Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-402 (2026)

Case Notes

Accomplice/Principal Distinction.

It was defendant's brother who fired the shot that killed the victim, and although defendant claimed the State failed to prove it was his conscious object to assist his brother, the law in Arkansas made no distinction between the criminal liability of a principal and an accomplice; defendant drove around with the stated purpose to assist in hunting down and killing the victim, and thus the evidence supported his convictions of first-degree murder and committing a terroristic act, and the circuit court properly denied his motions for directed verdict. Starling v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 429, 468 S.W.3d 294 (2015).

Accomplices.

Accessory could be tried and punished as a principal. Fanning v. State, 199 Ark. 932, 136 S.W.2d 1040 (1940); Fleeman v. State, 204 Ark. 772, 165 S.W.2d 62 (1942); Warford v. State, 214 Ark. 423, 216 S.W.2d 781 (1949); Lauderdale v. State, 233 Ark. 96, 343 S.W.2d 422 (1961); Ballew v. State, 246 Ark. 1191, 441 S.W.2d 453 (1969); Murrah v. State, 253 Ark. 432, 486 S.W.2d 897 (1972), overruled in part, Waters v. State, 271 Ark. 33, 607 S.W.2d 336 (Ark. 1980) (preceding decisions under prior law).

One who stood by, aided and abetted, could be tried as a principal regardless of what happened in cases against his alleged accomplices. Rush v. State, 239 Ark. 878, 395 S.W.2d 3 (1965) (decision under prior law).

One need not actually take an active part in an offense to be convicted of that charge, and where the defendant accompanied those who actually committed the offense, supplied them with a means of committing the offense, and was aware of the likelihood of some harm occurring, she brought herself within the terms of this section and § 5-4-403, she was properly convicted. Hallman v. State, 264 Ark. 900, 575 S.W.2d 688 (1979).

There is no distinction between the criminal responsibility of an accomplice and the person who actually commits the offense. Redman v. State, 265 Ark. 774, 580 S.W.2d 945 (1979); Swaite v. State, 272 Ark. 128, 612 S.W.2d 307 (1981).

One who aids or assists in the commission of a crime is as guilty as the actual perpetrator of the deed; the distinction between a principal and an accessory has been abolished. Smith v. State, 271 Ark. 671, 609 S.W.2d 922 (1981).

Defendant was an active participant in the transaction, and as an accomplice he was liable for the criminal conduct of the other participants; therefore, he was properly charged and convicted as a principal. Yent v. State, 9 Ark. App. 356, 660 S.W.2d 178 (1983).

A co-conspirator may also be an accomplice. Shrader v. State, 13 Ark. App. 17, 678 S.W.2d 777 (1984).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for capital murder based on accomplice liability where it was shown that defendant was involved in the planning of the murder, that he helped the killer set up his alibi, and that he selected the grave site and helped dig the grave where the victim's body was to be buried. Davis v. State, 350 Ark. 22, 86 S.W.3d 872 (2002).

Defendant had the burden of proving that a witness was an accomplice whose testimony had to be corroborated, since mere presence at the crime scene or failure to inform law enforcement officers of a crime did not make the witness an accomplice as a matter of law. Cook v. State, 350 Ark. 398, 86 S.W.3d 916 (2002).

Person is criminally liable for the conduct of another person when he is the accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense. Wilson v. State, 365 Ark. 664, 232 S.W.3d 455 (2006).

Defendant's conviction for capital murder, in violation of § 5-10-101(a)(4), was proper because there was substantial evidence that defendant was guilty as an accomplice pursuant to §§ 5-2-401, 5-2-403(b)(1), (2), and subdivision (2) of this section, and his argument that there was insufficient evidence of his acting as an accomplice by encouraging, aiding, or assisting the killer in stabbing the victim, was not preserved for review. Lawshea v. State, 2009 Ark. 600, 357 S.W.3d 901 (2009).

