2000).

Evidence held sufficient to establish that defendant was guilty, at least, of an attempt to commit rape of a female under 14 years of age. Treat v. State, 253 Ark. 367, 486 S.W.2d 16 (1972) (decision under prior law).

Evidence held sufficient to support the jury's finding that the prosecutrix was sexually assaulted. Rogers v. State, 257 Ark. 144, 515 S.W.2d 79 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 930, 95 S. Ct. 1656, 44 L. Ed. 2d 87 (1975) (decision under prior law).

Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to sustain verdict on rape charge where it gave rise to more than a mere suspicion and the inference which might reasonably have been deduced from it would leave little room for doubt. Whitmore v. State, 263 Ark. 419, 565 S.W.2d 133 (1978).

Evidence held sufficient to support the defendant's conviction even though the victim was unable to personally identify the defendant as the person who raped her. Smith v. State, 277 Ark. 64, 639 S.W.2d 348 (1982).

Evidence held sufficient to support conviction of attempted rape. Berry v. State, 278 Ark. 578, 647 S.W.2d 453 (1983).

In a rape prosecution, the positive identification of a defendant by a prosecutrix alone is sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. Clay v. State, 290 Ark. 54, 716 S.W.2d 751 (1986).

The age of the victim and the relationship of the victim to the assailant are key factors in weighing the sufficiency of evidence of force to prove rape. Griswold v. State, 290 Ark. 79, 716 S.W.2d 767 (1986); Kiefer v. State, 297 Ark. 464, 762 S.W.2d 800 (1989).

The testimony of the alleged victim which shows penetration is enough for conviction. Jackson v. State, 290 Ark. 375, 720 S.W.2d 282 (1986); Davis v. State, 308 Ark. 481, 825 S.W.2d 584 (1992).

Evidence held sufficient to support court's refusal to find defendant unfit for trial. Dyer v. State, 290 Ark. 405, 720 S.W.2d 297 (1986).

Evidence was sufficient to support rape conviction, given the corroborating testimony of the victim's husband and the police officers who investigated the incident. McCoy v. State, 293 Ark. 49, 732 S.W.2d 156 (1987).

Victim's testimony satisfies the requirement that there be substantial evidence that the defendant committed the rape. Houston v. State, 293 Ark. 492, 739 S.W.2d 154 (1987); Golston v. State, 26 Ark. App. 176, 762 S.W.2d 398 (1988); Jones v. State, 297 Ark. 499, 763 S.W.2d 655 (1989); West v. State, 27 Ark. App. 49, 766 S.W.2d 22 (1989); Franklin v. State, 308 Ark. 539, 825 S.W.2d 263 (1992).

When persons, other than physicians or other persons for legitimate medical reasons, insert something in another person's vagina or anus, it is not necessary that the state provide direct proof that the act was done for sexual gratification. Williams v. State, 298 Ark. 317, 766 S.W.2d 931 (1989).

Voice identification held sufficient. White v. State, 303 Ark. 30, 792 S.W.2d 867 (1990).

The requirement of substantial evidence was satisifed by the rape victim's testimony. Bishop v. State, 310 Ark. 479, 839 S.W.2d 6 (1992).

Where a prosecutrix positively identifies a defendant or there exists other evidence sufficient to support a rape conviction, a trial court cannot grant a directed verdict or acquittal. Foster v. Lockhart, 811 F. Supp. 1363 (E.D. Ark. 1992), aff'd, 9 F.3d 722 (8th Cir. Ark. 1993).

Evidence of restraint shown exceeded the restraint necessary to prove the crime of rape. Aaron v. State, 312 Ark. 19, 846 S.W.2d 655 (1993).

Evidence of sexual gratification held sufficient. Warren v. State, 314 Ark. 192, 862 S.W.2d 222 (1993).

Defendant was properly convicted on three counts of rape for having sexual intercourse with three girls, whose ages were nine, eight, and six, and properly sentenced to three consecutive life sentences. Langley v. State, 315 Ark. 472, 868 S.W.2d 81 (1994).

Evidence of rape of five- and four-year-old females and sexual misconduct with one-year-old female held sufficient. Clark v. State, 315 Ark. 602, 870 S.W.2d 372 (1994).

An 11-year-old boy's testimony that defendant touched his penis inside his underwear and hugged him, asked him to perform oral sex, and the boy's description in graphic detail how defendant performed oral sex on him on at least two separate occasions, was sufficient to prove rape by deviate sexual behavior. Laughlin v. State, 316 Ark. 489, 872 S.W.2d 848 (1994).

Evidence that defendant raped his twelve-year-old daughter held sufficient. Wilson v. State, 320 Ark. 707, 898 S.W.2d 469 (1995).

Blood and DNA evidence tested two years after the offense held sufficient to support rape conviction. Lee v. State, 326 Ark. 229, 931 S.W.2d 433 (1996); McGehee v. State, 328 Ark. 404, 943 S.W.2d 585 (1997).

Evidence of rape held sufficient even though victim could not remember whether the incident had occurred in the spring or the fall. Williams v. State, 331 Ark. 263, 962 S.W.2d 329 (1998).

Evidence that victim was alive when she was raped held sufficient. Sanford v. State, 331 Ark. 334, 962 S.W.2d 335 (1998).

Evidence held sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for rape of a 5-year-old girl where the defendant admitted that he kidnapped, handcuffed, and stripped the girl, the girl stated that he had placed his penis in her mouth, and there was medical evidence that the girl's vaginal area showed redness on the night of the incident. Jameson v. State, 333 Ark. 128, 970 S.W.2d 785 (1998).

Evidence was sufficient to show forcible compulsion in the prosecution of the defendant for the rape of his daughters where one daughter testified (1) that the defendant had intercourse with her on a regular basis from the time that she was 12 until she was 18 years old; (2) that when she was 12 years old, he forced her to have sex with him, and that it was not something that she wanted to do, but that she did it because she was afraid of him; (3) that the defendant had hurt her and other members of her family; and (4) that, in that regard, there was an incident when the defendant gathered the six family members in a room, lined up six bullets, and shot himself to prove a point to the family. Sublett v. State, 337 Ark. 374, 989 S.W.2d 910 (1999).

Evidence in the form of testimony of a mother and her daughter and son, both of whom were under the age of 14, that defendant, who was husband and father to the victims, sexually assaulted the daughter by inserting his finger into the daughter's vagina and forcing the daughter to perform oral sex on defendant, forcing the son and daughter to have sexual intercourse, and forcing the son to have intercourse with the mother, along with medical evidence of injuries to the daughter consistent with sexual assault, supported defendant's conviction for rape and three counts of accomplice to rape. Clem v. State, 351 Ark. 112, 90 S.W.3d 428 (2002).

There was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of attempted rape against an 11-year old fictional girl, who was a product of an internet email sting operation by police, because there was no defense of impossibility to attempt crimes, pursuant to § 5-3-201(a)(2), and the fact that defendant drove from his home state to the alleged home state of the girl with sexual accessories and photographic equipment represented a substantial step towards completing the commission of the crime, pursuant to subdivision (a)(1)(C)(i) of this section. Kirwan v. State, 351 Ark. 603, 96 S.W.3d 724 (2003).

Where the only evidence of sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity was the videotape of a prior encounter between petitioner and the victim which the jury had found to establish sexual abuse, the evidence was constitutionally insufficient to find that the act of sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity occurred again on the night that petitioner and the victim went to the Macaroni Grill, and no rational fact-finder could reasonably have inferred the necessary elements of rape beyond a reasonable doubt under these circumstances. Sera v. Norris, 312 F. Supp. 2d 1100 (E.D. Ark. 2004), rev'd, 400 F.3d 538 (8th Cir. 2005).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of rape where the victim testified that defendant forcibly held her down and penetrated her with his penis, and the arresting officer noticed that the victim had blood on her lip and defendant's shirt had blood on it; the jury was certainly within its right to believe the officer's testimony that indicated that force was used. Benson v. State, 357 Ark. 43, 160 S.W.3d 341 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's rape conviction where the child victim testified that defendant told her to put her mouth on his penis, and that he licked her “private parts.” Standridge v. State, 357 Ark. 105, 161 S.W.3d 815 (2004).

Substantial evidence proved defendant raped his 14-year old stepdaughter where (1) according to trial testimony defendant digitally penetrated the victim numerous times before she was 14 years old, (2) the DNA extracted from the victim's mattress, where the abuse occurred, tested positive for defendant's DNA, (3) an expert testified that the victim did not have a hymen, which indicated chronic or long-term sexual contact, and (4) the victim testified that she had been raped by her stepfather and she did not report the abuse because she was scared and was afraid that defendant would not love her anymore. Pinder v. State, 357 Ark. 275, 166 S.W.3d 49 (2004).

