Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-207 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

Validity, Construction, and Application of State Statutes and Municipal Ordinances Proscribing Failure or Refusal to Obey Police Officer's Order to Move On, or Disperse, on Street, as Disorderly Conduct. 52 A.L.R.6th 125.

Ark. L. Rev.

Egan, “Fighting Words” Doctrine: Are Police Officers Held to a Higher Standard, or per Bailey v. State, Do We Expect No More from our Law Enforcement Officers than We Do from the Average Arkansan, 52 Ark. L. Rev. 591.

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Criminal Law, 1 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 153.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Former section concerning use of abusive language as breach of the peace was narrowed to “fighting words” addressed to or about a person in his presence which were calculated to arouse anger in such person, and such words were not protected by the constitutional guarantee of free speech. Hammond v. State, 255 Ark. 56, 498 S.W.2d 652 (1973) (decision under prior law).

This section is not unconstitutionally overbroad. Bailey v. State, 334 Ark. 43, 972 S.W.2d 239 (1998).

Disorderly conduct statute was not impermissibly vague because it contained a mens rea requirement using terms defined in § 5-2-202, and “obstructing” and “unreasonably” were widely understood restrictions; it was not overbroad as it was a content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction justified without reference to the content of the speech, government had a substantial interest in preventing excessive noise and ensuring orderly flow of traffic, and it was sufficiently narrowly tailored. Duhe v. City of Little Rock, 902 F.3d 858 (8th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1178, 203 L. Ed. 2d 200 (2019).

Abusive or Obscene Language.

Whether profane language was calculated to arouse to anger or produce a breach of the peace was a question left to the jury. State v. Moser, 33 Ark. 140 (1878); Ruffin v. State, 207 Ark. 672, 182 S.W.2d 673 (1944) (preceding decisions under prior law).

It was not necessary for conviction for use of profanity that the profane language be used publicly. Bodenhamer v. State, 60 Ark. 10, 28 S.W. 507 (1894) (decision under prior law).

Indictment charging that defendant “did profanely swear and curse” was sufficient without setting out the profane words. Bodenhamer v. State, 60 Ark. 10, 28 S.W. 507 (1894) (decision under prior law).

Words used by defendant held insufficient to support conviction. Holmes v. State, 135 Ark. 187, 204 S.W. 846 (1918) (decision under prior law).

An indictment which followed the language of the former section concerning use of abusive language as a breach of peace was sufficient. Schaal v. State, 150 Ark. 631, 235 S.W. 38 (1921) (decision under prior law).

The fact that abusive language addressed to the arresting officer did not make the officer angry did not prevent it from constituting a violation. Meyers v. State, 253 Ark. 38, 484 S.W.2d 334 (1972) (decision under prior law).

Use of certain words was considered the use of “fighting words” under the circumstances, and thus fell within the constitutional reading of former section concerning use of abusive language as a breach of the peace. Hammond v. State, 255 Ark. 56, 498 S.W.2d 652 (1973) (decision under prior law).

Conviction for use of profane, violent or abusive language was improper where there was no determination by the trier of fact that the words spoken by defendant were likely to arouse to immediate and violent anger the person to whom the words were addressed. Hammond v. Adkisson, 536 F.2d 237 (8th Cir. 1976) (decision under prior law).

Curses and epithets addressed to a police officer in a department store were “fighting words” within subdivision (a)(3) even though the person addressed was a police officer who was not aroused to violent anger. Bousquet v. State, 261 Ark. 263, 548 S.W.2d 125 (1977).

Arrest.

Where the conduct of the defendant gave reasonable cause to believe that he was in violation of this section, his subsequent warrantless arrest was legal under Ark. R. Crim. P. 4.1(c)(iii). Williams v. State, 47 Ark. App. 143, 887 S.W.2d 312 (1994).

Disruption or Disturbance of Assembly.

It was not necessary to charge the manner of disturbance in any language more explicit than that used in the former section providing penalty for disturbing an assemblage. State v. Minyard, 12 Ark. (7 English) 156 (1851) (decision under prior law).

Indictment for disturbing a religious congregation which did not allege the manner of disturbance was bad in substance and did not support a judgment on a plea of guilty. Fletcher v. State, 12 Ark. (7 English) 169 (1851) (decision under prior law).

An indictment for disturbing a congregation assembled for religious worship by “profanely swearing” and by “talking and laughing aloud” was not bad for duplicity, the latter words being merely surplusage. State v. Horn, 19 Ark. (6 Barber) 578 (1858) (decision under prior law).

The disturbance of any member of a congregation assembled for religious worship was, in law, a disturbance of the congregation. State v. Wright, 41 Ark. 410 (1883); Walker v. State, 103 Ark. 336, 146 S.W. 862 (1912) (preceding decisions under prior law).

Membership in a church or organization is not necessarily the controlling factor as to whether a person has committed a crime at a meeting; thus, either a member or a stranger can be guilty of unlawfully disrupting a lawful assembly. State v. Kimbrough, 265 Ark. 289, 578 S.W.2d 26 (1979).

Evidence.

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for disorderly conduct for cursing police officers in a public place, where defendant was standing in the street shouting, flailing his arms around, cursing, and yelling, and stripping off his shirt and making a fist while taking an aggressive stance against one officer. Johnson v. State, 70 Ark. App. 343, 19 S.W.3d 66 (2000).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for disorderly conduct where (1) the defendant cursed a police officer after being asked his name, (2) the defendant then alternated between states of calm and irrationality and, during those periods of irrationality, he flailed his arms about, cursed loudly, and eventually demonstrated a violent demeanor towards an officer, and (3) another officer on the scene knew the defendant and was aware of his past charge of assaulting a police officer. Johnson v. State, 343 Ark. 343, 37 S.W.3d 191 (2001).

