Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United States, 570 F.2d 1197 (4th Cir. 1978)
A district court must find an actual conflict of interest rather than a speculative one before disqualifying counsel in a joint representation.
In an indemnification action arising from an airplane crash, the district court disqualified the Department of Justice from representing four federal air traffic controllers alongside the United States, citing a conflict of interest under professional responsibility rules. The Fourth Circuit reviews the disqualification order de novo, finding no actual conflict because the controllers acted within the scope of their employment and a judgment against the United States would bar any subsequent judgment against them. The court holds that the district court erred in requiring independent legal advice for the controllers' consent to joint representation and in finding it not obvious that the government could adequately represent all parties. The Fourth Circuit reverses the disqualification order, affirming that joint representation is permissible when consent is informed and adequate representation is evident.
At page 1201Limiting disqualification to actual or likely conflicts11 citing cases[A] judgment against the United States would automatically bar the entry of any contemporaneous or subsequent judgment against [the government employees].
- Frazer, No. 5:23-cv-00193 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 26, 2026).([A] judgment against the United States would automatically bar the entry of any contemporaneous or subsequent judgment against [the government employees].)
- Frazer, No. 5:24-cv-00177 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 26, 2026).([A] judgment against the United States would automatically bar the entry of any contemporaneous or subsequent judgment against [the government employees].)
- Denson v. United States, 574 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2009).published([A] judgment against the United States would automatically bar the entry of any contemporaneous or subsequent judgment against [government officials].)
- Ronnie Harris v. United States, 422 F.3d 322 (6th Cir. 2005).published([A] judgment against the United States would automatically bar the entry of any contemporaneous or subsequent judgment against [the government employees].)
- United States v. Perry, 30 F. Supp. 3d 514 (E.D. Va. 2014).published Id. at 1201 (emphasis added).
- Modanlo v. Ahan (In re Modanlo), 342 B.R. 230 (D. Md. 2006).publishedCo. v. United States, 570 F.2d 1197, 1201 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 , 99 S.Ct. 87 , 58 L.Ed.2d 113 (1978).
- Gay v. Luihn Food Sys., Inc., 54 Va. Cir. 468 (Isle of Wight Cir. Ct. 2001).published(disqualification inapplicable where “practical considerations” eliminate any real impact of the alleged conflict)
- Sanchez v. Rowe, 651 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Tex. 1986).publishedOther courts have found that this view of the effect of § 2676 is correct: Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 333 (2nd Cir.1978); Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. United States, 570 F.2d 1197, 1201 (4th Cir.1978); Henderson v. Bluemi…
- Clay v. Doherty, 608 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Ill. 1985).published“addressed solely to the relationship between the attorney and his immediate clients”
- Robert Arevalo v. Chuck Woods, 811 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1987).publishedSee Aetna Casualty and Surety Company v. United States, 570 F.2d 1197, 1201 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 , 99 S.Ct. 87 , 58 L.Ed.2d 113 (1978). *491 CONCLUSION The judgment against Woods is reversed.
Show 1 more citing case
- Smith v. Tricare Rehab. Sys., Inc. (In re Tricare Rehab. Sys., Inc.), 181 B.R. 569 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1994).publishedSee also Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States, 570 F.2d 1197, 1201 (4th Cir.1978); Smith v. City of New York, 611 F.Supp. 1080, 1088-89 (S.D.N.Y.1985); McAlinden v. Wiggins, 543 F.Supp. 1004, 1006 (S.D.N.Y.1982); Annot., Rep *577 r…
At page 1200Determining actual or likely conflict of interest11 citing cases“where only a purely legal matter is at issue.”
