Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-106 (2020)

Research References

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

DeSimone, Survey of Criminal Law, 3 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 191.

Case Notes

Note. Many of the cases cited below were decided prior to the consolidation of offenses by § 5-36-102.

Constitutionality.

The language of this section is not unconstitutionally vague. Newton v. State, 271 Ark. 427, 609 S.W.2d 328 (1980), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 805, 102 S. Ct. 77, 70 L. Ed. 2d 74 (1981).

Subsection (c) is constitutional. Grooms v. State, 283 Ark. 224, 675 S.W.2d 353 (1984).

Assistance of Counsel.

Defendant's constitutional right to counsel held violated when court refused request for a continuance to obtain counsel. Murdock v. State, 291 Ark. 8, 722 S.W.2d 268 (Ark. 1987).

Construction.

The legislature's 1995 amendment to the theft statute, § 5-36-103, which makes theft a Class C felony if the value of property taken exceeds $500 rather than $200, did not alter the requirements of this section. Coleman v. State, 327 Ark. 381, 938 S.W.2d 845 (1997).

Conviction.

Where defendant received the stolen property only once, not on several occasions, only one conviction for theft by receiving should lie. Watson v. State, 295 Ark. 616, 752 S.W.2d 240 (1988).

Double Jeopardy.

Where, on appeal, case was reversed for new trial there was no double jeopardy and sentence to longer term at second trial than at first trial was not unconstitutional where the nature of the punishment was the same and the degree of the crime was not greater in the second than in the first verdict. Fuller v. State, 246 Ark. 704, 439 S.W.2d 801 (1969), cert. denied, Fuller v. Arkansas, 396 U.S. 930, 90 S. Ct. 260, 24 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1969) (decision under prior law).

The fact that defendant had been acquitted by a federal court of the charge of transporting stolen property across a state line did not prevent his trial in Arkansas on a charge of possessing stolen property although it was the same property involved in the federal action. Journey v. State, 257 Ark. 1007, 521 S.W.2d 210 (1975), cert. denied, Journey v. Arkansas, 423 U.S. 866, 96 S. Ct. 127 (1975) (decision under prior law).

Evidence.

Evidence held sufficient to show that defendant had possession and to show value of the property. Scott v. State, 205 Ark. 158, 167 S.W.2d 883 (1943) (decision under prior law).

Evidence held insufficient to support conviction. Thompson v. State, 207 Ark. 680, 182 S.W.2d 386 (1944) (decision under prior law); Lee v. State, 270 Ark. 892, 609 S.W.2d 3 (1980).

Evidence held sufficient to sustain conviction. Carnal v. State, 234 Ark. 1050, 356 S.W.2d 651 (1962), cert. denied, Carnal v. Arkansas, 371 U.S. 876, 83 S. Ct. 146 (1962); Paschal v. State, 243 Ark. 329, 420 S.W.2d 73 (1967); Evans v. State, 252 Ark. 335, 478 S.W.2d 874 (1972) (preceding decisions under prior law); Handy v. State, 264 Ark. 909, 575 S.W.2d 693 (1979); Parker v. State, 270 Ark. 3, 603 S.W.2d 393 (1980); Arras v. State, 3 Ark. App. 134, 623 S.W.2d 537 (1981); Jones v. State, 276 Ark. 116, 632 S.W.2d 414 (1982); Bradley v. State, 8 Ark. App. 300, 651 S.W.2d 113 (1983); Wilson v. State, 10 Ark. App. 176, 662 S.W.2d 204 (1983); Tubbs v. State, 19 Ark. App. 306, 720 S.W.2d 331 (1986); Austin v. State, 26 Ark. App. 70, 760 S.W.2d 76 (1988); Duncan v. State, 38 Ark. App. 47, 828 S.W.2d 847 (1992).

There is no requirement that stolen property be introduced into evidence before a conviction for possession of it may be obtained. Sims v. State, 266 Ark. 922, 587 S.W.2d 604 (Ct. App. 1979) (decision under prior law).

