Arkansas Code Annotated

Ark. Code Ann. § 6-13-620 (2020)

Powers and duties

✓ Arkansas Code release r76: Acts through about 2020 (2021-2025 sessions missing)
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The board of directors of each school district in the state is charged with the following powers and required to perform the following duties in order to provide no less than a general, suitable, and efficient system of free public schools:

  1. Attend meetings of the school district board of directors;
  2. Determine the mission and direction of the school district;
  3. Adhere to state and federal laws governing public schools;
  4. Enact, enforce, and obey school district policies;
    1. Employ staff, including:
        1. A superintendent of schools to oversee the day-to-day operations of the school district.
        2. A superintendent shall be evaluated annually or no less often than before any extension of his or her employment contract.
        3. Superintendents and assistant superintendents may be employed under contract terms and conditions that incorporate all elements prescribed by the State Board of Education; and
        1. School district employees under initial written employment contracts in the form prescribed by the State Board of Education, not including day-to-day substitutes.
        2. The employment contract shall:
          1. State the duration of employment, specific duties of the employee and the annual salary or hourly wage of the employee and projected annual earnings in the case of nonexempt employees under applicable state and federal law; and
          2. Incorporate all personnel policies adopted by June 30 to be in effect on July 1 of the following employee contract year, subject to the requirements and exceptions contained in §§ 6-17-204 and 6-17-205.
            1. Reviewing, adopting, and publishing the school district's budget;
            2. Overseeing and monitoring the school district finances, including:
            3. Borrowing money as necessary, but in no case shall the school district board of directors permit the school district to end the fiscal year with a negative legal balance;
            4. Entering into contracts for goods and services necessary to operate the school district;
            5. Buying, selling, renting, and leasing real property and personal property on behalf of the school district;
            6. Receiving, reviewing, and approving each annual financial audit report and presenting it to the public;
    2. Copies of initial written employment contracts and renewed written employment contracts issued in accordance with §§ 6-17-1506 and 6-17-1703 shall be distributed as follows:
      1. One (1) copy to be given to the employee;
      2. One (1) copy to be retained by the school district board of directors; and
      3. One (1) copy to be retained by the school district's treasurer or bookkeeper;
  5. Understand and oversee school district finances required by law to ensure alignment with the school district's academic and facility needs and goals, including without limitation:
    1. Revenues;
    2. Expenditures;
    3. Investments;
    4. Debts;
    5. Obligations;
    6. Inventory; and
    7. Real property;
  6. Ensure that:
    1. Necessary and sufficient facilities are built or obtained, furnished, and maintained; and
    2. All properties belonging to the district are managed and maintained for the benefit of the school district;
  7. Approve the selection of curriculum and ensure that students are offered and taught the courses of study and educational content required by the State Board of Education;
  8. Visit district schools and classrooms when students are present no less than annually and attend some events and functions;
  9. Obtain the training and professional development necessary to serve as active and informed members of the school district board of directors; and
  10. Do all other things necessary and lawful for the conduct of efficient free public schools in the school district.

History. Acts 1931, No. 169, § 97; Pope's Dig., § 11535; Acts 1939, No. 316, § 1; 1941, No. 389, § 1; 1943, No. 96, § 1; 1949, No. 287, § 1; 1953, No. 204, § 1; 1957, No. 280, § 1; 1969, No. 327, § 1; 1973, No. 253, § 3; 1973, No. 690, § 1; 1977, No. 658, § 1; 1983 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 41, § 1; 1983 (1st Ex. Sess.), No. 53, § 1; A.S.A. 1947, § 80-509; Acts 1989, No. 822, § 1; 1993, No. 294, § 7; 1995, No. 233, § 1; 1999, No. 391, § 3; 1999, No. 1078, § 38; 2001, No. 581, § 1; 2001, No. 1747, § 1; 2003, No. 1738, § 1; 2007, No. 617, §§ 5, 6; 2007, No. 710, § 1; 2007, No. 1573, § 45; 2009, No. 1180, § 2.

Amendments. The 2009 amendment rewrote the section.

Cross References. Sixteenth section school lands, §§ 6-13-108 and 22-5-407.

Research References

Ark. L. Rev.

The Emerging Law of Students' Rights, 23 Ark. L. Rev. 619.

School Board Members' Immunity from § 1983 Suits — Wood v. Strickland, 29 Ark. L. Rev. 554.

Case Notes

In General.

School directors could exercise powers expressly conferred upon them or powers necessary for the due and efficient exercise of express powers or which might be fairly implied from the statute granting the express powers. A.H. Andrews Co. v. Delight Special Sch. Dist., 95 Ark. 26, 128 S.W. 361 (1910); Scott v. Magazine Special School Dist., 173 Ark. 1077, 294 S.W. 365 (1927) (decision under prior law).

