Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1980). · Go Syfert
Copy Cite Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1980).
Quick Summary

Prosecutors lack absolute immunity from suits by witnesses who were allegedly threatened or imprisoned to obtain perjured testimony.

A plaintiff sued prosecutors under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging they coerced perjured testimony and fabricated evidence to secure multiple indictments and a five-year pretrial detention. The district court dismissed the claims against the prosecutors, relying on absolute immunity. The Second Circuit affirmed, applying a distinction between prosecutorial and investigative conduct based on the nature of the harm. The court held that absolute immunity protects prosecutors from suits for injuries arising solely from the prosecution itself, such as pretrial detention and the ordeal of trial. However, immunity does not attach to harms inflicted independently of the prosecution, such as a witness’s injury from being threatened or imprisoned to obtain testimony. Because the plaintiff’s alleged injuries were direct results of the prosecution, the dismissal was proper.

152 citation events (17 in the last 25 years) across 23 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1980 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
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Cited for
At page 322Prosecutorial immunity from claims of misconduct35 citing cases“a prosecutor might not enjoy absolute immunity from suit by a witness who was allegedly threatened and imprisoned to obtain his perjured testimony”4 citing courts quote it · 31 listed here · 1 cautionary
Show 21 more citing cases
  • Sarf v. Town of Huntington, 702 F. Supp. 395 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).published 2 cites
    In Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir.1980), the Second Circuit held that absolute immunity is available if the injury arises solely from the prosecution itself, but that it is not available if the alleged harm is inflicted independ…
  • Barbera v. Smith, 836 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1987).published 2 cites
    Such protection also applies to the conduct of actual litigation, Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861 , 101 S.Ct. 165 , 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (1980), including the presentation of evidence to a grand jury, Magli…
  • Norman Rudow v. City of New York, 822 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1987).published
    (prosecutor absolutely immune to claims of suborning perjury and falsifying evidence)
  • Connie Robison v. Susan R. Via, 821 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1987).published 2 cites
    For example, it extends to the prosecutor’s seeking an indictment, because exposing him to liability for the initial phase of his prosecutorial work could interfere with his exercise of independent judgment at every phase of the case, see…
  • Josiah Haynesworth v. Frank P. Miller, 820 F.2d 1245 (D.C. Cir. 1987).published 2 cites
    See Dellums v. Powell, supra note 194, 212 U.S.App.D.C. at 407 , 660 F.2d at 806 (“[n]ever has a prosecutorial official been held liable for causing a prosecution to be brought”); see also Taylor v. Kavanagh, supra note 179 , 640 F.2d at 4…
  • Greg Myers v. R. Kathleen Morris, 810 F.2d 1437 (8th Cir. 1987).published 4 cites
    Accord Rachuy v. Murphy Motor Freight Dines, supra, 663 F.2d at 58 (fabricating evidence); Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861 , 101 S.Ct. 165 , 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (1980) (subjecting the complainant to the or…
  • Weg v. MacChiarola, 654 F. Supp. 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).published
    Lee, supra, 617 F.2d at 322; Taylor, supra, 640 F.2d at 453 .
  • Barbera v. Smith, 654 F. Supp. 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).published
    Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861 , 101 S.Ct. 165 , 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (1980).
  • Stevens v. Rifkin, 608 F. Supp. 710 (N.D. Cal. 1984).published
    The knowing use of perjured testimony is also subject to absolute immunity, Blevins v. Ford, 572 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th Cir.1978), as is falsification of evidence and coercion of perjured testimony, Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir.…
  • L. Patrick Gray, III v. Griffin Bell, 712 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1983).published 2 cites