Testimony by two witnesses that they were given drugs as well as cash by defendant in exchange for stolen property held admissible since the evidence tends to establish the entire criminal transaction, even though it had already been established that a purchase price in excess of minimum required for a felony conviction had been paid. Vernon v. State, 2 Ark. App. 305, 621 S.W.2d 17 (1981).

Evidence that on prior occasions the defendant had purchased property which he knew was stolen held properly admitted since under § 16-41-101, Rule 404(b), evidence of other acts under similar circumstances is admissible as tending to show a system, design or guilty knowledge in the case at hand where there is a question whether the crime was committed with guilty knowledge, and since the court gave cautionary instructions in which the jury was informed of the limited purpose for which the evidence might be considered. Vernon v. State, 2 Ark. App. 305, 621 S.W.2d 17 (1981).

Evidence was sufficient to establish that Cadillac automobile had a value of over $2,500. Coley v. State, 302 Ark. 526, 790 S.W.2d 899 (Ark. 1990).

Defendant's presence in the stolen vehicle, along with the incriminating fact of his flight from the police and his violent attempt to avoid capture, was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have found that the defendant had constructive possession of the car and knew or had reason to know it was stolen. Riddle v. State, 303 Ark. 42, 791 S.W.2d 708 (1990).

Evidence was insufficient to support a finding that defendant had actual or constructive possession of the vehicle. Smith v. State, 34 Ark. App. 150, 806 S.W.2d 391 (1991).

There was substantial evidence from which the trial court, as finder of fact, was able to determine that the defendant was guilty of theft by receiving. Ricks v. State, 316 Ark. 601, 873 S.W.2d 808 (1994).

The defendant's brief presence in a stolen van and his violent outbursts upon being taken into custody could not support a conviction under this section. Avett v. State, 325 Ark. 320, 928 S.W.2d 326 (1996).

A conviction for theft by receiving a stolen white utility van was reversed on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to show that the defendant was in actual possession of the stolen van as utility vans are not unique; therefore, the fact the defendant was seen in a white utility van that was similar to the stolen utility van discovered nearby some hours later, was insufficient to establish that he was seen in the stolen utility van. Lindsey v. State, 68 Ark. App. 70, 3 S.W.3d 346 (1999).

Where police found four-wheelers in defendant's driveway with VIN numbers that were reported stolen, defendant was properly convicted of three counts of theft by receiving. McDonald v. State, 354 Ark. 216, 119 S.W.3d 41 (2003).

There was sufficient evidence to support a conviction for theft by receiving where, although defendant's brother claimed he purchased a trailer in its present condition, no bill of sale was received, defendant failed to produce a registration at trial, defendant had possession of the trailer, and the trailer had marks identified by the owner; however, the state was not entitled to a presumption in subsection (c) because the trailer had not been recently stolen and there was no showing of the value of the trailer at the time it was discovered. Doubleday v. State, 84 Ark. App. 194, 138 S.W.3d 112, 138 S.W.2d 112 (2003).

At the time the offense was committed, this section provided that theft by receiving of a credit card was designated as a Class C felony, but theft by receiving of a debit card was not; thus, where the state failed to show that the card was a credit card, there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction for theft by receiving as a Class C felony and defendant's conviction was reduced to a misdemeanor in accordance with subdivision (e)(3) of this section. Withers v. State, 93 Ark. App. 276, 218 S.W.3d 386 (2005).

Defendant's conviction for theft by receiving was proper as the evidence established that his companion was in the store where the victim worked around the time that her credit card was stolen, defendant presented that credit card at a gas station a short time later, and defendant and his companion tried to purchase over $100 in merchandise. Henson v. State, 94 Ark. App. 163, 227 S.W.3d 450 (2006).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant's conviction for theft by receiving because defendant stated that the seller wanted $275 for several items, including an air compressor, a welder, a crate with several hand tools, and a saw. Defendant also admitted that he knew that the property “either had to be stolen or traded for drugs.” Tryon v. State, 371 Ark. 25, 263 S.W.3d 475 (2007).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of theft by receiving, because the state presented evidence showing that the VIN numbers of the owner's truck and the truck recovered from the scene were the same, the owner testified that the recovered truck was similar to his own truck, defendant's fingerprint was on an item found near the truck and he was in photographs found inside the truck, and defendant was observed driving a truck similar to the stolen truck to his storage unit. Tomboli v. State, 100 Ark. App. 355, 268 S.W.3d 918 (2007).