Sufficient evidence supported a rape conviction where the victim testified that defendant sexually assaulted her with his fingers and there was ample DNA evidence linking defendant to the crime; the victim's testimony established that defendant engaged in deviate sexual activity with the victim, as defined in § 5-14-101(9), by forcible compulsion, as defined in § 5-14-101(2). Walters v. State, 358 Ark. 439, 193 S.W.3d 257 (2004).

Defendant was properly convicted of four counts of rape in light of the testimony regarding the rape of two victims, the incident involving another, the vehicle and license-plate information, the presence of duct tape in the victim's garbage can, and the unequivocal identification by the victims and witnesses of defendant as the perpetrator. Moore v. State, 87 Ark. App. 385, 192 S.W.3d 271 (2004).

Defendant's conviction for rape was affirmed as the victim's testimony, that he performed oral sex on defendant after being threatened and that defendant performed oral sex on him, was sufficient to convict defendant under subdivision (a)(1)(C)(i) of this section. Williams v. State, 363 Ark. 395, 214 S.W.3d 829 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction on three counts of rape of a 10-year old of a person who was less than 14 years of age where the victim testified that she was 10 years old at the time of the offenses and that defendant put his penis inside her vagina, anus, and mouth, and she gave a full accounting of his actions on the evening in question; this testimony alone was substantial evidence to support defendant's convictions. Parker v. State, 93 Ark. App. 472, 220 S.W.3d 238 (2005).

There was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of rape where the victim gave detailed testimony regarding the sexual assaults; the jury was free to find the victim a more credible witness despite certain inaccuracies in her testimony. Gillard v. State, 366 Ark. 217, 234 S.W.3d 310 (2006).

Defendant's conviction for rape of his infant daughter was affirmed as the child showed signs of sexual abuse immediately after being left with defendant, and defendant's semen was found on the child's diaper. Terry v. State, 366 Ark. 441, 236 S.W.3d 495 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain an attempted rape conviction where defendant initiated a call to the 13 year old victim, picked her up under false pretenses, isolated her in a motel room, told her that he and his girlfriend intended to engage in sexual intercourse with her, and he returned to the motel room with his girlfriend; those steps went beyond mere planning and preparation. Mitchem v. State, 96 Ark. App. 78, 238 S.W.3d 623 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's rape convictions where both victims stated in their interviews that defendant had sexual intercourse with them, both victims were under the age of 14, and medical evidence substantiated the victims' testimony. White v. State, 367 Ark. 595, 242 S.W.3d 240 (2006), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 904, 127 S. Ct. 2114, 167 L. Ed. 2d 815 (2007).

Although appellant offered testimony that conflicted with the victim's testimony and the evidence presented at trial, the supreme court only needed to limit its review to those facts supporting the verdict to conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction of rape; the victim testified that she was forced to engage in deviate sexual activity with appellant and, after the attack, she ran from the house where she was eventually found by police. Although a semen sample collected during an examination did not match the DNA of appellant, but, rather that of the victim's fiance, the victim's testimony need not be corroborated; furthermore, it was for the jury to decide whether the testimony was credible. Hickey v. State, 2010 Ark. 109 (2010).

Evidence produced by the state at trial was sufficient for the jury to reasonably conclude that, by virtue of the living arrangement, appellant was placed in an apparent position of power or authority over the minor victim and that appellant was thus the victim's guardian for the purposes of subdivision (a)(4)(A)(i) of this section and §§ 5-14-125(a)(4)(A)(iii) and 5-14-101(3), thus the jury verdict was supported by substantial evidence. Pack v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 82 (2010).

Trial court properly denied defendant's motion for directed verdict on the charges of rape, as substantial evidence, including the victim's testimony that defendant forced him to submit to oral sex on several occasions and penetrated him anally, was presented to the jury. Jeffries v. State, 2014 Ark. 239, 434 S.W.3d 889 (2014).

Evidence, including the victim's testimony that the inmate engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim, the inmate's daughter, when she was less than 18, was sufficient to support defendant's rape conviction. Chunestudy v. State, 2014 Ark. 345, 438 S.W.3d 923 (2014).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's rape conviction because (1) the facts established at trial supported the conviction, and (2) defendant's explanation of how defendant's semen was found on a victim was improbable. Ward v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 408, 439 S.W.3d 56 (2014).

Defendant was properly found to be the 17-year-old victim's guardian and convicted of rape because, while he did not live with her custodial parent, he was in a position of apparent power or authority over her where her contact with him was as a result of his living arrangement with her mother, defendant was responsible for the victim's care while her mother was away at work, and the victim testified that when defendant asked her to remove her clothes, she did what she was told to do. Malone v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 585, 446 S.W.3d 197 (2014).

Challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a rape case would have been without merit because of the overwhelming evidence of guilt; the victim testified that defendant inserted his penis into her vagina against her will, and the DNA evidence identified defendant as the perpetrator. Burris v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 126 (2015).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction on the first count of rape because the victim testified that the first occasion in which she had sexual intercourse with defendant happened after he drove her home from a party, that it happened in the back seat of his vehicle, and that he inserted his sexual organ into her sexual organs; the victim's testimony alone was substantial evidence supporting the conviction; defendant admitted that he knew the victim was 12 years old and that they engaged in sexual intercourse for about five minutes in his vehicle after attending a party; the jury did not believe defendant's version of events; and consent was no defense to the rape of a person who was less than 14 years old. Hernandez v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 150 (2015).

Trial court properly convicted defendant of rape and sentenced him as a habitual offender to life imprisonment because there was sufficient evidence of both alternate theories of the case—forcible compulsion and physical helplessness; there was sufficient evidence that the victim was unconscious (and thus physically helpless) when defendant forcibly engaged in sexual intercourse with her against her will. Ortega v. State, 2016 Ark. 372, 501 S.W.3d 824 (2016).

In a rape case, an appellate court declined to address a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence due to the lack of specificity in defendant's directed verdict motions; even if the issue had been addressed, a rape victim's testimony alone could have been sufficient to sustain the conviction. The victim gave specific testimony relating to penetration, and defendant was permitted to cross-examine the victim about previous lies. Tatum v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 80 (2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's rape conviction, given that the minor child alleged penetration when defendant placed a black pole-like object inside her vaginal area, which was red and consistent with sexual abuse as per the nurse practitioner who examined the child, and defendant's polygraph responses in this regard were found to be deceptive. Thomas v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 195, 487 S.W.3d 415 (2016).

Victim's testimony that, when he was 10 or 11 years old, he had been raped by defendant more than 20 times over the course of about a year and the victim's testimony about several specific instances of penetration, which if believed by the jury, established the necessary elements of rape, was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for rape. Perez v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 291, 494 S.W.3d 431 (2016).

Substantial evidence supported appellant's conviction for rape under subdivision (a)(3)(A) of this section where the juvenile testified that he placed his mouth on appellant's penis and that appellant put his mouth on the juvenile's penis, which supported the trial court's conclusion that some portion of each person's penis entered the other person's mouth to at least some minimal degree. Lowe v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 389, 500 S.W.3d 176 (2016).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of rape under subdivision (a)(2)(B) of this section because the victim's doctor testified that she had a medical history of some retardation; there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that penetration occurred as a sexual-assault examiner testified that although the victim did not disclose any kind of sexual assault, she found a notch at six o'clock in the victim's hymen, which was abnormal and indicative of sexual assault; and a forensic examiner testified that the blood stains in both defendant's underwear and the victim's underwear contained a mixture of blood from defendant and the victim. Duck v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 596, 509 S.W.3d 5 (2016).

Testimony by the minor victims, defendant's cousins, and defendant's admission during a police interrogation to the sexual assault and rape of one victim, constituted sufficient evidence to support defendant's convictions for rape and second-degree sexual assault. The victims both described the sexual acts using their own body-parts terminology, such as “middle spot” and “private part,” and explained to which body parts they were referring in terms of “penis” and “anus”. Garcia v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 457, 530 S.W.3d 862 (2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict under this section where the victim testified that the juvenile and codefendant had forced her into a fieldhouse and that codefendant had touched her on the inside with his finger while the juvenile restrained her by the waist and grabbed her hands, and there was nothing inherently improbable or physically impossible about the testimony. K.B. v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 478, 531 S.W.3d 420 (2017).

