Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973). · Go Syfert
Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
127 citation events (4 in the last 25 years) across 36 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: An opinion was released in case 23-1067, Marin Audubon Society v. FAA (cadc, 2024-11-12) · Strongest negative: Friends of Fiery Gizzard v. Farmers Home Administration (ca6, 1995-08-07)
Treatment trajectory · 1973 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1973 1999 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "but see" Friends of Fiery Gizzard v. Farmers Home Administration
6th Cir. · 1995 · signal: but cf. · confidence high
But cf. Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 426-27 (5th Cir.1973), suggesting by way of dictum that an environmental impact statement may be necessitated by a significant beneficial environmental effect even if no adverse effects can be forecast.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) An opinion was released in case 23-1067, Marin Audubon Society v. FAA
D.C. Cir. · 2024 · confidence medium
At the time, several courts concluded that CEQ’s role was “merely advisory” because it lacked any “authority to prescribe regulations governing compliance with NEPA.” Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 424 (5th Cir. 1973) (citing Greene Cnty.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) An opinion was released in case 23-1067, Marin Audubon Society v. FAA
D.C. Cir. · 2024 · confidence medium
At the time, several courts concluded that CEQ’s role was “merely advisory” because it lacked any “authority to prescribe regulations governing compliance with NEPA.” Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 424 (5th Cir. 1973) (citing Greene Cnty.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Coliseum Square Ass'n v. Jackson
5th Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 426-27 (5th Cir.1973) (disavowed on other grounds).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Friends Of Fiery Gizzard v. Farmers Home Administration
6th Cir. · 1995 · confidence medium
Roney, United States Circuit Judge for the Eleventh Circuit, sitting by designation 1 But cf. Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 426-27 (5th Cir.1973), suggesting by way of dictum that an environmental impact statement may be necessitated by a significant beneficial environmental effect even if no adverse effects can be forecast.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Friends of Fiery Gizzard v. Farmers Home Administration
M.D. Tenn. · 1994 · confidence medium
Plaintiffs also cited Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 424-25 (5th Cir.1973).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
3rd Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
Secs. 4341-47 (1982), which "serve[s] as a research, resource, and advisory body in the Executive Office of the President of the United States." Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 423 (5th Cir.1973) 4 The NEPA Interim Policy Statement required reasoned consideration of the environmental risks attributable to accidents at the facility for which the environmental impact statement was prepared, a discussion of risks at the particular plant arising from external causes, and an estimate of the socioeconomic impact that might be associated with the emergency measures during or foll…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
3rd Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
CEQ is the agency established under NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341-47 (1982), which “serve[s] as a research, resource, and advisory body in the Executive Office of the President of the United States.” Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 423 (5th Cir.1973). .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Louisiana, Ex Rel. William J. Guste, Jr., and Save Our Coast, Inc., Cross-Appellants v. Colonel Robert C. Lee, Cross-Appellees
5th Cir. · 1988 · confidence medium
Owners, Res. & Assoc. v. Pierce, 719 F.2d 1272 , 1282 (5th Cir.1983); Image of Greater San Antonio v. Brown, 570 F.2d 517, 523 (5th Cir.1978); Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 425 (5th Cir.1973).
cited Cited as authority (rule) City of Southlake v. Federal Aviation Administration
N.D. Tex. · 1986 · confidence medium
Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 465 (5th Cir.1973); Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 425 (5th Cir.1973).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Citizen Advocates for ResponSible Expansion, Inc. v. Dole (2×)
5th Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
Naturally, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency, see Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 228 , 100 S.Ct. 497, 500 , 62 L.Ed.2d 433 (1980); Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 425 (5th Cir.1973), but must assess the reasonableness of the agency’s determination on the basis of the information before the agency at the time the decision not to prepare an EIS was made.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Citizen Advocates for Responsible Expansion, Inc. (I-Care) v. Dole (2×)