Evidence was sufficient to show that defendant committed theft by receiving of the car keys, because defendant conceded the keys belonged to the victim, and the unrebutted evidence showed the stolen keys were found in the car that defendant and his accomplices used for the burglary of the victim's residence. Lewis v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 504, 323 S.W.3d 640 (2009).

In a case in which a minor was adjudicated delinquent pursuant to a juvenile court's finding that he committed the criminal offense of misdemeanor theft by receiving, in violation of subsection (a) of this section, the minor unsuccessfully argued that a witness's testimony had to be corroborated. Since the minor had been charged with a misdemeanor, § 16-89-111(e)(1) did not apply. R.W. v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 220 (2010).

Evidence that defendant had the victim's credit card and driver's license and that he attempted to cash a forged check was sufficient to support his convictions for theft by receiving under this section and forgery under § 5-37-201. Suggs v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 571, 377 S.W.3d 461 (2010).

Evidence was sufficient to revoke defendant's suspended imposition of sentence for the underlying crime of theft by receiving where defendant sold a bus for scrap but there was no evidence that indicated how or why defendant came to be in possession of a bus that the owner had reported stolen that same day. Caldwell v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 358 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of theft by receiving under subsection (a) of this section because he was found underneath a stolen truck, with a gas tank sitting nearby; and the victim testified that he witnessed defendant working on the vehicle before the police arrived and that the truck had been stripped with the battery and gas tank removed. Scales v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 712 (2011).

Defendant's conviction for theft by receiving under subdivision (e)(2) of this section was appropriate because his possession of recently stolen property gave rise to the presumption that he knew that the ring was stolen. The jury was not required to believe his explanation that he had found the ring on the ground. Benton v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 71, 388 S.W.3d 488 (2012).

Defendant's conviction for theft by receiving, in violation of subsection (a) of this section, was supported by the evidence because a gas station employee identified defendant as the driver of a vehicle only hours after it was stolen. Turner v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 150, 391 S.W.3d 358 (2012).

Trial court did not err in revoking defendant's suspended sentences in cases where he pled guilty to forgery and theft by receiving, because the state proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he committed a new offense of theft by receiving under subsection (a) of this section. The complainant testified defendant took his car for a test drive and did not return it; the officer dispatched to the vehicle-theft report testified that defendant handed him the key to the car; and defendant's testimony that he took the car to a mechanic to have the transmission repaired made no sense. Wallace v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 571 (2012).

Adjudication of delinquency on charges of theft by receiving was improper because the evidence was insufficient without resorting to prohibited suspicion and conjecture; after excluding an accomplice's testimony, being a passenger in a stolen vehicle was not enough to establish constructive possession. The only evidence corroborating the accomplice testimony was that of his sister, who testified that she knew appellant and the other passengers in the stolen car and that all of them, appellant included, had seen her vehicle before. D.F. v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 656, 476 S.W.3d 189 (2015).

Substantial evidence supported defendant's conviction under this section where the State offered testimony that the truck was hidden in defendant's shed and was missing parts, the license plate was not on it, a piece of plastic concealed the VIN number, and defendant did not know how his friend acquired the vehicle, and thus, defendant knew or had good reason to believe that the truck was stolen. Crozier v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 307, 496 S.W.3d 401 (2016).

There was sufficient evidence to support the jury's decision that defendant committed theft by receiving; the owner identified the firearm as belonging to him, and while the serial-number evidence was off by one number, this discrepancy was an issue to be weighed by the jury. Furthermore, while defendant claimed he had obtained the firearm from his friend as a gift and did not know it was stolen, the jury was not required to believe his testimony. Blair v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 509, 562 S.W.3d 261 (2018).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for theft by receiving given testimony that a stolen firearm was discovered under the passenger-side dashboard of a car in which defendant was riding in the passenger seat and defendant's admission that he purchased the firearm from an acquaintance (no-merit brief). Kelley v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 71, 568 S.W.3d 801 (2019).

