Keohane v. Swarco, Inc., 320 F.2d 429 (6th Cir. 1963). · Go Syfert
Copy Cite Keohane v. Swarco, Inc., 320 F.2d 429 (6th Cir. 1963).
Court of Appeals for the Sixth CircuitPublished opinionNo. Nos. 15284, 15334Aug 5, 1963

Keohane v. Swarco, Inc.

Quick Summary

A motion is made by causing it to be served, and serving a motion within the required timeframe satisfies procedural requirements even if filing occurs later.

The district court dismissed a complaint, and the plaintiff served a motion for amended findings within ten days but filed it the next day. The plaintiff filed a notice of appeal before the district court ruled on the motion. The question presented is whether the motion was timely made to toll the appeal period. The court applies the rule that a motion is made by causing it to be served, and filing within a reasonable time thereafter satisfies procedural requirements. The court holds the motion was timely, rendering the first appeal premature. Because the premature appeal transferred jurisdiction, subsequent district court orders were void. The court denies the motion to dismiss the first appeal and grants the motion to dismiss the second appeal, retaining jurisdiction to review the original judgment.

86 citation events (7 in the last 25 years) across 27 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1964 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1964 1995 2026
Cited for
At page 432Jurisdictional limits on court authority after appeal17 citing casesholding void orders entered by a district court after notice of appeal from interlocutory order2 citing courts put it this way · 16 listed here
  • United States v. Lamont Harvey, 996 F.3d 310 (6th Cir. 2021).published
    United States v. Holloway, 740 F.2d 1373, 1382 (6th Cir. 1984) (quoting Keohane v. Swarco, Inc., 320 F.2d 429, 432 (6th Cir. 1963)).
  • Adkins v. Jeffreys, 327 F. App'x 537 (6th Cir. 2009).unpublished
    United, States v. Garcia-Robles, 562 F.3d 763 (6th Cir.2009); Hogg v. United States, 411 F.2d 578, 580 (6th Cir.1969); Keohane v. Swarco, Inc., 320 F.2d 429, 432 (6th Cir.1963).
  • Russell v. Pride Convenience, Inc., 640 N.E.2d 1109 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994).published
    The court also observed that in Keohane v. Swarco, Inc., 320 F.2d 429, 432 (6th Cir. 1963), the court did not consider the advisory committee notes and, instead, relied upon rule 5(d) in concluding that the date of service was the decisive…
  • Daniel Workman v. Arthur Tate, 958 F.2d 164 (6th Cir. 1992).published
    E.g., Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 379 (1985); Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982); United States v. Holloway, 740 F.2d 1373, 1382 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1021…
  • Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir. 1990).published
    Keohane v. Swarco, Inc., 320 F.2d 429, 432 (6th Cir.1963).
  • United States v. Paul F. Stein, 870 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1989).unpublished
    Id.; Keohane v. Swarco, Inc., 320 F.2d 429, 432 (6th Cir.1963), aff'd, 328 F.2d 615 (6th Cir.1964). 7 In this case, the judgment entered on July 25, 1988, was final and appealable, and a timely appeal to this court perfected, thereby dives…
  • United States v. Quema Holloway, 740 F.2d 1373 (6th Cir. 1984).published
    “null and void since that court was without jurisdiction ... after the appeal had been taken”
  • Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 510 F. Supp. 1104 (W.D. Mich. 1981).published
    Though this decision is related to that opinion and the general rule is that an appeal to the Court of Appeals deprives a district court of jurisdiction as to any matters involved in the appeal, see, e. g., Jago v. *1107 United States Dist…
  • United States v. John Hitchmon, 602 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1979).published
    The Sixth Circuit, in Keohane v. Swarco, Inc., 320 F.2d 429, 432 (6th Cir. 1963), held that though an appeal was premature because made while a motion to amend was pending, even an appeal from a nonappealable order transferred jurisdiction…
  • Fleming v. Gardner, 84 F.R.D. 217 (E.D. Tenn. 1978).published
    It divested this Court of authority to proceed further herein as to such matters, idem., even though that appeal was taken from an interlocutory nonappealable order, Keohane v. Swarco, Inc., C.A. 6th (1963), 320 F.2d 429, 432 [4], Accordin…
Show 6 more citing cases
  • Frazier v. Lane, 479 F. Supp. 841 (E.D. Tenn. 1978).published
    Bank of Salem, Ohio v. Hirsch, C.A. 6th (1976), 535 F.2d 343 , 345 n. 1; Hogg v. United States, C.A. 6th (1969), 411 F.2d 578, 580 [2]; Keohane v. Swarco, Inc., C.A. 6th (1963), 320 F.2d 429, 432 [4].
  • Comm. for Open Media v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 543 F.2d 861 (D.C. Cir. 1976).published
    We need not inquire as to whether these decisions have yielded their vitality to an impressive array of contrary holdings, e. g., Foman v. Davis, supra, 371 U.S. at 180-182 , 83 S.Ct. at 229-230 , 9 L.Ed.2d at 224-226 ; Lemke v. United Sta…