Victim's testimony that she was five years old when defendant began raping her and the other victim's testimony that she was nine years old when defendant raped her was sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions for rape under subdivision (a)(3) of this section; there was no requirement that the victims' birthdates must be established at trial. Friday v. State, 2018 Ark. 339, 561 S.W.3d 318 (2018).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant, age 28, of two counts of rape and two counts of second-degree sexual assault committed against the 13-year-old victim because the victim testified that she was 13 years old, and she described in detail two episodes where defendant engaged in both sexual intercourse and sexual contact with her; the State was not required to prove forcible compulsion; and mistake of age was not a defense. Trotter v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 326, 551 S.W.3d 421 (2018).

Substantial evidence supported defendant's conviction for conspiracy to commit rape because there was evidence that he made a plan with an undercover officer posing as a father to rape his 13-year-old daughter, and defendant took overt steps in furtherance of the plan; the sexually graphic language used by defendant left no doubt that he wanted to have sex with the father's daughter, plus defendant showed up at the meeting place at the appointed time in the vehicle he said he would be driving, and he had two gifts in his vehicle for the daughter. Frederic v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 449, 560 S.W.3d 494 (2018).

Victim's testimony that, when she was seven years old, defendant put his penis in her butt and that he forced her to suck on his penis while they were in the bathtub was sufficient to meet the definition of “deviate sexual activity” in § 5-14-101 and the crime of rape. King v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 572, 564 S.W.3d 563 (2018).

In a case under subdivision (a)(3) of this section, defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence was not preserved because he made only a general directed verdict motion without specifying the respect in which the evidence was deficient; and, in any event, the victim's testimony was substantial evidence to support defendant's convictions and credibility determinations are within the jury's province. Peoples v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 559, 590 S.W.3d 783 (2019).

Substantial evidence supported defendant's rape conviction because the victim testified about sexual encounters with defendant that satisfied the definition of either sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity and gave graphic descriptions of those encounters and she testified that at least one, if not more, of the encounters happened before her fourteenth birthday. Goins v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 11, 568 S.W.3d 300 (2019).

Substantial evidence supported defendant's conviction of rape, given that the victim, a 31-year-old female with learning disabilities, testified that defendant had bitten her, pinned her over the couch, and penetrated her vagina with his fingers and penis, then threatened to kill her if she told anyone, and while her testimony did not require corroboration, a neighbor testified to seeing defendant's car at the victim's home and other witnesses observed the bite mark. Carter v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 57, 568 S.W.3d 788 (2019).

—Suppression.

Defendant was in custody when the police interviewed him in his hotel room, given that when he exited his room, he encountered a police officer with his gun drawn, defendant was immediately searched by another officer, and a third officer positioned himself in front of the door, and the circuit court's ruling that defendant's statements were admissible because he was not in police custody was in error; defendant stated that he had sex with the victim, which eliminated the State's burden of proving that defendant committed the first element of rape, and it could not be said that the error in allowing the statement was harmless. Morris v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 546, 506 S.W.3d 299 (2016).

—Testimony of Minor Victims.

The trial court did not err in allowing the minor rape victim's testimony to be admitted where the trial court was apparently convinced of the victim's ability to understand the consequences of not telling the truth. Chambers v. State, 275 Ark. 177, 628 S.W.2d 306 (1982).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the nine-year-old victim competent to testify where her testimony was consistent with that of her sister concerning events in question, the inconsistencies in her testimony did not so exceed the bounds to be expected with a juvenile witness as to make the decision to allow her testimony an abuse of discretion, and her use of words she had heard when discussing the case with adults was not proof that the trial court was wrong in assessing her competency. Clifton v. State, 289 Ark. 63, 709 S.W.2d 63 (1986).

While the psychologist should not have been allowed to testify that the history given by the victim was consistent with sexual abuse, the testimony merely provided the jurors with a hint of the testimony which they would receive from the victim; therefore, the error was harmless and did not affect the judgment. Russell v. State, 289 Ark. 533, 712 S.W.2d 916 (1986).

In a child rape case, the matter of the competency of the child is primarily for the trial judge to decide, as he is better able than the appeals court to judge the child's intelligence and understanding of the necessity for telling the truth. Jackson v. State, 290 Ark. 375, 720 S.W.2d 282 (1986).

Even though the child victim may not use the correct terms for the body part, but instead uses his or her own terms, or demonstrates a knowledge of what and where those body parts referred to are, that will be sufficient to allow the jury to believe that the act occurred. Jackson v. State, 290 Ark. 375, 720 S.W.2d 282 (1986); Stewart v. State, 297 Ark. 429, 762 S.W.2d 794 (1989).

Uncorroborated testimony of minor victims is sufficient evidence to support convictions of rape and attempted rape. Winfrey v. State, 293 Ark. 342, 738 S.W.2d 391 (1987).

Testimony of child victim that in addition to forcing him to perform oral sex, the defendant also subjected him to anal sex, was properly admitted where such testimony helped to prove the depraved sexual instinct of the accused. Free v. State, 293 Ark. 65, 732 S.W.2d 452 (Ark. 1987).

Eight-year-old victim was competent to testify. Conley v. State, 20 Ark. App. 56, 723 S.W.2d 841 (1987).

The trial court has broad discretion in determining the competency of young witnesses and exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal absent clear abuse or manifest error. A witness is competent if able to understand the obligation to tell the truth and the consequences of false swearing and is capable of receiving and retaining accurate impressions and communicating a reasonable statement of what has been seen, felt, or heard. Barrett v. State, 23 Ark. App. 144, 744 S.W.2d 741 (1988).

When minor victim identifies defendant and testifies that he raped her, such testimony, standing alone, is sufficient to sustain a conviction if the witness is competent. Jones v. State, 300 Ark. 565, 780 S.W.2d 556 (1989).

The uncorroborated testimony of a child rape victim is sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. Caldwell v. State, 319 Ark. 243, 891 S.W.2d 42 (1995).

Testimony by a witness to the effect that the seven-year-old rape victim told the witness that defendant had told the victim he would kill the victim if she told about the sexual acts held admissible under Evid. Rule 803(3). Bradley v. State, 327 Ark. 6, 937 S.W.2d 628 (1997).

There was no constitutional violation when the trial court allowed the child witnesses in a sexual molestation case to testify while sitting in a witness chair that faced outside of defendant's line of sight, and while they did not have to look at the defendant while they testified, they were not precluded from doing so. Smith v. State, 340 Ark. 116, 8 S.W.3d 534 (2000).

Confrontation of a witness does not mean in whatever way and to whatever extent a defendant might wish. Smith v. State, 340 Ark. 116, 8 S.W.3d 534 (2000).

There was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of rape where the victim who was under the age of 14 testified that she was “pretty sure” she was the sleeping victim shown in a video tape of the rape and that the defendant had touched her inappropriately on other occasions. Chrobak v. State, 75 Ark. App. 281, 58 S.W.3d 387 (2001).

Victim's testimony alone supported appellant's conviction for rape and sexual assault; moreover, the victim's testimony illustrated that there were several different actions of sexual assault and rape—acts that could each be separated in time as involving distinct impulses. Bryant v. State, 2010 Ark. 7, 377 S.W.3d 152 (2010).

In a rape case, an appellate court did not reach the merits of defendant's sufficiency of the evidence argument because defendant's argument made before the trial court relating to sexual gratification was significantly different from the argument made on appeal. Even if the argument was considered on appeal, the evidence was sufficient to prove the crime of rape since the five-year-old victim testified that defendant put his hand in her panties and tickled her private part. Matar v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 243, 492 S.W.3d 106 (2016).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motions for a directed verdict on both counts of rape because the victim testified at trial that defendant put his middle in her middle; when asked by the State to clarify what middle part she was talking about, the victim stated that defendant put his middle part where he peed from into her middle part where she peed from; the victim testified that defendant molested her when she was 10 years old, which satisfied the statutory element requiring that the victim be less than 14 years old; semen was found on the victim's panties; and a forensic DNA analyst gave expert testimony that established, within all scientific certainty, that the DNA on the victim's panties belonged to defendant. Allen v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 537, 506 S.W.3d 278 (2016).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for rape because the victim testified that, when the victim was nine years old, defendant placed defendant's mouth on the victim's penis and that defendant would “go up and down” and that defendant placed defendant's hand on the victim's penis and that defendant's hand would “slightly go up and down slowly”. Ralston v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 175, 573 S.W.3d 607 (2019).

—Violence.

The fact that victim was caused to bleed when defendant inserted his finger into her vagina was sufficient evidence of violence in connection with committing a violation of subdivision (a)(3). Brooks v. State, 326 Ark. 201, 929 S.W.2d 160 (1996).

—Witnesses.