Indictment or Information.

Upon an indictment for receiving a stolen hog, a defendant could not be convicted of receiving the pork. Britton v. State, 61 Ark. 15, 31 S.W. 569 (1895) (decision under prior law).

An indictment had to allege that the property was received with the “intent to deprive the true owner thereof.” State v. Bills, 118 Ark. 44, 176 S.W. 114 (1915) (decision under prior law).

Indictment held sufficient. Slinkard v. State, 193 Ark. 765, 103 S.W.2d 50 (1937) (decision under prior law).

Amendment of the information by striking out the charge of “disposal” of stolen goods and thereby eliminating and reducing the charge to the one charge of “possession” of stolen goods held proper. Silas v. State, 232 Ark. 248, 337 S.W.2d 644 (1960), cert. denied, Silas v. Arkansas, 365 U.S. 821, 81 S. Ct. 705 (1961) (decision under prior law).

Upon an information for burglary and grand larceny, one could not be convicted for receiving stolen property. Pickens v. State, 236 Ark. 404, 366 S.W.2d 283 (1963) (decision under prior law).

Instructions.

Failure to instruct the jury that it could find the defendant guilty of misdemeanor possession of stolen property held to be error. Richie v. State, 261 Ark. 7, 545 S.W.2d 638 (1977) (decision under prior law).

Court's use of an instruction taken from the Arkansas Model Criminal Instructions did not result in a comment upon the weight of evidence, where the instruction did not say that there was evidence the defendants were in unexplained possession of recently stolen property but only that evidence of such possession could be considered by the jury. Newton v. State, 271 Ark. 427, 609 S.W.2d 328 (1980), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 805, 102 S. Ct. 77, 70 L. Ed. 2d 74 (1981).

Knowledge and Intent.

A person in possession of stolen property could not be convicted of larceny upon a mere suspicion that he had knowledge that the person from whom he received the property was without authority to dispose of it. Jones v. State, 85 Ark. 360, 108 S.W. 223 (1908) (decision under prior law).

Possession of stolen property in itself was not sufficient to raise a presumption of guilty intent, but when the accused made a distinct claim of title thereto, it was evidence that he intended to convert it to his own use. Douglass v. State, 91 Ark. 492, 121 S.W. 923 (1909); Cravens v. State, 95 Ark. 321, 128 S.W. 1037 (1910) (preceding decisions under prior law).

The mere receipt and possession of stolen goods did not constitute the offense; it was essential that they were received with the knowledge that they had been stolen and with intent to deprive the owner thereof of his property. Williams v. State, 202 Ark. 951, 154 S.W.2d 809 (1941) (decision under prior law).

In order to constitute possession of stolen goods it was necessary that the person possessing the stolen goods knew the property was stolen. Patterson v. State, 253 Ark. 393, 486 S.W.2d 19 (1972) (decision under prior law).

Evidence that numerous items were discovered on the defendants' property tended to show the motive, design, intent and scheme of the defendants to engage in illegal transactions and was admissible in a prosecution for possession of stolen property. Wilkens v. State, 261 Ark. 243, 547 S.W.2d 116 (1977).

Evidence held admissible as tending to show defendant's knowledge that the property in question had been stolen. Reeves v. State, 263 Ark. 227, 564 S.W.2d 503 (1978), cert. denied, Reeves v. Arkansas, 439 U.S. 964, 99 S. Ct. 450, 58 L. Ed. 2d 422 (1978); Reeves v. Mabry, 480 F. Supp. 529 (W.D. Ark. 1979), aff'd, 615 F.2d 489 (8th Cir. 1980).

It is clear that one may be in possession of stolen property or may actively participate in transporting it without being guilty of an offense, as long as there is no knowledge of the theft or good reason to believe the goods were stolen. Utley v. State, 266 Ark. 794, 586 S.W.2d 242 (Ct. App. 1979).

Evidence held sufficient to show that the defendant knew that he was not involved in a regular business transaction and that the defendant knew that the property was stolen. Riley v. State, 267 Ark. 916, 593 S.W.2d 45 (Ct. App. 1979).