  • Williams v. W. R. Grace & Co., 252 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Tenn. 1966).published 2 cites
    Keohane v. Swarco, Inc., C.A.6th (1963), 320 F.2d 429, 432 [4].
  • Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 383 N.E.2d 82 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978).published
    See Keohane v. Swarco, Inc., 320 F.2d 429, 432 (6th Cir. 1963), and Firchau v. Diamond Natl.
  • Cambio Health Solutions, LLC v. Reardon, 228 F. Supp. 2d 883 (M.D. Tenn. 2002).published
    (holding void orders entered by a district court after notice of appeal from interlocutory order)
  • Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Nat. Resources, 71 F.3d 1197 (6th Cir. 1995).published 2 cites
    (holding void orders entered by a district court after notice of appeal from interlocutory order)
At page 431Distinguishing summary judgment from other motions8 citing cases“although rule 52(b) refers to a motion of a party 'made,' while rule 59(b) and (d) refer to a motion 'served,' there is no difference in effect, since a motion is 'made' by causing it to be served.”1 citing court quotes it · 7 listed here
  • Paxton v. Wiebe, 1998 ND 169, 584 N.W.2d 72.published 5 cites
    (Professor Moore cites no cases to support the statement in the footnote.)
  • Sucesión de Pérez Sanes v. Cirino, 153 P.R. Dec. 527 (2001).published
    Keohane v. Swarco, Inc. 320 F.2d 429, 431-432 (6to Cir. 1963); 5 Moore’s Federal Practice, pág. 2680; Wright and Miller, supra. A contrario sensu, nuestra Regla 43.3 claramente dispone que una moción sobre determinaciones de hecho adiciona…
  • In re Berger's Babes 'N Bears, Inc., 149 B.R. 715 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993).published
    Lucas, Moore’s Federal Practice 1Í 52.11[1] at 2748 n. 8 (2d ed. 1982); Keohane v. Swarco, Inc., 320 F.2d 429, 431-32 (6th Cir.1963).
  • Carl E. Barrier, Jr. v. David W. Chester Attorney Gen. of North Carolina, 848 F.2d 184 (4th Cir. 1988).unpublished
    See Clayton v. Douglas, 670 F.2d 143, 144 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1109 (1982); Keohane v. Swarco, Inc., 320 F.2d 429, 431-32 (6th Cir.1963).
  • Nation v. Nation, 715 P.2d 198 (Wyo. 1986).published 2 cites
    Although not a summary judgment case, Keohane v. Swarco, Inc., 320 F.2d 429, 431 (6th Cir.1963) discussed Rule 5(d), and stated: "In the 1937 preliminary draft of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure proposed Rule 5(b) in part provided: "`…
  • Sonoma V v. Sells, 703 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1983).published 2 cites
    Lucas, Moore’s Federal Practice H 52.11[1], at 2748 n. 8 (2d ed. 1982); Keohane v. Swarco, Inc., 320 F.2d 429, 431-32 (6th Cir. 1963).
  • Davenport v. Broadhurst, 406 N.E.2d 1030 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980).published
    In Keohane v. Swarco, Inc., 320 F.2d 429, 431-432 (6th Cir. 1963), the court ruled that a motion under the Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(b) was timely made because it was served within ten days though it was not filed until the eleventh day.
At page 430Requiring motion service rather than filing within ten days3 citing casesWEICK, Circuit Judge. Both of these appeals are from orders entered by the District Court in the same case. Appellees have moved to dismiss the appeal in No.…opening of page *430 (no citing court says what it cites this page for)
  • Emerson Emory v. Sec'y of the Navy, 819 F.2d 291 (D.C. Cir. 1987).published
    Keohane v. Swarco, Inc., 320 F.2d 429, 430-32 (6th Cir.1963).
  • Parks v. Mr. Ford, 68 F.R.D. 305 (E.D. Pa. 1975).published
    However, the rule merely requires that the motion be served, rather than filed of record, within ten days, provided that it is filed within a reasonable time after it is served, Rule 5(d), (F.R.Civ.P.), Keohane v. Swarco, Inc., 320 F.2d 42…
  • Donna L. Nichols v. Bd. of Trs. of the Asbestos Workers Local 24 Pension Plan, 835 F.2d 881 (D.C. Cir. 1987).published 2 cites
    See, e.g., Keohane v. Swarco, Inc., 320 F.2d 429, 430-432 (6th Cir.1963); Parks v. “Mr. Ford," 68 F.R.D. 305, 307 (E.D.Pa.1975), rev'd on other grounds, 556 F.2d 132 (3d Cir.1977); cf. Sadowski v. Bombardier Ltd., 527 F.2d 1132, 1133-1134…
Other citing cases2 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
William H. KEOHANE
v.
SWARCO, INC., Amerace, Inc., Morton G. Nussbaum, Fred C. Ward, Joseph Halberstein, William C. Loughley and Herbert Loewy, (two cases)
Nos. 15284, 15334.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Aug 5, 1963.
Published opinion
320 F.2d 429
1963 U.S. App. LEXIS 4463
Sidney D. L. Jackson (of Baker, Hos-tetler & Patterson), Cleveland, Ohio, for appellant., George M. Austin, Cleveland, Ohio (George M. Austin, Harry C. Nester, Dennis C. Cronin, Cleveland, Ohio, on the brief; Hahn, Loeser, Freedheim, Dean & Wellman, Cleveland, Ohio, of counsel), for appellees.
Weick.
Cited by 52 opinions  |  Published
WEICK, Circuit Judge.