- Road King Dev., Inc. v. JTH Tax, LLC, 540 F. Supp. 3d 554 (E.D. Va. 2021).publishedSee Richmond Hilton Associates v. City of Richmond, 690 F.2d 1086, 1089 (4th Cir.1982) (“actual or likely” conflict of interest required); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States, 570 F.2d 1197, at 1200 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U…
- Gulf Coast Mktg. Grp., Inc. v. JTH Tax LLC, No. 2:21-cv-00078 (E.D. Va. May 18, 2021).See Richmond Hilton Associates v. City of Richmond, 690 F.2d 1086, 1089 (4th Cir.1982) (“actual or likely” conflict of interest required); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States, 570 F.2d 1197, at 1200 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U…
- Capacchione ex rel. Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 9 F. Supp. 2d 572 (W.D.N.C. 1998).publishedAetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States, 570 F.2d 1197, 1200 (4th Cir.1978).
- Shaffer v. Farm Fresh, Inc., 966 F.2d 142 (4th Cir. 1992).published Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States, 570 F.2d 1197, 1200 (4th Cir.1978).
- In re Roberts, 75 B.R. 402 (D. Utah 1987).publishedAetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. United States, 570 F.2d 1197, 1200-01 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 , 99 S.Ct. 87 , 58 L.Ed.2d 113 (1978), (practical considerations of the case must be weighed, mere existence of multiple defendan…
- In re Review of Opinion 552 of Advisory Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, 507 A.2d 233 (N.J. 1986).publishedCo. v. United States, 570 F.2d 1197, 1200 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 439 U.S. 821 , 99 S.Ct. 87 , 58 L.Ed.2d 113 (1978); Sherrod v. Berry, 589 F.Supp. 433, 438 (N.D.Ill.1984).
- Alfred B. Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1982).publishedNovo, supra, 607 F.2d at 188 , quoting Aetna Casualty and Surety Company v. United States, 570 F.2d 1197, 1200 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 , 99 S.Ct. 87 , 58 L.Ed.2d 113 (1978).
- Richmond Hilton Assocs. v. City of Richmond, 690 F.2d 1086 (4th Cir. 1982).published However, as we stated in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States, 570 F.2d 1197, 1200 (4 Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 , 99 S.Ct. 87 , 58 L.Ed.2d 113 (1978), the abuse of discretion test is inappropriate "where only a purely legal…
- Kerry Coal Co. v. United Mine Wkrs. of Am., 470 F. Supp. 1032 (W.D. Pa. 1979).publishedThese hypotheses, however, were based solely upon conjecture and ignored the representation of Government counsel, which was accepted by the court, that in the conference between the representatives of the Department of Justice and the con…
At page 1202Weighing consent and government representations in defense5 citing caseswarning against rigid application of the rule where practical circumstances do not so warrant
- Ramaco Resources, LLC v. Chubb INA Holdings, Inc., No. 2:19-cv-00703 (S.D. W. Va. June 10, 2024).(warning against rigid application of the rule where practical circumstances do not so warrant)
- Gaumer v. McDaniel, 811 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Md. 1991).publishedCo. v. The United States, 570 F.2d 1197, 1202 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 , 99 S.Ct. 87 , 58 L.Ed.2d 113 (1978), the appellate court reversed the district court’s order disqualifying government counsel from representing four indi…
- Figueroa-Olmo v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 616 F. Supp. 1445 (D.P.R. 1985).publishedId. at 1202.
- Halperin v. Kissinger, 542 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1982).publishedMoreover, weighing defendants’ informed consent, the good faith representations of the Department, the benefits to defendants of a “united front” and Government experience in presenting their defense, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. United…
- Palumbo v. Tele-Commc'ns, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 129 (D.D.C. 1994).published(adopting same reasoning)
Other citing cases
- Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 2d 469 (E.D. Va. 2010).published
- Tessier v. Plastic Surgery Specialists, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Va. 1990).published
- Burger v. Health Ins. Plan of Greater New York, 684 F. Supp. 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).published
- Altschul v. Paine Webber, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).published
- Terrence Williams v. Aberdeen Proving Ground Fed. Credit Union, No. 1:25-cv-02726 (D. Md. July 10, 2026).
