Ark. Code Ann. § 9-13-103 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

Validity of Grandparent Visitation Statutes. 86 A.L.R.6th 1.

Ark. L. Rev.

Brummer and Looney, Grandparent Rights in Custody, Adoption, and Visitation Cases, 39 Ark. L. Rev. 259.

Note, Is Arkansas's Grandparent Visitation Statute Constitutional Under the Standards Articulated By the Arkansas Supreme Court in Linder v. Linder?, 58 Ark. L. Rev. 197.

Recent Developments: Visitation Rights of Natural Grandparents Do Not Survive the Adoption of Their Own Adult Children, 66 Ark. L. Rev. 601 (2013).

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Legislative Survey, Family Law, 8 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 577.

Survey — Family Law, 10 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 577.

Fifteenth Annual Survey of Arkansas Law, 15 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 427.

Legislative Survey, Family Law, 16 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 131.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Annual Survey of Caselaw, Family Law, 25 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 988, 992.

Survey of Legislation, 2003 Arkansas General Assembly, Family Law, Grandparents' Visitation Rights, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 411.

Case Notes

Constitutionality.

Failure to allow grandparents who had visitation rights to intervene in adoption proceedings was inconsistent with their due process right to be heard, since the adoption court could extinguish the visitation rights given by the chancery court. Quarles v. French, 272 Ark. 51, 611 S.W.2d 757 (1981) (decision under prior law).

Adoption statutes did not deprive grandparents of rights to grandchildren without showing a compelling state interest, or deprive them of due process, since they did not demonstrate any constitutionally protected right or interest. Cox v. Stayton, 273 Ark. 298, 619 S.W.2d 617 (1981) (decision under prior law).

This section held constitutional. Reed v. Glover, 319 Ark. 16, 889 S.W.2d 729 (1994).

This section was unconstitutional as applied, and violated the mother's fundamental liberty interest under the due process clause of the U.S. Const. Amend. 14 § 1; so long as the mother was fit to care for the child, the Fourteenth Amendment right attached, and the state could not interfere without a compelling interest to do so. Linder v. Linder, 348 Ark. 322, 72 S.W.3d 841 (2002).

This section does not unconstitutionally discriminate between married and divorced parents. Seagrave v. Price, 349 Ark. 433, 79 S.W.3d 339 (2002).

Grandparent visitation statute was unconstitutionally applied in a case where the trial court made no reference in its findings as to the mother's fitness as custodial parent, and failed to give her the presumption to which she was entitled regarding her opinions with respect to rearing her child. Seagrave v. Price, 349 Ark. 433, 79 S.W.3d 339 (2002).

In a father's action to terminate the maternal grandmother's visitation with his children, where he had failed to appeal a prior ruling that the Arkansas Grandparent Visitation Act was constitutional, res judicata precluded him from relitigating this issue because the same parties and issue had been involved in the prior action. Hunt v. Perry, 355 Ark. 303, 138 S.W.3d 656 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1074, 124 S. Ct. 2428, 158 L. Ed. 2d 984 (2004).

Where the mother neither presented the trial court with the issue of the constitutionality of Acts 2003, No. 652, nor did she obtain a ruling on the issue, the Arkansas Supreme Court declined to review the constitutionality of the grandparents visitation law. Gwin v. Daniels, 357 Ark. 623, 184 S.W.3d 28 (2004).

In General.

Under the language of this section, grandparents are afforded the separate right to file for visitation rights with their grandchildren in situations where the child's parents are divorced, legally separated, or when a parent has died. This section contains no restrictive language that would require grandparents to file their visitation action in a divorce action filed previously by the child's parents. In fact, § 9-12-320, the venue statute concerning subsequent proceedings in divorce actions, would be wholly inapplicable where the grandparents' action is precipitated because their son or daughter died and the surviving, but not divorced, parent denied them access to their grandchild. Sanders v. Sanders, 297 Ark. 621, 764 S.W.2d 443 (1989).

