Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Archer
A district court may not enter a separate judgment under Rule 54(b) when the adjudicated claims are logically, factually, or legally related to the claims remaining for trial.
After a district court granted summary judgment on certain counterclaims regarding a breach of fiduciary duty and good faith business judgment, it entered a separate judgment under Rule 54(b) while reserving a related counterclaim regarding service contracts for trial. The court must not direct entry of a separate judgment under Rule 54(b) if the adjudicated claims are logically, factually, or legally related to the pending claims. Because the determination of the reserved counterclaim regarding the service contracts could directly impact the factual inquiry into whether the defendant exercised good faith business judgment during the sale, the claims were inseverable. The district court erred by failing to make specific findings justifying the separate judgment.
At page 965Limiting rule 54(b) judgments to unusual cases118 citing casesCertification “must be reserved for the unusual case in which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and of overcrowding the appellate docket are outbalanced by pressing needs of the litigants for an early and separate judgment as to some claims or parties.
- Contractors Edge, Inc. v. City of Mankato, 863 N.W.2d 765 (Minn. 2015).published (requiring the district court to set out specific findings for a valid certification)
- (DP) (HC) Frye v. Calderon, No. 2:99-cv-00628 (E.D. Cal. May 19, 2022).(The trial court should not direct entry of judgment under Rule 54(b) unless it has made 2 specific findings setting forth the reasons for its order.)
- Democracy Forward Found. v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 1:25-cv-03384 (D. Md. Aug. 27, 2026).“Judgments under Rule 54(b) must be reserved for the unusual case in which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and overcrowding the appellate docket are outbalanced by pressing needs of the litigants for an early a…
- Locatelli, No. 2:21-cv-01831 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2025). “the unusual case in which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and 4 of overcrowding the appellate docket are outbalanced by pressing needs of the litigants for an 5 early and separate judgment a…”
- Escobedo, No. 1:23-cv-01627 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2025).“Judgments under Rule 54(b) must be reserved for the unusual case in which the costs 18 and risk of multiplying the number of proceedings and of overcrowding the appellate docket are 19 outbalanced by pressing needs of t…”
- Escobedo, No. 1:23-cv-01627 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2025).“Judgments under Rule 54(b) must be reserved for the unusual case in which the costs 16 and risk of multiplying the number of proceedings and of overcrowding the appellate docket are 17 outbalanced by pressing needs of t…”
- Jane Does 1–9 v. Collins Murphy, No. 7:20-cv-00947 (D.S.C. Oct. 22, 2025).Accordingly, it “must be reserved for the unusual case in which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and overcrowding the appellate docket are outbalanced by pressing needs of the litigants for an early and separate…
- Faison v. Alameda Cnty., No. 3:24-cv-06059 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025).The second requirement considers both the parties’ interests and “judicial administrative 26 interests” to “assure that application of the Rule effectively preserves the historic federal policy 27 against piecemeal appeals.” Wood v. GCC Be…
- CMB Infrastructure Grp. IX, LP v. Cobra Energy Inv. Fin., Inc., No. 2:21-cv-00214 (D. Nev. June 17, 2025).This was traditionally reserved for “unusual situations.” Morrison Knudsen Co., Inc. v. Archer, 4 655 F.2d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1981).
- Rabidue v. Bonner Cnty. Admin., No. 2:20-cv-00529 (D. Idaho Apr. 28, 2025).“[j]udgments under Rule 54(b) must be reserved for the unusual case in which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and of overcrowding the appellate docket are outbalanced by pressing needs of liti…”
Show 98 more citing cases
- Vargas v. City of Tracy, No. 2:22-cv-01454 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2025).Archer, 655 F.2d 962, 965 (9th 5 | Cir. 1981). 6 While the court did reach a final determination of the 7 claims against the City on which it granted summary judgment, the 8 City has not established that entry of final judgment is 9 | warr…
- United States v. Lawrence, No. 2:23-cv-01091 (D. Ariz. Feb. 18, 2025).“A similarity of legal or 16 factual issues will weigh heavily against entry of judgment under the [R]ule, and in such cases a Rule 54(b) order will be proper only where necessary to 17 avoid a harsh and unjust result”
- NAVAJO NATION v. United States, No. 21-1746 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 13, 2025).publishedCt. 735, 738 (1991) (quoting Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc., v. Archer, 655 F.2d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1981)).
