Ark. Code Ann. § 9-9-220 (2026)

Research References

ALR.

Parents' mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — Issues concerning guardian ad litem and counsel. 118 A.L.R.5th 561.

Parents' mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — Applicability of Americans With Disabilities Act. 119 A.L.R.5th 351.

Parents' mental illness or mental deficiency as ground for termination of parental rights — Evidentiary issues. 122 A.L.R.5th 385.

Parents' Physical Illness or Physical Deficiency as Ground for Termination of Parental Rights — Applicability of Americans with Disabilities Act, 27 A.L.R.7th Art. 1 (2018).

U. Ark. Little Rock L.J.

Survey — Family Law, 11 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 215.

Survey, Family Law, 13 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 369.

U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev.

Survey of Legislation, 2001 Arkansas General Assembly, Family Law, 24 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 483.

Annual Survey of Caselaw, Family Law, 26 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 913.

Case Notes

In General.

The natural relationship between parent and child is subject to absolute severance in an adoption proceeding; however, the courts are inclined to favor the maintaining of the natural relationship when the adoption is sought without the consent of a parent and against his or her protest. Lindsey v. Ketchum, 10 Ark. App. 128, 661 S.W.2d 453 (1983).

Construction.

Section 9-9-208 and this section are mutually exclusive, in that they address separate methods by which a child may be adopted and provide different means by which the relinquishment of consent or direct consent may be withdrawn. In re Parsons, 302 Ark. 427, 791 S.W.2d 681 (1990).

Sections 9-9-208 and 9-9-209 are mutually exclusive from this section in obtaining the relinquishment of consent or consent to an adoption, and either one or the other should be employed based on the applicable circumstances of the adoption; and the use of both relinquishment of parental rights and consent provisions in the affidavit and consent of natural mother document was in contravention of these sections. In re Parsons, 302 Ark. 427, 791 S.W.2d 681 (1990).

Local rule imposed by chancellor blending the different statutory consent requirements of § 9-9-208 and this section was inappropriate. In re Parsons, 302 Ark. 427, 791 S.W.2d 681 (1990).

Former subdivisions of this section were not effective on the date that the father's child support order was entered and, therefore, the statute was not applicable to the father's case; the legislature intended for those non-custodial parents whose child support orders were entered after August 13, 2001, to be affected, such that the statute was meant to apply prospectively from August 31, 2001, not retroactively to May 31, 2001, the date the divorce decree was entered. Stroud v. Cagle, 87 Ark. App. 95, 189 S.W.3d 76 (2004) (decision under prior law).

Appellate Review.

Couple challenged the denial of a petition for adoption, arguing that the circuit court erred in permitting the birth mother to withdraw her relinquishment of her rights outside the time permitted by the statute, but the merits could not be decided because the couple failed to challenge the finding that adoption was not in the child's best interests. Clark v. Hall (In re I.C.), 2014 Ark. App. 513 (2014).

Custody.

It was not unconscionable for the trial court to consider a putative father as “a parent not having custody” within the meaning of subdivision (c)(3) of this section, despite the putative father's contention that he should not be considered as a noncustodial parent because he surrendered his child pursuant to a court order rather than voluntarily. Wineman v. Brewer, 280 Ark. 527, 660 S.W.2d 655 (1983).

Trial court did not err in terminating a father's parental rights to his child after his wife gave the baby up for adoption because the father did not have custody within the meaning of subdivision (c)(3) of this section, due to his frequently living with his parents rather than his wife and his failure to support or even see the baby. D.L.R. v. N.K., 2012 Ark. App. 316, 416 S.W.3d 274 (2012).

Imprisonment.

Father was not unfit simply because he was incarcerated, and there was no evidence that he posed a risk to his son, rather, evidence showed that he purchased clothing for his son before he was born and had consistently sought contact with his son even while incarcerated, which were actions consistent with a parent who was making a good-faith effort to discharge his parental duties; there were no facts showing that the child would suffer any untoward effect by allowing him to establish a relationship with his father, and there was no evidence showing that the child would be adversely affected by knowledge of or association with his father, thus, the trial court's order granting the guardian's adoption petition and terminating the father's rights was reversed. Henderson v. Callis, 97 Ark. App. 163, 245 S.W.3d 174 (2006).

Jurisdiction.

In a proceeding seeking to set aside a prior divorce decree adjudicating a purported father the legal parent of a minor child, a trial court lacked authority to terminate the father's parental rights because the action did not concern adoption. Hudson v. Kyle, 352 Ark. 346, 101 S.W.3d 202 (2003).

Revocation.

Even in the case of a final adoption decree, consent to adopt may be withdrawn upon a proper showing of fraud, duress or intimidation. Dale v. Franklin, 22 Ark. App. 98, 733 S.W.2d 747 (1987).