Substantial evidence supported defendant's convictions for aggravated robbery, kidnapping, aggravated assault, theft of property, unlawful discharge of a firearm from a vehicle, and fleeing because while the state did not prove that defendant actually entered a bank, it did provide substantial evidence that he was the driver of the getaway car and thus was an accomplice of the two men who committed the aggravated robbery, kidnapping, and theft of property; while defendant did not personally shoot at an officer's vehicle, his conduct of driving the fleeing vehicle while another person in the car fired the shots sufficiently implicated him as an accomplice to unlawfully discharging a firearm from a vehicle. Barber v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 210, 374 S.W.3d 709 (2010).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of theft as an accomplice because defendant asked the complainant to give the back-seat passenger a ride; the back-seat passenger took the complainant's wallet and the $3700 it contained while defendant struggled with the complainant to take her cell phone; it was up to the circuit court to decide whether defendant and the back-seat passenger acted in concert to divert the complainant's attention and steal her money; defendant's account of events differed so significantly from the testimony of other witnesses that the trial court, as the trier of fact, could readily discount her entire testimony; and her attempt to flee from the crime scene was relevant to the issue of guilt. Cosey v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 441, 439 S.W.3d 731 (2014).

While no witness directly identified defendant as being the actual robber, a person was criminally liable for the conduct of another when he was an accomplice; defendant's car was stopped driving away from a robbery, he had two passengers with him, inside the car was the same amount of money that had been stolen, and the clothing in the car matched the description of what the robber wore, and the jury was permitted to weigh the evidence in reaching its guilty verdict. Richardson v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 679, 449 S.W.3d 718 (2014).

In a case where defendant was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery, there was sufficient evidence presented to corroborate the accomplice's testimony because defendant told a detective he was at the store on the date of the robbery; surveillance tapes showed defendant, co-defendant, and the accomplice in the store at the same time as the victim, leaving the store immediately after the victim, and leaving the parking lot right behind the victim; defendant's mother testified that the vehicle police were searching for in connection with the aggravated robberies belonged to defendant; and, at trial, the victim's sister identified defendant as the person who committed the aggravated robberies with co-defendant. Foster v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 63, 510 S.W.3d 782 (2017).

Enhancement of Punishment.

Enhancement of defendant's punishment on the basis of his companion's actions during the commission of an offense was proper, since under a former statute an accomplice was as guilty as his confederate and subject to the same punishment. Gammel v. State, 259 Ark. 96, 531 S.W.2d 474 (1976) (decision under prior law).

Employment Relationship.

Employer's civil liability upheld where an employee killed his employer's neighbor when the neighbor pointed a gun at the employer; the employer was an accomplice to that manslaughter. Costner v. Adams, 82 Ark. App. 148, 121 S.W.3d 164 (2003).

Evidence.

Concerted action to commit an unlawful act may be shown by circumstantial evidence, without direct proof of a conspiracy by prior agreement. King v. State, 271 Ark. 417, 609 S.W.2d 32 (1980).

Evidence sufficient to support defendant's conviction for crime performed by another. Smith v. State, 271 Ark. 671, 609 S.W.2d 922 (1981); Swaite v. State, 272 Ark. 128, 612 S.W.2d 307 (1981); Wallace v. Lockhart, 701 F.2d 719 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 934, 104 S. Ct. 340, 78 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1983); Ashley v. State, 22 Ark. App. 73, 732 S.W.2d 872 (1987); Purifoy v. State, 307 Ark. 482, 822 S.W.2d 374 (1991).

Evidence in the form of testimony of a mother and her daughter and son, both of whom were under the age of 14, that defendant, who was husband and father to the victims, sexually assaulted the daughter by inserting his finger into the daughter's vagina and forcing the daughter to perform oral sex on defendant, forcing the son and daughter to have sexual intercourse, and forcing the son to have intercourse with the mother, along with medical evidence of injuries to the daughter consistent with sexual assault, supported defendant's conviction for rape and three counts of accomplice to rape under the law of parties. Clem v. State, 351 Ark. 112, 90 S.W.3d 428 (2002).