Where the testimony of the witness at the first trial was extensive and significant, the reading of it to the jury at the second trial, where the state's showing of the unavailability of the witness was insufficient, was prejudicial. Lackey v. State, 288 Ark. 225, 703 S.W.2d 858 (1986).

Where doctor's testimony at the first trial described at length what the victim had said about the details of the alleged rape on the night she was examined by him, his testimony was so significant as to require that the jury at the second trial see his demeanor. Lackey v. State, 288 Ark. 225, 703 S.W.2d 858 (1986).

In prosecution for rape, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the state's expert, a serologist, to testify that the proportion of the male population with “A” blood type, who were also secreters and were vasectomized would equal 60 in 10,000, where a report of the defendant's vasectomy had been read to the jury, the serology expert was then qualified, and the defense had the opportunity to expose the limited applicability of the expert's statement and used that opportunity with fair success. Dumond v. State, 290 Ark. 595, 721 S.W.2d 663 (1986).

Force or Restraint.

In a case alleging rape, kidnapping, and third-degree domestic battery, a sufficiency of the evidence argument was not preserved for review because defendant argued on the first time on appeal that the amount of restraint or force used did not warrant a kidnapping conviction and a third-degree battery conviction in addition to the rape. This was not the same argument raised during a directed verdict motion. Rounsaville v. State, 372 Ark. 252, 273 S.W.3d 486 (2008).

Forcible Compulsion or Consent.

It was not the persistence with which the party accused intended to prosecute his illegal design, but the force actually used, that was an element in the crime of rape. Dawson v. State, 29 Ark. 116 (1874) (decision under prior law).

Rape could be committed on a female under the age of puberty, or one so young as not to be capable of giving her consent. Dawson v. State, 29 Ark. 116 (1874) (decision under prior law).

Force was an essential element in the crime of rape; it had to be committed forcibly and against the will of the female. Bradley v. State, 32 Ark. 704 (1878) (decision under prior law).

If carnal connection was had against the will of the female or she was incapable, from tender years, or want of mental and physical development, of exercising a will, with reference to the act, it was rape. Coates v. State, 50 Ark. 330, 7 S.W. 304 (1888) (decision under prior law).

If a man had, or attempted to have, connection with a woman while she was asleep, it was no defense that she did not resist, as she was then incapable of resisting. Harvey v. State, 53 Ark. 425, 14 S.W. 645 (1890) (decision under prior law).

It was not error in a rape case to refuse to instruct the jury that it was the duty of the prosecutrix when she thought a rape was about to be committed on her to make an outcry though, if requested, the court should have told the jury that her failure to make an outcry might be considered in connection with the other facts and circumstances adduced in evidence as tending to show want of resistance. Jackson v. State, 92 Ark. 71, 122 S.W. 101 (1909) (decision under prior law).

The words “forcibly and against her will” mean the same thing as “without her consent.” State v. Peyton, 93 Ark. 406, 125 S.W. 416 (1910) (decision under prior law).

Failure to make outcry because of fear did not prevent the crime from being rape. Threet v. State, 110 Ark. 152, 161 S.W. 139 (1913) (decision under prior law).

Age and lack of capacity to commit the sexual act was no defense. Hunt v. State, 114 Ark. 239, 169 S.W. 773 (1914) (decision under prior law).

In a prosecution for rape, the question for the jury to determine was whether the assault was with force and not merely whether an outcry was made or whether there was reasonable cause for failure to make an outcry. Crawford v. State, 132 Ark. 518, 201 S.W. 784 (1918) (decision under prior law).

Evidence held sufficient to show forcible compulsion. Allison v. State, 204 Ark. 609, 164 S.W.2d 442 (1942); Fink v. State, 265 Ark. 865, 582 S.W.2d 3 (1979); Jennings v. State, 268 Ark. 216, 594 S.W.2d 855 (1980); Banks v. State, 277 Ark. 28, 639 S.W.2d 509 (1982); Mills v. State, 322 Ark. 647, 910 S.W.2d 682 (1995); Mosley v. State, 323 Ark. 244, 914 S.W.2d 731 (1996).

The words “forcibly ravish a female” meant that the act was “done against the will” of the female, or without her consent, which had the same meaning. McDonald v. State, 225 Ark. 38, 279 S.W.2d 44 (1955) (decision under prior law).

Testimony by victim held admissible on issue of whether defendant forced the victim to submit. Fields v. State, 235 Ark. 986, 363 S.W.2d 905 (1963) (decision under prior law).

Failure of victim to cry out, when attacked at gunpoint, held not to indicate consent. Barton v. State, 256 Ark. 486, 508 S.W.2d 554 (1974) (decision under prior law).

Evidence of forcible compulsion held insufficient to support defendant's conviction of rape. Nelson v. State, 262 Ark. 391, 557 S.W.2d 191 (1977).

Where victim was unconscious, giving instruction on rape where the victim was “incapable of consent because he is physically helpless” held not abuse of court's discretion. Hair v. State, 266 Ark. 583, 587 S.W.2d 34 (1979).

Victim's fear of being killed or beaten up if he resisted, is not sufficient to show forcible compulsion in the absence of evidence that defendant ever threatened him before he committed a sex act with him, since subjective feelings of fear of physical injury by the victim must be based on some act of the accused that can be reasonably interpreted to warrant such fear. Mills v. State, 270 Ark. 141, 603 S.W.2d 416 (1980).

Where, after defendant performed an act of sex with the victim, defendant threatened to “kick his butt” if he told anyone, such conduct would not support conviction of rape, as it followed rather than preceded the deviate sexual activity. Mills v. State, 270 Ark. 141, 603 S.W.2d 416 (1980).

Evidence held sufficient to find consensual sexual activity and not an act carried out by forcible compulsion. Mills v. State, 270 Ark. 141, 603 S.W.2d 416 (1980).

Where the record indicated that defendant neither threatened nor employed physical force against victim, and allowed him to leave the motel room after rejecting defendant's advances, there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction for attempted rape. Mills v. State, 270 Ark. 141, 603 S.W.2d 416 (1980).

The state proved the required element of force, where the victim blacked out and did not regain consciousness until the act of intercourse was in progress; the victim had resisted to the extent of her ability and lapse into unconsciousness could not be said to have amounted to consent. Thomas v. State, 289 Ark. 72, 709 S.W.2d 83 (1986).

Where both victims were children and they were alone every day after school with the defendant, who was their mother's brother and the only adult male living in the house, the jury was justified in finding that their submission was induced through the forcible coercion of the defendant, who stood in loco parentis to the girls. Griswold v. State, 290 Ark. 79, 716 S.W.2d 767 (1986).

Where the 13-year-old victim testified that she asked the defendant not to have intercourse with her and that it upset her when he did and the 10-year-old victim testified the defendant told her to “do it or else,” there was sufficient proof for the jury to find the acts were consummated against the will of the girls. Griswold v. State, 290 Ark. 79, 716 S.W.2d 767 (1986).

“Forcible compulsion” under the rape statute is defined as “physical force,” which is further defined as any bodily impact, restraint or confinement, or the threat thereof. Strawhacker v. State, 304 Ark. 726, 804 S.W.2d 720 (1991); Skiver v. State, 37 Ark. App. 146, 826 S.W.2d 309 (1992).

The requirements of forcible compulsion, that the victim experience “bodily impact, restraint or confinement, or the threat thereof,” were sufficiently shown to prove that element of rape under subdivision (a)(1) of this section. Dillon v. State, 317 Ark. 384, 877 S.W.2d 915 (1994).

The test for determining whether there was force is whether the act was against the will of the party upon whom the act was committed. Mosley v. State, 323 Ark. 244, 914 S.W.2d 731 (1996).

Evidence of forcible compulsion held sufficient where victim testified that defendant inflicted two bruises on her upper arms and the examining physician's testimony supported this testimony. Freeman v. State, 331 Ark. 130, 959 S.W.2d 400 (1998).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of rape where the victim, who had physical limitations, testified that defendant forced her to have sexual intercourse and to perform sexual acts on him after he entered her home under the pretext of using the telephone. Ellis v. State, 364 Ark. 538, 222 S.W.3d 192 (2006).

Circuit court's decision to revoke probation on the ground that defendant had committed rape under subdivision (a)(1) of this section was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence because defendant's pointing of a firearm at the victim was evidence of an implied threat of death or physical injury, and thus was forcible compulsion, pursuant to § 5-14-101(2). Craig v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 309 (2010).

Indictment or Information.

No averment of sex was necessary in an indictment for rape. Warner v. State, 54 Ark. 660, 17 S.W. 6 (1891) (decision under prior law).

