Arkansas Code Annotated

Ark. Code Ann. § 9-19-202 (2020)

Exclusive, continuing jurisdiction

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  1. Except as otherwise provided in § 9-19-204, a court of this state which has made a child-custody determination consistent with § 9-19-201 or § 9-19-203 has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination until:
    1. a court of this state determines that neither the child, nor the child and one (1) parent, nor the child and a person acting as a parent have a significant connection with this state and that substantial evidence is no longer available in this state concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships; or
    2. a court of this state or a court of another state determines that the child, the child's parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in this state.
  2. A court of this state which has made a child-custody determination and does not have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under this section may modify that determination only if it has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under § 9-19-201.

History. Acts 1999, No. 668, § 202.

Research References

ALR.

Construction and Application of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act's Significant Connection Jurisdiction Provision. 52 A.L.R.6th 433.

Construction and Application of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act's Exclusive, Continuing Jurisdiction Provision — No Significant Connection/Substantial Evidence. 59 A.L.R.6th 161.

Construction and Application of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act's Exclusive, Continuing Jurisdiction Provision — Other Than No Significant Connection/Substantial Evidence. 60 A.L.R.6th 193.

Inconvenience of Forum as Ground for Declining Jurisdiction Under § 207 of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act [UCCJEA], 35 A.L.R.7th Art. 7 (2018).

Case Notes

Jurisdiction.

In the context of personal jurisdiction in a child custody or guardianship case, personal jurisdiction over a party requires the appellate court to consider whether Arkansas remains the “home state” as defined by the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, § 9-19-101 et seq.; because such an analysis necessarily turns upon some fact to be determined by the trial court, a writ of prohibition is not the proper remedy to determine the issue, and the related issue of the trial court's continuing jurisdiction under this section also involves a similar factual determination. Finney v. Cook, 351 Ark. 367, 94 S.W.3d 333 (2002).

Although mother lived in Oregon with her children, the Arkansas court had continuing jurisdiction of child custody matters because the children had a significant connection with Arkansas in that their father and multiple relatives resided in Arkansas and the children spent at least 20 percent of their time there; further, the mother's argument that findings in relation to subdivision (a)(1) of this section should not be based solely upon court-ordered visitation was meritless. West v. West, 364 Ark. 73, 216 S.W.3d 557 (2005).

Father's contempt citation based on an alleged deprivation of visitation was dismissed as, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(4) and § 9-19-102(7), Missouri was the child's “home state” due to the fact that the child had resided there for more than 5 years with the mother; thus, Arkansas was an inconvenient forum for deciding issues relating to visitation and an adoption. Wilson v. Beckett, 95 Ark. App. 300, 236 S.W.3d 527 (2006).

Trial court did not err when it determined that it had jurisdiction under this section to hear father's motion to change custody; the trial court's prior orders stated that it retained jurisdiction and there was sufficient contacts with Arkansas, despite the fact that the mother and children resided in the United Kingdom. Uttley v. Bobo, 97 Ark. App. 15, 242 S.W.3d 638 (2006).

Once it is determined that a significant connection remains, it is unnecessary under subsection (a) of this section to also determine whether there is substantial evidence available in Arkansas. Thomas v. Avant, 370 Ark. 377, 260 S.W.3d 266 (2007).

Because the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, had to be considered, a trial court did not err by determining that it had exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over a custody case after a child moved to Oklahoma due to the child's continuing contacts with Arkansas under subsection (a) of this section. The child's father and his family resided in Arkansas, visitation rights were exercised there, the child had friends there, and she attended church and vacation bible school in Arkansas. Thomas v. Avant, 370 Ark. 377, 260 S.W.3d 266 (2007).

Trial court's judgment modifying visitation was reversed because the trial court was wrong as a matter of law that it was required to retain jurisdiction based solely upon one parent's continued residence in the state, and applying that mistaken premise, the trial court erred when it failed to exercise its discretion to determine whether it should exercise, or decline to exercise, jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, subsection (a) of this section. Gullahorn v. Gullahorn, 99 Ark. App. 397, 260 S.W.3d 744 (2007).

Trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction when it entered an initial child-custody order because the order was not consistent with § 9-19-201; Arkansas was not the home state of a minor child because she was not born there and had never been there. Moreover, the home state had not declined to exercise jurisdiction. Czupil v. Jernigan, 103 Ark. App. 132, 286 S.W.3d 753 (2008).

Trial court did not abuse its discretion in retaining jurisdiction under the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, § 9-19-101 et seq., where a father and the child had a significant connection with the state of Arkansas and the trial court had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under subsection (a) of this section. The child had lived in Texas for only one year, the father had remained a resident of Arkansas, and the child had continued to come to Arkansas on a regular basis to visit with the father. Hatfield v. Miller, 2009 Ark. App. 832, 373 S.W.3d 366 (2009).

Because a circuit court awarded child custody when it entered a divorce decree, it had exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the custody determination until it made either of the two determinations set forth in the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, subsection (a) of this section; there was evidence of significant connections with Arkansas when the circuit court determined that it had jurisdiction to decide the father's motion to change custody, and subsection (a) required no additional determination of the availability of substantial evidence. Harris v. Harris, 2010 Ark. App. 160, 379 S.W.3d 8 (2010).

Where a mother relocated to Montana with the parties' child, as the child had lived in Arkansas for all but the last nine months of her life, had extended family in Arkansas, and had regular visitation with her father there, the Arkansas trial court that had issued the initial custody decree did not abuse its discretion by exercising its continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under subsection (a) of this section over the father's motion to modify custody. Shields v. Kimble, 2010 Ark. App. 479, 375 S.W.3d 738 (2010).

In a child custody dispute, the circuit court had lost jurisdiction under this section where the child had resided in Mississippi for at least four years with the paternal great-uncle and great-aunt, a Mississippi court had granted them emergency custody, and that action constituted an award of legal custody by a court. Kyle v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 491, 588 S.W.3d 754 (2019).

Cited: Newkirk v. Burton, 2015 Ark. App. 627, 475 S.W.3d 573 (2015).