Persons who dealt with school officers were presumed to have knowledge of the extent of officers' powers. Ark. Nat'l Bank v. School Dist., 152 Ark. 507, 238 S.W. 630 (1922) (decision under prior law).

Borrowing Money.

The power of a school district to borrow money and pay interest is granted by this section and power was not repealed by §§ 6-20-401, 6-20-402, 6-20-410 limiting school district's expenditure to amount of revenue for the school year, though those sections repealed the power to borrow from next year's revenue. Jenson v. Special School Dist. No. 6, 199 Ark. 886, 136 S.W.2d 169 (1940).

Power to borrow money conferred on school districts carries with it the power to issue evidences of indebtedness therefor and to pay interest thereon, but since this section does not fix or limit the rate of interest that may be paid, district was not authorized to contact for payment of interest in excess of the legal rate. Jenson v. Special School Dist. No. 6, 199 Ark. 886, 136 S.W.2d 169 (1940).

Closing Schools.

There was no abuse of discretion on the part of the board in closing a grade school where evidence sustained finding that the school was inefficient, both educationally and economically. Evans v. McKinley, 234 Ark. 472, 352 S.W.2d 829 (1962).

Consolidation and Annexation.

The directors of a school district may resist proceedings to annex a portion of their property to another district. School Dist. v. Rural Special School Dist., 128 Ark. 383, 194 S.W. 241 (1917) (decision under prior law).

An alleged agreement between the directors of two adjoining school districts that one district would not seek to acquire territory from the other district was not binding on the districts and therefore did not prevent taxpayers from petitioning for a consolidation of those districts. School Dist. No. 18 v. Grubbs Special Sch. Dist., 184 Ark. 863, 43 S.W.2d 765 (1931) (decision under prior law).

De Facto Officers.

De facto school director was authorized to execute contracts with third persons which were binding on the school district. School Dist. v. Garrison, 90 Ark. 335, 119 S.W. 275 (1909); School Dist. v. McClain, 185 Ark. 658, 48 S.W.2d 841 (1932) (decision under prior law).

Directors' Discretion.

In this state a broad discretion is vested in the board of directors of each school district in the matter of directing the operation of the schools and a chancery court has no power to interfere with boards in the exercise of that discretion unless there is a clear abuse of it and the burden is upon those charging such an abuse to prove it by clear and convincing evidence. Safferstone v. Tucker, 235 Ark. 70, 357 S.W.2d 3 (1962).

Employment Contracts.

School directors were not authorized to make a parol contract for the hire of a teacher. Griggs v. School Dist., 87 Ark. 93, 112 S.W. 215 (1908) (decision under prior law).

Only written contracts to teach school could be made by school directors, and parol evidence to vary the terms of a contract was inadmissible. Marr v. School Dist., 107 Ark. 305, 154 S.W. 944 (1913) (decision under prior law).

While the requirement that contracts for employment of teachers by school districts be in writing was mandatory, a verbal contract could be ratified by a district by accepting the teacher's services, but in the case of partial performance, the ratification extended only to the period of performance. Bald Knob Special Sch. Dist. v. McDonald, 171 Ark. 72, 283 S.W. 22 (1926) (decision under prior law).

Provisions of this section that contracts of teachers and other employees are to be in writing is mandatory. Johnson v. Wert, 225 Ark. 91, 279 S.W.2d 274 (1955).

Requirement of a valid contract was never consummated and action of board in rescinding its action in voting to reemploy superintendent was effective. Johnson v. Wert, 225 Ark. 91, 279 S.W.2d 274 (1955).

There is no statutory requirement that school custodians be employed by contract, much less that their contracts be subject to a contingency such as the one formerly contained in this section, but having elected to enter into a contract which did not provide for such a contingency, the school district and the custodial employee were equally bound to honor its terms. Calico Rock School Dist. v. Speak, 293 Ark. 206, 736 S.W.2d 10 (1987).

Under this section, the sole power to execute and to terminate a teacher's contract is vested in a school district's board of education; obviously, the legislature was mindful of that rule when it passed § 6-17-1506, as that section provides for a resignation to be delivered to the school board. Teague v. Walnut Ridge Sch., 315 Ark. 424, 868 S.W.2d 56 (1993).

Nothing in the law requires the board to actually name the person it purports to employ. Love v. Smackover Sch. Dist., 322 Ark. 1, 907 S.W.2d 136 (1995).