5th Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
Naturally, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency, see Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 228 , 100 S.Ct. 497, 500 , 62 L.Ed.2d 433 (1980); Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 425 (5th Cir.1973), but must assess the reasonableness of the agency's determination on the basis of the information before the agency at the time the decision not to prepare an EIS was made.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Louisiana Wildlife Federation, Inc. v. Dennis J. York, Colonel (3×)
5th Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Vieux Carre Property Owners, Residents & Associates, Inc. v. Pierce, 719 F.2d 1272, 1279 (5th Cir.1983); Image of Greater San Antonio, Texas v. Brown, 570 F.2d 517, 522 (5th Cir. 1978); Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 425 (5th Cir.1973); Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 466-67 (5th Cir. 1973). .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fritiofson v. Alexander
S.D. Tex. · 1984 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. Sands, 711 F.2d 634, 644 (5th Cir. 1983); Sierra Club v. Hassell, 636 F.2d 1095, 1097 (5th Cir.1981); Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 424 (5th Cir.1973); Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 466-67 (5th Cir.1973).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Citizen Advocates for Responsible Expansion, Inc. v. Dole
N.D. Tex. · 1984 · confidence medium
In reviewing the Defendants’ determination that an environmental impact statement was not required, this Court must not substitute its own views for those of the federal and state agencies since “it is not the province of the court to review the agency decision on the merits as to the desirability vel non of the project.” Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 425 (5th Cir.1973).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) National Wildlife Federation v. John O. Marsh, Secretary of the Army (2×)
11th Cir. · 1983 · confidence medium
Id. at 991 . 76 In reviewing an agency decision on the necessity for an SEIS, "the reviewing court should uphold the agency's decision only if it is reasonable, rather than use the deferential 'substantial evidence' standard." Id. at 992 (citing Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 424-25 (5th Cir.1973); Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 466-67 (5th Cir.1973)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sierra Club v. James M. Sigler, Etc., Pelican Terminal Company and Galveston Wharves, Intervenors-Appellees
5th Cir. · 1983 · confidence medium
Thus overruling our previous declaration that the “CEQ does not have the authority to prescribe regulations governing compliance with NEPA.” Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 424 (5th Cir.1973). 12 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) City of New York v. United States Department of Transportation
S.D.N.Y. · 1982 · confidence medium
But whether or not this is so where they are not expressly adopted by the agency, compare Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 424 (5th Cir. 1973) (CEQ guidelines not binding) with Andrus v. Sierra Club, supra, 442 U.S. at 358 , 99 S.Ct. at 2341 (CEQ guidelines entitled to “substantial deference”), they are clearly binding in this situation because they have been adopted by DOT as its own, and supplemented to establish a general obligation to study, develop, and describe alternatives even when an EIS is not prepared.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) City of Irving v. Federal Aviation Administration
N.D. Tex. · 1981 · confidence medium
If the FAA has not developed such a reviewable record, then the district court may either: (i) enjoin the project in question until the agency has completed such a record: Simmans v. Grant, 370 F.Supp. 5, 18 (S.D.Tex.1974); Citizens for Responsible Area Growth v. Adams, 477 F.Supp. 994 (D.N.H.1979); City of Romulus v. County of Wayne, 392 F.Supp. 578 (E.D.Mich.1975); or (ii) hear evidence on the environmental impact of the project for the purpose of supplementing the administrative record and determining the reasonableness of the agency’s conclusion that the project was not a major action ha…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Environmental Defense Fund v. Marsh (2×)
5th Cir. · 1981 · confidence medium
Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 424-25 (5th Cir. 1973); Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 466-67 (5th Cir. 1973).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Environmental Defense Fund v. Marsh (2×)
5th Cir. · 1981 · confidence medium
Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 424-25 (5th Cir. 1973); Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 466-67 (5th Cir. 1973).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Guilliaem Aertsen v. Moon Landrieu, Etc. (3×)
1st Cir. · 1980 · confidence medium