    We have thus expressed frustration with the rigidity of the analysis, see Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d at 21 (“To some extent, ... assignment of a particular incident to one of several mutually exclusive abstract categories is likely to inv…
  • Betts v. Richard, 566 F. Supp. 125 (D. Conn. 1983).published 2 cites
    Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 449 U.S. 861 , 101 S.Ct. 165 , 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (1980); Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 632 (7th Cir.1979), rev’d in part on other grounds, 446 U.S. 754 , 100 S.Ct. 1987 , 64 L.Ed.…
  • Whelehan v. Cnty. of Monroe, 558 F. Supp. 1093 (W.D.N.Y. 1983).published 2 cites
    The distinction, based on Imbler , between purely investigative and primarily prosecu-torial functions of the prosecutor, as drawn in Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861 , 101 S.Ct. 165 , 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (…
  • Dick v. Watonwan Cnty., 551 F. Supp. 983 (D. Minn. 1982).published
    Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861 , 101 S.Ct. 165 , 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (1980); see also Hilliard v. Williams, 540 F.2d 220, 221-22 (6th Cir.1976) (per curiam).
  • Martinez v. Winner, 548 F. Supp. 278 (D. Colo. 1982).published 4 cites
    See e.g., Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 834 (3d Cir. 1976); Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 321 (2d Cir. 1980); Forsyth v. Kliendienst, 599 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1979); Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256, 1264-1265 , modified 583 F.2d 779 (5th…
  • MacRae v. Motto, 543 F. Supp. 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).published 2 cites
    Taylor v. Kavanagh, supra, 640 F.2d at 452 ; Lee v. Willins, supra, 617 F.2d at 322. 12 .
  • Brooks v. Fitch, 534 F. Supp. 129 (D.N.J. 1981).published
    See e.g., Macko v. Bryon, 641 F.2d 447, 449 (6th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (malicious indictments); Norton v. Liddel, 620 F.2d 1375, 1379 (10th Cir. 1980) (information signed by district attorney in malicious prosecution case); Lee v. Willin…
  • Rodney Taylor v. Michael Kavanagh, 640 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1981).published 2 cites
    In contrast, activities in which a prosecutor engages that are independent of prosecution, Lee v. Willins, supra, 617 F.2d at 322, are not protected by the doctrine of absolute immunity.
  • Doe v. Russotti, 503 F. Supp. 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).published 2 cites
    Where the alleged harm is inflicted independently of the prosecution, however, absolute immunity will not attach.” Id. at 322 (citations omitted).
  • Gutierrez v. Vergari, 499 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).published
    Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir. 1980).
  • Grant v. Cafferri, No. 1:19-cv-02148, 2019 WL 6526007 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2019).
    (prosecutor absolutely immune from claims of suborning perjury and falsifying evidence)
  • Mangiafico v. Blumenthal, 358 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D. Conn. 2005).published
    ([A] prosecutor is immune from a suit to recover for an injury arising solely from the prosecution itself ... [wjhere the alleged harm is inflicted independently of the prosecution, however, absolute immunity will not a…)
At page 321Scope of absolute immunity for prosecutorial acts17 citing cases13 listed here
  • Schloss v. Bouse, 876 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1989).published 6 cites
    Though a different conclusion might be warranted if Lalor had done nothing more than prepare releases or had threatened to extend plaintiffs' detention without threatening to prosecute them, cf. Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d at 322 ("a prosecut…
  • Pearson v. City Of New York, No. 1:22-cv-10669, 2024 WL 1314099 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2024). 2 cites
    Absolute immunity extends to “the falsification of evidence and the coercion of witnesses.” Taylor v. Kavanagh, 640 F.2d 450, 452 (2d Cir. 1981) (citing Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 321-22 (2d Cir. 1980)).
  • Brown v. Fallon, No. 1:21-cv-00641 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2022).
    Immunity even extends to “the falsification of evidence and the coercion of witnesses,” Taylor v. Kavanagh, 640 F.2d 450, 452 (2d Cir. 1981) (citing Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 321-22 (2d Cir. 1980)), “the knowing use of perjured 9 testi…