Indictment held sufficient. Downs v. State, 60 Ark. 521, 31 S.W. 149 (1895); Beard v. State, 79 Ark. 293, 95 S.W. 995 (1906) (preceding decisions under prior law).

An indictment for rape was not required to allege that the act complained of was unlawful. Cabe v. State, 182 Ark. 49, 30 S.W.2d 855 (1930) (decision under prior law).

There is only one crime of rape under the statutory law of the State of Arkansas, which can be committed either by sexual intercourse or by deviate sexual activity; therefore, an alternative or disjunctive charging of the crime of rape by either sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity is adequate, proper, and sufficient notice to the defendant so charged. Bliss v. State, 288 Ark. 546, 708 S.W.2d 74 (Ark. 1986).

Information charging defendant alternatively with counts of rape by deviate sexual activity by either forcible compulsion, or upon one who is incapable of consent because he is physically helpless, was proper. Logan v. State, 299 Ark. 266, 773 S.W.2d 413 (1989).

The decision of what charge is to be filed rests with the prosecutor, and the fact that the prosecutor chose to file a Class Y felony against defendant for the rape of his daughter, which carries with it a higher penalty than incest, did not, by itself, give rise to a constitutional infringement. Simpson v. State, 310 Ark. 493, 837 S.W.2d 475 (1992).

The trial court was correct in allowing the state to amend the information from rape by deviate sexual activity to rape by sexual intercourse, since the amendment did not change the nature or degree of the crime. Midgett v. State, 316 Ark. 553, 873 S.W.2d 165 (1994).

Information held sufficient notwithstanding that it omitted culpable mental state from the statutory elements of the crime. Sawyer v. State, 327 Ark. 421, 938 S.W.2d 843 (1997).

Defendant was not entitled to a bill of particulars, pursuant to § 16-85-301(a); a bill of particulars as to the precise time offenses were committed was not necessary because time was not material to allegations of rape, under this section, and sexual assault in the second degree, under § 5-14-125. Wallis v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 238, 374 S.W.3d 737 (2010).

In a rape prosecution under subdivision (a)(3)(A) of this section, defendant's claim that the state did not prove sexual contact occurred on the date in the information failed because (1) the claim was unpreserved, as defendant did not contest the information before trial, and (2) a failure to specify the exact date and time of a crime was not fatal unless time was an essential element, and time was not an essential element of rape. Coleman v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 597 (2010).

Denial of a continuance to a defendant did not violate due process; although the information was amended the day before trial from a charge of rape of someone less than 14 years old by forcible compulsion to rape by forcible compulsion in violation of subdivision (a)(1) of this section, the nature of the crime charged did not change, pursuant to § 16-85-407(b). Green v. State, 2012 Ark. 19, 386 S.W.3d 413 (2012).

In a rape case, the State should not have been allowed to add the charge of second-degree sexual assault to an information at trial; defendant was unfairly surprised because he did not learn that the State intended to amend the information until after he made a motion to dismiss for failure to prove penetration. Defendant was prepared to defend against the essential element of penetration, and the amendment came after the State's witnesses were able to testify about acts that did not go to the elements of the rape charge. Martinez v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 182, 432 S.W.3d 689 (2014).

Instructions.

Instruction given held proper. Whittaker v. Kirchman, 171 Ark. 1029, 287 S.W. 168, 49 A.L.R. 316 (1926) (decision under prior law).

Giving a cautionary instruction held proper, however, the giving of such an instruction rested in the sound discretion of the trial court. Bradshaw v. State, 211 Ark. 189, 199 S.W.2d 747 (1947) (decision under prior law).

The refusal of the trial court to give a cautionary instruction held not to call for reversal. Williams v. State, 254 Ark. 940, 497 S.W.2d 11 (1973) (decision under prior law).

Since there is only one crime of rape with two possible means of commission, either by sexual intercourse or deviate sexual activity, the defendant was not prejudiced by the jury being instructed as to the two sexual acts that could be committed to constitute rape where there was substantial evidence of both acts. Cokeley v. State, 288 Ark. 349, 705 S.W.2d 425 (Ark. 1986).

Where, in prosecution for rape of his daughter, the defendant's defense was one of complete innocence and that nothing improper occurred between him and his daughter, he was not entitled to jury instructions on the lesser included offenses of carnal abuse in the third degree and sexual misconduct. Flurry v. State, 290 Ark. 417, 720 S.W.2d 699 (1986).

There is no rational basis for a lesser included instruction when a defendant charged with rape under this section denies entirely any sexual encounter with the purported victim. Fry v. State, 309 Ark. 316, 829 S.W.2d 415 (Ark. 1992).

Since “serious physical injury” is not an element of the crime of rape, the circuit court correctly refused the defendant's proffered modified version of AMCI 1803. Dillon v. State, 311 Ark. 529, 844 S.W.2d 944 (1993).

Defendant, who was convicted of rape, offered no authority or convincing argument in support of his argument that use of the model verdict form was improper or that the circuit court should have submitted a proffered non-model-verdict form to the jury; defendant contended that interrogatories should have been submitted to the jury in light of the alternate theories of the prosecution's case. Ortega v. State, 2016 Ark. 372, 501 S.W.3d 824 (2016).

Jurisdiction.

It is not essential to a prosecution in this state that all the elements of the crime charged take place in Arkansas; rather if the requisite elements of the crime are committed in different jurisdictions, any state in which an essential part of the crime is committed may take jurisdiction, and since carnal knowledge of the victim is an essential element of the crime of rape by sexual intercourse if it occurs in Arkansas, this state has jurisdiction. Gardner v. State, 263 Ark. 739, 569 S.W.2d 74 (1978), cert. denied, Gardner v. Arkansas, 440 U.S. 911, 99 S. Ct. 1224, 59 L. Ed. 2d 460 (1979).

Evidence held sufficient to support the jury's finding that the rape had occurred in Arkansas. Gardner v. State, 263 Ark. 739, 569 S.W.2d 74 (1978), cert. denied, Gardner v. Arkansas, 440 U.S. 911, 99 S. Ct. 1224, 59 L. Ed. 2d 460 (1979).

Rape is a violent offense, and such a charge is sufficient to meet the requirements set out in § 9-27-318(e)(1) for denial of transfer to juvenile court. Slay v. State, 309 Ark. 507, 832 S.W.2d 217 (1992).

Inmate's appeal from the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus was dismissed as the inmate could not state grounds on which to maintain his petition; appellate court rejected inmate's claim that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to charge him for the underlying conviction of rape of a person less than fourteen years old because inmate was charged within five years of the victim's 18th birthday and, therefore, was within the statute of limitations set forth in § 5-1-109(b)(1) and (h). Young v. Norris, 365 Ark. 219, 226 S.W.3d 797 (2006).

Lesser-Included Offenses.

An indictment for rape would support a conviction for carnal abuse. Henson v. State, 76 Ark. 267, 88 S.W. 965 (1905); Willis v. State, 221 Ark. 162, 252 S.W.2d 618 (1952) (preceding decisions under prior law).

An indictment for rape would support a conviction for assault with intent to rape. Green v. State, 91 Ark. 562, 121 S.W. 949 (1909); Crawford v. State, 132 Ark. 518, 201 S.W. 784 (1918); Lindsey v. State, 213 Ark. 136, 209 S.W.2d 462 (1948) (preceding decisions under prior law).

The court could correctly instruct the jury as to the lesser offense of assault with intent to rape, in view of the rule that a defendant indicted for rape could be convicted of assault with intent to rape. Bradshaw v. State, 211 Ark. 189, 199 S.W.2d 747 (1947) (decision under prior law).

Where on a charge of rape there was evidence tending to show both rape and attempted rape and that physical force used was for the purpose of satisfying sexual desires, the court was not required to instruct that crime of assault and battery could not be established unless intent to inflict an injury was shown, as statutory definition of assault and battery did not contain the word intent. Bailey v. State, 215 Ark. 53, 219 S.W.2d 424 (1949) (decision under prior law).

Refusal to instruct on the lesser charge held proper. Bailey v. State, 227 Ark. 889, 302 S.W.2d 796 (decision under prior law); Hair v. State, 266 Ark. 583, 587 S.W.2d 34 (1979); Wood v. State, 287 Ark. 203, 697 S.W.2d 884 (1985).

Where the proof of two rape charges was deficient in regard to forcible compulsion, both rape convictions were reduced to convictions of carnal abuse in the third degree and the sentences reduced accordingly. Mills v. State, 270 Ark. 141, 603 S.W.2d 416 (1980).

