green
Positive treatment
3.6 score
Treatment trajectory · 1989 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1989
2007
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 5 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited "see"
State v. Cote
See State v. Fiocchi, 17 Conn. App. 326, 331-33 , 553 A.2d 181 (concluding that trial court properly denied defendant’s request for instruction that “police officer is a public servant and if a statement was made in the course of his employment it is an official statement” because, under circumstances of case, whether statement was “official statement” was question of fact for jury), cert. denied, 210 Conn. 812 , 556 A.2d 611 (1989).
cited
Cited "see"
State v. Harris
See State v. Fiocchi, 17 Conn. App. 326, 338-39 , 553 A.2d 181 , cert. denied, 210 Conn. 812 , 556 A.2d 611 (1989).
cited
Cited "see"
State v. Person
See State v. Fiocchi, 17 Conn. App. 326 , 327 n.3, 553 A.2d 181 , cert. denied, 210 Conn. 812 , 556 A.2d 611 (1989).
cited
Cited "see"
State v. Boutwell
Practice Book § 4185; see State v. Lonergan, 16 Conn. App. 358 , 548 A.2d 718 (1988), cert. granted on other grounds, 210 Conn. 812 , 556 A.2d 611 (1989).
discussed
Cited "see, e.g."
State v. Kendrick
Ed. 2d 721 (1985) ; see also State v. Leonard, 14 Conn. App. 134, 135 , 539 A.2d 1030 (1988), aff'd, 210 Conn. 480 , 556 A.2d 611 (1989); State v. Mitchell, 7 Conn. App. 46, 49 , 507 A.2d 1017 (1986) (Appellate Court reviews entire record where trial court’s decision makes limited factual findings and legal conclusions), aff'd in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 204 Conn. 187 , 527 A.2d 1168 , cert. denied, 484 U.S. 927 , 108 S. Ct. 293 , 98 L.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
State of Connecticut
v.
John Lonergan
v.
John Lonergan
Supreme Court of Connecticut.
Feb 22, 1989.
Geoffrey E. Marion, deputy assistant state’s attorney, in support of the petition., James A. Wade and Sally S. King, in opposition.
Published
The plaintiffs petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 16 Conn. App. 358, is granted, limited to the following issue:
“Does the double jeopardy clause bar a prosecution on a charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor after acquittal of a charge of manslaughter in the second degree with a motor vehicle arising out of the same incident?”