A grandparent has standing to seek visitation where the marital relationship of the parents of the child has been severed without regard to which parent has custody of the child; the statute does not exclude the parents of the parent with custody from standing to seek visitation. Boothe v. Boothe, 341 Ark. 381, 17 S.W.3d 464 (2000).

In a father's action to terminate the maternal grandmother's visitation with his children, where the trial court ruled that it was not possible to determine whether the children's behavioral problems stemmed from their visitation with the grandmother or the blending of the families of the father and his current wife, and this finding was supported by the evidence, it was not disturbed on appeal. Hunt v. Perry, 355 Ark. 303, 138 S.W.3d 656 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1074, 124 S. Ct. 2428, 158 L. Ed. 2d 984 (2004).

Where a person stands in loco parentis to a child, rather than a person or persons who simply have a relationship with the child, the finding of an in loco parentis relationship is different from the grandparent relationships found in prior Arkansas precedent because it concerns a person who in all practical respects is a parent; further, the status of in loco parentis permits, where circumstances warrant, that a stepparent be granted visitation with a stepchild after a divorce. Robinson v. Ford-Robinson, 88 Ark. App. 151, 196 S.W.3d 503 (2004), aff'd, 362 Ark. 232, 208 S.W.3d 140 (2005).

Order granting grandparents visitation with their grandchild was upheld where the trial court's findings made pursuant to this section were supported by the evidence; the trial court accepted the grandparents at their word when they testified that they would cooperate with the mother if visitation was allowed. The grandparents shared a close and bonded relationship with the grandchild. Peterson v. Dean, 102 Ark. App. 215, 283 S.W.3d 610 (2008).

Applicability.

This section does not vest grandparents with an absolute right to visitation or intervention, but merely a means of petitioning for visitation. Suster v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 314 Ark. 92, 858 S.W.2d 122 (1993).

This section did not enable a grandparent to maintain an action for visitation rights to a grandchild when the unwed custodial parent was the grandparent's child. Reed v. Glover, 319 Ark. 16, 889 S.W.2d 729 (1994).

The plain language of this section limits its operation to cases in which a marital relationship between the parents of the child has been severed or if the child is in the custody or under the guardianship of a person other than one or both of his natural or adoptive parents. Reed v. Glover, 319 Ark. 16, 889 S.W.2d 729 (1994).

A child was legitimated for purposes of the statute when his parents married after his birth and his father executed an acknowledgment of paternity and, therefore, the child's grandparents were not eligible to petition for visitation. Ellis v. Bennett, 69 Ark. App. 227, 10 S.W.3d 922 (2000).

Father alleged that he refused to comply with the trial court's visitation order because his son was being sexually abused by the grandmother, but the trial court found that the allegations of sexual abuse were unsubstantiated; thus, the trial court did not err in denying the father's petition to terminate the grandmother's visitation with the grandchildren pursuant to the Arkansas Grandparent Visitation Act and in finding him in contempt of the visitation order for refusing to allow the grandmother her court ordered visitation. Hunt v. Perry, 357 Ark. 224, 162 S.W.3d 891 (2004).

Modification of custody order was reversed because the trial court erred in finding that a mother-in-law had a third-party interest in the divorce decree; the grandmother had no visitation rights unless they were allowed under this section. Hurtt v. Hurtt, 93 Ark. App. 37, 216 S.W.3d 604 (2005).

Adoption.

This section addresses itself to courts having jurisdiction in custody proceedings and is clearly inapplicable by its own terms to adoption proceedings. Poe v. Case, 263 Ark. 488, 565 S.W.2d 612 (1978) (decision under prior law).

Grandparents who have been granted visitation have a sufficient interest in adoption proceedings to entitle them to intervene for the limited purpose of offering such evidence as may be relevant to the focal issue such as whether the proposed adoption is in the best interest of the children. Quarles v. French, 272 Ark. 51, 611 S.W.2d 757 (1981) (decision under prior law).

