Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-103 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

Construction and Application of United States Supreme Court Holdings in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008) and McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 177 L. Ed. 2d 894 (2010) Respecting Second Amendment Right to Keep and Bear Arms, to State or Local Laws Regulating Firearms or Other Weapons. 64 A.L.R.6th 131.

Validity of State Gun Control Legislation Under State Constitutional Provisions Securing Right to Bear Arms — Convicted Felons. 85 A.L.R.6th 641.

What Constitutes “Possession” of Firearm for Purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), Providing Penalty for Possession of Firearm in Furtherance of Drug Trafficking Crime or Crime of Violence. 89 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 37 (2014).

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

DeSimone, Survey of Criminal Law, 3 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 191.

Survey of Arkansas Law, Evidence, 5 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 139.

Survey of Legislation, 2001 Arkansas General Assembly, Criminal Law, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 429.

U. Ark. Little Rock. L. Rev.

Annual Survey of Case Law, Criminal Law, 28 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 677.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

This section is not an unconstitutional statute based on status since it does not punish the status of being a felon but rather punishes the act of carrying a firearm by one who has been convicted of a felony. Crafton v. State, 274 Ark. 319, 624 S.W.2d 440 (1981).

The legislature could constitutionally provide that any person who had previously been convicted of a felony as defined by this section could not thereafter possess or own a firearm, and this section did not operate as an ex-post facto law when applied to a felon convicted prior to passage of the section. Finley v. State, 282 Ark. 146, 666 S.W.2d 701 (1984).

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), does not compel the reversal of Ferguson v. State, 362 Ark. 547, 210 S.W.3d 53 (2003), because whether a prior felony was violent in nature is a matter of law for the trial court; moreover, the jury did not have to determine the fact of a prior conviction. Austin v. State, 98 Ark. App. 380, 255 S.W.3d 888 (2007).

Purpose.

The purpose of this section is to keep firearms out of the hands of persons who have been formally adjudicated as irresponsible or dangerous. Reynolds v. State, 18 Ark. App. 193, 712 S.W.2d 329 (1986).

Applicability.

Specifics of defendant's ex post facto arguments regarding his 2014 charge were not considered as he lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the retroactive application of the amendment to this section. Even though defendant completed his earlier probation, he failed to fulfill the terms and conditions of the probation by using marijuana, and as a result his 1995 disposition was not expunged; and the amendment to subsection (b) did not apply to offenders whose cases were not dismissed and expunged. Kimbrell v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 555, 533 S.W.3d 114 (2017).

Arrest.

Regardless of whether the information or warrant were defective, a warrant was not required for the defendant's arrest on charges of being a felon in possession of a firearm, a Class D felony under this section, since Ark. R. Crim. P. 4.1 provides that a law enforcement officer may arrest a person without a warrant if he has reasonable cause to believe that that person has committed a felony. Van Daley v. State, 20 Ark. App. 127, 725 S.W.2d 574 (1987).

Authorization.

The “authorization” clause in subsection (a), permitting a felon to possess a firearm if authorized by the Governor, his designee, or the Treasury Department, creates a defense, as defined by § 5-1-111, rather than an element to be proved by the state. Fendley v. State, 314 Ark. 435, 863 S.W.2d 284 (1993).

Constructive Possession.

Actual physical possession is not necessary for conviction, nor is ownership; the evidence is sufficient if it is shown, by either direct or circumstantial evidence, that the defendant had the right to exercise control over the object. Harper v. State, 17 Ark. App. 237, 707 S.W.2d 332 (1986).

Where the gun was found in the defendant's bedroom, directly under a window in which the police officers had observed the defendant looking out when they drove up, the officers saw no other person in that room, and one of the officers testified that he saw the defendant fumbling around with something that could have been a gun, there was substantial evidence from which a jury could infer that the defendant had knowledge of the gun's presence and a right to control it. Harper v. State, 17 Ark. App. 237, 707 S.W.2d 332 (1986).