September 21, 1971 by CEQ General Counsel, as noted in Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 424-425 (5th Cir. 1973), provided that where a proposed action may be a major action, the local HUD office shall make a Special Environmental Clearance (SEC) study which shall result in either (a) a “negative statement” indicating that the action would *18 have no adverse effect on the environment or (b) an EIS pursuant to § 102(2)(C) of NEPA.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Winnebago Tribe v. Ray
8th Cir. · 1980 · confidence medium
See SOTA, supra, 472 F.2d at 467 ; Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 425 (5th Cir. 1973); Image of Greater San Antonio, Texas v. Brown, 570 F.2d 517, 522 (5th Cir. 1978).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Winnebago Tribe Of Nebraska v. Col. James W. Ray
8th Cir. · 1980 · confidence medium
See SOTA, supra, 472 F.2d at 467 ; Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 425 (5th Cir. 1973); Image of Greater San Antonio, Texas v. Brown, 570 F.2d 517, 522 (5th Cir. 1978). 10 In the present suit, the district court assigned appellant the burden of raising a substantial environmental issue.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Monarch Chemical Works, Inc. v. Exon
D. Neb. · 1979 · confidence medium
Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 425 (5th Cir. 1973); Hiatt Grain & Feed, Inc. v. Bergland, 416 F.Supp. 457, 490 (N.D.Ill. 1978).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Pokorny v. Costle
D. Neb. · 1979 · confidence medium
Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 425 (5th Cir. 1973); Hiatt Grain & Feed, Inc. v. Bergland, 446 F.Supp. 457, 490 (N.D.Ill.1978).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Como-Falcon Coalition, Inc. v. United States Department of Labor (3×)
D. Minnesota · 1978 · confidence medium
City Council, 339 F.Supp. 793 (D.D.C.1972); Morgan v. United States Postal Serv., 405 F.Supp. 413, 421 (W.D.Mo.1975); Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm’n v. Martin, 447 F.Supp. 350, 352 (D.D.C.1978); Benton County Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 450 F.Supp. 884, 890-91 (W.D.Ark.1978); Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 423 (5th Cir. 1973); cf. Town of Groton v. Laird, 353 F.Supp. 344, 350-51 (D.Conn.1972).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Image of Greater San Antonio, Texas v. Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense, American Federation of Government Employees, A.F.L., C.I.O., Local 1617 v. Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense
5th Cir. · 1978 · confidence medium
Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 425 (5th Cir. 1973). 14 Plaintiffs presented evidence below tending to show that the discharge of some 1,200 civilian employees from Kelly AFB would have significant socio-economic effects on the discharged employees specifically and on San Antonio generally.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Image of Greater San Antonio v. Brown
5th Cir. · 1978 · confidence medium
Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 425 (5th Cir. 1973).
cited Cited as authority (rule) City of New Haven v. Chandler
D. Conn. · 1978 · confidence medium
Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 426 (5th Cir. 1973); Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 , 421 (2d Cir. 1972).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hiatt Grain & Feed, Inc. v. Bergland
D. Kan. · 1978 · confidence medium
Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 425 (5th Cir. 1973).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Natural Resources Defense Council v. Hughes
D.D.C. · 1977 · confidence medium
Although courts have construed the legal status of these regulations as advisory and not entitled to binding effect, Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 424 (5th Cir. 1973), it is important to note when considering their weight that the President delegated the authority to the CEQ to issue these guidelines as to the manner of agency compliance with section 102 of NEPA.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sadler v. 218 Housing Corp. (2×) also: Cited "see"
N.D. Ga. · 1976 · confidence medium
Hiram Clarke, supra, at 425.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mid-Shiawassee County Concerned Citizens v. Train (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
E.D. Mich. · 1976 · confidence medium
Only if the plaintiff can show an inadequate evidentiary development before the agency should the District Court supplement the deficient administrative record by taking evidence on the environmental impact of the project.” 476 F.2d at 425; see Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, supra, at 467.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Association v. James T. Lynn
7th Cir. · 1975 · confidence medium
Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 429 (5th Cir. 1973); Greene County Planning Board v. Federal Power Commission, 455 F.2d 412, 421 (2d Cir. 1972). 4 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Save the Courthouse Committee v. Lynn
S.D.N.Y. · 1975 · confidence medium
Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 424 (5th Cir. 1973); Greene County Planning Board v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 , 421 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 , 93 S.Ct. 56 , 34 L.Ed.2d 90 (1972).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Carolina Action v. Simon
M.D.N.C. · 1975 · confidence medium
Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 424 (5th Cir. 1973); Greene Cty.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Trinity Episcopal School Corporation v. Romney
S.D.N.Y. · 1974 · confidence medium
These regulations established the rule that proposed apartment projects of one hundred or more units (including Site 30 with its 160 units) require a “Special Environmental Clearance.” Additional *1077 ly, paragraph 3 of HUD Circular 1390.1, Appendix A, states that issues raised by opponents and supporters of HUD projects shall be given careful consideration. 34 See Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 423-424 (5th Cir. 1973).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Earl L. Butz, in His Official Capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture
10th Cir. · 1973 · confidence medium
See Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 465 (5th Cir.); Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 424 (5th Cir.); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 148 U.S.App.D.C. 5 , 458 F.2d 827, 834 ; Scherr v. Volpe, 336 F.Supp. 886, 888 (W.D.Wis.), aff’d on other grounds, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir.); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 341 F.Supp. 356, 366-67 (E.D.N.C.); see also National Helium Corp. v. Morton, supra 458 F.2d at 656 ; Calvert Cliffs’, supra 449 F.2d at 1114 ; but see Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 829 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 412 …
examined Cited as authority (rule) Maryland - National Capital Park and Planning Commission a Public Body Corporate v. U. S. Postal Service (3×) also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
D.C. Cir. · 1973 · confidence medium
The Court noted that “Appellants, homeowners in the immediate area surrounding the site of the proposed apartments, initially opposed the project through local zoning boards and other governmental [bodies without success].” 476 F.2d at 423.
cited Cited "see" Pennsylvania Protect Our Water & Environmental Resources, Inc. v. Appalachian Regional Commission
M.D. Penn. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 424 (5th Cir.1973).
discussed Cited "see" The Township of Lower Alloways Creek v. Public Service Electric & Gas Company, and the United States of America Nuclear Regulatory Commission
3rd Cir. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 424 (5th Cir. 1973) (CEQ regulations are “merely advisory”); but cf. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 , 99 S.Ct. 2335, 2341 , 60 L.Ed.2d 943 (1979) (“CEQ’s interpretation of NEPA is entitled to substantial deference”).
cited Cited "see" Portela v. Pierce
9th Cir. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
New Hope Community Association v. Harris, No. 79-453-Civ-5 (E.D.N.C., decided Mar. 1981); see Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973).
cited Cited "see" Portela v. Pierce
9th Cir. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
New Hope Community Association v. Harris, No. 79-453-Civ-5 (E.D.N.C., decided Mar. 1981); see Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973).
cited Cited "see" New Hope Community Ass'n v. United States Department of Housing & Urban Development
E.D.N.C. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hiram Clarke, supra. Certainly, disputed questions of fact exist as regards the actual effect that the construction of the proposed project will have on water runoff and flooding in the area.
discussed Cited "see" Com. of Puerto Rico v. Muskie
D.P.R. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
Indeed, CEQ has no statutory authority even to issue regulations, Greene County Planning Board v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 , 421 (C.A.2, 1972); see 42 U.S.C. § 4344 , and its guidelines do not have the force of law, Hiram Clarke Civic Club Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421 (C.A.5, 1973). 18 .
cited Cited "see" Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills v. Costle
D.N.J. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc. v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421, 425 (5th Cir. 1973). 4 .
cited Cited "see" HALL CTY. HISTORICAL SOC., INC. v. Ga. Dept. of Transp.
N.D. Ga. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hiram Clarke Civic Club v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973).
cited Cited "see" Hall County Historical Society, Inc. v. Georgia Department of Transportation
N.D. Ga. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hiram Clarke Civic Club v. Lynn, 476 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Hiram Clarke Civic Club, Inc., Etc.
v.
James T. Lynn, Individually and as Secretary of the Department of Housing & Urban Development, Libo, Inc., Intervenor-Defendant-Appellee
72-1268.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Apr 3, 1973.
476 F.2d 421
Cited by 7 opinions  |  Published