There was sufficient evidence to support a conviction for manufacturing methamphetamine based on accomplice liability where the evidence showed that drug manufacturing was taking place on defendant's property, defendant admitted knowledge of the operation, and a co-defendant also testified regarding defendant's knowledge of the operation. George v. State, 356 Ark. 345, 151 S.W.3d 770 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for attempted capital murder where there was substantial evidence that defendant was not merely engaged in the “act of driving”; the victim, a police officer, testified that the driver attempted to run him over, he observed a flash from the passenger side window, he realized that he had heard a gunshot, and an officer identified defendant as the driver of the vehicle. Clark v. State, 358 Ark. 469, 192 S.W.3d 248 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's aggravated robbery conviction where defendant admitted to being in the vehicle when the crimes occurred, the evidence showed that he was the driver, defendant waited while an accomplice fired shots at the van's driver, and defendant retrieved the bank bag. Jefferson v. State, 359 Ark. 454, 198 S.W.3d 527 (2004).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of first degree murder and theft where, in addition to the testimony of defendant's wife, who was an accomplice, defendant's own statements to the police, his conduct before and after the crime, and statements of the victim's friends regarding her fear of defendant tended to connect him to the crimes; further, although there was no evidence that defendant ever drove victim's Cadillac or had the vehicle in his possession, the jury might have determined that defendant facilitated the theft by leaving the accomplice without a vehicle at the victim's house, and there was evidence that the theft of the Cadillac was part of the plan to murder the victim. MacKool v. State, 365 Ark. 416, 231 S.W.3d 676 (2006).

Defendant's conviction for capital murder was supported by substantial evidence where he served as an accomplice to the murder by directing his brother to “come on down” from the attic because the victim moved, suggesting that his brother needed to finish killing the victim, which he did while defendant watched. Wilson v. State, 365 Ark. 664, 232 S.W.3d 455 (2006).

Defendant's convictions for two counts of aggravated robbery were proper because a neighbor verified that one of the intruders had a gun; the victim told officers that the intruders hid their guns in the closet, where two guns were found; and both intruders were charged in the same instrument, implicating accomplice liability, under subdivision (2) of this section. That provided substantial evidence to support the finding that the intruders at minimum represented by word or conduct that they were armed as a threat in order to commit the theft. Hinton v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 341 (2010).

Defendant's convictions for two counts of aggravated burglary were proper because defendant's argument that there was no direct proof on the record of defendant holding a gun was without merit since substantial circumstantial evidence supported a finding of guilt, either as a principal or an accomplice, as defined in subdivision (2) of this section. A neighbor verified that one of the intruders had a gun, the victim told the officers that the intruders hid their guns in the closet, where two guns were found, and both intruders were charged in the same instrument, implicating accomplice liability; that provided substantial evidence supporting the finding that the intruders at minimum represented by word or conduct that they were armed as a threat. Hinton v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 341 (2010).

Defendant's convictions for breaking or entering, in violation of § 5-39-202(1), and theft of property, in violation of § 5-36-103(a)(1), were supported by the evidence because defendant's unlawful presence near a storage shed, flight from the victim, and association with persons involved in the crimes suggested that defendant jointly participated in the crimes under subdivision (a)(2) of this section. Goforth v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 735 (2010).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict during a trial for first-degree murder as an accomplice, in violation of subsection (2) of this section, because a codefendant testified that defendant hired the codefendant to murder his wife; the state presented the testimony of five witnesses concerning the fear of defendant's wife that he would kill her. Camp v. State, 2011 Ark. 155, 381 S.W.3d 11 (2011).

Substantial evidence supported a juvenile's second-degree battery disposition based on accomplice liability under subsection (2) of this section because a codefendant testified that the juvenile solicited and encouraged the plan to beat her boyfriend, who she suspected of cheating; the juvenile could be found guilty of the conduct of her accomplices who threw the punches. L.C. v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 666, 424 S.W.3d 887 (2012).

There was substantial evidence to support convictions for two aggravated-robbery counts based on accomplice liability where defendant was in a car moving away from the robbery scene, he was found with roughly the same amount of money that was stolen in the robbery, and he used a false name. Moreover, one of the vehicle's passengers was wearing clothing that matched the description of the perpetrator. Davis v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 658, 430 S.W.3d 190 (2013).

