United States ex rel. Gardner v. Madden, 352 F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1965). · Go Syfert
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United States ex rel. Gardner v. Madden, 352 F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1965). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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Federal district courts possess statutory authority to appoint counsel in civil actions, although the decision to do so remains within the court's discretion.

A state prisoner filed a civil rights action alleging police misconduct and sought appointment of counsel and permission to proceed in forma pauperis. The district court dismissed the complaint, asserting it lacked authority to appoint counsel in civil actions. The Ninth Circuit reviews whether the district court correctly interpreted its statutory authority. The court holds that the statute authorizes appointment of counsel in civil actions, though it remains a matter of judicial discretion rather than an absolute right. Because the record does not clarify whether the district court acted on a mistaken belief that it had no discretion, the appellate court remands the case for clarification.

208 citation events (163 in the last 25 years) across 23 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Redmond v. United States, No. 3:22-cv-01107 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2022)
Treatment trajectory · 1966 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1966 1996 2026
How cited ↗
Cited for
At page 793 Appointment of counsel in civil cases is a privilege91 citing casesnoting that the appointment of counsel in a civil case “is a privilege and not a right6 citing courts put it this way
  • Redmond v. United States, No. 3:22-cv-01107 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2022).
    ([T]he appointment of 26 counsel in a civil case is . . . a privilege and not a right.)
  • Tauscher v. Hanshew, No. 3:23-cv-03776 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2023).
    Lassiter v. Dep’t of 12 Social Svcs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981); see also Gardner v. Madden, 352 F.2d 792 , 793 (9th Cir. 13 1965) (“[T]he appointment of counsel in a civil case . . . is a privilege and not a right.”).
  • Tedesse, No. 2:26-cv-02300 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 20, 2026).
    Gardner v. Madden, 352 F.2d 792, 793 (9th Cir. 1965).
  • Talley, No. 4:26-cv-00206 (W.D. Ky. July 16, 2026).
    It is a privilege and not a right.”) (quoting United States v. Madden, 352 F.2d 792, 793 (9th Cir.1965)). ““‘It is a privilege that is justified only by exceptional circumstances.’” Lavado, 992 F.2d at 606 (quoting Wahl vy.
  • Sifuentes, No. 2:26-cv-02380 (W.D. Wash. July 13, 2026).
    Gardner v. Madden, 352 F.2d 792, 793 (9th Cir. 1965).
  • Charles J. Bicking IV v. Grass Valley Sch. Dist., No. 2:26-cv-02011 (E.D. Cal. June 4, 2026).
    Gardner 20 v. Madden, 352 F.2d 792, 793 (9th Cir. 1965) (citation omitted).
  • Northrop, No. 2:26-cv-01554 (W.D. Wash. June 1, 2026).
    Gardner v. Madden, 352 F.2d 792, 793 (9th Cir. 1965).
  • O'Bannon, No. 3:25-cv-00322 (W.D. Ky. May 18, 2026).
    It is a privilege and not a right.’”) (quoting United States v. Madden, 352 F.2d 792, 793 (9th Cir. 1965)). “‘It is a privilege that is justified only by exceptional circumstances.’” Lavado, 992 F.2d at 606 (quoting Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2…
  • Adkins, No. 5:25-cv-00061 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 17, 2026).
    It is a privilege and not a right.’”) (quoting United States v. Madden, 352 F.2d 792, 793 (9th Cir. 1965)). “‘It is a privilege that is justified only by exceptional circumstances.’” Lavado, 992 F.2d at 606 (quoting Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2…
  • Booza, No. 2:24-cv-01717 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2025).
    United States ex Rel. 10 Gardner v. Madden, 352 F.2d 792, 793 (9th Cir. 1965) (citation omitted).
Show 81 more citing cases
At page 794 Limiting court discretion in granting counsel in civil cases5 citing cases“appointment of counsel should be allowed only in exceptional cases.”27 citing courts quote it
At page 792 “the appointment of counsel in a civil case is ... a privilege and not a right.”1 citing case20 citing courts quote it
  • Tauscher v. Hanshew, No. 3:23-cv-03776 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2023).
    ([T]he appointment of counsel in a civil case . . . is a privilege and not a right.)
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America ex rel. Robert Newton GARDNER, Jr.
v.
William T. MADDEN, Captain, Edward J. Sanchez, Sergeant, Joe Aguirre, Detective, Dalton Newland, Inspector, William H. Parker, Los Angeles Chief of Police
No. 19971.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Nov 3, 1965.
Published opinion
352 F.2d 792
1965 U.S. App. LEXIS 4076
Robert Newton Gardner, Jr., in pro. per., Roger Arnebergh, City Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for appellees.
Barnes.
Cited by 95 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Citer courts: N.D. California (1)
BARNES, Circuit Judge:

