Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-212 (2026)
Public intoxication — Drinking in public
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A person commits the offense of public intoxication if he or she appears in a public place manifestly under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance to the degree and under circumstances such that:
- The person is likely to endanger himself or herself or another person or property; or
- The person unreasonably annoys a person in his or her vicinity.
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- Public intoxication is a Class C misdemeanor.
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- Public intoxication is an unclassified misdemeanor if the person has been convicted of public intoxication two (2) or more times within five (5) years of the date of the current offense.
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If convicted of the unclassified misdemeanor of public intoxication for a third or subsequent offense of public intoxication occurring within a five-year period, in addition to a fine of no more than five hundred dollars ($500), the person may be sentenced to:
- Probation not to exceed one (1) year, with a condition that the defendant enroll in a program of treatment or counseling for alcohol abuse or alcohol dependency;
- A term not to exceed thirty (30) days in a county jail, with an additional probationary period to include as a condition of probation that the defendant enroll in a program of treatment or counseling for alcohol abuse or alcohol dependency, with the total time of jail and probation not to exceed one (1) year; and
- Provided that with regard to any revocation of probation under subdivision (b)(2)(B)(i) or subdivision (b)(2)(B)(ii) of this section, that any jail sentence imposed for revocation of probation not exceed thirty (30) days in the county jail.
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A person commits the offense of drinking in public if the person, other than in a place of business licensed to sell alcoholic beverages for consumption on the premises, consumes any alcoholic beverage:
- In any public place;
- On any highway or street;
- Upon any passenger coach, streetcar, or in or upon any vehicle commonly used for the transportation of passengers; or
- In or about any depot, platform, waiting station or room, or other public place.
- Drinking in public is a Class C misdemeanor.
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This section does not prohibit or restrict the consumption of an alcoholic beverage when consumed:
- As a part of a recognized religious ceremony or ritual; or
- Within the physical boundaries of a designated entertainment district as defined in § 14-54-1412.
History. Acts 1975, No. 280, § 2913; 1975 (Extended Sess. 1976), No. 1155, §§ 1, 2; A.S.A. 1947, §§ 41-2913, 41-2913.1; reen. Acts 1987, No. 877, § 1; 2019, No. 781, § 2; 2019, No. 812, § 2.
A.C.R.C. Notes. Part of this section was reenacted by Acts 1987, No. 877, § 1. Acts 1987, No. 834, provided that 1987 legislation reenacting acts passed in the 1976 Extended Session should not repeal any other 1987 legislation and that such other legislation would be controlling in the event of conflict.
Acts 2019, No. 781, § 1, provided: “Legislative intent.
“(a) It is the intent of the General Assembly to increase the available penalty for repeat offenders of the offense of public intoxication, not to necessarily punish those persons who may have demonstrated a problem with or a dependency on alcohol, but to provide the judiciary with a longer time frame during which a sentencing court may sentence a person to probation or a diversionary program and during which the person may be ordered to seek treatment for an alcohol problem or alcohol dependency.
“(b) The General Assembly further intends that this act not be used to unnecessarily fine or incarcerate a person with a demonstrated alcohol problem or alcohol dependency who is not committing any other criminal act when he or she commits the offense of public intoxication and that sentencing courts use discretion and consider alternative sanctions or available probationary or diversionary programs when sentencing repeat offenders under this act”.
Amendments. The 2019 amendment by No. 781 added (b)(2) and redesignated former (b) as (b)(1); and substituted “This section does not” for “The provisions of this section shall not be construed to” in (e).
The 2019 amendment by No. 812 added (b)(2) and redesignated former (b) as (b)(1); redesignated part of (e) as (e)(1); substituted “This section does not” for “The provisions of this section shall not be construed to” in the introductory language of (e); added (e)(2); and made a stylistic change.
Cross References. Beer festival permit, § 3-5-105.
Beer, malt beverage, and hard cider education, § 3-5-1409.
Wine tasting events, § 3-5-104.
Case Notes
Purpose.
While the primary purpose of former statute against public drunkenness was to prevent annoyance to other members of the general public, the statute also served as a protection to the offender. Berry v. City of Springdale, 238 Ark. 328, 381 S.W.2d 745 (1964) (decision under prior law).
Evidence.
A conviction of appearing in drunken or intoxicated condition on a public highway was sustained by proof tending to show that the defendant was in an intoxicated condition on a certain road leading from a church which was being traveled by the public and also on a street in a certain town. Simmons v. State, 149 Ark. 348, 232 S.W. 597 (1921) (decision under prior law).
Evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant, charged with public drunkenness, was intoxicated. Berry v. City of Springdale, 238 Ark. 328, 381 S.W.2d 745 (1964) (decision under prior law).
Evidence sufficient to find that defendant was properly arrested for drinking in public. Taylor v. State, 254 Ark. 620, 495 S.W.2d 532 (1973) (decision under prior law).
Evidence held sufficient, notwithstanding the absence of any tests to confirm the defendant's intoxication, where the defendant admitted that he had 2 drinks on the night of his arrest and the arresting officer testified that the defendant was “extremely intoxicated.” Bailey v. State, 334 Ark. 43, 972 S.W.2d 239 (1998).
Grounds for Arrest.
Where the defendant fitted the description of a prowler, was found in the area in which the prowler was last seen, was unable to produce any identification and smelled strongly of alcohol, a police officer was justified in arresting him for intoxication. Holmes v. State, 262 Ark. 683, 561 S.W.2d 56 (1978).
Intoxication.
Instruction that one does not have to be under the influence of whiskey to such an extent as to become boisterous or stagger or be down drunk; that whenever the whiskey causes a man to be out of the ordinary in his general demeanor, it is sufficient under what the law terms in this case as intoxicated held proper. Simmons v. State, 149 Ark. 348, 232 S.W. 597 (1921) (decision under prior law).
Public Place.
One sitting in a motor vehicle near traveled portion of a highway was in a “public place.” Berry v. City of Springdale, 238 Ark. 328, 381 S.W.2d 745 (1964) (decision under prior law).
Police officers who made an arrest for public intoxication in a private home were entitled to qualified immunity from the arrestee's subsequent civil rights action based on a charge of wrongful arrest, even though the arrestee was subsequently acquitted on the charge of public intoxication, where the officers had probable cause to make the arrest when the drunken arrestee refused the homeowner's request to leave her home, and where the Arkansas law concerning what constituted a “public place” in connection with a public intoxication offense was not well established at the time of the arrest so that the officers could not have known that their actions were improper. Heslip v. Lobbs, 554 F. Supp. 694 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
The definition of “public place” speaks only to accessibility, not visibility. Weaver v. State, 326 Ark. 82, 928 S.W.2d 798 (1996).
Where defendant was attending a private party and was drinking on the tailgate of a pickup parked in the side yard of the residence, defendant was not drinking in a “public place” as that term is used in subsection (c) of this section. Weaver v. State, 326 Ark. 82, 928 S.W.2d 798 (1996).
Venue.
It was proper to prove venue by evidence that the defendant while intoxicated was seen driving an automobile on the highway near the county line and that he was apparently going toward the county seat where he resided and where he occupied an official position. McClain v. State, 151 Ark. 266, 236 S.W. 263 (1922) (decision under prior law).
Cited: Anable v. Ford, 653 F. Supp. 22 (W.D. Ark. 1985); Giron v. City of Alexander, 693 F. Supp. 2d 904 (E.D. Ark. 2010).