Both of these appeals are from orders entered by the District Court in the same case. Appellees have moved to dismiss the appeal in No. 15,284 because it was prematurely filed and to dismiss the appeal in No. 15,334 because it was not timely filed.

The motion to dismiss in No. 15,284 was based upon the following original papers and docket entries:

November 27, 1962 — Memorandum opinion
November 30, 1962 — Order dismissing complaint
December 10, 1962 — Service by mail on defendants’ counsel of plaintiff’s motion for amended and additional findings of fact.
December 11, 1962 — Motion for amended and additional findings of fact filed.

Rule 73(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the taking of an appeal 30 days from the entry of the judgment appealed from. It further provides that the “running of the time for appeal is terminated by a timely motion made pursuant to any of the rules hereinafter enumerated, and the full time for appeal fixed in this subdivision commences to run and is to be computed from the entry of any of the following orders made upon a timely motion under such rules: * * *; granting or denying a motion under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional findings of fact, *

Rule 52(b) provides in part as follows:

“Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59.”

Rule 59(b) provides:

“(b) Time for Motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment.”

Rule 59(e) provides:

“(e) Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment. A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.”

Rule 5(b) provides that service by mail is complete upon mailing.

Rule 5(d) provides:

“(d) Filing. All papers after the .complaint required to be served upon a party shall be filed with the court either before service or within a reasonable time thereafter.”

It will be noted from an examination of the docket entries that service of the motion to amend was made within the 10 day period required by Rule 52(b). The motion to amend, however, was not filed with the Clerk until the following day which was 11 days after the entry of the judgment.

Appellant was apprehensive whether its motion to amend was timely made un[*431]der Rule 52(b) on account of the filing of the motion 11 days after the judgment and as a precautionary measure filed its notice of appeal on December 28, 1962 which was within 30 days from the entry of the judgment dismissing the complaint.

Appellees contend that the motion to amend was timely made and the appeal, therefore, premature. It is their position that service of the motion is making the motion under Rule 52(b) and that under Rule 5(d) it need be filed only within a reasonable time after service. They argue that one day is certainly a reasonable time.

To complicate matters further, proceedings took place in the District Court after the appeal had been taken. On January 16, 1963, the District Court entered an order overruling plaintiff’s motion for amended and additional findings of fact. On March 6th the District Court entered a supplemental order which indicated that the motion had been overruled because not timely made. On March 14, 1963, the District Court entered an order vacating the orders of January 16th and March 6th and overruled the motion for amended and additional findings of fact on the ground that the motion was not timely made under Rule 52(b). On March 15, 1963, plaintiff filed its second notice of appeal which is Case No. 15,334.

In their motion to dismiss the appeal in No. 15,334, appellees contend that the second notice of appeal should have been filed within 30 days from January 16, 1963; that the District Court was without jurisdiction to enter the orders of March 6th and March 14th because an appeal had been taken in No. 15,284; that the District Judge was without power to extend the time for taking an appeal provided for by the Rules.

It is apparent from the foregoing that the District Judge and the appellant were both of the view that the motion for amended and additional findings was not timely made. In his subsequent orders, the District Judge stated that as the reason why he overruled the motion to amend. He had not considered the motion to amend on its merits.