This is another of the never-ending flow of cases initiated by State-incarcerated prisoners alleging an abridgement of their federal civil rights. Sued are four city police and one state narcotics inspector who allegedly entered into a conspiracy to deprive appellant of his rights by means of (1) an illegal arrest without warrant on December 10, 1959, for robbery; (2) a search of appellant’s house after such arrest; (3) prolonged interrogation and refusal to allow appellant to call an attorney; (4) rearrest and booking for possession of narcotics; (5) physical abuse; and (6) perjury at preliminary examination by defendant Sanchez — some twenty miscellaneous acts, allegedly violating appellant’s civil rights. (42 U.S.C. § . 1983.)

The order dismissing the complaint in the district court was on the court’s own motion. It was done apparently on the hearing of the plaintiff’s motion for appointment of an attorney, and for permission to proceed in forma pauperis. It was not based on appellant’s failure to state a claim. In fact, the order of dismissal specifically recognizes that the claim stated could probably be litigated at a later date.

The court gave two reasons for the dismissal. One — that the court had no authority to appoint counsel to represent the appellant in a civil action; and second — that there are no funds available to pay witness fees or transport appellant from his place of incarceration to the district court.

Without passing on the second reason, we cannot agree with the first.[1] 28 U.S.C. § 1915, by its terms, authorizes the appointment of counsel in civil actions.[2]

It is true that the appointment of counsel in a civil case is, as is the privilege of proceeding in forma pauperis, a matter within the discretion of the district court. It is a privilege and not a right. Wright v. Rhay, 310 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied 373 U.S. 918, 83 S.Ct. 1309, 10 L.Ed.2d 418 (1963).

Here the plaintiff sought to appeal in forma pauperis from the district court’s dismissal. The district court found the appeal was taken in good faith and was not frivolous. It is only if the issues raised are so frivolous that an appeal would be dismissed in the case of a non-indigent litigant, that a motion to •appeal in forma pauperis should be denied. Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, 675, 78 S.Ct. 974, 2 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1958); John v. Gibson, 270 F.2d 36 (9th Cir. 1959).

[*794] The court of appeals may, in the exercise of its plenary power, dismiss a civil appeal as frivolous. Jimenez v. Barber, 252 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1958). But because the district court granted permission to appeal in forma pauperis, we should give that order “great weight.” We do, and therefore will not dismiss the appeal as frivolous.

In civil actions for damages, appointment of counsel should be allowed only in exceptional cases. Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1963). This involves the exercise of the court’s discretion. .Here the court below may have refused to exercise its discretion upon the mistaken belief it had none.

The state of the record before us makes it impossible to determine whether the court felt it had any discretion to exercise. We remand for clarification.

1

It might be that an appointed attorney could, by way of depositions, obviate the necessity of transporting the plaintiff, or, at least, preserve testimony for subsequent hearings.

2

We note that there is good reason, from some language used by this court in the past, to come to a contrary conclusion and draw a distinction between civil and criminal cases. Anderson v. Heinze, 258 F.2d 479 (9th Cir. 1958); In re Dinerstein, 258 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1958); and see Judge Duniway’s concurring opinion in Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598, at 603 (9th Cir. 1963).