- Brittney Gobble Photography, LLC v. Sinclair Broadcast Grp., Inc., No. 1:18-cv-03403 (D. Md. Apr. 16, 2021).
- Jarallah v. Thompson, 123 F. Supp. 3d 719 (D. Md. 2015).published
v.
UNITED STATES of America, and Bernard C. Groseclose, Alden E. Hare, William L. Hogan and Dennis L. Hunter
The United States has appealed from an order of the district judge disqualifying the Department of Justice and the United States Attorney from representing four of its individual codefendants in this case. The district court concluded that such representation would violate Disciplinary Rules 5-105(A) and 5-105(B) of the Code of Professional Responsibility adopted by the North Carolina State Bar effective January I, 1974. 4A Gen.Stat. Append. VII 240 (Supp.1975).[1]
[*1199] The substantive litigation arises out of the crash of Eastern Airlines Flight 212 as it approached the airport at Charlotte, North Carolina, on the morning of September 11, 1974. At the time of the crash the individual defendants, Bernard C. Grose-close, Alden E. Hare, William L. Hogan and Dennis L. Hunter, were on duty at the airport as air traffic controllers employed by the Federal Aviation Administration.[2]
The plaintiff insurance companies have paid approximately twenty-five million dollars in settlement of wrongful death, personal injury, and property damage claims arising from the plane crash, and they filed this action on February 9, 1977, against the United States and the four federal air traffic controllers mentioned above. Charging that the negligence of the defendants was the proximate cause of the crash, the plaintiffs seek indemnification and contribution from the defendants for the amounts paid in settlement of the various insurance claims. Jurisdiction for the action against the United States is alleged under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) and for the claims against the individual defendants under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The plaintiffs have charged, and the Government admits, that at the time of the crash the four individual defendants were acting within the course and scope of their employment.
On March 23, 1977, the four individual defendants, who at the time were represented by the Department of Justice, filed a motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, to dismiss the complaint. On May 2, 1977, the plaintiff insurance compa-mes filed a memorandum and affidavit in opposition to the motion, and on the same day filed the motion to disqualify government counsel from representing the four air traffic controllers. The district judge conducted a non-evidentiary hearing on the motions on May 17,1977, and, while indicating that he perceived a conflict of interest on the part of the Government counsel, deferred ruling on the disqualification motion for a period of thirty days in the hope that the matter might be resolved without further action by the court. By order entered on May 19, 1977, the motions of the individual defendants for dismissal or summary judgment were denied.
On June 29, 1977, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Defense Division of the Department of Justice wrote to the district court and requested an opportunity to present additional evidence and argument bearing upon the existence of any potential conflict of interest between the United States and the individual defendants. He further advised the court that the question had been carefully reviewed in the Department of Justice and that the Department could discern “no conflict at the present time”, and that the possibility of any conflict developing in the future appeared “extremely remote”. He stated that the matter had been discussed at length with the individual defendants and that they had “knowingly and intelligently asserted their desire to be represented jointly by the Department of Justice”.
The district court convened a second hearing on July 25, 1977, at which time the[*1200] Deputy Assistant Attorney General was present, together with the four defendant air traffic controllers and counsel for their union. The court was advised that the question of conflict had been discussed with the air controllers in the presence of counsel for their union and that they, with the concurrence of the union counsel, consented to, and indeed demanded, joint representation by the Government. Counsel for the Department of Justice suggested that the court examine the individual defendants in camera, or otherwise hear their testimony with respect to the issue of full disclosure and informed consent to joint representation. The district judge, however, declined these suggestions and advised the parties that he would defer action for another ten days, indicating that if the Government failed to change its position he would enter adverse findings on the conflict question. By letter of August 3, 1977, the Department of Justice advised the court that the Government adhered to its position, and on October 14, 1977, the district court entered the order of disqualification from which the Government has appealed.