In an employment dispute, a school district was not liable because a purported employment contract with a nurse was not approved and ratified by the school board in the manner required by law. The fact that the nurse resigned her former employment based only on the school official asking her to come in for an interview and “promising” her that she would get the job did not support a claim for relief in Arkansas. Johnson v. Blytheville Sch. Dist., 2017 Ark. App. 147, 516 S.W.3d 785 (2017).

—Signature.

Where neither the secretary of the board nor a majority of the members of the board had signed principal's proposed renewal contract, no contract had been created. Morton v. Hampton School Dist., 16 Ark. App. 264, 700 S.W.2d 373 (1985).

Liability of Directors.

Where school directors acted in good faith believing at the time that they had authority under the statutes to expend money for the purposes for which they issued warrants, they were not liable to the district individually for money so expended even though they had no such authority. Hendrix v. Morris, 134 Ark. 358, 203 S.W. 1008 (1918) (decision under prior law).

Liability of School Principals.

It cannot be held as a matter of law that this section and §§ 6-17-302 and 6-17-919 absolutely bar an action against a school principal for damages allegedly caused by his actions in excess of his authority. Hart v. Bridges, 30 Ark. App. 262, 786 S.W.2d 589 (1990).

Number of Directors.

When there were only two school directors in a school district qualified to act, they could bind the district by their acts. Marr v. School Dist., 107 Ark. 305, 154 S.W. 944 (1913) (decision under prior law).

Religious Practices.

Religious exercises held prohibited by the establishment clause of the First Amendment to the constitution as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment and thereby could not be approved or condoned by policies of the directors of a county school district, its agents and employees. Goodwin v. Cross County School Dist. No. 7, 394 F. Supp. 417 (E.D. Ark. 1973).

School Property.

In a lease of school lands, it could be stipulated that the lessee should fence the lands and build tenant houses thereon. School Dist. v. Gladish, 111 Ark. 329, 163 S.W. 1193, 163 S.W. 1194 (1914) (decision under prior law).

The directors of a school district could build an addition to an existing schoolhouse without authorization from the annual school meeting. King v. Tuggles, 140 Ark. 405, 215 S.W. 613 (1919) (decision under prior law).

It was within the authority of directors to change the site of the schoolhouse. Thompson v. State, 151 Ark. 369, 236 S.W. 608 (1922) (decision under prior law).

Where the sale of school property was within the scope of the powers of school directors they were the exclusive judges of the necessity of making the sale and the application of the proceeds. Scott v. Magazine Special School Dist., 173 Ark. 1077, 294 S.W. 365 (1927) (decision under prior law).

The sale of school property partially in consideration of an agreement that the purchasers would maintain a school and receive pupils sent by the director of school districts was authorized. Scott v. Magazine Special School Dist., 173 Ark. 1077, 294 S.W. 365 (1927) (decision under prior law).

The school district had the power to buy and to sell property involved in boundary dispute under direct power conferred by statute. Jewel v. Shiloh Cem. Ass'n, 224 Ark. 324, 273 S.W.2d 19 (1954).

Student Conduct.

Rule prohibiting cosmetics not unreasonable. Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 247, 250 S.W. 538 (1923) (decision under prior law).

Rules making students who participated in secret groups ineligible for certain school honors and activities were within the duty of doing all things necessary for conduct of efficient free school system as provided in subdivision (12) (now subdivision (11)). Isgrig v. Srygley, 210 Ark. 580, 197 S.W.2d 39 (1946).

Supplies.

A contract made by a single school district director for supplies was not beyond the powers conferred on such director and therefore was not incapable of ratification. Beckley-Cardy Co. v. West Point Special School Dist., 209 Ark. 792, 192 S.W.2d 540 (1946).

Taxation.

Under this section, school districts had authority to cooperatively employ a tax representative to prepare the list of taxpayers to be filed with the county assessor under § 26-26-705 to attempt to discover new construction and other property not listed for taxation, to appraise the property, and to submit that information to the appropriate district. Burnett v. Nix, 244 Ark. 235, 424 S.W.2d 537 (1968).

After ascertaining the rate of taxation necessary to raise money for the construction and operation of schools, the school district board of directors must see that that rate is placed upon election ballots to be approved or rejected by the voters. Henry v. Stuart, 251 Ark. 415, 473 S.W.2d 165 (1971).

