Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-110 (2026)

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2001 Arkansas General Assembly, Criminal Law, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 429.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Appellate court applied strict scrutiny to defendant's claim that subdivision (a)(1) of this section violated his right to free speech where the texts and social media posts between defendant when he was age 18 and a 14-year-old were not in the record, and there was no recent case law finding that written descriptions of sexual acts constitute unprotected obscenity. Worsham v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 65, 572 S.W.3d 1 (2019).

Application of subdivision (a)(1) of this section to defendant under the stipulated facts was unconstitutionally overbroad in suppressing his fundamental right to engage in expression protected by the First Amendment and Ark. Const., Art. 2, § 6, by punishing speech about lawful activity. The State could have achieved its goal of protecting minors in a more narrowly tailored way by prohibiting sex between an 18-year-old and a 14-year-old, especially given that a prior version of the statute criminalized only solicitations of sexual conduct that otherwise would have been illegal. Worsham v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 65, 572 S.W.3d 1 (2019).

Construction.

Gravamen of the offense set out in subsection (a) of this section is the inducement of a child to engage in a sexual act; subsection (a) should not be read so narrowly as to require that inducement be expressed verbally where there is evidence of unambiguous nonverbal inducement. Renderos v. State, 92 Ark. App. 293, 213 S.W.3d 37 (2005).

“Solicits” has an ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language that can be drawn from dictionaries, and men may conduct themselves so as to avoid that which is forbidden; the statute is not impermissibly vague in all of its applications. Neely v. McDaniel, 677 F.3d 346 (8th Cir. 2012), rehearing denied, — F.3d —, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 12159 (8th Cir. Ark. June 14, 2012).

By criminalizing the solicitation of minors to engage in sexual activity, this section targets primarily, if not exclusively, illicit activity within the state's power to regulate; the court rejected petitioner's overbreadth challenge and concluded that whatever overbreadth may exist should be cured through case-by-case analysis of the fact situations to which its sanctions, assertedly, may not be applied. Neely v. McDaniel, 677 F.3d 346 (8th Cir. 2012), rehearing denied, — F.3d —, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 12159 (8th Cir. Ark. June 14, 2012).

Court rejected petitioner's contention that the reasonable mistake of age defense in § 5-14-102(d) violated the Due Process Clause by shifting the burden of proof on an essential element to the defendant; if the Arkansas statute employed a strict-liability standard concerning the victim's age, then the state retained the burden of proving all elements of the offense, and no further facts are either presumed or inferred in order to constitute the crime (the defendant's reasonable ignorance of the victim's age would therefore mitigate the offense, not rebut a presumed element). Neely v. McDaniel, 677 F.3d 346 (8th Cir. 2012), rehearing denied, — F.3d —, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 12159 (8th Cir. Ark. June 14, 2012).

This section prohibits the solicitation of conduct that is already criminal under Arkansas law, and offers to engage in illegal transactions enjoy no First Amendment protection. Neely v. McDaniel, 677 F.3d 346 (8th Cir. 2012), rehearing denied, — F.3d —, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 12159 (8th Cir. Ark. June 14, 2012).

Trial court properly directed a verdict in defendant's favor in the State's action for engaging in sexual indecency with a child under subdivision (a)(4)(C) (now (a)(4)(D)) of this section, because exposure must be to “another person” other than the defendant. A plain reading of this section indicates that the section clearly differentiated among the person (actor), the victim, and “another person” and that same distinction must be carried forward throughout the section. State v. Coble, 2016 Ark. 114, 487 S.W.3d 370 (2016) (decided before 2016 amendment).

Evidence.

Evidence was sufficient for a conviction of committing sexual indecency with a child where defendant offered a 14 year old girl money in exchange for sex, she understood that he had meant sexual intercourse and that he was serious, and his request amounted to solicitation. Heape v. State, 87 Ark. App. 370, 192 S.W.3d 281 (2004).

Defendant's conviction for sexual indecency with a child, in violation of subdivision (a)(1) of this section, was upheld as a finder of fact could reasonably have concluded that the act of forcibly and persistently pulling a girl's pants down against her wishes while alone with her in a garage attic was unmistakably importuning her to commit sexual indecency. Renderos v. State, 92 Ark. App. 293, 213 S.W.3d 37 (2005).

Evidence defendant initiated the first episode of sexual intercourse and provided transportation to his home and other locations so intercourse could take place supported a finding defendant solicited the victim and supported defendant's conviction for sexual indecency with a child. Halliday v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 544, 386 S.W.3d 51 (2011).