Evidence held sufficient to find that the jury had a substantial basis for thinking defendant had many good reasons to believe the property had been stolen. Fioranelli v. State, 270 Ark. 470, 605 S.W.2d 13 (1980).

Evidence of the defendant's and his accomplice's plans to sell stolen property in the future was properly admitted to show a system, design, or guilty knowledge. Walker v. State, 13 Ark. App. 124, 680 S.W.2d 915 (1984).

The unexplained possession or control by a person of recently stolen property, or the acquisition by a person of property for a consideration known to be far below its reasonable value, gives rise to a presumption that he or she knows or believes that the property was stolen. Jones v. State, 20 Ark. App. 1, 722 S.W.2d 871 (1987).

Where a gun in defendant's possession matched the serial number of a revolver that had been reported missing approximately four months before defendant was found with the gun, a jury was entitled to find, as a matter of fact, that the gun had been “recently stolen,” thus giving rise to the statutory presumption that defendant had knowledge of the gun's status as stolen property. Williams v. State, 93 Ark. App. 353, 219 S.W.3d 676 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for theft by receiving because defendant was in possession of the stolen property, riding and selling one four-wheeler to her ex-husband prior to it becoming public knowledge that the four-wheelers were stolen, and defendant made statements in her alleged attempt to help the deprived owners locate their property that she wanted revenge on her husband whom she accused of committing the theft. Eaton v. State, 98 Ark. App. 39, 249 S.W.3d 812 (2007).

Because there was no evidence regarding how a gun that was stolen seven or eight months earlier came to be in defendant's possession, the theft was not recent enough to give rise to a presumption that defendant knew it was stolen; therefore, the evidence was insufficient to convict defendant of violating subsection (a) of this section. Thomas v. Ark., 2011 Ark. App. 637, 386 S.W.3d 536 (2011).

Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for directed verdict where the testimony showed that he was found with a gun that had been stolen three months before his arrest, he concealed it in an armrest in the back of a pickup truck, and attempts had been made to alter the gun's appearance; as a result, the presumption in subdivision (c)(1) of this section applied. Miller v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 478, 561 S.W.3d 345 (2018).

Lesser Included Offense.

The offense of knowingly receiving stolen property was not a lesser offense of either burglary or larceny and therefore an indictment or information charging only the greater offense did not support a conviction of knowingly receiving stolen property. Pickens v. State, 236 Ark. 404, 366 S.W.2d 283 (1963) (decision under prior law).

Possession of stolen property was not necessarily a lesser included offense in burglary or grand larceny, and acquittal on charges of burglary or grand larceny did not necessarily bar defendant's subsequent conviction for possession of the stolen goods. Davis v. State, 256 Ark. 538, 509 S.W.2d 547 (1974) (decision under prior law).

Ownership.

Where there was no competent evidence establishing the ownership of the property, it being a material element in the definition of crime of possession of stolen property, the conviction of stolen property was not proper. King v. State, 250 Ark. 523, 465 S.W.2d 712 (1971) (decision under prior law).

Evidence held sufficient to support a felony conviction where prior ownership of the alleged stolen guns was sufficiently established. Kennedy v. State, 49 Ark. App. 20, 894 S.W.2d 952 (1995).

Possession.

Possession of property recently stolen, unexplained, was evidence of guilt to go to a jury for their consideration, but was not such evidence as to compel the jury to convict, unless it was not rebutted. Boykin v. State, 34 Ark. 443 (1879); Shepherd v. State, 44 Ark. 39 (1884); Reed v. State, 54 Ark. 621, 16 S.W. 819 (1891); Blankenship v. State, 55 Ark. 244, 18 S.W. 54 (1891); Gunter v. State, 79 Ark. 432, 96 S.W. 181 (1906); Threadgill v. State, 207 Ark. 478, 181 S.W.2d 236 (1944) (preceding decisions under prior law).

The possession by a party of stolen goods was a fact from which his complicity in the larceny could be inferred, but this fact standing alone was not sufficient to sustain a conviction; it had to appear that the property was recently stolen, the possession had to be unexplained, and in some form involve an assertion of property in the possessor. Shepherd v. State, 44 Ark. 39 (1884) (decision under prior law).