None of the crimes of rape, burglary or kidnapping is necessarily a lesser included offense of the other. Hickerson v. State, 282 Ark. 217, 667 S.W.2d 654 (1984); Handy v. State, 24 Ark. App. 122, 749 S.W.2d 683 (1988).

Public sexual indecency is not a lesser included offense of rape because the two offenses each contain an element that the other does not. Henderson v. State, 286 Ark. 4, 688 S.W.2d 734 (1985), overruled in part, McCoy v. State, 347 Ark. 913, 69 S.W.3d 430 (2002), but see McCoy v. State, 347 Ark. 913, 69 S.W.3d 430 (2002), restating the test for determining when an offense is included in another offense.

Sexual abuse in the first degree is a lesser included offense of attempted rape. Speer v. State, 18 Ark. App. 1, 708 S.W.2d 94 (1986).

Rape and first degree battery are separate and distinct crimes with different elements of proof. And neither is a crime which can be subsumed under the other. Strawhacker v. State, 304 Ark. 726, 804 S.W.2d 720 (1991).

Carnal abuse is not a lesser included offense of rape; the lesser included offense is sexual abuse. Langley v. State, 315 Ark. 472, 868 S.W.2d 81 (1994).

First-degree sexual abuse as defined in § 5-14-108(a)(3) is not a lesser included offense of rape pursuant to subdivision (a)(3) of this section, because it contains an element (age of the perpetrator) not found in the rape provision. Weber v. State, 326 Ark. 564, 933 S.W.2d 370 (1996).

Trial court was not required to instruct a jury on the offense of carnal abuse in the third degree (former § 5-14-106) because it was not a lesser-included offense of rape; carnal abuse in the third degree contained elements not found in subdivision (a)(4) of this section and carnal abuse in the third degree differed from rape in more ways that just the seriousness of harm inflicted upon a victim. Gaines v. State, 354 Ark. 89, 118 S.W.3d 102 (2003).

Court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on sexual indecency with a child where it was not a lesser included offense of rape because committing the crime of sexual indecency with a child was not an attempt to commit rape, and the injury or risk of injury was the same for both offenses; specifically, subjecting the victim to deviate sexual activity was the injury or risk of injury for both offenses. Pratt v. State, 359 Ark. 16, 194 S.W.3d 183 (2004).

Trial court did not err during defendant's trial in refusing to instruct a jury on the lesser offense of sexual assault in the second degree, in violation of § 5-14-125(a)(3)(A)-(B), on one count of rape, in violation of subdivision (a)(3)(A) of this section, because sexual assault was not established by proof of the same or less than all of the elements required to establish rape, as required by § 5-1-110(b) to be a lesser-included offense. Joyner v. State, 2009 Ark. 168, 303 S.W.3d 54, cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1047, 130 S. Ct. 736, 175 L. Ed. 2d 514 (2009).

In a criminal trial, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request to instruct the jury that second-degree sexual assault under § 5-14-125(a)(3) was a lesser offense included in rape of a person less than fourteen years of age, as defined in subdivision (a)(3)(A) of this section, because the offense contained two elements not included in rape: defendant's age and marital status. Therefore, second-degree sexual assault was not a lesser offense included in rape. Webb v. State, 2012 Ark. 64 (2012).

Juvenile was properly adjudicated delinquent for committing second-degree assault and his due-process rights were not violated because the juvenile confirmed that he engaged in deviate sexual activity by penetrating the victim's anus without touching her, forcible compulsion was an element of both rape and second-degree sexual assault, and the juvenile could not claim surprise by the trial court's true finding as to the lesser-included offense where he was on notice of the greater offense. X.O.P. v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 424, 439 S.W.3d 711 (2014).

Circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it declined defendant's request to include a lesser-included-offense jury instruction for second-degree sexual assault; second-degree sexual assault is not a lesser-included offense of rape because it requires proof of two elements that rape does not: defendant's age (18 or over) and defendant's marital status (not married to the victim). Hartman v. State, 2015 Ark. 30, 454 S.W.3d 721 (2015).

Circuit court's mistake in failing to give a lesser-included instruction on second-degree sexual assault in a rape case did not constitute reversible error because there was no rational basis for instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense where a victim testified that defendant inserted his penis into her vagina against her will, and the DNA evidence established that defendant was the perpetrator. Burris v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 126 (2015).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing defendant's proffered jury instruction because first-degree sexual assault under § 5-14-124(a)(1)(C) is not a lesser-included offense of guardian rape under subdivision (a)(4)(A)(i) of this section, as first-degree sexual assault contains an additional element that guardian rape does not—proof that the minor is not the actor's spouse; and even if first-degree sexual assault were a lesser-included offense, there would be no rational basis on which to allow the jury instruction because defendant claimed that he was innocent of the allegations. Matlock v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 470, 588 S.W.3d 152 (2019).

Penetration.

The carnal knowlege that was required to constitute rape was res in re but to no particular depth and the hymen need not be ruptured nor the body torn. Poe v. State, 95 Ark. 172, 129 S.W. 292 (1910); Cabe v. State, 182 Ark. 49, 30 S.W.2d 855 (1930); McDonald v. State, 225 Ark. 38, 279 S.W.2d 44 (1955) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Proof of penetration was necessary to sustain a conviction but penetration could be proved by circumstantial evidence, provided the inferences to be deduced from circumstances proved left no reasonable doubt. Hudspeth v. State, 194 Ark. 576, 108 S.W.2d 1085 (1937).

Where a qualified doctor obtained a smear from the mouth of the victim's womb and found living spermatozoa of the male sperm cells in the secretion, the requirements for conviction for the offense of rape were met by the evidence. Maxwell v. State, 236 Ark. 694, 370 S.W.2d 113 (1963) (decision under prior law).

Evidence regarding penetration held sufficient to support conviction. Scott v. State, 254 Ark. 271, 492 S.W.2d 902 (1973); Hice v. State, 268 Ark. 57, 593 S.W.2d 169 (1980); Harris v. State, 9 Ark. App. 253, 657 S.W.2d 566 (1983); D.D. v. State, 40 Ark. App. 75, 842 S.W.2d 62 (1992).

Penetration in a rape or sodomy case can be shown by circumstantial evidence. Whitmore v. State, 263 Ark. 419, 565 S.W.2d 133 (1978).

By defining “sexual intercourse,” which is included within the definition of rape, as “penetration, however slight, of a vagina by a penis,” the draftsmen of the 1975 Criminal Code did not intend to change the crime of rape by requiring a deeper penetration into the body than penetration of the labia, as was formerly necessary; therefore, penetration within the labia up to as far as the hymen, was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction. Hice v. State, 268 Ark. 57, 593 S.W.2d 169 (1980).

Penetration can be shown by circumstantial evidence, and if that evidence gives rise to more than a mere suspicion, and the inference that might reasonably have been deduced from it would leave little room for doubt, that is sufficient. Jackson v. State, 290 Ark. 375, 720 S.W.2d 282 (1986).

A rational juror could reasonably conclude that putting the mouth on the penis constitutes penetration. Chambers v. Lockhart, 872 F.2d 274 (8th Cir. 1989), rehearing denied, — F.2d —, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 7394 (8th Cir. May 19, 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 938, 110 S. Ct. 335 (1989).

Both deviate sexual activity and sexual intercourse require penetration “however slight.” D.D. v. State, 40 Ark. App. 75, 842 S.W.2d 62 (1992).

Nine-year-old victim's testimony that defendant put his penis inside her body, along with her description of defendant's acts, was substantial evidence of penetration, and was sufficient, standing alone, absent any corroboration, to sustain defendant's conviction for rape. United S. Assurance Co. v. Beard, 320 Ark. 115, 894 S.W.2d 948 (1995).

Evidence of penetration held sufficient, even though the attacker did not have an erection, where victim testified that he “smushed it in.” Stewart v. State, 331 Ark. 359, 961 S.W.2d 750 (1998).

Defendant's conviction for rape was upheld where the 16-year-old victim's testimony about her physical symptoms, when coupled with the testimony of the other witnesses, provided circumstantial evidence of penetration, which was an element of both rape by sexual intercourse and rape by deviate sexual activity. Marshall v. State, 94 Ark. App. 34, 223 S.W.3d 74 (2006).

In a case in which defendant appealed his conviction for rape of a 20-year old woman with a mental defect or mental incapacity, he unsuccessfully argued that there was insufficient evidence that penetration occurred. In addition to the testimony, there was also circumstantial medical evidence admitted that constituted substantial evidence to support the conviction; testimony from a nurse describing the procedure for taking the medical samples from inside the anus and vagina, together with evidence from the forensic experts concerning the presence of defendant's Y-chromosomal DNA on the victim's rectal swab, clearly gave rise to more than a mere suspicion and left little room for doubt that penetration occurred. Fernandez v. State, 2010 Ark. 148, 362 S.W.3d 905 (2010).

