Arkansas Code Annotated

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-229 (2026)

Stalking

✓ current as of May 2026

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1. A person commits stalking in the first degree if he or she knowingly engages in a course of conduct that would place a reasonable person in the victim's position under emotional distress and in fear for his or her safety or a third person's safety, and the actor:
  1. Does so in contravention of an order of protection consistent with the Domestic Abuse Act of 1991, § 9-15-101 et seq., or a no contact order as set out in subdivision (a)(2)(A) of this section, protecting the same victim, or any other order issued by any court protecting the same victim;
  2. Has been convicted within the previous ten (10) years of:
    1. Stalking in the second degree;
    2. Terroristic threatening, § 5-13-301, or terroristic act, § 5-13-310; or
    3. Stalking or threats against another person's safety under the statutory provisions of any other state jurisdiction; or
  3. Is armed with a deadly weapon or represents by word or conduct that he or she is armed with a deadly weapon.
2. 1. Upon pretrial release of the defendant, a judicial officer shall enter a no contact order in writing consistent with Rules 9.3 and 9.4 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure and shall give notice to the defendant of penalties contained in Rule 9.5 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure.
  2. The no contact order remains in effect during the pendency of any appeal of a conviction under this subsection.
  3. The judicial officer or prosecuting attorney shall provide a copy of the no contact order to the victim and the arresting law enforcement agency without unnecessary delay.
  4. If the judicial officer has reason to believe that mental disease or defect of the defendant will or has become an issue in the case, the judicial officer shall enter orders consistent with § 5-2-327 or § 5-2-328, or both.
3. Stalking in the first degree is a Class C felony.
1. A person commits stalking in the second degree if he or she knowingly engages in a course of conduct that harasses another person and makes a terroristic threat with the purpose of placing that person in imminent fear of death or serious bodily injury or placing that person in imminent fear of the death or serious bodily injury of his or her immediate family.
2. 1. Upon pretrial release of the defendant, a judicial officer shall enter a no contact order in writing consistent with Rules 9.3 and 9.4 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure and shall give notice to the defendant of penalties contained in Rule 9.5 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure.
  2. The no contact order remains in effect during the pendency of any appeal of a conviction under this subsection.
  3. The judicial officer or prosecuting attorney shall provide a copy of the no contact order to the victim and arresting law enforcement agency without unnecessary delay.
  4. If the judicial officer has reason to believe that mental disease or defect of the defendant will or has become an issue in the case, the judicial officer shall enter orders consistent with § 5-2-327 or § 5-2-328, or both.
3. Stalking in the second degree is a Class D felony.
1. A person commits stalking in the third degree if he or she knowingly commits an act that would place a reasonable person in the victim's position under emotional distress and in fear for his or her safety or a third person's safety.
2. 1. Upon pretrial release of the defendant, a judicial officer shall enter a no contact order in writing consistent with Rules 9.3 and 9.4 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure and shall give notice to the defendant of penalties contained in Rule 9.5 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure.
  2. The no contact order remains in effect during the pendency of any appeal of a conviction under this subsection.
  3. The judicial officer or prosecuting attorney shall provide a copy of the no contact order to the victim and arresting law enforcement agency without unnecessary delay.
  4. If the judicial officer has reason to believe that mental disease or defect of the defendant will or has become an issue in the case, the judicial officer shall enter orders consistent with § 5-2-327 or § 5-2-328, or both.
3. Stalking in the third degree is a Class A misdemeanor.
It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section if the actor is a law enforcement officer, licensed private investigator, attorney, process server, licensed bail bondsman, or a store detective acting within the reasonable scope of his or her duty while conducting surveillance on an official work assignment.
It is not a defense to a prosecution under this section that the actor was not given actual notice by the victim that the actor's conduct was not wanted.
As used in this section:
1. 1. “Course of conduct” means a pattern of conduct composed of two (2) or more acts, separated by at least thirty-six (36) hours, but occurring within one (1) year, including without limitation an act in which the actor directly, indirectly, or through a third party by any action, method, device, or means follows, monitors, observes, places under surveillance, threatens, or communicates to or about a person or interferes with a person's property.
  2. 1. “Course of conduct” does not include constitutionally protected activity.
    2. If the defendant claims that he or she was engaged in a constitutionally protected activity, the court shall determine the validity of that claim as a matter of law and, if found valid, shall exclude that activity from evidence;
2. 1. “Emotional distress” means significant mental suffering or distress.
  2. “Emotional distress” does not require that the victim sought or received medical or other professional treatment or counseling; and
3. “Harasses” means an act of harassment as prohibited by § 5-71-208.