Where there is joint occupancy of premises, mere occupancy is insufficient to convict one of possession of contraband, unless there are additional factors linking the defendant with the contraband. Kandur v. State, 20 Ark. App. 194, 726 S.W.2d 682 (1987).

Evidence held insufficient to convict. Kandur v. State, 20 Ark. App. 194, 726 S.W.2d 682 (1987).

Where defendant occupied the truck with the driver, and the shotgun was located in plain view between the seats, which made it immediately accessible to her and subject to her control, this was sufficient to constitute constructive possession. Banks v. State, 315 Ark. 666, 869 S.W.2d 700 (1994).

When possession of contraband is an element of an offense, the State need not prove literal, physical possession; constructive possession can be implied when the contraband is in the joint control of the accused and another person. Kilpatrick v. State, 322 Ark. 728, 912 S.W.2d 917 (1995).

Joint occupancy of the vehicle, standing alone, is not sufficient to establish possession of contraband; there must be some other factor linking the accused to the contraband. Kilpatrick v. State, 322 Ark. 728, 912 S.W.2d 917 (1995).

Among the “linking” factors this court has considered in cases involving vehicles occupied by more than one person are: (1) whether the contraband is in plain view; (2) whether the contraband is found with accused's personal effects; (3) whether the contraband is found on the same side of the car seat as the accused was sitting or in near proximity to it; (4) whether the accused is the owner of the automobile, or exercises dominion and control over it; (5) whether the accused acted suspiciously before or during the arrest. Courts have also considered the improbability that anyone other than the occupants of the vehicle placed the contraband in the vehicle; and the improbable nature of the accused's explanation for his journey. Kilpatrick v. State, 322 Ark. 728, 912 S.W.2d 917 (1995).

When there is joint occupancy of a residence, additional factors must be proven linking the accused to the firearm. Killian v. State, 60 Ark. App. 127, 959 S.W.2d 432 (1998).

Where gun owned by defendant's girlfriend was found in the girlfriend's house, where defendant also lived, defendant's remark to police that the gun should have been hidden better was a sufficient additional factor to link the defendant to the gun. Killian v. State, 60 Ark. App. 127, 959 S.W.2d 432 (1998).

Front passenger's conviction for constructive possession of gun was reversed where, although the gun was under his seat, it was more readily available to driver; however, the rear passenger's conviction was upheld because he was in close proximity to the gun that was found under the rear seat and he had behaved suspiciously by giving the police different dates of birth and repeatedly identifying himself as someone else. Gamble v. State, 82 Ark. App. 216, 105 S.W.3d 801 (2003).

Evidence showed that defendant signed the ticket to pawn a gun, which constituted circumstantial evidence that defendant constructively possessed the firearm; the pawn ticket indicated that defendant had given a security interest in the gun, and the pawn shop owner's testimony made it clear that only defendant could have redeemed the pawn ticket and retrieved the gun. Loar v. State, 368 Ark. 171, 243 S.W.3d 923 (2006).

Conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm was reversed as, although defendant was a felon, the state failed to show constructive possession; despite the fact that a gun was found in a jointly occupied apartment, nothing showed that defendant had care, control, and management over the contraband. Williams v. State, 95 Ark. App. 307, 236 S.W.3d 519 (2006).

Defendant was properly convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm because there was sufficient evidence that he constructively possessed a gun where he consented to a search of his house and anything on the property, the gun was in his aunt's truck in plain view, located in close proximity to defendant's personal effects, he exercised regular control over the truck, and, although he was not in it at the time the gun was discovered, he had driven it on the morning that the gun was found. White v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 587, 446 S.W.3d 193 (2014).

Motion for a directed verdict was properly denied because the State presented sufficient evidence that defendant constructively possessed a firearm; although there was joint occupancy of a vehicle, the State presented other evidence linking defendant to the gun. The gun was found in the backseat, where defendant was the sole passenger, the compartment where the gun was found was immediately and exclusively accessible to defendant, and defendant behaved suspiciously before and during the traffic stop. Lambert v. State, 2017 Ark. 31, 509 S.W.3d 637 (2017).

