Gibbs v. Dweck, 52 A.D.2d 801 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976). · Go Syfert
Gibbs v. Dweck, 52 A.D.2d 801 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
28 citation events (9 in the last 25 years) across 7 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Yahya v. United States (nywd, 2024-11-25)
Treatment trajectory · 1977 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1977 2001 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Yahya v. United States
W.D.N.Y. · 2024 · confidence medium
Apr. 18, 2013) (quoting Kelsey v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 52 A.D.2d 801, 801 (N.Y.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cuello v. Target Corporation (2×)
S.D.N.Y. · 2023 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Deluna-Cole v. Tonali, Inc., 303 A.D.2d 186, 187 (1st Dep’t 2003) (finding time between five and eight minutes sufficient for defendants to discover and remove broken glass); Kelsey v. Port Authority of N. ¥. & N.J., 52 A.D.2d 801, 801 (1st Dep’t 1976) (upholding jury finding of premises liability where slippery condition that existed for 15 to 20 minutes); Alexander v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 1124 (LMM), 2002 WL 1492125 , at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Zanki v. Cahill
N.Y. App. Div. · 2003 · confidence medium
Auth., 249 AD2d 59 [1998] [defendant did not except to recurring condition charge]; O’Connor-Miele v Barhite & Holzinger, 234 AD2d 106, 107 [1996] [plaintiff testified to “accumulation of debris” on stairwell, “particularly of soap powder”]; Vitanza v Growth Realties, 91 AD2d 917 [1983] [in wrongful death action, evidence was presented that stairway “was seriously and pervasively defective”]; Kelsey v Port Auth., 52 AD2d 801, 801 [1976] [plaintiff “testified that she saw cigarette butts, paper cups and wetness” on stairway]; Gramm v State of New York, 28 AD2d 787, 787 [1967],…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Padula v. Big V Supermarkets, Inc.
N.Y. App. Div. · 1991 · confidence medium
Much more comprehensive evidence of constructive and actual notice was established on the trial warranting submission of the notice issue to the jury (see, Kelsey v Port Auth., supra, at 801).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Weisenthal v. Pickman
N.Y. App. Div. · 1989 · confidence medium
In Kelsey v Port Auth. (supra, at 801), the plaintiff proved that a stairway in the defendant’s terminal had been littered for 15 to 20 minutes with "cigarette butts, paper cups and wetness” when, as she descended the stairs, she slipped on something which she was "unable to specify”.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Rizzo v. Lincoln Diner Corp.
N.Y. App. Div. · 1995 · signal: see also · confidence low
The plaintiffs have presented ample evidence, if true, to establish that the defendants, in the person of the diner manager and one of his employees, either created the icy condition or had actual notice of it (see, e.g., Padula v Big V Supermarkets, 173 AD2d 1094, 1096 ; see also, Kelsey v Port Auth., 52 AD2d 801 ; Cameron v Bohack Co., 27 AD2d 362, 365 ).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Linda Gibbs
v.
Jack S. Dweck
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York.
May 18, 1976.
52 A.D.2d 801
Published

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County, entered on May 8, 1975, denying plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, unanimously reversed, on the law, with $60 costs and disbursements to appellant, and the motion granted. The mortgage on the premises 2120 St. Paul’s Avenue, Bronx County, held by defendant, should be vacated as it does not secure any indebtedness. The retainer agreement drawn by defendant attorney provides in pertinent part as follows: "In the event that you are not successful in vacating the judgment or the lien, as aforementioned, then my liability to you for legal services shall be only in the sum of $800. paid to you”. Defendant admittedly received $800. While he was successful at the trial level, the Appellate Division reversed and the Court of Appeals affirmed such reversal. Hence, defendant was paid all that he was entitled to and no debt exists. There is no specific language in the agreement indicating the contrary. The language in the retainer agreement that "The aforementioned retainer shall not include any services you may render in connection with any appeal in this proceeding’’ merely means that defendant would be entitled to an additional fee for appellate services, and, not, as urged by him that, "I was to be paid the contingency if I was successful in the trial court”. Settle order on notice. Concur—Stevens, P. J., Markewich, Murphy, Capozzoli and Lane, JJ.