In defendant's prosecution under subdivision (a)(3)(A) of this section, evidence of penetration was sufficient because testimony of the victim's brother, the victim, a forensic examiner, and an expert sexual-assault nurse-examiner supported the jury's finding of penetration. Elliott v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 810, 379 S.W.3d 101 (2010).

Defendant's confession that he had his penis out and touched his five-year-old niece's mouth with it, and that she might have opened her mouth, coupled with the child's statement to her mother within seconds or minutes of the incident that defendant had put his pee-pee in her mouth, was sufficient to convict defendant of rape. Davis v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 686, 386 S.W.3d 647 (2011).

Victim's oral cavity does not have to be fully entered in order for penetration to occur under § 5-14-101(1)(A); rather, slight penetration, such as that of the lips, can be sufficient to constitute rape. Therefore, a directed verdict was properly denied because there was sufficient evidence of penetration under § 5-14-101(1)(A) where the victim testified that appellant pushed her head down on his penis, which touched her lips; appellant was unable to push it further in the victim's mouth because she had her teeth clenched. Henderson v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 485 (2012).

Suspended sentence was properly revoked because the evidence showed that appellant committed rape under subdivision (a)(1) of this section; penetration was shown by the circumstantial evidence where the victim sustained wounds to her body, appellant admitted to having intercourse, and debris was found inside of the victim's vagina. Moreover, appellant's semen was found on the victim's inner thigh. Edwards v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 551 (2012).

Defendant's claim that there was insufficient evidence of penetration lacked merit; the semen protein found inside the victim's mouth and vaginal canal was matched to either defendant or someone who shared his parental lineage, plus there was also proof that a sperm cell found on the victim matched defendant's personal DNA profile within all scientific certainty. Sharp v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 718, 479 S.W.3d 568 (2015).

In a case in which defendant was convicted of raping the victim, his cousin, when she was 14 years old, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for directed verdict that challenged the sufficiency of the State's proof of penetration. Although defendant argued that the victim had lied and was not credible, any inconsistencies in the victim's testimony were for the jury to resolve, and it was not an issue for the appellate court; the uncorroborated testimony of the victim that showed penetration was sufficient evidence for a rape conviction; semen was found inside the victim's vagina; and the forensic DNA analyst gave expert testimony that established, within all scientific certainty, that the DNA originated from defendant. Wiseman v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 371 (2017).

Substantial evidence supported a rape conviction where an accomplice testified that defendant had penetrated the victim's vagina with a broomstick, and other witnesses testified that defendant had said so while showing a video of the incident. Sorum v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 384, 526 S.W.3d 50 (2017).

Physically Helpless.

Subdivision (a)(2) only requires physical helplessness, not total incapacity. Dabney v. State, 326 Ark. 382, 930 S.W.2d 360 (1996).

Where the victim's physical condition made it impossible for her to be “aware” of defendant's intentions before he actually commenced the rape, it is likely that the victim was unaware of what was about to occur and of her need to indicate her lack of consent; under these circumstances, the victim was unable to consent due to her physical helplessness. Dabney v. State, 326 Ark. 382, 930 S.W.2d 360 (1996).

Allowing an alleged rape victim's prior sexual conduct into evidence was improper because defendant was charged with raping the victim while she was physically helpless and pursuant to subdivision (a)(2)(A) of this section, a person who was physically helpless at the time of the rape was incapable of consent. Therefore, any prior sexual encounters between defendant and the victim, which might have been relevant if consent was a defense, were irrelevant where the victim could not have consented due to being physically helpless. State v. Parker, 2010 Ark. 173 (2010).

Sentencing.

The reclassification of rape to a Class Y felony from a Class A felony was a substantive change in the law and that those charged with rape after the effective date of the amendment should be tried under the substantive law in effect when the crime was committed. Smith v. State, 277 Ark. 64, 639 S.W.2d 348 (1982); Young v. State, 14 Ark. App. 122, 685 S.W.2d 823 (1985).

Since § 5-4-104(c) provides that defendant convicted of a Class Y felony must be sentenced to imprisonment, a defendant convicted of deviate sexual activity could not be given a suspended sentence or probation even where the prosecutor agreed that some form of probation would be proper. Harris v. State, 15 Ark. App. 58, 689 S.W.2d 353 (1985).

Where the judge imposed a net sentence of 35 years when he could well have imposed a life sentence and he spoke at some length about the crime and the fact that it exceeded anything he had seen while serving on the bench, his words, (that if it had been his child, there would be no sentencing hearing), were intended in a figurative sense and there was no prejudice. Campbell v. State, 288 Ark. 213, 703 S.W.2d 855 (1986).

Where the defendant was originally sentenced to 50 years with 15 years suspended for a Class Y felony, the trial judge was right to modify the sentence to 35 years, but the defendant was not entitled to the 15 years suspended under the original sentence. Campbell v. State, 288 Ark. 213, 703 S.W.2d 855 (1986).

There was no error in court's imposition of life sentence where defendant was convicted of rape, a Class Y felony, and with a record of four prior felonies, the range of his punishment was 40 years to life imprisonment. Henderson v. State, 310 Ark. 287, 835 S.W.2d 865 (1992).

The penalty for rape is the same whether it is by deviate sexual activity or by sexual intercourse. Midgett v. State, 316 Ark. 553, 873 S.W.2d 165 (1994).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to reduce his life sentence for the rape of his minor daughter as numerous witnesses testified to the alleged abuse of the victim, including the victim herself, and a nurse examiner testified to signs of extensive and ongoing sexual abuse; based on this evidence, the jury's verdict did not appear to be the result of passion or prejudice. McDonald v. State, 364 Ark. 491, 221 S.W.3d 349 (2006).

Where defendant pled guilty to rape and elected to be sentenced by a jury in a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court erred in admitting a videotaped statement of the child rape victim during the sentencing proceeding, because this violated defendant's right of confrontation under U.S. Const. Amend. VI and Ark. Const. Art. II, § 10. Vankirk v. State, 2011 Ark. 428, 385 S.W.3d 144 (2011).

Separate Offenses.

Prosecution in the justice of the peace court for assault and disturbing the public peace could not constitute former jeopardy in prosecution for sodomy, as there was no relation between the misdemeanors of assault and disturbing the peace and the felony of sodomy. Verser v. State, 256 Ark. 609, 509 S.W.2d 299 (1974) (decision under prior law).

Where there was ample testimony by which the jury could have found that the defendant father committed rape by deviate sexual activity on one occasion and, on other occasions, was guilty of incest by having sexual intercourse with his 14-year-old daughter, each act constituted a separate offense, and the defendant was properly convicted on separate counts of rape and incest. Massey v. State, 278 Ark. 625, 648 S.W.2d 52 (1983).

A forcible act of intercourse with one's child under the age of 11 would support a conviction for rape or incest, but not both, and neither is a lesser included offense of the other, though several elements are the same. Williams v. State, 11 Ark. App. 11, 665 S.W.2d 299 (1984).

Since defendant was convicted of rape and attempted first degree murder, and rape and attempted first murder are separate and distinct offenses and each requires proof of a fact which the other does not, the convictions for rape and attempted first degree murder did not violate the double jeopardy clause. Wiman v. Lockhart, 797 F.2d 666 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1021, 107 S. Ct. 678, 93 L. Ed. 2d 728 (1986).

Kidnapping and rape are not lesser included offenses of one another because each crime requires a different element of proof. While kidnapping does require the restraint to be substantial for one of several purposes, one of which is the purpose of engaging in sexual intercourse, kidnapping does not require the act of sexual intercourse itself. Rape requires a sexual act by forcible compulsion; that force is not necessarily the same as that required to sustain a conviction for kidnapping. Cozzaglio v. State, 289 Ark. 33, 709 S.W.2d 70 (1986).

Where the defendant raped the victim with his finger, and then, after leaving the bedroom and returning, got an erection and penetrated her, the two acts of rape were of a different nature and were separate in point of time, and the defendant was properly convicted of two counts of rape. Tarry v. State, 289 Ark. 193, 710 S.W.2d 202 (1986).

Where the victim was forced to drive to the country where she was repeatedly raped, her life was threatened several times although she was not seriously injured physically, and after the rape the victim was tied to a tree, the crime of rape and kidnapping were separate. Jones v. State, 290 Ark. 113, 717 S.W.2d 200 (1986).

