Ark. Code Ann. § 9-15-103 (2026)

Case Notes

Domestic Abuse.

Order of protection entered against defendant was reversed as the evidence was insufficient to find that defendant had inflicted physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault, as required by this section. Newton v. Tidd, 94 Ark. App. 368, 231 S.W.3d 84 (2006).

Trial court could have reasonably found that appellant committed domestic abuse by inflicting fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault where appellee testified that he grabbed her, screamed obscenities in her face, and burst a beer bottle behind her at a party, causing her to fear for her safety. Pablo v. Crowder, 95 Ark. App. 268, 236 S.W.3d 559 (2006).

Pursuant to the Domestic Abuse Act, a court erred in granting a mother's petition for an order of protection against appellant where the only allegations that were proven were that appellant had continued to see the mother's 16-year-old daughter after the mother prohibited contact between them and that appellant had purchased the morning-after pill for the daughter; the mere fact that the parents did not like appellant was not a proper ground upon which to issue an order of protection in the absence of evidence of actual physical harm or the fear of imminent physical harm. Claver v. Wilbur, 102 Ark. App. 53, 280 S.W.3d 570 (2008).

Circuit court's finding of no domestic abuse was not clearly erroneous where (1) although the husband admitted that the parties argued, that he pulled the phone out of the wall, and that he closed the living room blinds, the husband testified that he neither threatened the wife, hit her, or hit or threatened his son; and (2) the husband also testified that he did not intend to frighten the wife. Oates v. Oates, 2010 Ark. App. 345, 377 S.W.3d 394 (2010).

Sufficient evidence supported a finding that a mother committed domestic abuse; the parties were involved in an ongoing dispute, and even though the father did not testify to being afraid, the father had called the police after hearing gun shots on his porch and refused to open the door until the police arrived. Davenport v. Burnley, 2010 Ark. App. 385 (2010).

Any parent, after learning that his or her child was in a car with a certain driver during an accident, might fear the child could be harmed or suffer injury if the child were to ride in the car with that driver again, but a car accident in and of itself does not rise to the level of domestic abuse; although the father claimed he feared for the safety of the child because the mother had driven under the influence of drugs while the child and other children were in the car, the father failed to support those allegations, and the circuit court clearly erred in finding that there was sufficient evidence to support the entry of a final order of protection against the mother. Bohannon v. Robinson, 2014 Ark. 458, 447 S.W.3d 585 (2014).

Circuit court's decision to enter a final order of protection was not clearly erroneous where it credited the victim's testimony that appellant pushed her down, shoved her against a wall, threatened to beat and kill her and her boyfriend, sent her text messages stating the same threats, and had violated an ex parte order of protection by sitting in a vehicle within 10 to 15 feet of her apartment. Wornkey v. Deane, 2017 Ark. App. 176, 517 S.W.3d 438 (2017).

Evidence was sufficient to sustain the protective order where there was testimony that the husband hit the wife's legs and caused bruising, he always had his gun near him, he waved the gun at the wife, he threatened the daughter, and the daughter was present during many of the confrontations. Poland v. Poland, 2017 Ark. App. 178, 518 S.W.3d 98 (2017).

Five-year order of protection against a father was upheld because the district court judge's finding of domestic abuse was not clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence given the statutory definition of domestic abuse; although the father contended that the incident did not constitute excessive corporeal punishment, the four-year-old child incurred a bodily injury when the father struck him up and down with a leather belt, leaving bruises, and the child's therapist testified how traumatic the experience was for him, which was why the child said he wanted to kill himself and needed inpatient mental-health treatment. Smith v. Murphy, 2017 Ark. App. 188, 517 S.W.3d 453 (2017).

In granting an order of protection under § 9-15-205, it was within the purview of the circuit court to assess the witnesses' credibility, and the circuit court found petitioner's testimony that she was fearful of her husband to be credible. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to find “infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault between family or household members” under the definition of “domestic abuse” in this section. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 2019 Ark. App. 188, 574 S.W.3d 720 (2019).

Family or Household Members.

Domestic Abuse Act's purpose does not in any way indicate that it should be utilized only when there are no other adequate remedies or that the parties must reside together. Therefore, a case where the parties had dated for eight months, but never lived together, came within the purview of the Act, and the fact that there were other remedies available did not preclude seeking a protective order under the Act. Steele v. Lyon, 2015 Ark. App. 251, 460 S.W.3d 827 (2015).

Imminent.

“Imminent” means “likely to occur at any moment” or “impending” at the time of the alleged abuse, not at the time of filing the petition for a protective order; therefore, an order of protection was properly granted where the girlfriend was in fear of imminent harm based on threatening text messages sent by her boyfriend four months prior to the filing of the order of protection. Simmons v. Dixon, 96 Ark. App. 260, 240 S.W.3d 608 (2006).

Cited: Oates v. Oates, 2010 Ark. App. 346 (2010); Calaway v. Crotty, 2014 Ark. App. 636, 448 S.W.3d 723 (2014); Shepherd v. Tate, 2019 Ark. App. 143 (2019).