The acceptability of the accused's explanation of the possession of stolen property was a matter for the jury to decide. Jackson v. State, 101 Ark. 473, 142 S.W. 1153 (1912) (decision under prior law).

Where possession of the stolen property was traced to defendant a short time after her disappearance, instruction that such possession, if unexplained, should be considered as a circumstance in determining guilt, was proper. Stard v. State, 204 Ark. 247, 161 S.W.2d 756 (1942) (decision under prior law).

The possession of recently stolen property, if not satisfactorily explained to the jury, is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Holcomb v. State, 217 Ark. 407, 230 S.W.2d 487 (1950); Fields v. State, 219 Ark. 373, 242 S.W.2d 639 (1951) (preceding decisions under prior law); Patterson v. State, 253 Ark. 393, 486 S.W.2d 19 (1972); Riley v. State, 267 Ark. 916, 593 S.W.2d 45 (Ct. App. 1979); Wilson v. State, 10 Ark. App. 176, 662 S.W.2d 204 (1983).

Where the missing property was found in defendant's possession and no satisfactory explanation, consistent with innocence, was given by him, the evidence against the defendant amounted to more than a suspicion of guilt. Hammond v. State, 232 Ark. 692, 340 S.W.2d 280 (1960) (decision under prior law).

Unexplained possession or control is not eliminated simply whenever the possessor gives a plausible explanation for his possession. Core v. State, 265 Ark. 409, 578 S.W.2d 581 (1979).

Constructive possession occurs when the accused maintains control or the right to control property and when stolen property is found at a location which is under the joint control of the accused and other persons, it is sufficient to prove possession if there are additional factors which would link the accused to the possession. Parker v. State, 270 Ark. 3, 603 S.W.2d 393 (1980).

It is not necessary that the state prove the accused had actual possession of stolen property; it is enough to prove he had constructive possession or the right to control. Jones v. State, 276 Ark. 116, 632 S.W.2d 414 (1982).

Possession of recently stolen property is prima facie evidence of the guilt of the party in whose possession the property is found in cases of burglary, larceny and possession of stolen property, unless satisfactorily accounted for by the evidence. Ward v. State, 280 Ark. 353, 658 S.W.2d 379 (1983).

An accused's unexplained possession or control of recently stolen property is prima facie evidence of his guilt of theft by receiving. Hall v. State, 299 Ark. 209, 772 S.W.2d 317 (1989).

Being a passenger in a stolen vehicle is not, standing alone, enough to establish constructive possession of the vehicle. Avett v. State, 325 Ark. 320, 928 S.W.2d 326 (1996).

Defendant's recurring possession of jewelry later discovered to be stolen held sufficient to sustain conviction. Jenkins v. State, 60 Ark. App. 1, 959 S.W.2d 57 (1997).

Because defendant was unable to explain defendant's possession of property that had been stolen from a neighbor's home the previous day, defendant was properly convicted of violating subsection (a) of this section; consequently, defendant's prior suspensions were properly revoked. Johnson v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 718 (2011).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions of felony theft by receiving, possession of methamphetamine, and possession of drug paraphernalia, as defendant was in constructive possession of the contraband found at the residence; although another individual also was in the residence at the time of the search, defendant had listed the residence as his address, the contraband was found in plain view in common areas in and around the house, and the fact that defendant was in a bedroom hiding under a bed when the search commenced did not negate the additional factors linking him to the contraband. Mudd v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 628, 565 S.W.3d 154 (2018).

Restoration of Property.

Keeping stolen property in sight for purpose of returning to owner if he should demand same was not a defense, but only a point to stress before the jury. Fields v. State, 219 Ark. 373, 242 S.W.2d 639 (1951) (decision under prior law).

The defense of receiving property with the purpose of restoring it to the owner is not applicable when property is returned when the defendant was confronted; the purpose must exist at the time of the purchase and it cannot be based upon a general policy of the buyer to relinquish property purchased by him to a claimant who can identify it as his to the satisfaction of the buyer. Core v. State, 265 Ark. 409, 578 S.W.2d 581 (1979).