476 F.2d 421

5 ERC 1177, 3 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,287

HIRAM CLARKE CIVIC CLUB, INC., etc., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
James T. LYNN, Individually and as Secretary of the
Department of Housing & Urban Development, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees, Libo, Inc.,
Intervenor-Defendant-Appellee.

No. 72-1268.

United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.

April 3, 1973.

Hellmut A. Erwing, O. K. Jerden, Houston, Tex., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Anthony J. P. Farris, U. S. Atty., Jack Shepherd, Chief Asst. U. S. Atty., Theo W. Pinson, III, James R. Gough, Asst. U. S. Attys., W. Edwin Denman, Vernon E. Fewell, Houston, Tex., Kent Frizell, Asst, Atty. Gen., Edmund B. Clark, Larry G. Gutterridge, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for defendants-appellees.

Before JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge, and MOORE[a] and RONEY, Circuit Judges.

RONEY, Circuit Judge:

[*~421]1

In this action appellants seek to enjoin the federal funding of a proposed low and moderate income apartment project in Houston, Texas. Appellants contend that the failure of the Department of Housing and Urban Development to file an environmental impact statement bars it from further funding of the project. The District Court denied injunctive and declaratory relief. We affirm, holding that the threshold determination made by HUD not to file an environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 4321 et seq. was not unreasonable and must therefore be upheld. See Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1973).

2

The proposed project against which this action is directed is a 272-unit apartment complex to be known as the Artistocrat Apartments and to be constructed on a fifteen acre tract near West Airport Boulevard and Hiram Clarke Road in Houston, Texas. The estimated cost of the project is some $4,181,330, and a loan to the private developer, approximately $3,763,200, is to be insured by HUD under Section 236 of the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1715z-1(j), which provides federal mortgage insurance for housing projects designed for low and moderate income residents. The apartments have an average value of $15,400 and the project contains courtyards, open spaces, children's playgrounds, a swimming pool, and a 6,500 square-foot community center.

3

Appellants, homeowners in the immediate area surrounding the site of the proposed apartments, initially opposed the project through local zoning boards and other governmental administrative bodies. Finding no success, appellants then challenged the HUD funding decision. On appeal, as in the District Court, they contend first, that HUD failed to comply with its own regulations implementing NEPA and second, that, even if HUD's actions complied with its own regulations, the requirements of the Act itself remain unfulfilled.

I.

[*~422]4

Under NEPA, Congress has established a system of procedures for federal agencies to follow in making decisions that might have an impact on the environment. Section 102(2)(C) of the Act, 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 4332(2)(C), which sets out the concept of the environmental impact statement, requires that "all agencies of the Federal Government shall . . . (C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" a detailed statement on the proposed action's envionmental effects.[1] This rather general legislative language received explication in the interim guidelines of April, 1970, published by the Council on Environmental Quality, the agency established by Title II of NEPA, 42 U.S.C.A. Secs. 4341-4347, to serve as a research, resource, and advisory body in the Executive Office of the President of the United States. These guidelines became final, without important alteration, in April, 1971. Section 3 of the guidelines directed federal agencies to promulgate their own procedures for "identifying those agency actions requiring environmental statements . . . ." Council on Environmental Quality, Guidelines Sec. 3, 36 Fed.Reg. 7724 (April 23, 1971). Section 5(a)(ii) defines "action" as including projects supported in whole or in part by federal loans, subsidies, or other forms of funding assistance. Guidelines, supra, Sec. 5(a)(ii), 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971).

5

*****

6

* * *

7

These CEQ guidelines are merely advisory, because the CEQ does not have the authority to prescribe regulations governing compliance with NEPA. Greene County Planning Board v. Federal Power Commission, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972). Following these CEQ guidelines, however, HUD published Circular 1390.1 setting forth the detailed procedures that it would employ for screening all HUD projects to insure its compliance with the Act as to each project.

8

HUD Circular 1390.1 established certain "thresholds" that are used to isolate those projects that may be major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. A project passing the first threshold is then given special environmental consideration and study. This means that the project must be thoroughly investigated, and the HUD office involved must either file a "negative statement," indicating that approval of the project application is consistent with established HUD policy and standards and that it would have no significant adverse effect on the environment or, if unresolved environmental issues or concerns remain, must draft and circulate a detailed environmental impact statement.

9

The "threshold concept" used to screen proposed applications of the kind under review here establishes the rule that proposed apartment projects of one hundred or more units require a "Special Environmental Clearance." Additionally, paragraph 3 of HUD Circular 1390.1, Appendix A, states that "controversial" or "precedent-making" HUD projects must be given "Special Environmental Clearance."[2]

10

The precise question before us, then, is whether HUD complied with the mandate of NEPA and with its own guidelines.

