Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-207 (2026)
Intoxication
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Intoxication that is not self-induced intoxication is an affirmative defense to a prosecution if at the time a person engages in the conduct charged to constitute the offense the person lacks capacity to:
- Conform his or her conduct to the requirements of the law; or
- Appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct.
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As used in this section:
- “Intoxication” means a disturbance of a mental or physical capacity resulting from the introduction of alcohol, a drug, or another substance into the body; and
- “Self-induced intoxication” means intoxication caused by a substance that the actor knowingly introduces into his or her body and the actor knows or ought to know the tendency of the substance to cause intoxication.
History. Acts 1975, No. 280, § 207; 1977, No. 101, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 41-207.
Research References
Ark. L. Notes.
Liebman, Voluntary Intoxication as a Defense to Crime, 1983 Ark. L. Notes 29.
Malone and Hurst, Update: Voluntary Intoxication as a Defense to Crime, etc., 1987 Ark. L. Notes 91.
Ark. L. Rev.
The Constitutionality of Affirmative Defenses to Criminal Charges, 29 Ark. L. Rev. 430.
Article, Ethical and Effective Representation in Arkansas Capital Trials, 60 Ark. L. Rev. 1.
U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.
Survey of Arkansas Law, Criminal Law, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 153.
DeSimone, Survey of Criminal Law, 3 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 191.
Note, Defense of Involuntary Intoxication No Longer Available to Disprove Intent, etc., 9 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 657.
Survey—Criminal Law, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 137.
Survey — Criminal Law, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 183.
Case Notes
Constitutionality.
This section is constitutionally sound. Sullinger v. State, 310 Ark. 690, 840 S.W.2d 797 (1992).
Burden of Proof.
This section does not eliminate the state's burden to prove purposeful intent. Caldwell v. State, 322 Ark. 543, 910 S.W.2d 667 (1995), cert. denied, Caldwell v. Arkansas, 517 U.S. 1124, 116 S. Ct. 1361, 134 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1996).
Evidence.
Expert testimony as to the physiological effects of defendant's alcohol consumption to show that he lacked the requisite mental state to commit offense was properly excluded since voluntary intoxication is no longer available as a defense or admissible for the purpose of negating specific intent. Pharo v. State, 30 Ark. App. 94, 783 S.W.2d 64 (1990).
Testimony by medical doctor about blackout alcoholism in murder trial was simply another means of using voluntary intoxication as a defense, thus, the witness' testimony was properly excluded since voluntary intoxication was no longer a defense to criminal prosecutions. Spohn v. State, 310 Ark. 500, 837 S.W.2d 873 (1992).
Evidence was sufficient to support a finding of purposeful intent. Caldwell v. State, 322 Ark. 543, 910 S.W.2d 667 (1995), cert. denied, Caldwell v. Arkansas, 517 U.S. 1124, 116 S. Ct. 1361, 134 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1996).
Instructions.
Defendant's proffered instruction which merely emphasized his theory of the case that his intoxication should be considered as diminishing his capacity to form the requisite intent to commit capital murder was properly refused. Kemp v. State, 324 Ark. 178, 919 S.W.2d 943, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 982, 117 S. Ct. 436, 136 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1996).
Self-Induced Intoxication.
Except in cases involving specific intent crimes, voluntary intoxication is not a defense, even though it may produce a form of “temporary insanity” or render the person charged unconscious of what he is doing. Gonce v. State, 11 Ark. App. 278, 669 S.W.2d 490 (1984).
Voluntary intoxication is no longer available as a defense to criminal prosecutions. White v. State, 290 Ark. 130, 717 S.W.2d 784 (1986); Sullinger v. State, 310 Ark. 690, 840 S.W.2d 797 (1992); Spohn v. State, 310 Ark. 500, 837 S.W.2d 873 (1992).
Drinking to the point of intoxication by an alcoholic is self-induced intoxication and therefore not covered by the involuntary intoxication defense. To hold otherwise would serve only to immunize a certain category of people from prosecution for their criminal conduct because of their addiction to alcohol. See v. State, 296 Ark. 498, 757 S.W.2d 947 (1988).
Specific Intent.
Where the crimes in this case were committed when Varnedare v. State, 264 Ark. 596, 573 S.W.2d 57 (1978), was still the law, substantive law recognized the common law defense of voluntary intoxication to specific intent crimes, and the trial court erred in applying State v. White, 290 Ark. 130, 717 S.W.2d 784 (1986), retroactively eliminating a defense available at the time of the offense. Mauppin v. State, 309 Ark. 235, 831 S.W.2d 104 (1992).
Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to the charge of murder in the first degree or to the charge of battery in the second degree; voluntary intoxication is not available as a defense for purposes of negating specific intent. Gilkey v. State, 41 Ark. App. 100, 848 S.W.2d 439 (1993).
Sufficient evidence supported the prosecutor's decision to charge appellant with capital murder; although defendant had no recollection of the events leading to his girlfriend's death, intent could be inferred from the nature and extent of the injuries that caused her death. True v. State, 2017 Ark. 323, 532 S.W.3d 70 (2017).
Cited: Bailey v. State, 263 Ark. 470, 565 S.W.2d 603 (1978); Hobgood v. Housewright, 698 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. 1983); Sullinger v. State, 310 Ark. 690, 840 S.W.2d 797 (1992).