Where both relinquishment of parental rights and consent provisions were contained in the same document purporting to sanction the adoption of a minor child and the trial court included the ten day right to withdraw provision in its decree of adoption, the document was, in the main, a relinquishment of parental rights as embodied in this section and natural mother's revocation of her relinquishment five days after she signed the affidavit was effective. In re Parsons, 302 Ark. 427, 791 S.W.2d 681 (1990).

Circuit court clearly erred in failing to set aside an adoption decree; although the face of the relinquishment affidavit attached to the adoption petition reflected that the biological mother may well have signed it, the text messages and testimony showed that the mother believed that the document gave a friend the temporary ability to care for the child, that she wanted to proceed with an adoption, if at all, with the misunderstanding that the friend would adopt the child and she would share custody, and that she had never met nor communicated with the adoptive couple. Thompson v. Brunck, 2018 Ark. App. 198, 545 S.W.3d 830 (2018).

Termination by Court Order.

This section does not require a separate petition for termination of parental rights but allows the parental relationship to be terminated by a court order in connection with an adoption proceeding if the requisite grounds are satisfied. Wineman v. Brewer, 280 Ark. 527, 660 S.W.2d 655 (1983).

While the primary consideration in adoption proceeding is the welfare of the child, this does not mean that courts can sever the parental rights of nonconsenting parents and order adoption merely because the adoptive parents might be able to provide a better home. Lindsey v. Ketchum, 10 Ark. App. 128, 661 S.W.2d 453 (1983).

While the primary consideration is the welfare of the child, the court cannot sever the parental rights of nonconsenting parents and order adoption merely because the adoptive parents might be able to provide a better home. In re Milam, 27 Ark. App. 100, 766 S.W.2d 944 (1989).

Parent’s consent to the adoption of the parent’s child was not required because for years the child suffered irremediable abuse and neglect at the hands of the parent, who was addicted to alcohol, and the adoption of the child was in the child’s best interest. Ducharme v. Gregory, 2014 Ark. App. 268, 435 S.W.3d 14 (2014).

Unreasonable Withholding of Consent.

Evidence sufficient to find that parent unreasonably withheld consent to child's adoption. Lindsey v. Ketchum, 10 Ark. App. 128, 661 S.W.2d 453 (1983); In re Titsworth, 11 Ark. App. 197, 669 S.W.2d 8 (1984).

Psychological studies of the natural father and evidence of his antisocial behavior prior to the birth of his child were admissible in determining whether he unreasonably withheld his consent to adoption contrary to the best interests of the child. In re K.M.C., 333 Ark. 95, 62 Ark. App. 95, 969 S.W.2d 197 (1998).

Record contained no showing that a father unreasonably withheld his consent to an adoption by a guardian where the father had no obligation to consent merely because he was incarcerated or because the guardian did not want to communicate or have the child exposed to him; further, even if the father had consented to the guardianship, he would not have forfeited his parental rights in so doing and, thus, the trial court's order granting the guardian's adoption petition and terminating the father's rights was reversed. Henderson v. Callis, 97 Ark. App. 163, 245 S.W.3d 174 (2006).

Trial court's decision that the father unreasonably withheld consent and that it was in the child's best interest to be adopted by the adoptive parents was not against the preponderance of the evidence, which included evidence that the father was marginally self-sufficient while the adoptive parents had stable employment and housing. T.R. v. L.H., 2015 Ark. App. 483 (2015).

Bifurcation of proceedings under a stepmother's adoption petition into a hearing on whether the consent of the children's mother to the adoption was necessary and a hearing on whether the adoption was in the children's best interest did not deny the stepmother due process because (1) the stepmother did not object to the procedure, (2) once it was determined that the mother's consent was required, a best interest finding was unnecessary, and (3) the stepmother did not preserve the issue of whether the mother was unjustifiably withholding her consent, as the adoption petition only alleged the mother's consent was not required. Hrdlicka v. Hrdlicka (In re Adoption of P.H.), 2020 Ark. App. 178, 598 S.W.3d 846 (2020).

Cited: Temple v. Tucker, 277 Ark. 81, 639 S.W.2d 357 (1982); Loveless v. May, 278 Ark. 127, 644 S.W.2d 261 (1983); Lindsey v. Ketchum, 10 Ark. App. 128, 661 S.W.2d 453 (1983); In re Proposed Local Rules, 284 Ark. 133, 682 S.W.2d 452 (1984); Corley v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 46 Ark. App. 265, 878 S.W.2d 430 (1994); Vice v. Andrews, 328 Ark. 573, 945 S.W.2d 914 (1997); Batiste v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 361 Ark. 46, 204 S.W.3d 521 (2005); Marshall v. Rubright, 2017 Ark. App. 548 (2017).