A.C.R.C. Notes.
This chapter was formerly entitled “Medicaid Fraud.”
Case Notes
Cited:
United States v. Brown, 763 F.2d 984 (8th Cir. 1985).
Subchapter 1
— Medicaid Fraud Act
A.C.R.C. Notes.
Due to the addition of Subchapter 3 by Acts 1995, No. 862, and the transfer of former § 5-56-101 et seq. to be Subchapter 2, the preexisting provisions of this chapter have been designated as Subchapter 1.
Preambles.
Acts 1979, No. 823, contained a preamble which read:
“Whereas, the Attorney General and the Prosecuting Attorneys need specific legislation by which to eliminate fraud in the Arkansas Medicaid Program; and
“Whereas, the Commissioner of Arkansas Social Services, the Attorney General and the Prosecuting Attorneys need access to all Medicaid-related records of all recipients of benefits and/or claimants for payments under the Arkansas Medicaid Program;
“Now, therefore …”
Effective Dates.
Acts 1979, No. 823, § 13: Apr. 10, 1979. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the Attorney General and the Prosecuting Attorneys are in need of specific legislation by which to eliminate fraud in the Arkansas Medicaid Program and that immediate passage of this Act is necessary to protect the integrity of the program. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act, being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”
Acts 1993, No. 1291, § 13: Apr. 22, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the Attorney General and the Prosecuting Attorneys are in need of specific legislation by which to eliminate fraud in the Arkansas Medicaid Program and that immediate passage of this Act is necessary to protect the integrity of the program. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this Act, being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”
Acts 1993, No. 1300, § 5: Apr. 23, 1993. Emergency clause provided: “It is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly that the Attorney General and the prosecuting attorneys are in need of specific legislation by which to eliminate fraud in the Arkansas Medicaid Program and that immediate passage of this act is necessary to protect the integrity of the program. Therefore, an emergency is hereby declared to exist and this act being necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.”
Acts 2003, No. 1122, § 2: Apr. 7, 2003. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the Medicaid Fraud Act is in immediate need of the revision to clarify an ambiguity in the law; and that the provisions of this act are essential to successful operations and activities of the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit and the Department of Human Services. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”
Acts 2011, No. 1154, § 3: Apr. 4, 2011. Emergency clause provided: “It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that the statutes authorizing procedures for the recovery of false or fraudulent Medicaid claims are in immediate need of this revision to encourage citizens of the state to help recover public funds and Medicaid moneys that have been wrongfully misappropriated and will otherwise be lost forever; and that the provisions of this act are essential to successful operations and activities of the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit of the Attorney General’s office and the Department of Human Services. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on: (1) The date of its approval by the Governor; (2) If the bill is neither approved nor vetoed by the Governor, the expiration of the period of time during which the Governor may veto the bill; or (3) If the bill is vetoed by the Governor and the veto is overridden, the date the last house overrides the veto.”
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 52
cases (23 in the last 5 years), 1989–2026 · leading case: Sherman v. State, 931 S.W.2d 417 (Ark. 1996).
Sherman v. State, 931 S.W.2d 417 (Ark. 1996). · cites it 8דTherefore, we conclude that first-degree battery and aggravated assault are not lesser-included offenses of reckless driving and that they are not considered the same offenses for double jeopardy purposes.”
Stutte v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 139 (Ark. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 10דArk. Code Ann. § 5-54-125 (a) (Supp. 2011).”
Hall v. State, 772 S.W.2d 317 (Ark. 1989). · cites it 10דThe information charged the appellant with fleeing, on foot, pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 5-54-125 (1987). Certainly "on foot" and "in an automobile" are two different modes of travel.”
Fondren v. State, 221 S.W.3d 333 (Ark. 2006). · cites it 34דArk. Code Ann. § 5-54-125 . When appellant first stole the candy, he committed a misdemeanor.”
Shaw v. State, 773 S.W.2d 827 (Ark. 1989). · cites it 4דTherefore, he argues, as the offense was not complete until the injury in Carroll County, the trial for that offense must be held in that county and Boone County was without jurisdiction.”
United States v. Roseboro, 551 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2009). · cites it 2ד"); Ark.Code Ann. § 5-54-125(a) ("If a person knows that his or her immediate arrest or detention is being attempted by a duly authorized law enforcement officer, it is the lawful duty of the person to refrain from fleeing, either on foot or by means of any vehicle or conveyance.”
Brown v. State, 47 S.W.3d 314 (Ark. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 4דHere, the legislative intent is not clear. What little legislative intent we can glean supports a holding that the legislature intended only to prescribe additional punishment for the conduct leading to the charges in this case, rather than to proscribe separate, cumulative…”
Jefferson v. State, 276 S.W.3d 214 (Ark. 2008). · cites it 2דJefferson was charged and convicted of Class D felony fleeing pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-125 (a) and (d)(2) (Repl.”
Garner v. State, 131 S.W.3d 734 (Ark. 2003). · cites it 2ד” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-125 (Repl. 1997). According to the evidence presented at trial, Deputy Ring saw a motorcycle run a stop sign and attempted to make a traffic stop.”
Robinson v. State, 283 S.W.3d 558 (Ark. 2008). · cites it 4ד2006), and vehicular fleeing, a Class A felony and a violation of Ark.Code Ann. § 5-54-125 (Repl.2005). For these convictions, Robinson was sentenced by a Randolph County jury to life *559 imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction.”
Jeremy Boudoin v. Terral Harsson, 962 F.3d 1034 (8th Cir. 2020). “Although Boudoin was charged with misdemeanor fleeing, see Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-125 (a), fleeing by means of a vehicle is a Class D felony if the person attempts to flee in a manner “manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life,” id.”
Flemons v. State, 2016 Ark. 460 (Ark. 2016). · cites it 2דThese facts are sufficient to establish that Flem-ons knew that his immediate arrest or detention was being attempted by a duly authorized law-enforcement officer, and a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on the basis raised in the motion for directed verdict would…”
United States v. Roseboro, 551 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2009). “"); Ark.Code Ann. § 5-54-125(a) ("If a person knows that his or her immediate arrest or detention is being attempted by a duly authorized law enforcement officer, it is the lawful duty of the person to refrain from fleeing, either on foot or by means of any vehicle or conveyance.”
Stutte v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 139 (Ark. Ct. App. 2014). “Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-125 (a) (Supp. 2011).”
Hall v. State, 772 S.W.2d 317 (Ark. 1989). “The information charged the appellant with fleeing, on foot, pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 5-54-125 (1987). Certainly "on foot" and "in an automobile" are two different modes of travel.”
Sherman v. State, 931 S.W.2d 417 (Ark. 1996). “Therefore, we conclude that first-degree battery and aggravated assault are not lesser-included offenses of reckless driving and that they are not considered the same offenses for double jeopardy purposes.”
Brown v. State, 47 S.W.3d 314 (Ark. Ct. App. 2001). “Here, the legislative intent is not clear. What little legislative intent we can glean supports a holding that the legislature intended only to prescribe additional punishment for the conduct leading to the charges in this case, rather than to proscribe separate, cumulative…”
Stutte v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 139 (Ark. Ct. App. 2014). “Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-125 (a) (Supp. 2011).”
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