History. Acts 1993, No. 379, §§ 1-3; 1993, No. 388, §§ 1-3; 1995, No. 1302, § 1; 2007, No. 827, § 94; 2013, No. 1014, § 1; 2017, No. 472, §§ 22-24.

A.C.R.C. Notes. Acts 2013, No. 1014, § 1, amended subdivision (a)(3) of this section to read “Stalking in the first degree is a Class B C felony.” The apparent legislative intent was to make stalking in the first degree a Class C felony.

Amendments. The 2013 amendment rewrote the introductory language in (a)(1); rewrote (a)(1)(b)(ii); substituted “Class C” for “Class B” in (a)(3); substituted “Class D” for “Class C” in (b)(3); added (c) and (e), redesignating subsections accordingly; in (f), added the language beginning “including without” to the end of (1)(A), inserted (2), and, in current (3), deleted the definition for “Immediate family” and added the definition for “Harasses”.

The 2017 amendment, in (a)(2)(D), (b)(2)(D), and (c)(2)(D), substituted “case” for “cause” and “orders consistent with § 5-2-327 or § 5-2-328, or both” for “such orders as are consistent with § 5-2-305”.

Research References

ALR.

Validity of State Stalking Statutes. 6 A.L.R.7th Art. 6 (2015).

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Criminal Law, 16 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 91.

Case Notes

Course of Conduct.

“Course of conduct” as used in this section means a pattern of conduct composed of two or more acts separated by at least 36 hours but occurring within one year. Wesson v. State, 320 Ark. 380, 896 S.W.2d 874 (1995).

This section does not require that a person first be subjected to conduct warranting an order of protection or an order of no contact and then endure at least two more acts separated by at least 36 hours before charges of stalking in the first degree can be filed. Moses v. State, 72 Ark. App. 357, 39 S.W.3d 459 (2001).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for first-degree stalking because there was a course of conduct of harassment based on the threats made to the victim. Weeks before the incident at issue, defendant forced the victim to have oral sex with him by threatening to tell her probation officers about prescriptions, and he threatened her that she would never see her son again. Van Winkle v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 591, 445 S.W.3d 542 (2014).

Evidence.

Where the trial judge, in hearing the defendant's several answering machine messages to the victim, reasonably found that the defendant intended to terrorize the victim with threats of harm, substantial evidence existed to support defendant's conviction for second degree stalking. Wesson v. State, 320 Ark. 380, 896 S.W.2d 874 (1995).

Evidence established that the defendant threatened physical injury to the victim or her immediate family where the victim testified that the defendant called her repeatedly and persistently after she tried to terminate her relationship with him, that he threatened to find her husband and kill him, and that he told her, “You can get me arrested but that'll be the last thing you do.” Dye v. State, 70 Ark. App. 329, 17 S.W.3d 505 (2000).

Where a witness testified that defendant chased the victim in his car, and the victim testified that defendant followed her in his car on several occasions, blocked the victim's car in her drive, and threatened to kill the victim, the evidence of defendant's guilt on the stalking charge was overwhelming and the improper admission of the unavailable officer's testimony was harmless as to the offense of second-degree stalking. Proctor v. State, 349 Ark. 648, 79 S.W.3d 370 (2002).

Three threats defendant made against the victim and her family constituted sufficient evidence of a terroristic threat; thus, defendant's conviction for first-degree stalking was affirmed. Lowry v. State, 364 Ark. 6, 216 S.W.3d 101 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for stalking and a violation of an order of protection because the content and timing of text messages connected them to defendant through circumstantial evidence; the messages contained a daughter's nickname, names of people of whom defendant was jealous, and references to reconciliation with defendant's former wife. Moreover, one message was sent immediately after defendant was served with an order of protection. Brawner v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 413, 428 S.W.3d 600 (2013).

Harasses.

The term “harasses” employed in subdivision (b)(1) means acts of harassment as defined in § 5-71-208. Wesson v. State, 320 Ark. 380, 896 S.W.2d 874 (1995).

Terroristic Threat.

The use of the term “terroristic threat” when defining the crime of stalking does not require that it be shown that the accused has the immediate ability to carry out the threats. Wesson v. State, 320 Ark. 380, 896 S.W.2d 874 (1995).

Cited: Kirkendoll v. State, 57 Ark. App. 321, 945 S.W.2d 400 (1997).

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 22 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1995–2026 · leading case: Lowry v. State, 205 S.W.3d 830 (Ark. Ct. App. 2005).

Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment

Lowry v. State, 205 S.W.3d 830 (Ark. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 12× “Ark.Code Ann. § 5-71-229 (Repl.1997). Lowry asserts that the State failed to prove that he made a terroristic threat while armed with a deadly weapon or in contravention of an order of protection as required by section 5-71-229.”