Grandparents who have court ordered visitation rights are constitutionally entitled to receive notice of an adoption proceeding. Otherwise, their right to intervene in the adoption action is meaningless. Brown v. Meekins, 278 Ark. 67, 643 S.W.2d 553 (1982) (decision under prior law).

A grandmother's visitation and custody rights were derivative of her daughter's parental rights, and, as a result, were terminated when her daughter's parental rights were terminated. Suster v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 314 Ark. 92, 858 S.W.2d 122 (1993).

Mother's adoption by adoptive parents severed a grandmother's relationship with the mother (her daughter), and therefore, the grandmother was no longer a grandparent entitled to visitation under subdivision (b)(2) of this section with the mother's child. The circuit court erred by continuing to recognize the grandmother's visitation rights following the adoption. Scudder v. Ramsey, 2013 Ark. 115, 426 S.W.3d 427 (2013).

Best Interest of Child.

Even though the circuit court did not clearly err in finding that the grandparents had established a significant and viable relationship with the children, reversal was still required because the grandparents did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that visitation was in the children's best interest; in part, the mother testified that the grandmother condoned the father's drug use, and the circuit court clearly erred in finding that the grandparents had proven that the children were likely to be harmed by the loss of a relationship that, according to the mother, the children did not even recall. Shores v. Lively, 2016 Ark. App. 246, 492 S.W.3d 81 (2016).

Determination of Reasonable Visitation.

It appeared the trial court summarily awarded the grandmother the standard visitation schedule used by the circuit for non-custodial parents, and the court was not convinced the trial court exercised its discretion, and thus the trial court on remand was to determine the amount of visitation that was reasonable under the circumstances. Horton v. Freeman, 2014 Ark. App. 166, 433 S.W.3d 280 (2014).

Elements.

Because the grandparents did not prove that they had been denied visitation, they failed to prove the loss in relationship necessary to satisfy this section. Further, the decision to reverse the order of grandparent visitation was equally based upon the grandparents' failure to show that they could and would cooperate with the father were visitation allowed; therefore, the trial court's finding that the grandparents were willing to cooperate with appellant if visitation was allowed was clearly erroneous. Harvill v. Bridges, 2012 Ark. App. 683 (2012).

Testimony, which was expressly credited by the trial court, established that the child lived with the grandmother for more than six consecutive months. Horton v. Freeman, 2014 Ark. App. 166, 433 S.W.3d 280 (2014).

Final Order.

Order granting or denying visitation is a final order for purposes of appeal. Horton v. Freeman, 2014 Ark. App. 166, 433 S.W.3d 280 (2014).

Great-Aunts.

There is no common law right to grandparent visitation, and it must logically follow that a great-aunt has no such right. Hendershot v. Hendershot, 30 Ark. App. 184, 785 S.W.2d 34 (1990).

A great-aunt seeking court-ordered visitation with her grand-nephew and who had helped raise the father of her grand-nephew did not qualify as a grandparent under the provisions of this section. Hendershot v. Hendershot, 30 Ark. App. 184, 785 S.W.2d 34 (1990).

Illustrative Cases.

Where the testimony of two of the children's teachers, two neighbors, and other witnesses clearly demonstrated the grandmother's ability to provide love, affection, and guidance to the children, the grandmother was entitled to visitation pursuant to this section. Grant v. Richardson, 2009 Ark. App. 187, 300 S.W.3d 499 (2009), overruled in part, Pippinger v. Benson (In re Adoption of J.P.), 2011 Ark. 535, 385 S.W.3d 266 (2011).

Where the mother of a child divorced her father after he was incarcerated for sexual assault and possession of child pornography, the trial court did not err by denying the paternal grandparents' petition for visitation pursuant to this section. The grandparents lacked the capacity to provide guidance to the child, because of their willingness to allow her to visit her biological father in prison; the grandparents also failed to rebut the presumption that the mother's denial or limitation of visitation was in the best interest of the child. Painter v. Kerr, 2009 Ark. App. 580, 336 S.W.3d 425 (2009).

