Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Benefits Review Bd., 535 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1976). · Go Syfert
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Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Benefits Review Bd., 535 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1976). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
92 citation events (14 in the last 25 years) across 21 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Riley v. Dist. of Columbia DOES & D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., No. 19-AA-974 (D.C. Sept. 9, 2021)
Treatment trajectory · 1976 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1976 2001 2026
How cited ↗
Cited for
At page 760 Determining finality of administrative orders for appeal20 citing casesIt is a well-established rule of appellate jurisdiction ... that where liability has been decided but the extent of damage remains undetermined, there is no final order.3 citing courts put it this way · 17 listed here
  • Riley v. Dist. of Columbia DOES & D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., No. 19-AA-974 (D.C. Sept. 9, 2021).published
    (defining “collateral” issue exception by reference to Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 , 545–47 (1949) (announcing collateral order doctrine)
  • Arizona Physicians IPA, Inc. v. W. Arizona Reg'l Med. Ctr., 263 P.3d 661 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011).published
    (It is a well-established rule of appellate jurisdiction ... that where liability has been decided but the extent of damage remains undetermined, there is no final order.)
  • Kuri v. Bergen Cnty., 137 F. App'x 437 (3d Cir. 2005).unpublished
    It stands to reason, then, that if an order granting partial summary judgment on liability but not assessing damages is not a final order for purposes of appellate jurisdiction, see Sun Shipbuilding, 535 F.2d at 760, and such a final order…
  • Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 520 A.2d 186 (Conn. 1987).published
    Bethlehem Steel Corporation v. Environmental Protection Agency, 669 F.2d 903, 910-11 (3d Cir. 1982); Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Benefits Review Board, 535 F.2d 758, 760-61 (3d Cir. 1976); cf. Hattersley v. Bollt, 512 F.2d 209, 213-…
  • Fairchild Repub. Co. v. United States, 810 F.2d 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1987).published
    This court noted in Dewey, however, that there is not always “ ‘precise congruence between “the classical jurisdictional requirements” applied to appeals from district courts and the jurisdictional standards applicable to review of adminis…
  • Teller Env't Sys., Inc. v. United States, 802 F.2d 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1986).published
    “precise congruence’ between the ‘classical jurisdictional requirements’ applied to appeals from district courts and the jurisdictional standards applicable to review of administrative proceedings”
  • Dewey Elec. Corp. v. United States, 803 F.2d 650 (Fed. Cir. 1986).published
    “precise congruence between ‘the classical jurisdictional requirements’ applied to appeals from district courts and the jurisdictional standards applicable to review of administrative proceedings____”
  • Olson v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 724 P.2d 960 (Utah 1986).published 2 cites
    Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Benefits Review Board, United States Department of Labor, 535 F.2d 758, 760 (3rd Cir.1976).
  • RSR Corp. v. Raymond J. Donovan, 733 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1984).published
    Therefore, we observed, [i]t is a well-established rule of appellate jurisdiction ... that where liability has been decided but the extent of damage remains undecided, there is no final order. 723 F.2d at 404 quoting Sun Shipbuilding & Dry…
  • Newpark Shipbuilding & Repair, Inc. v. Roundtree, 723 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1984).published 2 cites
    “[i]t is a well-established rule of appellate jurisdiction, however, that where liability has been decided but the extent of damage remains undecided, there is no final order”
Show 7 more citing cases
At page 761 Postponing review until damages are adjudicated8 citing cases“Judicial economy, the interest underlying the finality rule, [is] better served by postponing review until the amount of damages has been adjudicated”2 citing courts quote it · 7 listed here
Other citing cases8 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
SUN SHIPBUILDING & DRY DOCK CO.
v.
BENEFITS REVIEW BOARD, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor, Party-Respondent, Leo M. McCabe, Intervenors
No. 75-1715.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Mar 25, 1976.
Published opinion
535 F.2d 758
John J. Runzer, Hedy M. Powell, Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant., William J. Kilberg, Solicitor of Labor, Laurie M. Streeter, Assoc. Sol., Jean S. Cooper, Atty., Washington, D. C., for respondent, Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs., Paul J. Senesky, Galfand, Berger, Senesky, Lurie & March, Philadelphia, Pa., for intervenors.
Adams, Garth, Hunter.
Cited by 26 opinions  |  Published

[*760] OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM:

Ten employees of Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. (Sun), complaining of a loss of hearing because of work conditions filed claims with the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs pursuant to the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act.[1] An administrative law judge found Sun liable and set damages. Sun appealed the decisions to the Benefits Review Board (Board) of the Department of Labor. The Board affirmed the administrative law judge’s determinations with respect to liability, but in each case remanded the proceedings for a redetermination of the degree of hearing loss and the amount of damages. Sun then filed this petition to review the Board’s action, naming the Board as respondent.

