Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-208 (2026)
Duress
- It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution that the actor engaged in the conduct charged to constitute an offense because the actor reasonably believed he or she was compelled to engage in the conduct by the threat or use of unlawful force against the actor's person or the person of another that a person of ordinary firmness in the actor's situation would not have resisted.
- The affirmative defense provided by this section is unavailable if the actor recklessly placed himself or herself in a situation in which it was reasonably foreseeable that the actor would be subjected to the force or threatened force described in subsection (a) of this section.
History. Acts 1975, No. 280, § 208; A.S.A. 1947, § 41-208.
Research References
Ark. L. Rev.
The Impact of the 1976 Criminal Code on the Law of Accessorial Liability in Arkansas, 31 Ark. L. Rev. 100.
Article, Ethical and Effective Representation in Arkansas Capital Trials, 60 Ark. L. Rev. 1.
Case Notes
In General.
The defense of duress requires that at the time of the conduct constituting the offense the actor suffers an impairment of his ability to control his conduct such that he cannot properly be held accountable for it. Marx v. State, 291 Ark. 325, 724 S.W.2d 456 (1987).
Where a psychologist testified that he did not believe defendant was any more susceptible to reacting to his co-defendant differently than anyone else, defendant could not demonstrate how he was prejudiced by the exclusion of the psychologist's complete testimony regarding the co-defendant's borderline personality disorder. Pugh v. State, 351 Ark. 5, 89 S.W.3d 909 (2002).
Defendant's claim that she was acting in a state of extreme emotional disturbance as a result of fear of her husband, i.e. that she was acting out of duress, was an attempt to mitigate the crime of intentional killing her mother to voluntary manslaughter; as the affirmative defense of duress was available to defendant as a complete defense, this argument was not available to mitigate the charge of murder to manslaughter. MacKool v. State, 363 Ark. 295, 213 S.W.3d 618 (2005).
Accomplices.
The trial court did not err by refusing to declare witness an accomplice as a matter of law; the evidence was such that it was appropriate for the jury to decide whether his participation was under duress under this section and thus that it was not his purpose to aid in the commission of the crime. Cole v. State, 323 Ark. 8, 913 S.W.2d 255 (1996).
Evidence.
Evidence insufficient to find that the defendant acted under duress. Johnson v. State, 266 Ark. 514, 587 S.W.2d 3 (1979); Roleson v. State, 272 Ark. 346, 614 S.W.2d 656 (1981).
The court in a murder prosecution did not err in refusing to instruct the jury with regard to duress where (1) the defendant did not testify and presented no witnesses, and (2) the only evidence of the defendant's defense was presented through his tape-recorded statement, which, at best, amounted to a claim of self-defense, as opposed to duress. Wright v. State, 335 Ark. 395, 983 S.W.2d 397 (1998).
Standard of Proof.
The coercion of the defendant had to appear from all the facts and circumstances, and could not be presumed merely from his presence. Edwards v. State, 27 Ark. 493 (1872) (decision under prior law).
The standard used to measure a person of ordinary firmness takes into account the actor's “situation.” Factors to be considered in determining that situation are those that differentiate the actor from another, such as size, strength, age or health; matters of temperament are not considered. Marx v. State, 291 Ark. 325, 724 S.W.2d 456 (1987).