State did not sufficiently prove that defendant constructively possessed a semi-automatic 9-mm pistol because defendant was not particularly close to the gun when he was arrested, and multiple people had access to the backyard and the shed areas where the gun was found; the State presented no forensic evidence, like a fingerprint analysis, to link him to either the gun or the ammunition. Bradley v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 586, 564 S.W.3d 569 (2018).

Substantial evidence supported defendant's conviction for felon in possession of a firearm where constructive possession could be implied given that the firearm was under the driver's seat, so it was immediately and exclusively accessible by defendant and subject to his control, and the jury was not required to believe defendant's self-serving testimony that he had no knowledge that the firearm was in the vehicle, especially given that the evidence showed that the gun case in which the firearm had been kept was open and empty on the passenger's seat; defendant's mother owned the vehicle, his fiancée testified that it was her gun, and defendant was the sole occupant of the vehicle at the time of arrest. Bens v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 6 (2020).

Conviction.

—In General.

A prior Supreme Court ruling on a completely different statute did not justify the defendant's reliance on alleged “mistake of law” in assuming his suspended sentence did not constitute a “conviction” under this section prohibiting felons from carrying firearms. Finley v. State, 282 Ark. 146, 666 S.W.2d 701 (1984).

A prior felony offense of aggravated assault was properly used to establish the defendant's previous felony conviction in a later prosecution for felon in possession of a firearm, notwithstanding that, at the time the defendant was placed on probation for aggravated assault, the court stated that he would be eligible for expungement of his conviction upon successful completion of his probationary period and that the defendant completed his sentence without violating any condition of his probation, since, at the time he was placed on probation. Edwards v. State, 70 Ark. App. 127, 15 S.W.3d 358 (2000).

—Proof.

As a prior felony conviction was an element of the offense, it was certainly not improper for the prosecutor to refer to the previous conviction prior to the introduction of direct proof so long as competent evidence was later presented to support the statement. Plummer v. State, 270 Ark. 11, 603 S.W.2d 402 (1980).

Where the defendant was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, the very nature of the crime charged necessarily placed the defendant on notice that the state would be required to prove that he was a felon, and therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the state to introduce documents concerning the defendant's prior felony convictions. Terry v. State, 9 Ark. App. 38, 652 S.W.2d 634 (1983).

A prior felony conviction was relevant evidence in a prosecution for possession of a firearm by a felon in that it was an element of the crime, and the trial court's decision that the State could elect to introduce evidence of one prior conviction rather than another was not an abuse of discretion; the defendant's contention that he should be permitted to select the prior conviction to be introduced by the State was not tenable. Clinkscale v. State, 15 Ark. App. 166, 690 S.W.2d 740 (1985).

Where defendant was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, proof of one prior felony conviction would have been sufficient. Tatum v. State, 21 Ark. App. 237, 731 S.W.2d 227 (1987).

Proof of a prior felony is an element of the crime of felon in possession of a firearm and must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the state. To require an accused to prove expungement of his record after completion of his sentence under the Youthful Offender Alternative Service Act would be to require an affirmative defense when none is required by the section. Irvin v. State, 301 Ark. 416, 784 S.W.2d 763 (1990) (decision under prior law).

Several convictions, including one for being a violent felon in possession of a firearm under this section, were reversed because a trial court erred by refusing to accept defendant's stipulation to having a prior felony; the court should not have informed the jury that the prior conviction was violent and allowed publication to the jury. Austin v. State, 98 Ark. App. 380, 255 S.W.3d 888 (2007).

Evidence.

Impeachment of defendant with remarks made by defendant's attorney during opening statement held not abuse of discretion. Fisher v. State, 290 Ark. 490, 720 S.W.2d 900 (1986).

Evidence held sufficient to uphold conviction. Holbird v. State, 301 Ark. 382, 784 S.W.2d 171 (1990); Moore v. State, 304 Ark. 257, 801 S.W.2d 638 (1990).