Retention.

Retaining stolen property is clearly a continuing offense. State v. Reeves, 264 Ark. 622, 574 S.W.2d 647 (1978), cert. denied, Reeves v. Arkansas, 441 U.S. 964, 99 S. Ct. 2412 (1979).

Sentence.

Although defendant's Class C felony conviction for theft by receiving in excess of $500.00 could not stand, defendant did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence showing that he was generally guilty of theft by receiving and, as the value of the stolen generator was at most $499.99, defendant still stood convicted of a Class A misdemeanor; accordingly, his conviction was modified to reflect the maximum sentence for a Class A misdemeanor of one year, with credit for any time defendant had already served. Russell v. State, 367 Ark. 557, 242 S.W.3d 265 (2006).

In a case in which a minor was adjudicated delinquent pursuant to the juvenile court's finding that he committed the criminal offense of misdemeanor theft by receiving, in violation of subsection (a) of this section, the trial court did not err by revoking the minor's probation from a previous adjudication. He was required to obey all state, federal, and municipal laws as a condition of his probation, and substantial evidence supported the trial court's decision to adjudicate him delinquent. R.W. v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 220 (2010).

Separate Offenses.

Since burglary is a separate offense from theft by receiving, a defendant who had been convicted of burglary was not twice placed in jeopardy by being convicted of theft by receiving property stolen at the time of the burglary. King v. State, 262 Ark. 342, 557 S.W.2d 386 (1977), overruled in part, State v. Brown, 356 Ark. 460, 156 S.W.3d 722 (2004).

Theft and aggravated robbery are separate offenses for which a defendant may be convicted even though they arise out of one incident. Rolark v. State, 299 Ark. 299, 772 S.W.2d 588 (1989).

The legislature did not intend to create a statute that would merge an instance of theft-by-receiving under this section that is committed in one jurisdiction with an instance of theft-of-property under § 5-36-103 committed in a second jurisdiction; clearly, the two crimes are separate and distinct, and an interpretation of § 5-36-102 that the two offenses merge is particularly untenable when applied to factual circumstances wherein the theft crimes are not committed in the same criminal episode. Nelson v. State, 350 Ark. 311, 86 S.W.3d 909 (2002).

Value.

Evidence of the value of the car was necessary to sustain a felony conviction of the possession of a stolen automobile, there being no presumption that the value of such a car was a matter of common knowledge, within the experience of any person, from which the jury could infer that it was worth more than thirty-five dollars. Rogers v. State, 248 Ark. 696, 453 S.W.2d 393 (1970), superseded by statute as stated in, Walker v. State, 318 Ark. 107, 883 S.W.2d 831 (1994) (decision under prior law).

Value as used in this section means the market value of the property at the time and place of the offense, but if the market value cannot be ascertained, value is the cost of replacing the property within a reasonable time. Cannon v. State, 265 Ark. 270, 578 S.W.2d 20 (1979).

The cost of the owner a number of years prior to the offense cannot be substantial evidence that the property had a market value of more than the minimum value for a felony conviction. Cannon v. State, 265 Ark. 270, 578 S.W.2d 20 (1979).

Evidence held insufficient to prove that the property was worth more than minimum value for a felony conviction. Riley v. State, 267 Ark. 916, 593 S.W.2d 45 (Ct. App. 1979).

The purchase price paid by the owner is admissible as a factor for the jury to consider in determining market value, when it is not too remote in time and bears a reasonable relation to present value. Tillman v. State, 271 Ark. 552, 609 S.W.2d 340 (1980); Jones v. State, 276 Ark. 116, 632 S.W.2d 414 (1982).

Evidence of a market value exceeding minimum value for a felony conviction held sufficient. Tillman v. State, 271 Ark. 552, 609 S.W.2d 340 (1980); Jones v. State, 276 Ark. 116, 632 S.W.2d 414 (1982).

Court property allowed the owner of the goods that were stolen to testify as to the price he paid for them a number of years prior to the theft, since the purchase price was not too remote and it bore a reasonable relation to the present value of the goods. Jones v. State, 6 Ark. App. 7, 636 S.W.2d 880 (1982).

