Arkansas Code Annotated

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-27-605 (2026)

Computer exploitation of a child

✓ current as of May 2026
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    1. A person commits computer exploitation of a child in the first degree if the person:
      1. Causes or permits a child to engage in sexually explicit conduct; and
      2. Knows, has reason to know, or intends that the prohibited conduct may be:
        1. Photographed;
        2. Filmed;
        3. Reproduced;
        4. Reconstructed in any manner, including on the Internet; or
        5. Part of an exhibition or performance.
    2. Computer exploitation of a child in the first degree is a:
      1. Class B felony for the first offense; and
      2. Class A felony for a subsequent offense.
    1. A person commits computer exploitation of a child in the second degree if the person:
      1. Photographs or films a child engaged in sexually explicit conduct; or
      2. Uses any device, including a computer, to reproduce or reconstruct the image of a child engaged in sexually explicit conduct.
    2. Computer exploitation of a child in the second degree is a Class C felony.

History. Acts 2001, No. 1496, § 1; 2003, No. 1087, § 4.

Research References

ALR.

Construction and Application of U.S. Sentencing Guideline § 2G1.3(b)(3), Providing Two-Level Enhancement for Use of Computer to Persuade, Induce, Entice, Coerce, or Facilitate the Travel of, Minor to Engage in Prohibited Sexual Conduct. 58 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1.

Case Notes

Double Jeopardy.

With respect to his convictions for computer exploitation of a child under this section, defendant did not explain how his multiple convictions under the statute resulted in a double-jeopardy violation. Defendant presented no specific argument that the Legislature did not intend multiple punishments for the same act. Rea v. State, 2015 Ark. 431, 474 S.W.3d 493 (2015).

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

Because the State presented sufficient evidence to support petitioner's conviction for computer exploitation of a child, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to preserve the sufficiency-of-the-evidence issue for appeal; petitioner testified that he prodded the victim with the broomstick around her thigh area, and it was the duty of the jury to view the video and determine if actual or simulated penetration of the victim's vagina or anus occurred. Sorum v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 354, 582 S.W.3d 18 (2019).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying postconviction relief because trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to move for a directed verdict on the offense of computer exploitation of a child on the correct grounds; the State presented evidence that petitioner had reason to know that a cell phone could have been recording video of his actions against the victim. Sorum v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 354, 582 S.W.3d 18 (2019).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 8 cases, 2008–2020 · leading case: Michael E. Rea v. Wendy Kelley, Dir., Arkansas Dep't of Corr., 2019 Ark. 339 (Ark. 2019).
Michael E. Rea v. Wendy Kelley, Dir., Arkansas Dep't of Corr., 2019 Ark. 339 (Ark. 2019). · cites it 9× “Ark. Code Ann. § 5-27-605 (a)(1). In this argument, and other arguments Rea makes, he alleges factual errors in the sentencing order and the documents filed with it.”
Rea v. State, 2015 Ark. 431 (Ark. 2015). · cites it 8× “-With respect to his convictions under section 5-27-605, 3 Rea has not favored us with any argument explaining how his multiple convictions under the statute result in a double-jeopardy violation.”
Michael E. Rea v. Wendy Kelley, Dir., Arkansas Dep't of Corr., 2020 Ark. 347 (Ark. 2020). · cites it 12× “” Rea claims that because the State alleged that Rea “manufactured photographs,” he was convicted of “manufacturing 3 photographs,” which is a violation of section 5-27-605(b) and not section 5-27-605(a); therefore, the judgment and sentencing order is invalid on its face.”
Rea v. State, 2016 Ark. 368 (Ark. 2010). · cites it 6× “1 petition that his appellate counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to research and develop an argument on appeal—similar to his double-jeopardy argument regarding section 5-27-602—regard-ing the double-jeopardy issue particular to Arkansas Code Annotated section…”
Sorum v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 384 (Ark. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 2× “Ark. Code Ann. § 5-27-605 (a)(l) (Supp. 2015).”
Jeran Kyler Sorum v. State of Arkansas, 2019 Ark. App. 354 (Ark. Ct. App. 2019). · cites it 2× “Ark. Code Ann. § 5-27-605 (a)(1) (Repl. 2013).”
Fountain v. State, 285 S.W.3d 706 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 2× “7-603; (u) Computer exploitation of a child in the first degree, § 5-27-605(a); (v) Permanent detention or restraint when the offender is not the parent of the victim, § 5-11-106; (w) Distributing, possessing, or viewing of matter depicting sexually explicit conduct involving a…”
Allen v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 264 (Ark. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 2× “2013), and three counts of second-degree computer exploitation of a child, in violation of section 5-27-605 (Repl.2013). At a jury trial on those charges held December 9, 2014, Chad Meli, a special |2agent for the Arkansas Attorney General’s Office, testified that he specialized…”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 5-27-605(a) — 4 cases
Michael E. Rea v. Wendy Kelley, Dir., Arkansas Dep't of Corr., 2019 Ark. 339 (Ark. 2019). “Ark. Code Ann. § 5-27-605 (a)(1). In this argument, and other arguments Rea makes, he alleges factual errors in the sentencing order and the documents filed with it.”
Michael E. Rea v. Wendy Kelley, Dir., Arkansas Dep't of Corr., 2020 Ark. 347 (Ark. 2020). “” Rea claims that because the State alleged that Rea “manufactured photographs,” he was convicted of “manufacturing 3 photographs,” which is a violation of section 5-27-605(b) and not section 5-27-605(a); therefore, the judgment and sentencing order is invalid on its face.”
Rea v. State, 2015 Ark. 431 (Ark. 2015). “-With respect to his convictions under section 5-27-605, 3 Rea has not favored us with any argument explaining how his multiple convictions under the statute result in a double-jeopardy violation.”
Fountain v. State, 285 S.W.3d 706 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008). “7-603; (u) Computer exploitation of a child in the first degree, § 5-27-605(a); (v) Permanent detention or restraint when the offender is not the parent of the victim, § 5-11-106; (w) Distributing, possessing, or viewing of matter depicting sexually explicit conduct involving a…”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 5-27-605(a)(l) — 1 case
Rea v. State, 2015 Ark. 431 (Ark. 2015). “-With respect to his convictions under section 5-27-605, 3 Rea has not favored us with any argument explaining how his multiple convictions under the statute result in a double-jeopardy violation.”
— Ark. Code Ann. § 5-27-605(b) — 2 cases
Michael E. Rea v. Wendy Kelley, Dir., Arkansas Dep't of Corr., 2019 Ark. 339 (Ark. 2019). “Ark. Code Ann. § 5-27-605 (a)(1). In this argument, and other arguments Rea makes, he alleges factual errors in the sentencing order and the documents filed with it.”
Michael E. Rea v. Wendy Kelley, Dir., Arkansas Dep't of Corr., 2020 Ark. 347 (Ark. 2020). “” Rea claims that because the State alleged that Rea “manufactured photographs,” he was convicted of “manufacturing 3 photographs,” which is a violation of section 5-27-605(b) and not section 5-27-605(a); therefore, the judgment and sentencing order is invalid on its face.”
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