In urging that the motion to dismiss be denied, appellant takes the position that in order for a motion to be “made” under Rule 52(b) it must be served and filed within the 10 day period. But Rule 5(d) grants a reasonable time after service to file the motion. There would not be much reason to have Rule 5(d) if the papers had to be both served and filed within the 10 day period.

In the 1937 preliminary draft of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure proposed Rule 5 (b) in part provided:

“When a time is prescribed for the service of a pleading or other paper, it shall be filed with the court as well as served within that time.”

This proposed rule was rejected. 2 Moore’s Federal Practice Par. 5.10, p. 1352.

Moreover, Rule 52(b) provides that the motion to amend may be made with a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. Rule 59 provides for service of the motion for a new trial not later than 10 days after judgment.

In 5 Moore’s Federal Practice on page 2680 the author states:

“Hence the motion under Rule 52 (b) just as the motion for a new trial under Rule 59 which may be joined with it, must be served6 not later than 10 days after the entry of judgment.
“6. Although Rule 52(h) refers to a motion of a party ‘made,’ while Rule 59 (b) and (d) refer to a motion ‘served,’ there is no difference in effect, since a motion is ‘made’ by causing it to be served.”

Professor Moore cites no cases to support the statement in the footnote. The only federal case which appellees cite construing the word “made” is Thierfeld v. Postman’s Fifth Avenue Corp., 37 F.Supp. 958, 960 (S.D.N.Y.) where the court said:

“Defendants urge that these motions [motions to strike] are not timely, and must be denied. The[*432] contention is that, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 12 (f), 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723(c), the motion must be ‘made’ within 20 days after the service of the pleading to which it is addressed, and that ‘made’ means actually presented to the court. I do not agree with defendants. Rule 12(a), F.R. C.P. provides that ‘service’ of a motion automatically extends time for the service of any responsive pleading. Service here was on the 20th day and therefore timely.”

Some of the Rules are geared specifically to a filing requirement. See Rule 3 (filing a complaint), Rule 41(a) (1) (filing notice of dismissal), Rule 73(a) (filing notice of appeal). Rule 5 (a) requires service of every pleading subsequent to the complaint, including motions and other papers. 2 Moore’s Federal Practice Par. 5.04, p. 1333.

Appellees rely heavily on Reliance Life Insurance Co. v. Burgess, 112 F.2d 234 (CA 8). The critical dates in that case were as follows: Thursday, July 27,1939 on which day the judgment was entered. The motions for a new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict were served on Saturday, August 5,1939 which was the ninth day. They were filed with the Clerk on Monday, August 7th. Since Sunday was excluded under Rule 6(a) the motions were all served and filed within the 10 day period.

While the case contains language helpful to appellees it was not necessary for the decision.

In our judgment, the motion to amend was timely made. It tolled the running of the time for appeal in No. 15,284. Rule 73; Leishman v. Associate Wholesale Electric Co., 318 U.S. 203, 63 S.Ct. 543, 87 L.Ed. 714; United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 65 S.Ct. 254, 89 L.Ed. 160. Since the District Court had not passed upon the motion to amend at the time the notice of appeal was filed, the judgment of dismissal was not final. The appeal was, therefore, premature. Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Mouat, 184 F.2d 44 (CA 9); Segundo v. United States, 221 F.2d 296 (CA 9).

The taking of the appeal even though from an interlocutory nonappealable order nevertheless transferred jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals. The orders entered by the District Court on January 16th, March 6th and March 14, 1963 were null and void since that court was without jurisdiction to make them after the appeal had been taken. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. City of Seattle, 281 F.2d 896 (CA 9); United States v. Frank B. Killian Co., 269 F.2d 491 (CA 6) ; Hirsch v. United States, 186 F.2d 524 (CA 6).

Professor Moore states that where a premature appeal has been taken careful practice suggests perfecting another appeal within the time limited by law. The trouble here is that the second appeal was not timely. Where the second appeal has not been taken Professor Moore says:

“But in the event that it is not, the premature appeal should now be effective to the extent that the appellant may secure review of so much of the original judgment, from which he took the premature appeal, as remains after the district court has disposed of the motion under Rule 52. (b).” 5 Moore’s Federal Practice, p. 2689.

A decision of this case by our Court on the merits ought not to be avoided on the basis of such technicalities. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222.

Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that we have jurisdiction to review the judgment dismissing the complaint without consideration of the motion to amend. The making of the motion to amend was not a prerequisite to appellate review. 5 Moore’s Federal-Practice, Par. 52.11 [4].

In the event counsel desires consideration to be given of the motion to amend, leave is granted to the District Court to[*433] determine the motion on its merits and certify its ruling in a supplemental record.

The motion to dismiss is denied in No. 15,284 and granted in No. 15,334.