Evidence held sufficient to support the jury's determination that the appellant was in possession of the controlled substance and a firearm. Kilpatrick v. State, 322 Ark. 728, 912 S.W.2d 917 (1995).

Evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant was the same person who had a felony conviction from Texas and, therefore, was sufficient to support a conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Leatherwood v. State, 69 Ark. App. 233, 11 S.W.3d 571 (2000).

Where police seized a rifle in defendant's home during the execution of a search warrant, defendant was properly convicted of one count of felon in possession of a firearm. McDonald v. State, 354 Ark. 216, 119 S.W.3d 41 (2003).

Where appellant was convicted of two hotel robberies, the trial court properly convicted him of aggravated robbery, rape, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and being a habitual offender. The State alleged that appellant had prior felony convictions. Townsend v. State, 355 Ark. 248, 134 S.W.3d 545 (2003).

In defendant's trial for aggravated assault on a family member and felon in possession of a firearm, defendant challenged the State's proof only as to actual possession of the gun and, despite the fact that defendant's parents' later recanted their written statements that defendant was the one with the gun, that credibility determination was for the fact finder and the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction. Nelson v. State, 84 Ark. App. 373, 141 S.W.3d 900 (2004).

Although defendant admitted at trial that she possessed the two firearms because they were evidence to prove that she did not commit arson in another criminal case in which the charges against her had been dismissed the year before, she argued that she should not be convicted pursuant to § 5-2-604(a) since her possession of the firearms was justifiable; however, there was no proof of extraordinary attendant circumstances in defendant's case requiring emergency measures to avoid any sort of imminent public or private injury, as required under § 5-2-604 and, thus, there was no reason for giving a jury instruction on the choice-of-evils defense. Whisenant v. State, 85 Ark. App. 111, 146 S.W.3d 359 (2004).

Defendant's convictions for first-degree murder, a terroristic act, and possession of firearms by certain persons were proper where the jury believed the witnesses's testimony that defendant fired the only shots and fired toward the group where the victim was standing and toward the nightclub. Jackson v. State, 363 Ark. 311, 214 S.W.3d 232 (2005).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction for possession of firearms by certain persons and to corroborate the accomplice's testimony where witnesses testified as to the role defendant played in the robbery and described his clothing and weapon, which were collected at the scene; further, defendant's jacket had blood stains on it and a hole corresponding to the location of a gunshot wound he received, and defendant was found hiding inside a dumpster near the site where his car became stuck in the mud. Flowers v. State, 92 Ark. App. 29, 210 S.W.3d 907 (2005).

Sufficient evidence supported the conclusion that a defendant was in possession of a gun and that defendant was a convicted felon: a witness testified that the witness gave defendant a gun, other witnesses testified that defendant shot a victim with that gun, and the record showed that defendant had been convicted of three prior felonies. Hawkins v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 675 (2009).

Defendant found guilty on three counts of attempted first-degree murder, of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and three counts of committing a terroristic act unsuccessfully argued that substantial evidence did not support his convictions; while the evidence was circumstantial, substantial evidence supported the conclusion that defendant committed the crimes in question. Moments after the shooting, a dark-colored car was observed speeding away from the area without its lights on even though it was dark outside, that car crashed into another vehicle five blocks from the shooting, a witness positively identified defendant as the person who emerged from the driver's side of the car carrying a long rifle, shell casings from a rifle were recovered from the scene of the shooting, defendant's DNA was found on the driver's side airbag of the car, and the car contained a letter addressed to defendant. Smith v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 216 (2010).

When a rape victim testified at defendant's probation revocation hearing that he had a gun at the time of the rape, that testimony was sufficient for the court to find that he had possessed a firearm within the meaning of this section and the definition of “possess” in § 5-1-102. Craig v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 309 (2010).

Evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by certain persons, in violation of this section, as a firearm was observed in plain view next to defendant in a truck that he was riding in; the evidence showed that defendant was in constructive possession, if not actual possession, of the weapon. Hancock v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 338 (2012).

Defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under this section was sufficiently supported by evidence from a friend that he had seen defendant shoot the rifle although the rifle belonged to defendant's father and it was at his friend's house for shooting a raccoon. Fraser v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 598 (2012).

Defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of this section, was supported by the evidence because defendant lived alone in a cabin for a week in which there was a gun in plain sight right in front of the door; although defendant denied being aware of the gun, the jury was not required to believe defendant's testimony. Magness v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 609, 424 S.W.3d 395 (2012).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of possession of firearms by certain persons because defendant was stopped in close proximity to where there was a report of shots fired; moreover, he was driving a silver vehicle and wearing jeans with no shirt, which matched the description given. When confronted with the prospect of being tested for gunshot residue, defendant exhibited aggressive behavior and was observed wiping his hands, which could have interfered with the testing. Moore v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 582 (2013).

Substantial evidence supported defendant's conviction of being a felon in possession of a firearm, given that a certified copy of his felony robbery conviction had been entered into evidence and he admitted to being in possession of a firearm and that he shot the victim. Toombs v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 71, appeal dismissed, 2015 Ark. 471 (2015).

Circuit court did not err in denying defendant's motions for directed verdict because there was sufficient evidence to find that defendant, a convicted felon, possessed a firearm; the testimony of two witnesses indicated that defendant brought a gun to a residence where the victim used it to shoot himself. McCormick v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 330 (2016).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm as (1) defendant stipulated to a prior felony conviction, (2) a jury could conclude from an undated photo of defendant that defendant possessed a firearm after his brother-in-law moved to the county, (3) the jury could accept the officer's testimony that the firearm in the photo was a rifle, rather than the brother-in-law's testimony that it was a BB gun, and (4) shotgun shells were found in defendant's car. Coger v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 466, 529 S.W.3d 640 (2017).

Evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of possession of a firearm by a felon because another individual's testimony that the gun had been in his possession and he had thrown it on the ground did not explain the gun being found on the ground in front of the officer's patrol car after defendant made a tossing motion in that direction; the other individual was not in the area when the officer drove up and observed defendant tossing something; and the officer more than once on a video stated that he had seen defendant throw something, that he had found the gun on the ground in that area, and that the condition of the gun indicated that it had been thrown on the ground. McNeely v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 483, 530 S.W.3d 876 (2017).

Sufficient evidence supported defendant's conviction under this section for possession of a firearm because (1) a witness said she saw defendant shoot the victim, (2) another witness said defendant approached the victim with a gun, and (3) any inconsistency in testimony went to weight rather than admissibility. Green v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 145, 544 S.W.3d 574 (2018).

In a bench trial resulting in defendant's convictions for possession of a firearm by certain persons and criminal use of prohibited weapons, the evidence before the trial court, though circumstantial, showed that defendant took a picture holding a gun on the same day that he attempted to retrieve an apparently temporarily discarded and illegally cutdown rifle. Accordingly, the appellate court found no error with the circuit court's finding that the State's circumstantial evidence proved its case nor with the circuit court's finding that the circumstantial evidence was inconsistent with any other reasonable alternative. Caple v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 41, 569 S.W.3d 353 (2019).

State did not present sufficient evidence on which a fact finder could have convicted defendant of being a felon in possession of a firearm. A firearm was never recovered and presented as being one that defendant had possessed, and there was no video or photographic evidence that defendant had possessed a gun. Holmes v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 384, 586 S.W.3d 183 (2019).

Expungement of Prior Felony.

A count charging the defendant with being a felon in possession of a firearm was properly dismissed since the underlying felony could not be used by the state because that felony had been lawfully sealed and expunged. State v. Ross, 344 Ark. 364, 39 S.W.3d 789 (2001).

Defendant could not be convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm when his only felony conviction had been properly expunged. State v. Warren, 345 Ark. 508, 49 S.W.3d 103 (2001).