Because an eight-year-old child victim's testimony was enough to support a conviction, there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's convictions for sexual indecency with a child and second-degree sexual assault under subdivision (a)(2)(A) of this section and § 5-14-125(a)(3), respectively. Newton v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 91 (2012).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's sexual-indecency conviction because ample evidence allowed a jury to infer defendant exposed himself to children to gratify defendant's sexual desire. Ward v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 408, 439 S.W.3d 56 (2014).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of sexual indecency with a child because while a photograph was simply the manner he selected for the minor victim to view his exposed penis, he intentionally laid his penis open to view by a member of his church congregation for the purpose of arousing or gratifying his sexual desire, and what she saw when she viewed the photograph was no different than what she would have seen had defendant pulled down his pants while standing in front of her. Malvin v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 584, 446 S.W.3d 208 (2014).

Because defendant's arguments on appeal were not part of his directed-verdict motion in the circuit court, his arguments were not preserved for appellate review; however, even had defendant preserved his arguments, his motion for a directed verdict on the sexual indecency with a child charge was properly denied. The victim's testimony that defendant said he was going to perform fellatio on the victim for some money was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction, and any forensic evidence on the condom wrapper found at the scene was irrelevant to the offense of sexual indecency because sexual indecency only required solicitation of sexual intercourse or contact. Langford v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 289, 461 S.W.3d 712 (2015).

In a motion for a directed verdict at the close of the State's case, in which no specific element of the offense of sexual indecency with a child was challenged, and, at the close of all the evidence, in which defendant renewed his motion for directed verdict but added that the State had failed to prove solicitation where the explicit story sent to the victim, defendant's younger stepdaughter, did not request or ask the victim to do anything sexual, defendant's failure to make a specific motion for directed verdict at the close of the State's case rendered the lack of sufficient proof of the solicitation issue not preserved for appellate review. Campbell v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 59, 512 S.W.3d 663 (2017).

In a case where defendant was convicted of one count of sexual indecency with a child, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the State to ask the victim, defendant's younger stepdaughter, about the contents of emails or messages she received in relation to the explicit stories sent to her by defendant because there was no evidence, nor had it been alleged, that the police or the State lost or destroyed the electronic communications or that any loss or destruction was in bad faith, and as such, other evidence of the contents was admissible under Ark. R. Evid. 1004. Campbell v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 59, 512 S.W.3d 663 (2017).

In a case where defendant was convicted of one count of sexual indecency with a child, the trial court did not err in permitting the victim, defendant's younger stepdaughter, to testify to the general content of messages and the stories that defendant sent to the victim about a sexual relationship between a stepfather and stepdaughter, as that was not to prove the truth of the messages or the truth of the fictional stories, but, instead, it gave context to how the victim came to be in possession of the stories and provided the basis for her having suspicions that the sender was her stepfather. Campbell v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 59, 512 S.W.3d 663 (2017).

In a case where defendant was convicted of one count of sexual indecency with a child, defendant admitted having sent one story to the victim, and thus that story constituted an admission of a party opponent, which was not hearsay under Ark. R. Evid. 801. Campbell v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 59, 512 S.W.3d 663 (2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of three counts of sexual indecency with a child, a Class D felony, because the plain language of subdivision (a)(2) of this section does not contain a requirement that the child consciously observed the indecent exposure; and, in any event, the trial court simply restated the language of the elements as written in the statute without defining whether the word “to” required proof that the child saw defendant's exposed genitals, and concluded that the State had made a prima facia case that presented a question of fact for the jury to decide. In addition, it was not improper to charge defendant with three offenses rather than two; while defendant only lifted his shirt twice, he laid his sex organs open to view to three children. Krol v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 512, 563 S.W.3d 586 (2018).

Lesser Included Offenses.

Court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on sexual indecency with a child where it was not a lesser included offense of rape because committing the crime of sexual indecency with a child was not an attempt to commit rape, and the injury or risk of injury was the same for both offenses; specifically, subjecting the victim to deviate sexual activity was the injury or risk of injury for both offenses. Pratt v. State, 359 Ark. 16, 194 S.W.3d 183 (2004).

Mental State.

Appellate court found no merit in defendant's argument that he was merely rhetorically questioning a 14-year-old girl about sex, rather than soliciting her, and that he had no intent to make such a statement where there was testimony that he offered to pay money in exchange for sex, that he offered her more money after she refused him, and that he kissed her on the neck after encouraging the young boys in her charge to kiss her. Heape v. State, 87 Ark. App. 370, 192 S.W.3d 281 (2004).

Cited: Laughlin v. State, 316 Ark. 489, 872 S.W.2d 848 (1994); Wilson v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 385 (2017).