D'Ascenzo, 215 Ct. Cl. 971 (Ct. Cl. 1977). · Go Syfert
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D'Ascenzo, 215 Ct. Cl. 971 (Ct. Cl. 1977). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“ejven if, as here, the assessment of damages is reserved for the quantum phase of the ease, the plaintiff as part of its proof of entitlement, must show it was damaged to some extent, by defendant's derelictions, and it has failed to do so for the reason stated.”
17 citation events (9 in the last 25 years) across 6 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. v. States (uscfc, 2005-03-03)
Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#17 10 U.S.C. § 915 cited 1× in this case · 75 total citations of statute
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. v. States
Fed. Cl. · 2005 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
ejven if, as here, the assessment of damages is reserved for the quantum phase of the ease, the plaintiff as part of its proof of entitlement, must show it was damaged to some extent, by defendant's derelictions, and it has failed to do so for the reason stated.
discussed Cited "see" System Fuels Inc. v. United States (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Fed. Cl. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, 64 Fed.Cl. at 523 (quoting Puritan Assocs. v. United States, 215 Ct.Cl. 976, 978 , 566 F.2d 1191 (1977)) (“[E]ven if, as here, the assessment of damages is reserved for the quantum phase of the case, the plaintiff as part of its proof of entitlement, must show it was damaged to some extent, by defendant’s derelictions.”); see also Reynolds v. United States, 141 Ct.Cl. 211 , 158 F.Supp. 719, 725 (1958) (“The time when performance should have taken place is the time as of which damages are measured.”).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Blaine v. United States
Ct. Cl. · 1984 · signal: see also · confidence low
In Willcox v. United States, 3 Cl.Ct. 83, 85 (1983), Judge Wood stated: A plaintiff’s ignorance as to the existence of a claim of which he should be aware is, however, in itself far from enough to extend the statutory period; as a prerequisite to obtaining any such relief, “plaintiff must show either that defendant has concealed its acts with the result that plaintiff was unaware of the existence of a cause of action or that the nature of plaintiff’s injury was such that it was inherently unknowable at the time the cause of action accrued.” Coastal Petroleum Co. v. United States, 228 C…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Willcox v. United States
Ct. Cl. · 1983 · signal: see also · confidence low
A plaintiff’s ignorance as to the existence of a claim of which he should be aware is, however, in itself far from enough to extend the statutory period; as a prerequisite to obtaining any such relief, “plaintiff must show either that defendant has concealed its acts with the result that plaintiff was unaware of the existence of a cause of action or that the nature of plaintiff’s injury was such that it was inherently unknowable at the time the cause of action accrued.” Coastal Petroleum Co. v. United States, 228 Ct.Cl. 864, 866 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 , 102 S.Ct. 1770 , 72 …
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
William D. D'Ascenzo
No. 442-74.
United States Court of Claims.
Nov 25, 1977.
215 Ct. Cl. 971
Neil B. Kabatchnick, attorney of record, for plaintiff., Peter A. T. Sartin, with whom was Assistant Attorney General Barbara Allen Babcock, for defendant.
Cited by 1 opinion  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 90%
Citer courts: Federal Claims (1)

"This military pay case comes before the court on cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff, a Marine, received orders to report for Vietnam duty on December 16, 1967. On December 14, 1967, while on home leave, he went to a local hospital and shot himself in the foot, causing permanent injury. He was court-martialed for malingering, 10 U.S.C. § 915 (1970), USMJ Art. 115, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced to dishonorable discharge, later reduced to bad conduct. He was discharged on January 3, 1969.

"Plaintiff now insists that his conviction and discharge were improper because he lacked the mental capacity necessary to commit the offense of malingering and to defend himself. This claim was first raised when he filed suit in the Court of Claims on December 23, 1974, a period of 5 years, 11 months, and 20 days after his bad conduct discharge. To try the issue of his mental capacity at the time of trial or at the time of his offense would now be a most difficult task, and the prejudice defendant would suffer from such a contest is obvious. No good cause explains this delay. We note that plaintiff was examined by psychiatrists both at the time of the offense and subsequently. Plaintiffs own counsel stated at the court-martial that plaintiff was mentally responsible. We hold that the doctrine of laches bars plaintiffs claim. Brundage v. United States, 205 Ct. Cl. 502, 504 F.2d 1382 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 998 (1975). It is unnecessary to address additional issues.

"Now, therefore, upon consideration of the motions, briefs, and oral arguments of the parties,

[*972] "it is ordered that defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted, plaintiffs cross-motion is denied, and plaintiffs petition is dismissed.”

Plaintiffs motion for rehearing, rehearing en banc and for other relief was denied February 3, 1978.