As a prefatory matter, we note that it is now well established that the order of a district court granting or denying a motion to disqualify an attorney is a final order appealable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, MacKethan v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 557 F.2d 395, 396 (4 Cir. 1977); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 496 F.2d 800 (2 Cir. 1974), and we reject the argument of the plaintiffs that the United States is not an aggrieved party and therefore lacks standing to prosecute this appeal. The United States Attorney and the Department of Justice are the targets of the district court’s order and, in our opinion, it would be sophistic to say that the Government is not adversely affected by their disqualification. See In Re Investigation before April 1975 Grand Jury, 174 U.S.App.D.C. 268, 274, 531 F.2d 600, 606 (1976).[3]
Turning to the merits of the appeal, the plaintiffs contend that the scope of our review is limited to a determination of whether the district court abused its permissible discretion. While some of the cases support the position of the plaintiffs on this point, more recently the courts have expressed serious reservations about whether the limited abuse of discretion standard is appropriate in disqualification cases where only a purely legal question is at issue. Woods v. Covington Cty. Bank, 537 F.2d 804 (5 Cir. 1976); Kroungold v. Triester, 521 F.2d 763, 765, n.2 (3 Cir. 1975); American Roller Company v. Budinger, 513 F.2d 982, 985, n.3 (3 Cir. 1975). We are inclined to agree with the Fifth Circuit that “[i]n disqualification cases such as this, where the facts are not in dispute, District Courts enjoy no particular functional advantage over appellate courts in their formulation and application of ethical norms,”[4] and that it is appropriate for us “to determine whether the District Court’s disqualification order was predicated upon a proper understanding of applicable ethical principles.”[5]
It is our opinion that in disqualifying the Department of Justice in this case the district court erred in two respects. First of all, we find nothing in the record to support the conclusion of the court that “an actual conflict exists.”[6] We agree with counsel for the Government that in reaching this conclusion the court appears to have taken the position that the mere exist[*1201]ence of multiple defendants in a case such as this inevitably creates a conflict of interest on the part of the lawyer undertaking to represent them. At the hearings and in its order the district court pointed out possible contentions which might be made by each of the four controllers which would exculpate him from liability, but cast the blame upon one or more of his codefend-ants, including the Government. These hypotheses, however, were based solely upon conjecture and ignored the representation of Government counsel, which was accepted by the court, that in the conference between the representatives of the Department of Justice and the controllers, there was no dispute among them either with respect to their duties and responsibilities or the details of the plane crash.[7]
Bearing further on the question is the fact that there is little or no possibility that the four controllers will incur any personal liability as a result of this litigation. As heretofore noted, the plaintiffs allege, and the Government admits, that the controllers were acting within the course and scope of their employment at the time of the crash, and under such circumstances any finding of negligence against them would be imputed to the Government and place liability upon it under the Tort Claims Act. Additionally, we note that if the Government and the controllers should be held to be jointly liable, the individual defendants would not be required to pay the damages, since a judgment against the United States would automatically bar the entry of any contemporaneous or subsequent judgment against them. 28 U.S.C. § 2676; see Gilman v. United States, 206 F.2d 846, 848 (9 Cir. 1953), aff’d 347 U.S. 507, 74 S.Ct. 695, 98 L.Ed. 898. These, we think, are practical considerations which appropriately should have entered into the disposition of the motion.
Even, however, assuming the existence of a conflict, we think the district court erred in its reading of Disciplinary Rule 5-105(0) which permits an attorney to represent multiple parties who are in a position of potential conflict “if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of each and if each consents to the representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of such representation on the exercise of his independent professional judgment on behalf of each.” The court accepted the representations of the Department of Justice relative to such disclosure and consent, but, nevertheless, discounted them entirely upon the basis that such consent “can not be presumed to be fully informed when it is procured without the advice of a lawyer who has no conflict of interest.”[8] We find no authority or reason to support the theory that the consent to multiple representation under the Rule can be effective only upon the advice of an independent[*1202] attorney, but, in any event, as we have noted, counsel for the air controllers’ union participated in the discussions between the individual defendants and the Department of Justice, and we think it reasonable to assume that he was aware of any problems and properly advised the controllers with respect to their best interests.