Being convicted of rape and kidnapping does not violate a defendant's right to be free from double jeopardy. White v. State, 301 Ark. 74, 781 S.W.2d 478 (1989).

There are different elements of proof between the offenses of third degree carnal abuse (§ 5-14-106) which requires that the accused be 20 years of age or above, and the crime of rape (this section) which has no such element. Fry v. State, 309 Ark. 316, 829 S.W.2d 415 (Ark. 1992).

Rape is not a continuing offense; rather, each act of rape is a separate offense. Wofford v. State, 44 Ark. App. 94, 867 S.W.2d 181 (1993).

An offense such as rape necessarily contemplates restrictions on the victim's liberty while the crime is being committed; therefore, only when the restraint imposed exceeds that normally incidental to the underlying crime should the rapist also be subject to prosecution for kidnapping. Wofford v. State, 44 Ark. App. 94, 867 S.W.2d 181 (1993).

Where defendant was accused of committing five unconnected sexual assaults against five different girls, the alleged offenses occurred over a twelve-month period, involved different charges, and were committed in different manners, against different victims, and at different locations, the charges should not have been consolidated for trial; since these five crimes were of a similar character, but were not part of a single scheme or plan, the defendant had a right to a severance of the offenses. Clay v. State, 318 Ark. 550, 886 S.W.2d 608 (1994).

Defendant was properly charged with multiple counts of rape rather than one count where there were separate penetrations occurring as a result of separate impulses, notwithstanding that the acts were not separated in time. Ricks v. State, 327 Ark. 513, 940 S.W.2d 422 (1997).

Because the carnal abuse statute requires proof of facts that the rape statute does not, the fact that a defendant is charged with both offenses does not violate double jeopardy. Standridge v. State, 357 Ark. 105, 161 S.W.3d 815 (2004).

Defendant's acquittal of charges under 18 U.S.C.S. § 2423(a) in federal court did not operate as a bar to his statutory rape prosecution in state court as the underlying conduct upon which the federal conviction and Arkansas charge were based was not the same; a state jury's verdict that an act of statutory rape occurred in Arkansas would not necessarily be consistent with a federal jury's finding that, at the point in time when defendant transported the minor across state lines, he did not intend for the minor to engage in sexual activity. Winkle v. State, 366 Ark. 318, 235 S.W.3d 482 (2006).

Circuit court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss because the second trial did not violate her Fifth Amendment right against double jeopardy; although the victim was the same, each rape charge was the result of a separate impulse separated in point of time and thus the charges were not for the same continuing offense. Schoolfield v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 575, 564 S.W.3d 558 (2018).

Because the rape offenses charged in the second prosecution did not occur within the same jurisdiction and venue of the initial prosecution, the offenses were not “related offenses” under Ark. R. Crim. P. 21.3 and dismissal was not required; the requisite inquiry for purposes of Rule 21.3 was not whether the offenses were committed in Craighead County but whether the offenses were committed in the same separate judicial district of Craighead County. Schoolfield v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 575, 564 S.W.3d 558 (2018).

“Victim”.

Trial court did not err when it referred to the victim as a “victim” during the bench trial; the word “victim” was primarily used by the court during discussions about elements under this section that the State charged defendant with violating. Graham v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 88, 572 S.W.3d 29 (2019).

Voir Dire.

In a rape prosecution under subdivision (a)(3)(A) of this section, it was not an abuse of discretion to overrule defendant's objection to the state's voir dire questions asking if jurors would require DNA evidence to convict a person of rape because (1) the prosecutor posed the question to discern if any jurors would require scientific evidence for a rape conviction, which was a legitimate purpose of voir dire, and (2) defendant could not show prejudice, as defendant did not seek a mistrial or admonition at trial. Coleman v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 597 (2010).

Voluntary Intoxication.

Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to having sexual relations with minor children. Drymon v. State, 316 Ark. 799, 875 S.W.2d 73 (1994).

Cited: Kitchen v. State, 264 Ark. 579, 572 S.W.2d 839 (1978); White v. State, 266 Ark. 499, 585 S.W.2d 952 (1979); Marion v. State, 267 Ark. 345, 590 S.W.2d 288 (1979); Conley v. State, 267 Ark. 713, 590 S.W.2d 66 (Ct. App. 1979); Rogers v. Britton, 466 F. Supp. 397 (E.D. Ark. 1979); Rogers v. Britton, 466 F. Supp. 397 (E.D. Ark. 1979); Rogers v. Britton, 476 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Ark. 1979); Washington v. State, 267 Ark. 1040, 594 S.W.2d 29 (Ct. App. 1980); Holcomb v. State, 268 Ark. 138, 594 S.W.2d 22 (1980); Harris v. State, 268 Ark. 425, 597 S.W.2d 75 (1980); Bailey v. State, 269 Ark. 397, 601 S.W.2d 843 (1980); Shepherd v. State, 270 Ark. 457, 605 S.W.2d 414 (1980); Beed v. State, 271 Ark. 526, 609 S.W.2d 898 (1980); Conley v. State, 272 Ark. 33, 612 S.W.2d 722 (1981); Harper v. State, 1 Ark. App. 190, 614 S.W.2d 237 (1981); Robinson v. State, 275 Ark. 473, 631 S.W.2d 294 (1982); Urquhart v. State, 275 Ark. 486, 631 S.W.2d 304 (1982); Veasey v. State, 276 Ark. 457, 637 S.W.2d 545 (1982); Stephens v. State, 277 Ark. 113, 640 S.W.2d 94 (1982); Clayborn v. State, 278 Ark. 533, 647 S.W.2d 433 (1983); Massey v. State, 278 Ark. 625, 648 S.W.2d 52 (1983); Keck v. American Emp. Agency, Inc., 279 Ark. 294, 652 S.W.2d 2, 41 A.L.R.4th 523 (1983); McGee v. State, 280 Ark. 347, 658 S.W.2d 376 (1983); Scott v. State, 284 Ark. 388, 681 S.W.2d 915 (1985); Timmons v. State, 286 Ark. 42, 688 S.W.2d 944 (1985); McKinnon v. State, 287 Ark. 1, 695 S.W.2d 826 (1985); Hickey v. State, 14 Ark. App. 50, 684 S.W.2d 830 (1985); Avery v. State, 15 Ark. App. 134, 690 S.W.2d 732 (1985); Young v. State, 287 Ark. 361, 699 S.W.2d 398 (1985); McGuire v. State, 288 Ark. 388, 706 S.W.2d 360 (1986); Chappell v. State, 18 Ark. App. 26, 710 S.W.2d 214 (1986); Hughes v. State, 292 Ark. 619, 732 S.W.2d 829 (1987); Foster v. State, 294 Ark. 146, 741 S.W.2d 251 (1987); Yates v. State, 301 Ark. 424, 785 S.W.2d 199 (1990); Cozad v. State, 303 Ark. 137, 792 S.W.2d 606 (1990); Leshe v. State, 304 Ark. 442, 803 S.W.2d 522 (1991); Dewitt v. State, 306 Ark. 559, 815 S.W.2d 942 (1991); Cole v. State, 307 Ark. 41, 818 S.W.2d 573 (1991); Swanson v. State, 308 Ark. 28, 823 S.W.2d 812 (1992); Terry v. State, 309 Ark. 64, 826 S.W.2d 817 (1992); Bonds v. State, 310 Ark. 541, 837 S.W.2d 881 (1992); Richardson v. State, 314 Ark. 512, 863 S.W.2d 572 (1993); Tolbert v. State, 316 Ark. 671, 874 S.W.2d 371 (1994); Evans v. State, 317 Ark. 449, 879 S.W.2d 409 (1994); Hagen v. State, 47 Ark. App. 137, 886 S.W.2d 889 (1994); Helton v. State, 320 Ark. 352, 896 S.W.2d 887 (1995); Parnell v. State, 323 Ark. 34, 912 S.W.2d 422 (1996); Hansen v. State, 323 Ark. 407, 914 S.W.2d 737 (1996); Hinzman v. State, 53 Ark. App. 256, 922 S.W.2d 725 (1996); Donihoo v. State, 325 Ark. 483, 931 S.W.2d 69 (1996); Chavis v. State, 328 Ark. 251, 942 S.W.2d 853 (1997); Sansevero v. State, 345 Ark. 307, 45 S.W.3d 840 (2001); Isom v. State, 356 Ark. 156, 148 S.W.3d 257 (2004); Rye v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 839, 373 S.W.3d 354 (2009); Ratchford v. State, 2015 Ark. 309, 468 S.W.3d 274 (2015); B.J. v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 310, 462 S.W.3d 709 (2015).