Trial court did not err by admitting defendant's prior conviction for felony possession of drug paraphernalia into evidence as proof on a charge of possession of a firearm by a felon (FIP) because defendant's expunged felony conviction could be used as proof on his FIP charge under former version of section; although still uncodified, 1995 Act No. 595, § 1 indicated legislative intent for an expunged felony conviction to remain a conviction for the purposes of possession of a firearm by a felon. Smith v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 539 (2011) (decision under prior law).

Intent.

In prosecution for the offense of felon in possession of a firearm, whether the defendant believed that it was legal for a felon to possess a firearm after the completion of his parole was irrelevant. Fisher v. State, 290 Ark. 490, 720 S.W.2d 900 (1986).

Involuntary Commitment.

Although appellant argued that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because appellant had not been adjudicated mentally ill or involuntarily committed to a mental institution within the meaning of subsection (a) of this section, this point was not properly before the Supreme Court on appeal from a conditional plea. Gooch v. State, 2015 Ark. 227, 463 S.W.3d 296 (2015).

Lesser-Included Offenses.

Since the offense of possession of a firearm by a felon requires proof that the person possessing the firearm has been convicted of a felony and that fact is not an element in the proof of aggravated robbery, the lesser offense is not included in aggravated robbery. Allen v. State, 281 Ark. 1, 660 S.W.2d 922 (1983), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1019, 105 S. Ct. 3482, 87 L. Ed. 2d 617 (1985).

Preservation for Review.

Although appellant argued that subdivision (a)(3) of this section was void for vagueness, deprived him of due process, and violated the Second Amendment and Ark. Const. art. 2, § 5, these points were not raised below and ruled on by the circuit court, and the Supreme Court did not reach the merits of appellant's arguments. Gooch v. State, 2015 Ark. 227, 463 S.W.3d 296 (2015).

Defendant did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence concerning his conviction under this section in his motion for dismissal as required, and thus his argument was not preserved for review and his conviction was affirmed. Oliver v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 332, 498 S.W.3d 320 (2016).

Defendant's argument that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for felon in possession of a firearm was preserved for review despite the State's argument concerning defendant's failure to use the word “constructive” in his directed verdict motion at the close of the State's case; the broad term “possession” encompassed the more precise term “constructive possession” because defendant essentially argued constructive possession in his initial directed verdict motion. Bens v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 6 (2020).

Sentencing.

The nature of the prior felony and the facts surrounding the incident leading to defendant's arrest do reflect on the seriousness of the crime and are relevant in the determination of sentence, and if these factors were not meant to be considered in sentencing, the General Assembly could have provided for imprisonment for a definite term upon conviction of a felon for possession of a firearm rather than allowing the jury to impose any sentence not in excess of five years. Combs v. State, 270 Ark. 496, 606 S.W.2d 61 (1980).

The state can use the defendant's prior felony convictions to convict him of felon in possession of a firearm and then use the same prior felony convictions to enhance the penalty for that conviction. The defendant was not convicted of two offenses which share the same elements, and thus he was not twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. Traylor v. State, 304 Ark. 174, 801 S.W.2d 267 (1990).

State v. Lawson, 295 Ark. 37, 746 S.W.2d 544 (1988), prohibits “stacking” of specific subsequent-offense penalty enhancements like the one in the driving while impaired statute, which operates to convert a misdemeanor to a felony because of multiple recurrences of the same underlying offense within a specified period of time; the Court of Appeals of Arkansas, Division One, declines to expand Lawson past that boundary. Therefore, there was no impermissible stacking of a specific firearm enhancement statute for a felon in possession of a firearm under subdivision (c)(1) of this section with the general habitual-offender enhancement statute under § 5-4-501(b)(2)(C); subdivision (c)(1) did not contain an enhancement for recidivism, there was no greater sentence than if either statute was applied singly, and the designation of the possession offense as a Class B felony was not an enhancement. Moore v. State, 2012 Ark. App. 662 (2012).

Because defendant's sentence for felon-in-possession/using firearm to commit another felony under subdivision (c)(1)(B) of this section was not enhanced by the statute defining the crime, the trial court did not err by applying the enhancement in § 16-90-120(a) for using a firearm to commit a felony. Stubblefield v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 734 (2013).

