Ark. Code Ann. § 5-26-303 (2026)
Domestic battering in the first degree
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A person commits domestic battering in the first degree if:
- With the purpose of causing serious physical injury to a family or household member, the person causes serious physical injury to a family or household member by means of a deadly weapon;
- With the purpose of seriously and permanently disfiguring a family or household member or of destroying, amputating, or permanently disabling a member or organ of a family or household member's body, the person causes such an injury to a family or household member;
- The person causes serious physical injury to a family or household member under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life;
- The person knowingly causes serious physical injury to a family or household member he or she knows to be sixty (60) years of age or older or twelve (12) years of age or younger;
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The person:
- Commits any act of domestic battering as defined in § 5-26-304 or § 5-26-305; and
- For conduct that occurred within the ten (10) years preceding the commission of the current offense, the person has on two (2) previous occasions been convicted of any act of battery against a family or household member as defined by the laws of this state or by the equivalent laws of any other state or foreign jurisdiction;
- With the purpose of causing physical injury to a family or household member, the person causes physical injury to a family or household member by means of a firearm; or
- The person knowingly causes serious physical injury to a family or household member who is four (4) years of age or younger under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.
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- Domestic battering in the first degree is a Class B felony.
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However, domestic battering in the first degree is a:
- Class Y felony under subdivision (a)(2) or subdivision (a)(7) of this section; or
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Class A felony under subsection (a) of this section if:
- Committed against a woman the person knew or should have known was pregnant; or
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The person committed one (1) or more of the following offenses within five (5) years of the offense of domestic battering in the first degree:
- Domestic battering in the first degree; (b) Domestic battering in the second degree, § 5-26-304; (c) Domestic battering in the third degree, § 5-26-305; or (d) A violation of an equivalent penal law of this state or of another state or foreign jurisdiction.
History. Acts 1979, No. 396, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 41-1653; Acts 1995, No. 1291, § 1; 1999, No. 1317, § 2; 1999, No. 1365, § 1; 2001, No. 1553, § 8; 2003, No. 944, § 1; 2003, No. 1079, § 1; 2005, No. 1994, § 481; 2007, No. 671, § 1; 2009, No. 194, § 1; 2009, No. 748, § 16; 2011, No. 1120, § 7; 2013, No. 417, § 1; 2017, No. 301, § 1; 2019, No. 498, § 2.
A.C.R.C. Notes. This section was formerly codified as § 5-26-301. Former § 5-26-303 has been renumbered as § 5-26-305.
Pursuant to § 1-2-207, this section is set out above as amended by Acts 1999, No. 1365. This section was also amended by Acts 1999, No. 1317, to read as follows:
“(a) A person commits domestic battering in the first degree if:
“(1) With the purpose of causing serious physical injury to a family or household member, he causes serious physical injury to a family or household member by means of a deadly weapon; or
“(2) With the purpose of seriously and permanently disfiguring a family or household member or of destroying, amputating, or permanently disabling a member or organ of a family or household member's body, he causes such an injury to a family or household member;
“(3) He causes serious physical injury to a family or household member under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life; or
“(4) He commits any act of domestic battering, as defined in §§ 5-26-303, 5-26-304, or 5-26-305, and within the past ten years, he has on two previous occasions been convicted of any act of battery, as defined by the laws of this state or by the equivalent laws of any other state or foreign jurisdiction, against a family or household member.
“(b) Domestic battering in the first degree is a Class B felony.”
The amendment to present subdivision (a)(5) of this section by Acts 2009, No. 748, § 16, is partially superseded by Acts 2009, No. 194, § 1, pursuant to Acts 2009, No. 748, § 45.
Amendments. The 2009 amendment by No. 194 inserted (a)(4), redesignated the following subdivision accordingly, and substituted “(a)(1)-(4)” for “(a)(1) – (a)(3)” in present (a)(5)(A).
The 2009 amendment by No. 748 subdivided present (a)(5), and made related and minor stylistic changes.
The 2011 amendment deleted “subdivisions (a)(1)–(4) of this section” following “as defined in” in (a)(5)(A).
The 2013 amendment rewrote the introductory language of (b)(2)(B); and added “A violation of” at the beginning of (b)(2)(B)(iv).
The 2017 amendment added (a)(6).
The 2019 amendment added (a)(7); inserted (b)(2)(A); redesignated part of (b)(2) as (b)(2)(B) and redesignated the remaining subdivisions accordingly; and deleted “upon a conviction” following “Class A felony” in the introductory language of (b)(2)(B).
Research References
U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.
Survey of Legislation, 2003 Arkansas General Assembly, Criminal Law, Domestic Violence, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 363.
Case Notes
Evidence of Prior Convictions.
In a case in which a jury convicted defendant of first-degree domestic battering, the circuit court did not err by admitting evidence of defendant's prior domestic-battering convictions during the guilt phase of the trial. The previous offenses were elements of first-degree domestic battering, not a sentence enhancement, and were properly proved during the guilt phase of the trial. Crayton v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 110, 543 S.W.3d 544 (2018).
Evidence Sufficient.
Evidence was sufficient to show that defendant acted “under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life” and to sustain his conviction for first degree battery because defendant admittedly placed a child in a tub of water so hot that it severed the skin from his feet, and defendant's own statements, although inconsistent, supported the conclusion that he knew that it was his responsibility to properly supervise the child during a bath and to ensure a safe water temperature and that he consciously disregarded the risks involved. Bell v. State, 99 Ark. App. 300, 259 S.W.3d 472 (2007).
When defendant stabbed the victim after she arrived home to her apartment, the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for domestic battery in the first degree in violation of subdivision (a)(1) of this section; the trial court did not err by denying his motion for a directed verdict. The state did prove that he and the victim were involved in a “dating relationship” pursuant to § 5-26-302(1)(A); they had been talking for several months, having sexual relations, and defendant constantly accused the victim of being with other men. Webster v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 579 (2009).
Family or Household Member.
In a first-degree domestic battering case, the circuit court did not err in denying defendant's motions for directed verdict because the evidence at trial showed that defendant was 22 years old when he shot the victim, who had been married to defendant's mother when he was about seven or eight; defendant was between 13 and 15 years old when he stopped living with the victim based on the divorce between the victim and defendant's mother; the victim stated that he continued to treat defendant like a son; defendant and the victim were persons who in the past had resided together; and the statute contained no express time limitation. Williams v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 287 (2017).
Sentencing.
Where defendant was convicted of multiple offenses and sentenced to 240 months for committing a terroristic act under § 5-13-310 and 192 months for domestic battery under subdivision (a)(3) of this section, the enhancement of his sentence on both charges by 144 months pursuant to § 16-90-120 did not result in his sentence being enhanced twice for using a deadly weapon because the use of a firearm was not an element the prosecution had to prove to obtain his convictions. King v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 94 (2012).
Cited: Bates v. Bates, 303 Ark. 89, 793 S.W.2d 788 (1990).