Evidence supported the inference that defendant juvenile intended to engage in the conduct of hitting a nurse and threatening her and a doctor's lives to create public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm in violation of this section because the nurse testified that defendant attacked her on several different occasions, and defendant did not argue that he was in any way incapable of controlling his actions at the time he threatened to kill either the nurse or the doctor and struck the nurse; at the very least, defendant consciously disregarded the effects of his actions. M.T. v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 761, 350 S.W.3d 792 (2009).

There was sufficient evidence to uphold defendant's conviction for disorderly conduct in violation of this section because after police officers arrived at defendant's house in response to a request from a utility company for a civil standby for a tree service to trim the trees along electric lines, defendant became and remained irrational, even after being told that she could be arrested, she cursed police officers and tree service employees, and she aggressively ran from person to person confronting them, both inside and outside the designated work zone; there was testimony from the operations manager of the tree service that he was intimidated by defendant and was concerned for the well-being of his employees, one of the officers also testified that she was intimidated by defendant, and the trial court, as the finder of fact, found the testimony of the state's witnesses to be more credible than the testimony of defendant and her husband. Watkins v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 85, 377 S.W.3d 286, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 892, 131 S. Ct. 275, 178 L. Ed. 2d 140 (2010).

Indictment.

In an indictment for disturbing a religious congregation by profanely swearing, it was not necessary to charge the particular language used by the defendant. State v. Ratliff, 10 Ark. (5 English) 530 (1850) (decision under prior law).

An indictment for disturbing religious worship “by talking and laughing” and by indecent gestures was not bad for duplicity. It charged but one offense; the words “by talking and laughing” were merely surplusage. State v. Bledsoe, 47 Ark. 233, 1 S.W. 149 (1886) (decision under prior law).

An indictment for disturbing a religious congregation was insufficient if it failed to allege that the language or conduct charged as a disturbance was calculated to disquiet, insult, or interrupt the congregation. State v. Booe, 62 Ark. 512, 37 S.W. 47 (1896) (decision under prior law).

Intent.

An intent to disturb was not necessary. Walker v. State, 103 Ark. 336, 146 S.W. 862 (1912) (decision under prior law).

Place of Offense.

There is no requirement in this section that the disorderly conduct must take place on public property since, unquestionably, public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm within the meaning of this section can occur due to an individual's conduct whether such conduct takes place on private or public property. Farr v. State, 6 Ark. App. 14, 636 S.W.2d 884 (1982).

Search.

Since the crime addressed by this section is a minor offense, no exigent circumstances were present that would have allowed police officer's warrantless entry into the defendant's home under the “hot pursuit” exception to the warrant requirement, for what was a petty disturbance. Butler v. State, 309 Ark. 211, 829 S.W.2d 412, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 998, 113 S. Ct. 597, 121 L. Ed. 2d 534 (1992).

Separate Offenses.

The offense of a breach of the peace by using abusive language was not embraced in the act of assault and battery; they were not of the same generic class and one could not be included in the other, although they arose out of the same occurrence or transaction. Moreland v. State, 125 Ark. 24, 188 S.W. 1 (1916) (decision under prior law).

Prosecution in the justice of the peace court for assault and disturbing the public peace did not constitute former jeopardy in prosecution for sodomy, as there was no relation between the misdemeanors of assault and disturbing the peace and the felony of sodomy. Verser v. State, 256 Ark. 609, 509 S.W.2d 299 (1974) (decision under prior law).

Disorderly conduct, assault, and battery are not lesser included offenses of robbery but are simply offenses of a different class. Williams v. State, 11 Ark. App. 11, 665 S.W.2d 299 (1984).

Unreasonable or Excessive Noise.

Where the information charged defendant with disturbing the peace by operating a go-kart race track and juke box in a loud and unusually noisy manner, it sufficiently charged the crime of disturbing the peace, although it also stated that defendant thereby disturbed the peace of a named individual. England v. State, 234 Ark. 421, 352 S.W.2d 582 (1962) (decision under prior law).

After plaintiff yelled a two-word expletive at the trooper from a moving vehicle, the trooper lacked even arguable probable cause for a disorderly conduct arrest under subdivision (a)(2) of this section (“unreasonable or excessive noise”) and thus violated plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure; cases where shouting was part of the scenario that resulted in a finding of disorderly conduct involved extended loud shouting and disruptive behavior or amplified sound, and in no case has a two-word unamplified outburst constituted disorderly conduct. Thurairajah v. City of Fort Smith, 925 F.3d 979 (8th Cir. 2019).

Cited: Hawksley v. State, 276 Ark. 504, 637 S.W.2d 573 (1982); Perkins v. Cross, 562 F. Supp. 85 (E.D. Ark. 1983); McIntosh v. White, 582 F. Supp. 1244 (E.D. Ark. 1984); McIntosh v. White, 676 F. Supp. 912 (E.D. Ark. 1987); Williams v. State, 327 Ark. 97, 938 S.W.2d 547 (1997); Giron v. City of Alexander, 693 F. Supp. 2d 904 (E.D. Ark. 2010).