Under Arkansas law, possession of a firearm by a felon is at most a class B felony, punishable by no more than 20 years. Unless the flight causes serious physical injury to another, fleeing by vehicle is at most a class D felony, punishable by up to six years. United States v. Thomas, 790 F.3d 784 (8th Cir. 2015).

Defendant's 10-year sentence for possession of a firearm by a felon was within the statutory range of punishment for a Class D felony committed by a defendant previously convicted of four or more felonies, and the circuit court's decision to run the sentence consecutively to defendant's other sentence was within the court's discretion. McNeely v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 483, 530 S.W.3d 876 (2017).

Circuit court properly sentenced defendant as a habitual offender to 12 years' imprisonment for possession of a firearm by certain persons, Class B felony, because defendant's prior federal conviction for aggravated assault qualified as a “prior violent felony conviction” under this section and § 5-73-101; assault with a dangerous weapon in the federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 113, met the “serious physical force” requirement in § 5-73-101(11)(B) because the threat of bodily impact, restraint, or confinement when committed with a dangerous weapon is a threat of serious force. Seyller v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 423, 586 S.W.3d 685 (2019).

Trial Proceedings.

Where during closing arguments the prosecuting attorney pled with the jurors to enforce the law and send a message out to other drug-traffickers in the county that that kind of conduct is not going to be tolerated, the defendant objected but did not ask for a mistrial, and the trial court sustained the objection and admonished the jury that arguments of counsel were not evidence and that they should disregard any statements by counsel which were not supported by the evidence, there was no error. Reynolds v. State, 18 Ark. App. 193, 712 S.W.2d 329 (1986).

The trial judge erred in refusing to sever a firearm/felon count from a murder count for trial; an offense based in part on a prior conviction is not part of a single scheme or plan with first degree murder, as Ark. R. Crim. P. 22.2(a) requires, nor do the two offenses require the same evidence, which would be an alternative reason for upholding the trial judge's decision to deny severance. Ferrell v. State, 305 Ark. 511, 810 S.W.2d 29 (1991).

Where the trial of a felon/firearm charge with a murder charge was prejudicial error, the circuit court abused its discretion in denying a motion to sever; accordingly, defendant was prejudiced by the joinder and was entitled to a new trial. Sutton v. State, 311 Ark. 435, 844 S.W.2d 350 (1993).

Where defendant offered to stipulate to the convicted-felon element of the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm charge, the state's introduction of the certified copy of defendant's conviction was unfairly prejudicial and should have been excluded; the right of the state to prove its case had to be balanced against the right of a defendant to a trial free from unfair prejudice. Ferguson v. State, 362 Ark. 547, 210 S.W.3d 53 (2005).

Cited: Shelton v. State, 271 Ark. 342, 609 S.W.2d 18 (1980); Terry v. State, 271 Ark. 715, 610 S.W.2d 272 (1981); Scott v. State, 272 Ark. 88, 612 S.W.2d 110 (1981); Bradley v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 736 F.2d 1238 (8th Cir. 1984); Henderson v. State, 16 Ark. App. 225, 699 S.W.2d 419 (1985); Beasley v. State, 29 Ark. App. 104, 777 S.W.2d 865 (1989); Ussery v. State, 308 Ark. 67, 822 S.W.2d 848 (1992); State v. Mosley, 313 Ark. 616, 856 S.W.2d 623 (1993); Kanig v. State, 321 Ark. 515, 905 S.W.2d 847 (1995); Polk v. State, 329 Ark. 174, 947 S.W.2d 758 (1997); Travis v. State, 331 Ark. 7, 959 S.W.2d 32 (1998); Timmons v. State, 81 Ark. App. 219, 100 S.W.3d 52 (2003); Smith v. State, 85 Ark. App. 475, 157 S.W.3d 566 (2004); Butler v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 708 (2011); Mosley v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 353, 499 S.W.3d 226 (2016).