Two questions arise before the merits may be reached: the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition, and the propriety of the designation of the Board as a party-respondent.

I.

33 U.S.C. § 921(c) confers on the courts of appeals jurisdiction to review “final orders of the Board.” Sun maintains that because the issue of liability has been authoritatively decided by the Board, there is a final order, even though the amount of damages remains to be ascertained.

Whether a particular order or judgment in a proceeding is a “final” one for purposes of appealability frequently poses a difficult problem.[2] It is a well-established rule of appellate jurisdiction, however, that where liability has been decided but the extent of damage remains undetermined, there is no final order.[3] Although there may be no precise congruence between “the classical jurisdictional requirements” applied to appeals from district courts and the jurisdictional standards applicable to review of administrative proceedings,[4] we perceive no reason that would preclude the employment of this “classical” finality rule to ascertain the nature of the Board’s decision in this matter. Our resolution ought not to be guided solely by whatever label the Board affixes to its action, nor is this an instance where the statute or the Board’s regulations impose special considerations on the determination of finality. In view of these circumstances, we hold that the Board’s action does not constitute a “final order” for the purposes of review by this Court.

Without deciding whether such considerations can ever afford relief with respect to the review of administrative actions, we note only that this case presents none of the reasons that have been advanced in the cases cited by Sun to justify departure from the classical finality rule. The issue of liability is hardly a collateral one,[5] the determination of the degree of hearing loss is not a purely ministerial function,[6] this decision by the Board will not result in the effective termination of the litigation,[7] and there is no need for an adju[*761]dication by a court of appeals in order to effect a remedy decreed below.[8] Moreover, the possibility of irreparable harm to Sun if the administrative process is permitted to run its course is not in issue here.[9]

Additional legal issues may arise on the remand to the administrative law judge, and no rights to review will be lost by Sun if it must first litigate the issue of damages before the administrative agency.[10] Judicial economy, the interest underlying the finality rule, will be better served by postponing review until the amount of damages has been adjudicated.

II.

The Board seeks its dismissal as a party-respondent in this case, contending that its role is that of a judge, not that of an adversary.[11] Since we are without jurisdiction to entertain the petition, we may only deny that motion without prejudice to the Board’s right to reassert the motion if a valid petition to review is later filed.

Accordingly, the petition to review will be dismissed without prejudice for want of jurisdiction, and the motion of the Board will be denied without prejudice.

1

33 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq. (1970 and Supp. II, 1972).

2

See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170-71, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 2149-50, 40 L.Ed.2d 732, 744-45 (1974).

3

McGourkey v. Toledo & Ohio Central Ry. Co., 146 U.S. 536, 546-51, 13 S.Ct. 170, 172-74, 36 L.Ed. 1079, 1083-85 (1892); Craighead v. Wilson, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 199, 201, 15 L.Ed. 332, 333 (1855); The Palmyra, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 502, 503-04, 6 L.Ed. 375 (1825); Wrist-Rocket Mfg. Co. v. Saunders Archery Co., 516 F.2d 846, 848-49 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 870, 96 S.Ct. 134, 46 L.Ed.2d 100 (1975); Haverhill Gazette Co. v. Union Leader Corp., 333 F.2d 798, 803 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 931, 85 S.Ct. 329, 13 L.Ed.2d 343 (1964).

5

See Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-47, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 1225-26, 93 L.Ed. 1528, 1535-36 (1949).

6

See Hattersley v. Bollt, 512 F.2d 209, 213-14 (3d Cir. 1975).

7

See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 525 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1975).

8

See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 309, 82 S.Ct. 1502, 1515, 8 L.Ed.2d 510, 526 (1962).

9

See Isbrandtsen Co. v. United States, 93 U.S. App.D.C. 293, 211 F.2d 51, cert. denied, 347 U.S. 990, 74 S.Ct. 852, 98 L.Ed. 1124 (1954). Sun indicated at oral argument that speculation about the financial irresponsibility of the claimants, who have already received benefits, has not been recognized as grounds for a determination of irreparable injury. E. g., Tucker v. Norton, 47 F.Supp. 762 (E.D.Pa.1942), aff’d 134 F.2d 172 (3d Cir. 1943) (per curiam).

10

If Sun chooses to appeal the administrative law judge’s determination of the extent of damages, the Board’s decision on that issue, whether in favor of Sun or against Sun, will implicitly incorporate its prior judgment on Sun’s liability. At that point the judgment will be final, and Sun may then petition this Court to review such a final order, raising both the liability and damages questions.

11

The Board makes reference to McCord v. Benefits Review Board, 168 U.S.App.D.C. 302, 514 F.2d 198 (1975), as an instance in which the Board was dismissed. But cf. Brennan v. Gilles & Cotting, 504 F.2d 1255, 1266-67 (4th Cir. 1974) (Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n motion for dismissal denied).