Petition for visitation by a maternal grandmother and great-grandmother under this section was premature; while the father had severely restricted contact between them and the child, he had not cut off visitation and, thus, they failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the relationship had been, or would have been, lost. Pippinger v. Benson (In re Adoption of J.P.), 2011 Ark. 535, 385 S.W.3d 266 (2011).

Grandparent had no standing to assert grandparent visitation rights under subsection (b) of this section regarding a grandchild born out of wedlock because the child had been adopted by the wife of the child's father and, under § 9-9-215(a)(2), was treated as if the blood descendant of the wife and thus was not illegitimate. Walchli v. Morris, 2011 Ark. App. 170, 382 S.W.3d 683 (2011).

Order granting appellees visitation with their grandchildren was reversed because the trial court substituted a benefit analysis for the required statutory presumption in favor of the parent's decision and in so doing, the trial court basically required appellant to prove that visitation would be harmful, losing sight of the fact that it was the parent who had a right to uninterrupted custody. Bowen v. Bowen, 2012 Ark. App. 403, 421 S.W.3d 339 (2012).

Award of grandparent visitation was improper. However, because the grandparents established regular contact with the child for at least 12 consecutive months during the child's life while his parents were still married, the grandparents proved a significant and viable relationship under subdivision (d)(1)(C) [now (d)(3)] of this section even though they had not had recent regular contact with the child. Harrison v. Phillips, 2012 Ark. App. 474, 422 S.W.3d 188 (2012).

Award of grandparent visitation to the child's paternal grandparents was inappropriate because they failed to rebut the statutory presumption under subsection (e) of this section that the mother's denying visitation was in the child's best interest. There was a lack of evidence that the loss of the grandparents' relationship with the child was likely to harm the child and the trial court made no written findings of the factors it considered in awarding grandparent visitation. Harrison v. Phillips, 2012 Ark. App. 474, 422 S.W.3d 188 (2012).

Decision granting the grandmother's petition for grandparent visitation was inappropriate pursuant to subdivision (c)(1) of this section because the trial court failed to address the required element of harm that the child would suffer from a loss of her relationship with her grandmother and there was insufficient evidence in the record to satisfy the grandmother's burden of proving that element. Thus, the trial court's finding that the grandmother had proved that visitation was in the child's best interest was clearly erroneous. Favano v. Elliott, 2012 Ark. App. 484, 422 S.W.3d 162 (2012).

Trial court abused its discretion in awarding visitation rights to paternal grandparents because they could not show that the relationship with their grandchildren was lost or would be lost absent a court order, where the grandparents alleged that the mother of the children was “starting” to keep them away. Drinkwitz v. Drinkwitz, 2015 Ark. App. 345, 464 S.W.3d 489 (2015).

Jurisdiction.

This section does not purport to exclude grandparent visitation after a paternity finding, and § 9-10-109(a) specifically provides for visitation grants after paternity is found; consequently, where a petition was filed by the grandfather requesting visitation, the chancery court operated well within its authority in granting visitation rights to the grandfather as well as the father. Rudolph v. Floyd, 309 Ark. 514, 832 S.W.2d 219 (1992).

Without authority for the proposition that an order of paternity entered before the filing of a petition for grandparent visitation was required for the trial court to acquire subject-matter jurisdiction, the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction. Horton v. Freeman, 2014 Ark. App. 166, 433 S.W.3d 280 (2014).

Presumption Not Rebutted.

Visitation with a maternal grandmother was improperly awarded because she failed to rebut the presumption under subsections (c)-(e) of this section; although she had a significant and viable relationship with a child for 12 consecutive months when he was under four years old, visitation was not in the child's best interest where there was no contact for many years, and the child did not wish to see the grandmother. The evidence did not show that the child would have been harmed by the father's decision to allow periodic contact at his discretion. Brandt v. Willhite, 98 Ark. App. 350, 255 S.W.3d 491 (2007).