The district court, however, further took the position that even if there were full disclosure and “fully informed consent”, the Government was barred from representation because it was not “obvious” that it could adequately represent the interest of each defendant. In the light of what we have said in this opinion we think it is “obvious” that the Government can adequately represent the interests of the air controllers. Indeed, it appears to us that such representation is highly desirable since these defendants will have the benefit not only of Government counsel but also the reservoir of the Government’s expertise in this highly involved and technical litigation, and will be spared the burden upon their time and resources incident to the employment of independent counsel.
Noting that motions to disqualify lawyer-opponents upon alleged ethical grounds have become increasingly common in the litigation process, in International Electronics Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288 (2 Cir. 1975), the Second Circuit requested four bar associations to file briefs on the subject as amici curiae. In its brief the Connecticut Bar Association made the following comments:
It behooves this court, therefore, while mindful of the existing Code, to examine afresh the problems sought to be met by that Code, to weigh for itself what those problems are, how real in the practical world they are in fact, and whether a mechanical and didactic application of the Code to all situations automatically might not be productive of more harm than good, by requiring the client and the judicial system to sacrifice more than the value of the presumed benefits.
527 F.2d at 1293. Viewed in the light of these observations, with which we are in full accord, the plaintiffs’ motion should have been denied. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the district court.
REVERSED.
DR5-105 Refusing to Accept or Continue Employment if the Interests of Another Client May Impair the Independent Professional Judgment of the Lawyer.
(A) A lawyer should decline proffered employment if the exercise of his independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected[*1199] by the acceptance of the proffered employment, except to the extent permitted under DR5-105(C).
(B) A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by his representation of another client, except to the extent permitted under DR5-105(C).
(C) In the situations covered by DR5-105(A) and (B), a lawyer may represent multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of each and if each consents to the representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of such representation on the exercise of his independent professional judgment on behalf of each.
Groseclose was Chief of the Air Traffic Controllers at the Charlotte airport. At the time of the crash, Hunter was the approach controller; Hare, a trainee, was the local controller and was being supervised by Hogan.
Counsel for the plaintiffs also suggests that we should dismiss this appeal as a sanction against the Government for its violation of the statutory provisions regarding the use of reports of the National Transportation Safety Board. We agree with the Government that the reference to the report in its brief relative to the present appeal does not contravene the statutes in question, 49 U.S.C. § 1903(c) and 49 U.S.C. § 1441(e), which provide that no such reports “shall be admitted as evidence or used in any suit or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in such report or reports.”
Woods v. Covington Cty. Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 810 (5 Cir. 1976).
App. 143.
This lack of any dispute among the defendants apparently disturbs counsel for the plaintiffs. At the initial hearing on the motion the following colloquy took place:
COURT: Does it hurt the plaintiffs? Does it harm your clients if the defendants happen to have lawyers who can’t represent either client adequately?
MR. RUTHERFORD: 1 think it does because I think and experience has shown that when the government attorney represents everybody in a piece of litigation that the position taken by everybody is uniform, that in effect there is almost a conspiracy of silence as to what truly happened with respect to the air traffic controller management of this particular flight. (App. 61).
From this it appears to us that in filing the motion for disqualification, counsel for the plaintiffs seems to have been motivated more by a desire to fragmentize the defense than by any sensitivity to the ethical considerations involved. While it is true that when such motions are based on Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility the court must consider the rights of both adversaries in the litigation, Canon 5 is addressed solely to the relationship between the attorney and his immediate clients. With respect to multiple representation, Disciplinary Rule 5-105 is designed to protect the interests of those clients, and their interests alone, and the impact of such multiple representation upon the plaintiffs is irrelevant. We further note that cases involving the multiple representation of criminal defendants are largely inapposite since in such cases the court is required to consider the multiple representation in the light of the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
App. 142-143.