Where a gold and silver dealer testified that the stolen gold rings which defendant attempted to sell him were worth far more than minimum value for a felony conviction, his testimony was properly admitted as a positive statement of value by one qualified as an expert, and the fact that he had not accurately weighed the rings nor refreshed his memory as to the market value of gold on the date of the crime affected only the weight to be given his testimony and not its admissibility. Jones v. State, 6 Ark. App. 7, 636 S.W.2d 880 (1982).

Under subdivision (e)(2)(c) of this section, the State is not required to establish the value of the weapon in order to obtain a conviction. Gregory v. State, 9 Ark. App. 242, 657 S.W.2d 570 (1983).

Because the sales tax should not have been included in computing the value of the generator, and the state failed to prove that the warranty was stolen along with the generator, defendant's Class C felony conviction could not stand; however, defendant did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence showing that he was generally guilty of theft by receiving and, as the value of the generator was at most $499.99, defendant still stood convicted of a Class A misdemeanor. Russell v. State, 367 Ark. 557, 242 S.W.3d 265 (2006).

Defendant's conviction for theft by receiving, in violation of subdivision (e)(3) of this section, was proper because the State proved that the stolen trailer's value was in excess of $ 1,000; the owner of a trailer dealership testified that the owner sold the trailer at issue to the victim for $ 1,475 and even with the damage to the trailer, it would still be worth over $ 1,000. Johnson v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 615 (2012).

Defendant argued that the State was required to put on affirmative proof of the value of the allegedly stolen property, but theft by receiving of a firearm is at least a Class D felony regardless of the weapon's value, and the State is not required to establish the value of the firearm in order to obtain a conviction. Blair v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 509, 562 S.W.3d 261 (2018).

Circuit court did not err in finding that the State had met its burden of proving the vehicle had a fair market value of more than $1,000 when defendant stole it; the owner testified that she had paid $3,900 for the vehicle approximately one year before it was stolen and that she would have been willing to sell it at the time of the theft for $3,000, and her testimony in conjunction with an officer's testimony describing the high-speed chase and a video, which captured the attempted traffic stop and the ensuing pursuit, allowed the circuit court to observe the stolen vehicle and make a determination that it met the minimum statutory value. Beene v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 493, 588 S.W.3d 748 (2019).

Venue.

The crime of receiving stolen property was committed where the property was received, though it was stolen in another state, and it was immaterial whether the property was taken in a state which made the taking larceny. Thompson v. State, 207 Ark. 680, 182 S.W.2d 386 (1944) (decision under prior law).

Cited: Wilkens v. State, 261 Ark. 243, 547 S.W.2d 116 (1977); Brewer v. State, 261 Ark. 732, 551 S.W.2d 218 (1977); Wilson v. State, 261 Ark. 820, 552 S.W.2d 223 (1977); Lipovich v. State, 265 Ark. 55, 576 S.W.2d 720 (1979); Patrick v. State, 265 Ark. 334, 576 S.W.2d 191 (1979); Bateman v. State, 265 Ark. 307, 578 S.W.2d 216 (1979); Reeves v. Mabry, 615 F.2d 489 (8th Cir. 1980); Tolley v. State, 1 Ark. App. 1, 611 S.W.2d 798 (1981); Clinkscale v. State, 13 Ark. App. 149, 680 S.W.2d 728 (1984); Howard v. State, 289 Ark. 587, 715 S.W.2d 440 (1986); Fallon v. State, 24 Ark. App. 119, 749 S.W.2d 686 (1988); Adams v. State, 25 Ark. App. 212, 755 S.W.2d 579 (1988); Williams v. State, 26 Ark. App. 62, 760 S.W.2d 71 (1988); Campbell v. State, 300 Ark. 606, 780 S.W.2d 567 (1989); Johnson v. State, 313 Ark. 308, 854 S.W.2d 336 (1993); Dunham v. State, 315 Ark. 580, 868 S.W.2d 496 (1994); Misenheimer v. State, 100 Ark. App. 189, 265 S.W.3d 764 (2007).