  • Shmueli v. City of New York, 424 F.3d 231 (2d Cir. 2005).published 2 cites
    See generally Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985); Bernard v. County of Suffolk, 356 F.3d 495, 501-02 (2d Cir.2004) (" Bernard "); Hill v. City of New York, 45 F.3d 653, 659-60 (2d Cir.1995) (" H…
  • Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 212 F.R.D. 134 (W.D.N.Y. 2002).published
    Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 321 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861 , 101 S.Ct. 165 , 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (1980) (prosecutorial immunity); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corporation, et al., 550 F.2d 68, 70 (2d Cir.1977) (act of state doctrine precluded…
  • Cooney v. Park Cnty., 792 P.2d 1287 (Wyo. 1990).published 4 cites
    Barbera v. Schlessinger, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 1338 , 103 L.Ed.2d 808 (1989) (soliciting and suborning perjured testimony does not create liability in damages for prosecutorial conduct functionally qualifying for absolute immunity under…
  • Katz v. Morgenthau, 709 F. Supp. 1219 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).published 2 cites
    Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 , 98 S.Ct. 2894 , 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 , 96 S.Ct. 984 , 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976); Betts v. Richard, 726 F.2d 79, 80 (2d Cir.1984); Taylor v. Kavanagh, 640 F.2d 450, 454 (2d Cir…
  • Lawson v. Abrams, 863 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1988).published 2 cites
    See Taylor v. Kavanagh, 640 F.2d at 452-53 ; Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 321-22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861 , 101 S.Ct. 165 , 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (1980); see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. at 431 n. 33, 96 S.Ct. at 995 n. 33 (“At…
  • Barrett v. United States, 622 F. Supp. 574 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).published
    Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 321-22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861 , 101 S.Ct. 165 , 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (1980).
  • Martinez v. Winner, 548 F. Supp. 278 (D. Colo. 1982).published 4 cites
    See e.g., Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 834 (3d Cir. 1976); Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 321 (2d Cir. 1980); Forsyth v. Kliendienst, 599 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1979); Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256, 1264-1265 , modified 583 F.2d 779 (5th…
Show 3 more citing cases
  • Redcross v. Cnty. of Rensselaer, 511 F. Supp. 364 (N.D.N.Y. 1981).published
    Taylor v. Kavanagh, 640 F.2d 450 (2d Cir., 1981); Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 321-22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. —, 101 S.Ct. 165 , 66 L.Ed.2d 78 (1980).
  • Cerbone v. Cnty. of Westchester, 508 F. Supp. 780 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).published 4 cites
    NOTES [1] A habeas corpus proceeding based upon the same series of events is currently pending before Judge Motley of this Court. 80 Civ. 2647. [2] Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 , 92 S.Ct. 594 , 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); Martin v. Merola, 53…
  • Peterson v. Tomaselli, 469 F. Supp. 2d 146 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).published
    See Lee v. Willins, 617 F.2d 320, 321-22 (2d Cir.1980).
Other citing cases2 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Lester LEE
v.
Joseph "Scooter Joe" WILLINS, Kenneth Kaufman, "John Bailey", "John James", "John Doe" and "Richard Roe", Police Officers of the City of New York, and Eugene Gold, District Attorney of the County of Kings, and Thomas Davenport, Assistant District Attorney of the County of Kings
No. 808, Docket 79-2178.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Mar 17, 1980.
Published opinion
617 F.2d 320
1980 U.S. App. LEXIS 19568
Stuart K. Lesansky, New York City (John S. Kinzey, New York City, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant., Robert J. Schack, Asst. Atty. Gen., State of N. Y. (Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen., Gerald Ryan, Asst. Atty. Gen., New York City, of counsel), for defendants-appellees.
Kaufman.
Cited by 52 opinions  |  Published
IRVING R. KAUFMAN, Chief Judge:

