Ark. Code Ann. § 5-39-203 (2026)

Research References

Ark. L. Notes.

Brill, Arkansas Law of Damages, Fifth Edition, Chapter 30: Real Property, 2004 Arkansas L. Notes 9.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey, Miscellaneous — Property, 13 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 386.

Case Notes

Applicability.

This section does not apply to a case where a renter, who was served with a valid notice to quit based upon failure to pay rent, refused to vacate the premises, in view of the more specific statutes regulating a tenant's unlawful detainer. Williams v. City of Pine Bluff, 284 Ark. 551, 683 S.W.2d 923 (1985).

Evidence.

Evidence of burglary held insufficient; however, the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that defendant was guilty of the lesser included offense of attempted criminal trespass. Tiller v. State, 42 Ark. App. 64, 854 S.W.2d 730 (1993).

Implied Repeal.

Section 4-70-101, governing trespass by persons refusing to leave a public place of business, was not impliedly repealed by this section. Culhane v. State, 282 Ark. 286, 668 S.W.2d 24 (1984).

Instructions.

It was not prejudicial error by the court to refuse to give the proffered instruction on criminal trespass in view of appellant's admission on the stand and in his statement that he intended to go to the courthouse to steal the money before he actually got there. LeFlore v. State, 17 Ark. App. 117, 704 S.W.2d 641 (1986).

Where the court in burglary trial instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass, but refused to give the clearly inapplicable definition of “occupiable structure”, there was no error in refusing an instruction which may have misled or confused the jury. Townsend v. State, 308 Ark. 266, 824 S.W.2d 821 (1992).

Intent.

Criminal trespass is complete upon the making of an unlawful entry; no intent to engage in further unlawful conduct is necessary. Brown v. State, 12 Ark. App. 132, 671 S.W.2d 228 (1984).

Jurisdiction.

Justice of the peace courts had jurisdiction of the offense of unlawful possession of lands, and the contention that the prosecution involved questions relating to the title and right to the possession of the land, was unavailable where such questions had been concluded by former adjudications. Simpson v. State, 193 Ark. 623, 101 S.W.2d 795 (1937) (decision under prior law).

Jury Question.

The question whether the defendant took possession of a house on behalf of his son against whom a judgment in unlawful detainer had been rendered for the purpose of obstructing process against the son, or had taken possession in his own right as tenant of the owner with the owner's acquiescence subsequent to the rendition of such judgment, was held for the jury. State v. Townsend, 161 Ark. 56, 255 S.W. 312 (1923) (decision under prior law).

Lesser Included Offenses.

Where there was no basis for acquitting defendant of burglary, the trial court was correct in refusing to instruct on the lesser included offenses of breaking and entering or criminal trespass. Grays v. State, 264 Ark. 564, 572 S.W.2d 847 (1978).

Criminal trespass meets all of the requirements of being a lesser included offense of burglary. Bongfeldt v. State, 6 Ark. App. 102, 639 S.W.2d 70 (1982).

Refusal to give the instruction requested by the defendant on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass held error. Bongfeldt v. State, 6 Ark. App. 102, 639 S.W.2d 70 (1982).

Probable Cause.

Deputy was entitled to qualified immunity with respect to a Fourth Amendment false arrest claim because the deputy had arguable probable cause to make an arrest for criminal trespass given that the deputy had warned the arrestee not to contact an alleged victim, the alleged victim complained that the arrestee kept taunting him, the deputy observed the arrestee driving a four-wheeler away from the alleged victim's residence, and the arrestee admitted that he had contact with the alleged victim and had been over there. Chevallier v. Hand, 722 F.3d 1101 (8th Cir. 2013).

Revocation.

When defendant was placed on two years' probation on his plea of guilty to possession of cocaine, one of the conditions was that he not violate any state law; the state petitioned to revoke his suspended imposition of sentence, alleging that he violated his conditions by committing burglary and failed to satisfy court costs. Defendant's plea of guilty to criminal trespass in violation of subdivision (a)(2) of this section alone was sufficient to support the finding that he violated his probation. Johnson v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 527, 334 S.W.3d 419 (2009).

Sentence.

Defendant's sentence for criminal trespass was not executed by the lapse of time on the sentence where the defendant was released under a void order prior to the completion of the sentence. Davis v. State, 291 Ark. 191, 723 S.W.2d 366 (1987).

Cited: Wilson v. City of Pine Bluff, 6 Ark. App. 286, 641 S.W.2d 33 (1982); Moore v. Lockhart, 740 F.2d 14 (8th Cir. 1984); Polk v. State, 28 Ark. App. 282, 772 S.W.2d 368 (1989); Bates v. Bates, 303 Ark. 89, 793 S.W.2d 788 (1990); Yocum v. State, 325 Ark. 180, 925 S.W.2d 385 (1996).