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 24 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 2002–2025 · leading case: Harris v. Harris, 379 S.W.3d 8 (Ark. Ct. App. 2010).
Harris v. Harris, 379 S.W.3d 8 (Ark. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 16× “In an order entered on December 3, 2008, the court found that the case was controlled by Ark.Code Ann. § 9-19-202 and Thomas v. Avant, 370 Ark.”
Hatfield v. Miller, 373 S.W.3d 366 (Ark. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 12× “After a hearing on the matter, the circuit court denied appellant’s motion to dismiss, finding that appellee and the child had a significant connection with the state of Arkansas and that the court had jurisdiction pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 9-19-202(a). Finally, on January 22,…”
Thomas v. Avant, 260 S.W.3d 266 (Ark. 2007). · cites it 8× “resided in Clark County or had a significant connection with Arkansas as required by section 9-19-202, a part of the UCCJEA. Avant counters that the court must consider the requirements of the UCCJEA and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), codified at 28 U.”
West v. West, 216 S.W.3d 557 (Ark. 2005). · cites it 8× “Ark. Code Ann. § 9-19-202 (a) (Repl. 2002).”
Gullahorn v. Gullahorn, 260 S.W.3d 744 (Ark. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 12× “The applicable section of the UCCJEA is Arkansas Code Annotated section § 9-19-202, which provides, in part: (a) Except as otherwise provided in § 9-19-204, a court of this state which has made a child-custody determination consistent with § 9-19-201 or § 9-19-203 has exclusive,…”
Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Cox, 82 S.W.3d 806 (Ark. 2002). · cites it 4× “Ark.Code Ann. § 9-19-202—9-19-204 (Repl.2002).”
Piccioni v. Piccioni, 378 S.W.3d 838 (Ark. Ct. App. 2011). · cites it 10× “The exact language of subparagraph (a)(2) was the subject of considerable debate. Ultimately the Conference settled on the phrase that "a court of this State or a court of another State determines that the child, the child’s parents, and any person acting as a parent do not…”
Shields v. Kimble, 375 S.W.3d 738 (Ark. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 6× “Ark.Code Ann. § 9-19-202(a) (Repl.2007). Although the UCCJEA governs determinations of jurisdiction, the jurisdictional preferences set out in the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act (PKPA), codified at 28 U.”
Wilson v. Beckett, 236 S.W.3d 527 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 4× “2002), an Arkansas court making an initial custody determination has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction until a court of this state or a court of another state determines that the child, the child’s parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in this state.”
Finney v. Cook, 94 S.W.3d 333 (Ark. 2002). · cites it 4× “The related issue of the trial court's continuing jurisdiction under Ark.Code Ann. § 9-19-202 (Repl. 2002) also involves a similar factual determination.”
Harter v. Szykowny, 2014 Ark. App. 701, 451 S.W.3d 215. · cites it 2× “2009)) or to modify an existing child-custody determination ( Ark. Code Ann. §§ 9-19-202 , -203 (Repl.2009)).”
Devine v. Martens, 263 S.W.3d 515 (Ark. 2007). · cites it 2× “ination and states: Except as otherwise provided in § 9-19-204, a court of this state may not modify a child-custody determination made by a court of another state unless a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under § 9-19-201(a)(1) or (2) and:…”
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-19-202(a): 10 cases
Hatfield v. Miller, 373 S.W.3d 366 (Ark. Ct. App. 2009). “After a hearing on the matter, the circuit court denied appellant’s motion to dismiss, finding that appellee and the child had a significant connection with the state of Arkansas and that the court had jurisdiction pursuant to Ark.Code Ann. § 9-19-202(a). Finally, on January 22,…”
Harris v. Harris, 379 S.W.3d 8 (Ark. Ct. App. 2010). “In an order entered on December 3, 2008, the court found that the case was controlled by Ark.Code Ann. § 9-19-202 and Thomas v. Avant, 370 Ark.”
Thomas v. Avant, 260 S.W.3d 266 (Ark. 2007). “resided in Clark County or had a significant connection with Arkansas as required by section 9-19-202, a part of the UCCJEA. Avant counters that the court must consider the requirements of the UCCJEA and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), codified at 28 U.”
Shields v. Kimble, 375 S.W.3d 738 (Ark. Ct. App. 2010). “Ark.Code Ann. § 9-19-202(a) (Repl.2007). Although the UCCJEA governs determinations of jurisdiction, the jurisdictional preferences set out in the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act (PKPA), codified at 28 U.”
Gullahorn v. Gullahorn, 260 S.W.3d 744 (Ark. Ct. App. 2007). “The applicable section of the UCCJEA is Arkansas Code Annotated section § 9-19-202, which provides, in part: (a) Except as otherwise provided in § 9-19-204, a court of this state which has made a child-custody determination consistent with § 9-19-201 or § 9-19-203 has exclusive,…”
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-19-202(a)(1): 2 cases
Harris v. Harris, 379 S.W.3d 8 (Ark. Ct. App. 2010). “In an order entered on December 3, 2008, the court found that the case was controlled by Ark.Code Ann. § 9-19-202 and Thomas v. Avant, 370 Ark.”
West v. West, 208 S.W.3d 776 (Ark. 2005).
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-19-202(a)(2): 1 case
Piccioni v. Piccioni, 378 S.W.3d 838 (Ark. Ct. App. 2011). “The exact language of subparagraph (a)(2) was the subject of considerable debate. Ultimately the Conference settled on the phrase that "a court of this State or a court of another State determines that the child, the child’s parents, and any person acting as a parent do not…”
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-19-202(a)(l): 2 cases
West v. West, 216 S.W.3d 557 (Ark. 2005). “Ark. Code Ann. § 9-19-202 (a) (Repl. 2002).”
West v. West, 208 S.W.3d 776 (Ark. 2005).
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-19-202(b): 1 case
Harris v. Harris, 379 S.W.3d 8 (Ark. Ct. App. 2010). “In an order entered on December 3, 2008, the court found that the case was controlled by Ark.Code Ann. § 9-19-202 and Thomas v. Avant, 370 Ark.”
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