11

The standard for reviewing HUD's decision has been explicated by this Court in our recent opinion in Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, supra. In SOTA, we held that the decision of a federal agency not to file an environmental impact statement, when reviewed by the courts, should be tested by a stricter "reasonableness standard," instead of by the well-settled rule that, in the absence of fraud, administrative findings of fact are conclusive if supported by any substantial record evidence. This more penetrating standard is necessary because "[t]he spirit of [NEPA] would die aborning if a facile, ex parte decision that the project was minor or did not significantly affect the environment were too well shielded from impartial review." SOTA, at page 466.

[*~423]12

This case, though, differs from the SOTA case in the procedures and standards employed by the District Court to evaluate HUD's determination that an environmental impact statement was not required. Unlike in SOTA, where the District Court denied relief solely on the basis of its review of the agency's administrative record, the District Court here conducted a full-scale trial on the issue, hearing witnesses and taking evidence from parties involved. Hence, the District Court's decision here rests upon two independent bases: the record of HUD's considerations and the Court's own findings. This is not to say, though, that this procedure is mandatory whenever someone challenges an agency's failure to file an environmental impact statement. Rather, as we said in SOTA, only if a plaintiff raises substantial environmental issues should a court proceed to examine and weigh the evidence of both the plaintiff and the agency to determine whether the agency reasonably concluded that the particular project would have no effects that would significantly affect our environmental quality. Only if the plaintiff can show an inadequate evidentiary development before the agency should the District Court supplement the deficient administrative record by taking evidence on the environmental impact of the project.

13

We reiterate, as we stated in SOTA, that it is not the province of the courts to review the agency decision on the merits as to the desirability vel non of the proposed project. Instead,

14

it is the courts' function to insure that the mandate of the statute [NEPA] has been carried out and that all relevant environmental effects of the project be given appropriate consideration by the responsible official whenever it is unreasonable to conclude that the project is without the purview of the Act.

15

SOTA, supra, at page 467 (emphasis added).

II.

16

On December 1, 1969, the private developer, LIBO, Inc., applied to HUD for federal mortgage insurance available under Section 236 of the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1715z-1(j). On July 16, 1971, HUD issued a Firm Commitment to assist the proposed project, promising to supply both federal loan insurance and mortgage payment subsidies.

[*~424]17

NEPA became effective on January 1, 1970, and on April 30, 1970, the interim guidelines for implementing NEPA were issued. As we have pointed out earlier, these guidelines were issued in final form, with only minor changes, on April 23, 1971. On June 19, 1970, HUD issued a memorandum establishing interim internal procedures for implementing NEPA. Specific policies and procedures applicable to HUD offices in the Fort Worth Region were established by HUD Circular FW 1300.2, issued March 1, 1971, and received by the Houston HUD office on March 15, 1971. This Circular introduced the "threshold" and "negative statement" concepts. On July 16, 1971, HUD issued Circular 1390.1 establishing nationwide departmental policies governing the implementation of NEPA, including specific "threshold" and "negative statement" procedures. On September 21, 1971, CEQ General Counsel approved HUD's "negative statement" procedures.

18

Appellants filed their complaint on October 18, 1971. At this time, the Houston HUD office reviewed the entire project for the second time. Although the project had been in the HUD "pipeline" prior to the effective date of NEPA and before HUD Circular FW 1300.2, paragraph 3, directed that there must be evidence of "significantly adverse" environmental impact before the provisions of HUD Circular 1390.1 (the HUD Circular implementing NEPA) apply to applications in the HUD "pipeline" prior to March 15, 1971, the Houston HUD office, nevertheless, worked up a "Special Environmental Clearance."

19

Under the direction of the Multi-Family Appraiser, a HUD "Environmental Clearance Worksheet" was prepared, considering population density and distribution, adequacy of sewer and water facilities, vehicular traffic, ingress and egress, noxious odors, inharmonious property uses, deteriorating neighborhood influences, adequacy of community support facilities, location in relation to the general area, the proposed management plan for maintaining the apartments, and the value of the property and the kind of development that could otherwise be expected on the property.

20

This "Worksheet" was reviewed by the same officials who had previously evaluated it, the Chief Valuator, the Chief Architect, and the Multi-Family Coordinator, but this time with special emphasis on environmental impact. Their review concluded that the proposed project would not produce the significant environmental impact contemplated by NEPA. The Chief Underwriter and Environmental Clearance Officer then prepared a "negative impact" statement. After full staff consultation, the Director of the Houston HUD office concurred in the "negative statement."