Cited: White v. Jenkins, 213 Ark. 119, 209 S.W.2d 457 (1948); Johnson v. Robbins, 223 Ark. 150, 264 S.W.2d 640 (1954); Garrett v. Faubus, 230 Ark. 445, 323 S.W.2d 877 (1959); Morrilton School Dist. v. United States, 606 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1979); Carter v. Arkansas, 392 F.3d 965 (8th Cir. 2004); Crenshaw v. Eudora Sch. Dist., 362 Ark. 288, 208 S.W.3d 206 (2005).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 11 cases (4 in the last 5 years), 1990–2026 · leading case: Bentonville Sch. Dist. Dr. Debbie Jones v. Matt Sitton, 2022 Ark. 80, 643 S.W.3d 763.
Bentonville Sch. Dist. Dr. Debbie Jones v. Matt Sitton, 2022 Ark. 80, 643 S.W.3d 763. · cites it 5× “” Ark. Code Ann. § 6-13-620 (11); see also Ark.”
Releford v. Pine Bluff Sch. Dist. No. 3, 140 S.W.3d 483 (Ark. 2004). · cites it 4× “In another attempt to bring Releford’s suspension within the Fair Hearing Act, he cites to Ark. Code Ann. § 6-13-620 (a)(4)(A), (a)(4)(C), and (a) (4) (A) (8) (Supp.”
Crenshaw v. Eudora Sch. Dist., 208 S.W.3d 206 (Ark. 2005). · cites it 4× “Even so, we disagree that auditing local school districts, requiring an accounting of state revenue expenditures, monitoring school performance, and requiring curriculum enhancements necessarily transforms school districts into a segment of state government.”
Teague v. Walnut Ridge Schs., 868 S.W.2d 56 (Ark. 1993). · cites it 2× “We are well aware of the existence of both statutory authority and case law in support of the proposition that the sole power to execute and to terminate a teacher’s contract is vested in a school district’s board of education.”
Wolfe ex rel. W.W. v. Fayetteville, 600 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (W.D. Ark. 2009). · cites it 2× “Plaintiffs have not alleged an official policy instituted by the Board of Directors of the FSD which caused injury to WW.”
Hart v. Bridges, 786 S.W.2d 589 (Ark. Ct. App. 1990). · cites it 3× “Section 6-13-620(3) 4. As a matter of law, the plaintiff, an experienced teacher, could not have reasonably been misled by the statements of the defendant (agent) in excess of the authority given to him by the School District (Principal) that he could hire the defendant to teach…”
Johnson v. Blytheville Sch. Dist. ex rel. Bd. of Directors, 2017 Ark. App. 147, 516 S.W.3d 785. · cites it 4× “Ark. Code Ann. § 6-13-620 (5)(A)(ii)(a) (Repl.”
Arkansas Dep't of Educ. v. Amber Booth McCoy, 2021 Ark. 136, 624 S.W.3d 687. “§ 6-15-2916 (2)(K) (The State Board may “limit the powers and duties of the public school district board of directors under Arkansas Code Annotated § 6-13-620 or any other law.”). This aligns with our precedent, which recognized the State Board’s broad authority to deal with…”
Love v. Smackover Sch. Dist., 907 S.W.2d 136 (Ark. 1995). · cites it 2× “Love’s name was not mentioned at the board meeting or in the minutes. It is true that Ms. Love was not hired at the school board meeting by name.”
Benton Sch. Dist. v. Brandi Greer, 2026 Ark. 53, 730 S.W.3d 1. · cites it 2× “The circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Greer on her individual- capacity ACRA claim Greer’s individual-capacity claim fails under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act because she did not establish the elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim.”
Beasley v. McNulty, No. 4:18-cv-00508 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 1, 2021). “§ 6-13-620(6)(A). While these disagreements below the Board level support the educators’ claims, they are insufficient to create a jury question on pretext.”
Ark. Code Ann. § 6-13-620(11): 1 case
Bentonville Sch. Dist. Dr. Debbie Jones v. Matt Sitton, 2022 Ark. 80, 643 S.W.3d 763. “” Ark. Code Ann. § 6-13-620 (11); see also Ark.”
Ark. Code Ann. § 6-13-620(3): 1 case
Hart v. Bridges, 786 S.W.2d 589 (Ark. Ct. App. 1990). “Section 6-13-620(3) 4. As a matter of law, the plaintiff, an experienced teacher, could not have reasonably been misled by the statements of the defendant (agent) in excess of the authority given to him by the School District (Principal) that he could hire the defendant to teach…”
Ark. Code Ann. § 6-13-620(6)(A): 1 case
Beasley v. McNulty, No. 4:18-cv-00508 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 1, 2021). “§ 6-13-620(6)(A). While these disagreements below the Board level support the educators’ claims, they are insufficient to create a jury question on pretext.”
Ark. Code Ann. § 6-13-620(a): 1 case
Crenshaw v. Eudora Sch. Dist., 208 S.W.3d 206 (Ark. 2005). “Even so, we disagree that auditing local school districts, requiring an accounting of state revenue expenditures, monitoring school performance, and requiring curriculum enhancements necessarily transforms school districts into a segment of state government.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.