In 1977, Lester Lee brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Kings County District Attorney Eugene Gold, Assistant District Attorney Thomas Davenport, six New York City police officers, state judges, and his defense counsel. Lee alleged that the defendants had conspired to violate his civil rights in connection with criminal prosecutions brought against him for the murders of Police Officer Elijah Stroud and Lawrence Cooper, a drug dealer, and for unlawful possession of a firearm. Though convicted on the weapons charge, Lee was acquitted of the Cooper murder. In addition, he was tried five times on the Stroud indictment. His first trial ended in a hung jury. His second resulted in a conviction that was reversed on appeal because of improper remarks to the jury by the trial judge and defendant Davenport. When Lee’s third and fourth trials ended in deadlocked juries, Lee sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court to enjoin further prosecution. District Attorney Gold, meanwhile, obtained a fifth indictment, but the state trial judge dismissed it and ordered Lee released from prison, ■ where he had been incarcerated awaiting trial for five years. Judge Nickerson, to whom the habe-as petition proceeding was assigned, permitted Lee to amend his petition to allege civil rights violations by the prosecutors and police, to seek money damages, and to drop his claims against the judges and defense counsel.

Specifically, Lee alleged that the prosecutors had (1) induced a defense witness, Juanita Roman, to render herself unavailable to testify in return for dropping felony charges against her, (2) compelled a witness, Marguerita Rhodes, to perjure herself by arresting and incarcerating her for fifteen days without cause and threatening to “take away” her baby, (3) coerced false testimony from Joseph Cox by imprisoning him and depriving him of methadone, (4) sought and obtained five indictments for the same crime, and (5) supervised police officers who “planted” a pistol in Lee’s possession. Judge Nickerson granted a motion to dismiss the complaint as against defendants Gold and Davenport, Lee v. Willins, 474 F.Supp. 970 (E.D.N.Y.1979), relying upon the prosecutorial immunity recognized in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976); and entered final judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). We affirm.

Imbler held that “in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983.” 424 U.S. at 431, 96 S.Ct. at 995. The Court, however, recognized that absolute immunity from suit might not attach to a prosecutor’s acts performed in an investigative or administrative capacity. Id. at 430-31, 96 S.Ct. at 995. Accordingly, as one Court of Appeals has noted, “[t]he crucial inquiry concerns the nature of the official behavior challenged, not the identity or title of the officer responsible therefor.” Briggs v. Goodwin, [*322] 186 U.S.App.D.C. 179, 190, 569 F.2d 10, 21 (D.C.Cir.1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904, 98 S.Ct. 3089, 57 L.Ed.2d 1133 (1978). Thus, in Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1979), a district attorney was given only the qualified “good faith” immunity that protects, for example, police officers, for his role in planning a police raid on an apartment owned by the Black Panther Party. Id. at 632; accord, Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1979); Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256, 1264-65, modified, 583 F.2d 779 (5th Cir. 1978).

The Supreme Court in Imbler recognized, however, that “[preparation, both for the initiation of the criminal process and for a trial, may require the obtaining, reviewing, and evaluating of evidence.” 424 U.S. at 431 n.33, 96 S.Ct. at 995 n.33. Thus, “[t]o grant a prosecuting attorney absolute immunity over his decision to initiate a prosecution while subjecting him to liability for securing the information necessary to make that decision would only foster uninformed decisionmaking . . .” Forsyth v. Kleindienst, supra, 599 F.2d at 1215. Courts, therefore, are left with the difficult chore of drawing a line separating amorphous and vague notions of “investigating” and “prosecutorial” conduct.

We believe Judge Nickerson sensibly distinguished these two concepts in his opinion below. Although he recognized that prosecutorial and investigatory activities are necessarily interrelated to some degree, he separated them for purposes of applying the Imbler test for triggering the defense of absolute immunity by reference to the type of harm allegedly suffered. We endorse this useful and sensible approach. Under this analysis, a prosecutor is immune from a suit to recover for an injury arising solely from the prosecution itself — e. g. being compelled to stand trial or to suffer imprisonment or pretrial detention. Such harm must always result in substantial part from the protected prosecutorial activities of initiating prosecution or presenting the state’s case. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. at 409, 96 S.Ct. at 985.

Where the alleged harm is inflicted independently of the prosecution, however, absolute immunity will not attach. See Hampton v. Hanrahan, supra. If, for example, a prosecutor violates the Fourth Amendment by conducting an illegal search, the victim is harmed by the invasion of his zone of privacy, whether or not the evidence unlawfully obtained is introduced at trial. Redress for this harm is not barred by Imbler. See J.D. Pflaumer, Inc. v. United States Department of Justice, 450 F.Supp. 1125 (E.D.Pa.1978).

The complaint in the instant case alleges prosecutorial misconduct, including falsification of evidence, and the coercion of perjured testimony from a number of witnesses. But the injuries to Lee that could result from these acts are, as his amended complaint states, the deprivation of his liberty for five years, his subjection to the ordeal of multiple trials, and the emotional and economic injury resulting therefrom. These are precisely the alleged injuries for which Imbler granted absolute immunity. Since appellees Gold and Diamond are totally immune from suit for damages of this kind, the motion to dismiss was properly granted. Judge Nickerson correctly noted, however, that a prosecutor might not enjoy absolute immunity from suit by a witness who was allegedly threatened and imprisoned to obtain his perjured testimony. Here, Lee claims to have suffered no harm at the hands of appellees that was not a direct result of his prosecution.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.