21

After a careful examination of the trial testimony and the supporting HUD documents, we conclude that the District Court correctly held that, as a matter of law, HUD was not required by NEPA to file an environmental impact statement covering the proposed apartment project. Although the District Court here did not have the benefit of our opinion in SOTA when it reviewed the HUD decision, its findings amply support the agency decision. As the Director of the Houston HUD office testified, appellants have raised no environmental factors, either beneficial or adverse, that were not considered by HUD before it concluded that this apartment project would produce no significant environmental impact. On this record, then, it was not unreasonable for HUD to determine that an environmental impact statement was not required.

[*~425]22

Appellants argue that the HUD actions here do not comply with the final CEQ Guidelines. They especially contend that Section 5(b) of the Guidelines, 36 Fed.Reg. 7724 (1971), which requires that an environmental impact statement be prepared where the proposed federal action "is likely to be highly controversial," requires HUD to file an environmental impact statement here. Apart from the question of what constitutes a "highly controversial" federal action, a question which must surely be answered in the negative in this case, appellants misperceive the authority of the CEQ Guidelines. Unlike agency regulations, which have the force of law, these Guidelines are merely advisory because the CEQ was not given authority to prescribe regulations governing compliance with NEPA. Greene County Planning Board v. FPC, supra.

23

Appellants next contend that HUD's standard of determining "significant effect" incorrectly equates "significant" with "adverse." Appellants argue that HUD's determination was necessarily based on an incomplete investigation, since HUD was concerned only with adverse impact. They point to CEQ Guideline 5(c), which states:

24

Section 101(b) of the Act indicates the broad range of aspects of the environment to be surveyed in any assessment of significant effect.

25

36 Fed.Reg. at 7725 (1971). Once again, though, possible HUD noncompliance with CEQ Guidelines raises no legal issue. But the deeper question remains of whether this HUD practice, that of determining that an environmental impact statement is unnecessary if no adverse environmental effects can be forecast for the federal action in question, complies with NEPA. Appellants argue that NEPA requires that an agency file an environmental impact statement if any significant environmental effects, whether adverse or beneficial, are forecast. Thus, they argue, by considering only adverse effects HUD in effect did but one-half the proper investigation. We think this contention raises serious questions about the adequacy of the investigatory basis underlying the HUD decision not to file an environmental impact statement. A close reading of Section 102(2)(C) in its entirety discloses that Congress was not only concerned with just adverse effects but with all potential environmental effects that affect the quality of the human environment.

26

Nevertheless, any deficiency in this HUD procedure does not require the preparation of an environmental impact statement for this project. The District Court in a full evidentiary hearing fully explored the controlling factors and concluded that the project in question was not a major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment within the Congressional meaning of the National Environmental Policy Act.

[*~426]27

Affirmed.

a

Hon. Leonard P. Moore, Senior Circuit Judge of the Second Circuit, sitting by designation

1

Cooperation of agencies; reports; availability of information; recommendations; international and national coordination of efforts

The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this chapter, and (2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall-

(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-

(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,

(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented,

(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,

(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and

(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.

Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved. Copies of such statement and the comments and views of the appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental standards, shall be made available to the President, the Council on Environmental Quality and to the public as provided by section 552 of Title 5, and shall accompany the proposal through the existing agency review processes;

42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 4332.

2

Paragraph 3 states:

"Special Environmental Clearance" for projects and major changes: That additional review of environmental consequences which shall be applied to larger size projects or projects with greater environmental significance (including all projects above thresholds in Appendix A) and to projects which are controversial with regard to whether or not HUD and other appropriate environmental policies and standards are being met, or precedent-making in the sense that important environmental circumstances are not treated in HUD's central office guidance documents. For this purpose, the HUD Environmental Clearance Worksheet (see Appendix B) is suggested. All special environmental clearances shall result in either (a) a negative statement signed by the head of the HUD field office (or his designated Environmental Clearance Officer), indicating that approval of the application is consistent with established HUD policy and standards and would have no significant adverse effect on the environment, or (b) if there are still unresolved environmental issues and concerns, the drafting and circulating of a 102(2)(C) environmental statement. A negative statement or a 102 (2)(C) environmental statement shall become part of the application file and shall accompany the application through the HUD review and decision process.