Because there was evidence that defendant’s accomplice caused injury to the victim using a deadly weapon, and because the jury was instructed on accomplice liability, there was sufficient evidence presented to support defendant’s second-degree battery conviction as the baseball bat swung by the accomplice, while not specifically designed for the purpose of inflicting death or serious physical injury, could clearly be used in a manner capable of causing death or serious physical injury when it was swung at the victim with the intent to strike her, and did strike her and fracture her hand. Wimbley v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 405, 437 S.W.3d 132 (2014).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motions for a directed verdict based on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to corroborate an accomplice's testimony where defendant admitted that he had been in the car with the individuals who carried out the robberies, a video showed him on a shopping trip to buy hoodies one hour before the armed robberies, and the act of buying the hoodies was a substantial step toward commission of the crimes. Willis v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 199, 546 S.W.3d 550 (2018).

Substantial evidence supported defendant's convictions as an accomplice to first-degree murder and aggravated robbery as defendant was in the proximity of the crime, a video put defendant inside the victim's home shortly before the video tended to establish the victim had been killed, and he had the opportunity to aid in the commission of the crime. Jackson v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 330, 552 S.W.3d 55 (2018).

Innocent Agents.

One is no less guilty of the commission of a crime because he uses the overt conduct of an innocent agent. Parnell v. State, 323 Ark. 34, 912 S.W.2d 422 (1996).

Defendant properly held guilty of rape for forcing his adopted children to engage in sexual relations, even though the two children themselves were not guilty of that crime. Parnell v. State, 323 Ark. 34, 912 S.W.2d 422 (1996).

Instructions.

For cases discussing jury instructions concerning an accessory's liability, see Burnett v. State, 80 Ark. 225, 96 S.W. 1007 (1906); Witherspoon v. State, 179 Ark. 647, 17 S.W.2d 307 (1929); Simmons v. State, 184 Ark. 373, 42 S.W.2d 549 (1931); London v. State, 204 Ark. 767, 164 S.W.2d 988 (1942); Fleeman v. State, 204 Ark. 772, 165 S.W.2d 62 (1942); Fitzhugh v. State, 207 Ark. 117, 179 S.W.2d 173 (1944), superseded by statute as stated in, Fight v. State, 314 Ark. 438, 863 S.W.2d 800 (1993); Roberts v. State, 254 Ark. 39, 491 S.W.2d 390 (1973); Parker v. State, 258 Ark. 880, 529 S.W.2d 860 (1975) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Because the status of the driver of the car and the juvenile who gave directions to the victim's house as accomplices was a mixed question of law and fact, the trial court properly did not instruct the jury that they were accomplices as a matter of law as agreeing to drive defendant and the accomplice to the victim's house with no questions asked did not conclusively show that the driver knew about or participated in the robbery or battery; it was the role of the jury to determine whether the juvenile had to have known that the robbery and battery were about to occur; and no testimony showed beyond dispute that either the driver or the juvenile knew of defendant's plan to rob the victim or that they encouraged him to shoot the victim. West v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 416, 530 S.W.3d 355 (2017).

Venue.

Action against accessory for acts in another county was properly brought in county where theft occurred as the acts of the accessory were the same as the principal. State v. Reeves, 246 Ark. 1187, 442 S.W.2d 229 (1969) (decision under prior law).

Cited: Estate of Sargent v. Benton State Bank, 279 Ark. 402, 652 S.W.2d 10 (1983); Berry v. State, 290 Ark. 223, 718 S.W.2d 447 (1986); Heffernan v. Lockhart, 834 F.2d 1431 (8th Cir. 1987); Wilford v. State, 300 Ark. 185, 777 S.W.2d 855 (1989); Wilson v. State, 301 Ark. 342, 783 S.W.2d 852 (1990); Clements v. State, 303 Ark. 319, 796 S.W.2d 839 (1990); Wofford v. State, 44 Ark. App. 94, 867 S.W.2d 181 (1993); Ramsey v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 836, 378 S.W.3d 797 (2010).