Lowry v. State, 216 S.W.3d 101 (Ark. 2005). · cites it 6× “Evidence of Stalking in the First Degree Lowry first argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for first-degree stalking, under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-229 (Repl. 1997), which provides in pertinent part: (a)(1) A person commits stalking in the first…”

Proctor v. State, 79 S.W.3d 370 (Ark. 2002). · cites it 2× “Ark.Code Ann. § 5-71-229(b)(1) (Repl. 1997).”

Rodgers v. Bryant, 301 F. Supp. 3d 928 (E.D. Ark. 2017). · cites it 4× “" Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-229 (f)(2). Ark. Code Ann.”

Clinton Greenwood v. Kathryn Greenwood, 2026 Ark. App. 306 (Ark. Ct. App. 2026). · cites it 13× “” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-229 (a)(1) (emphasis added).”

Van Winkle v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 591 (Ark. Ct. App. 2014). · cites it 4× “Ark.Code Ann. § 5-71-229(a)(l)(C) (Repl. 2005).”

United States v. Dedman, 527 F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 2008). “in which any party is related to him or her by consanguinity or affinity within such degree as prescribed *590 by law____”); Ark.Code Ann. §§ 5-71-229(d)(3) (defining “immediate family” for purposes of a stalking statute as one of several things including “any person related by…”

Reeves v. State, 5 S.W.3d 41 (Ark. 1999). · cites it 2× “On February 14, 1996, a criminal information was filed against Reeves charging her with stalking in the first degree in violation of Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-229 (Repl. 1993). On April 9, 1996, she entered into a Guilty Plea Agreement relating to this charge.”

Nicholson v. State, 963 N.E.2d 1096 (Ind. 2012). “Ark.Code Ann. § 5-71-229(d)(1)(A) (2011).”

Moses v. State, 39 S.W.3d 459 (Ark. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 4× “” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-229 (d)(1)(A). Appellant specifically argues that the State failed to show that there was a thirty-six hour period between his acts of harassment toward Ms.”

Wesson v. State, 896 S.W.2d 874 (Ark. 1995). · cites it 5× “Acts 379 and 388 of 1993 [ Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-229 (Repl. 1993)] created the offenses of stalking in the first and second degree and also contained sections that amended the statutory offenses of harassment and terroristic threatening to make them Class A misdemeanors.”

Brawner v. State, 428 S.W.3d 600 (Ark. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 2× “Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-71-229 (Repl.2005) provides that the offense of stalking is committed by a person who purposely engages in a course of conduct that harasses another person and makes a terroristic threat with the intent of placing that person in imminent fear of…”

Show all 22 citing cases →

— Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-229(a)(1)(A) — 1 case

Lowry v. State, 205 S.W.3d 830 (Ark. Ct. App. 2005). “Ark.Code Ann. § 5-71-229 (Repl.1997). Lowry asserts that the State failed to prove that he made a terroristic threat while armed with a deadly weapon or in contravention of an order of protection as required by section 5-71-229.”

— Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-229(a)(l)(A) — 1 case

Moses v. State, 39 S.W.3d 459 (Ark. Ct. App. 2001). “” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-229 (d)(1)(A). Appellant specifically argues that the State failed to show that there was a thirty-six hour period between his acts of harassment toward Ms.”

— Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-229(a)(l)(C) — 1 case

Van Winkle v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 591 (Ark. Ct. App. 2014). “Ark.Code Ann. § 5-71-229(a)(l)(C) (Repl. 2005).”

— Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-229(b)(1) — 2 cases

Proctor v. State, 79 S.W.3d 370 (Ark. 2002). “Ark.Code Ann. § 5-71-229(b)(1) (Repl. 1997).”

Kirkendoll v. State, 945 S.W.2d 400 (Ark. Ct. App. 1997).

— Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-229(b)(l) — 1 case

Wesson v. State, 896 S.W.2d 874 (Ark. 1995). “Acts 379 and 388 of 1993 [ Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-229 (Repl. 1993)] created the offenses of stalking in the first and second degree and also contained sections that amended the statutory offenses of harassment and terroristic threatening to make them Class A misdemeanors.”

— Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-229(d)(1)(A) — 1 case

Nicholson v. State, 963 N.E.2d 1096 (Ind. 2012). “Ark.Code Ann. § 5-71-229(d)(1)(A) (2011).”

— Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-229(d)(3) — 1 case

— Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-229(d)(l)(A) — 1 case

Van Winkle v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 591 (Ark. Ct. App. 2014). “Ark.Code Ann. § 5-71-229(a)(l)(C) (Repl. 2005).”

— Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-229(f)(l)(A) — 1 case

Clinton Greenwood v. Kathryn Greenwood, 2026 Ark. App. 306 (Ark. Ct. App. 2026). “” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-229 (a)(1) (emphasis added).”

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