Circuit court abused its discretion by granting the grandparents visitation with their granddaughter because the grandparents failed to establish that court-ordered visitation was in the granddaughter's best interest and failed to rebut the statutory presumption of this section that the father's decision was in the granddaughter's best interest, as they did not prove that a loss of the relationship between them and the granddaughter would likely harm her. There was no evidence presented at trial that the relationship between the grandparents and their granddaughter had been lost or would be lost, as the grandmother testified that she had seen her granddaughter seven times from November 17, 2006 and January 29, 2007 and that the father was very willing to work with the grandparents and let them see their granddaughter as much as they wanted. Oldham v. Morgan, 372 Ark. 159, 271 S.W.3d 507 (2008).

Trial court did not err in denying a grandfather's petition for visitation with his grandson, although he had established a meaningful relationship with the child, because the grandfather did not rebut the presumption in subdivision (c)(1) of this section that the mother's decision limiting his visitation was in the best interest of the child. Hollingsworth v. Hollingsworth, 2010 Ark. App. 101, 377 S.W.3d 313 (2010).

Circuit court erred by awarding grandparent visitation; because the grandmother's visitation had been limited by the child's father but not altogether denied, she failed to prove the loss in relationship necessary to overcome the presumptive weight given to the parent's decision of whether grandparent visitation was in the best interest of the child under subdivision (c)(1) of this section. Morris v. Dickerson, 2012 Ark. App. 129, 388 S.W.3d 910 (2012).

Significant Relationship.

Mother and child one lived with the grandparents for at least the first six months of child one's life, which was sufficient to establish a significant and viable relationship. Shores v. Lively, 2016 Ark. App. 246, 492 S.W.3d 81 (2016).

Evidence was conflicting as to how long the children lived with the grandparents after child two's birth, but given the grandmother's testimony that the mother and the children lived with the grandparents for four months after child two's birth, and taking the grandmother's testimony as true that she saw her grandchildren every other day until September 2013, this testimony supported the finding that the grandparents had established a significant and viable relationship with child two. Shores v. Lively, 2016 Ark. App. 246, 492 S.W.3d 81 (2016).

This section requires only that the children have resided with the grandparents for at least six months with or without the current custodian present to establish a significant and viable relationship; there is no requirement that those six months be close in time to the date the grandparents file for visitation rights. Shores v. Lively, 2016 Ark. App. 246, 492 S.W.3d 81 (2016).

Visitation Denied.

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the grandfather's request for grandparent visitation where there was evidence that the child suffered from pain and swelling in her vaginal area and evidence that her grandfather touched her, although the evidence of the extent and form of the touching was contradictory. Johnson v. Bennett, 2016 Ark. App. 24, 480 S.W.3d 870 (2016).

Witness Credibility.

Mother disputed the finding that visitation was in the child's best interests, and she asked the court to make a credibility determination, but because it was the trial court's province to assess witness credibility, not the appellate court's province, the court affirmed on this point. Horton v. Freeman, 2014 Ark. App. 166, 433 S.W.3d 280 (2014).

Written Findings Required.

Denial of the grandparents' petition for visitation was reversed, given that the trial court erred in failing to comply with the requirement in this section that the order denying the request state in writing all factors considered by the trial court in its decision; aside from stating that a hearing was held at which the various parties appeared, the order simply stated that the grandparents' petition was hereby denied, and as it was not entirely clear that the case had to be decided only one way as a matter of law, the trial court's failure required reversal and remand. Schwartz v. Lobbs, 2016 Ark. App. 242, 491 S.W.3d 161 (2016).

Circuit court made no written finding with regard to the best interests of the children, but that was not an impediment to reversing the grant of grandparent visitation because there was no basis on the record to affirm the trial court's decision. Shores v. Lively, 2016 Ark. App. 246, 492 S.W.3d 81 (2016).

Cited: Vice v. Andrews, 328 Ark. 573, 945 S.W.2d 914 (1997).