Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-105 (2026)

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

The Impact of the 1976 Criminal Code on the Law of Accessorial Liability in Arkansas, 31 Ark. L. Rev. 100.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

The mere existence of overlapping provisions in this section and § 5-53-111 does not render either statute constitutionally infirm; there appears to be no impermissible uncertainty in the definitions of the respective offenses. Puckett v. State, 328 Ark. 355, 944 S.W.2d 111 (1997).

Applicability.

The plain language of subdivision (a)(4) precludes a construction that limits its applicability to a person's acts of hindering that transpire before a criminal suspect has been identified and arrested. Puckett v. State, 328 Ark. 355, 944 S.W.2d 111 (1997).

Accessory After the Fact.

An instruction that an accessory after the fact is a person who, after a full knowledge that a crime has been committed, conceals it from the magistrate or harbors or protects the person charged with the crime; in other words, a person who harbors, receives, relieves, comforts or assists the felon was not erroneous. Higgins v. State, 136 Ark. 284, 206 S.W. 440 (1918) (decision under prior law).

One who was formerly an accessory after the fact is now guilty of a separate crime, i.e., hindering apprehension and prosecution. Tyler v. State, 265 Ark. 822, 581 S.W.2d 328 (1979).

Accomplice.

An accessory before the fact is now referred to as an accomplice, defined in § 5-2-403, and one who was formerly an accessory after the fact is now guilty of a separate crime under this section. Fight v. State, 314 Ark. 438, 863 S.W.2d 800 (1993).

Affirmative Act.

To constitute the crime of accessory after the fact there must have been some affirmative act, as mere passive failure to disclose commission of a crime did not make one an accessory after the fact. Fields v. State, 213 Ark. 899, 214 S.W.2d 230 (1948) (decision under prior law).

Evidence held to show that there was an affirmative attempt upon the part of the defendant to prevent disclosure of details of a crime and justified conviction of defendant as accessory after the fact. Fields v. State, 213 Ark. 899, 214 S.W.2d 230 (1948) (decision under prior law).

Evidence.

Evidence held insufficient to support conviction. Flippo v. State, 258 Ark. 233, 523 S.W.2d 390 (1975) (decision under prior law).

Under subsection (a), providing for six different ways in which the offense can be committed with only one involving dishonesty or false statement, evidence of a misdemeanor conviction for that offense was not admissible for impeachment purposes until it was shown that the conviction was based upon an act of dishonesty or false statement. West v. State, 27 Ark. App. 49, 766 S.W.2d 22 (1989).

Evidence was more than sufficient from which a jury could infer that the defendant destroyed fingerprints on the weapon, hid the gun from authorities, and did not tell the authorities of the gun's whereabouts until confronted by the investigating officers. Puckett v. State, 328 Ark. 355, 944 S.W.2d 111 (1997).

Defendant's conviction for hindering the apprehension or prosecution of her child's abuser, in violation of subdivisions (a)(6) or (7) of this section, was supported by the evidence because defendant consistently told medical personnel and the police that her 23-month-old child's life-threatening brain injury was caused by falling from a top bunk bed. Sullivan v. State, 2012 Ark. 74, 386 S.W.3d 507 (2012).

Harboring or Concealment.

One who, with full knowledge that a crime had been committed, harbored and protected the felon, was guilty as accessory after the fact. State v. Jones, 91 Ark. 5, 120 S.W. 154 (1909); Froman v. State, 232 Ark. 697, 339 S.W.2d 601 (1960) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Knowledge and Intent.

One who, knowing of a crime, concealed it from the magistrate from anxiety for his own safety and not to shield the criminal, was not an accomplice. Melton v. State, 43 Ark. 367 (1884); Carroll v. State, 45 Ark. 539 (1885). See also Edmonson v. State, 51 Ark. 115, 10 S.W. 21 (1888); Green v. State, 51 Ark. 189, 10 S.W. 266 (1889); McFalls v. State, 66 Ark. 16, 48 S.W. 492 (1898) (preceding decisions under prior law).

The mere fact that one remained silent after learning of the commission, without intending to shield the criminal, did not make him an accessory. Butt v. State, 81 Ark. 173, 98 S.W. 723 (1906); Davis v. State, 96 Ark. 7, 130 S.W. 547 (1910); Simms v. State, 105 Ark. 16, 150 S.W. 113 (1912); Burrow v. State, 109 Ark. 365, 159 S.W. 1123 (1913) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Although former law required that the hinderer have full knowledge of the crime committed, this section speaks in terms of the actor's purpose rather than the certainty of his knowledge respecting the consummated crime, and requires only that the hinderer purposely aid one sought for an offense. Workman v. State, 267 Ark. 103, 589 S.W.2d 20 (1979).

Evidence held sufficient to support finding that defendant had reason to believe that the accused had committed an offense and that she purposely hindered his prosecution. Workman v. State, 267 Ark. 103, 589 S.W.2d 20 (1979).

Evidence that defendant, the husband of a murder victim, met with his stepdaughter, the murderer, after the murder; he denied knowledge of her whereabouts; he admitted giving her money and a car to go to Mississippi; and he had a sexual relationship with her; was sufficient to convict him of hindering her apprehension under this section. Devor v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 82, 389 S.W.3d 22 (2012).

Reasonable Cause to Arrest.

The district court was not clearly erroneous in concluding that the parolee's attempt to conceal herself in the defendant's room, with his knowledge, coupled with the defendant's assertion of ignorance regarding the parolee's whereabouts, constituted reasonable belief by the officers that the defendant was attempting to hinder the apprehension of the parolee in violation of this section; therefore, the officers had reasonable cause to arrest the defendant. Washington v. Simpson, 806 F.2d 192 (8th Cir. 1986).

Cited: Rowdean v. State, 280 Ark. 146, 655 S.W.2d 413 (1983).