- Johnson v. Holms, No. 2:18-cv-00647 (D. Nev. Dec. 4, 2024).The Ninth Circuit 3 disfavors Rule 54(b) judgments, and Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that there is a “seriously 4 important reason” to enter final judgment, or why the relief is “necessary to avoid a harsh and 5 unjust result.” Wood v. G…
- La Canada Ventures, Inc. v. MDalgorithms, Inc., No. 3:22-cv-07197 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2024).Cal. 2008) 25 (citing Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc. v. Archer, 655 F.2d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1981)).
- Terry v. Wasatch Advantage Grp., LLC, No. 2:15-cv-00799 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2024).Id. (quoting Morrison-Knudsen, 655 F.2d at 965) 18 Finally, plaintiffs request “the Court retain jurisdiction over the [False Claims Act] claim 19 to oversee implementation of the Settlement Agreement’s provisions regarding the False Claim…
- Jha v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., No. 2:23-cv-00584 (W.D. Wash. May 30, 2024).“Judgments under Rule 54(b) must be reserved for the unusual case in which the 20 costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and of overcrowding the 21 appellate docket are outbalanced by pressing needs of…”
- Snow v. Align Tech., Inc., No. 3:21-cv-03269 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2024).Cal. Apr. 20, 2022) (citing Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Archer, 655 F.2d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1981)); see also Jewel v. Nat’l Sec.
- State of Montana v. Talen Montana, LLC, No. 6:16-cv-00035 (D. Mont. Jan. 2, 2024).(Doc. 424 at 9–10.) As Montana points out in its opening brief, “[t]he Ninth Circuit has instructed trial courts to direct entry of judgment under Rule 54(b) only after determining ‘whether, upon any review of the judgment entered under th…
- Fambrough v. City of East Cleveland, No. 1:22-cv-00992 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 23, 2023).Tenn. 1996) (quoting Morrison–Knudsen Co., Inc. v. Archer, 655 F.2d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1981)).
- Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-cv-01517, 2023 WL 3750334 (D. Or. June 1, 2023).“it is not proper to direct entry of a separate judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b)”
- Lawson v. Grubhub, Inc., No. 3:15-cv-05128 (N.D. Cal. May 30, 2023).“Judgments under Rule 54(b) must be 19 reserved for the unusual case in which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of 20 proceedings and of overcrowding the appellate docket are outbalanced by pressing needs of…”
- Lighting Retrofit Int'l, LLC v. Constellation Newenergy, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-02751 (D. Md. May 19, 2023).“Judgments under Rule 54(b) must be reserved for the unusual case in which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and overcrowding the appellate docket are outbalanced by pressing needs of the litigants for an early a…
- Wadsworth v. Msad 40/rsu 40, No. 2:19-cv-00577 (D. Me. May 16, 2023).The First Circuit wrote that “[t]he entry of ‘[j]udgments under Rule 54(b) must be reserved for the unusual case in which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and of overcrowding the appellate docket are outbalanced…
- Washington v. Baltimore Police Dep't, No. 1:19-cv-02473 (D. Md. May 16, 2023).“Judgments under Rule 54(b) must be reserved for the unusual case in which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and overcrowding the appellate docket are outbalanced by pressing needs of the litigants for an early a…
- The Est. of Carlos Escobar Mejia v. Archambeault, No. 3:20-cv-02454 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2023).“A similarity of 16 legal or factual issues will weigh heavily against entry of judgment under the rule, 17 and in such cases a Rule 54(b) order will be proper only where necessary to avoid 18 a harsh and unjust result, documented by furth…
- Amyndas Pharm., S.A. v. Zealand Pharma A/S, 48 F.4th 18 (1st Cir. 2022).publishedThe entry of "[j]udgments under Rule 54(b) must be reserved for the unusual case in which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and of overcrowding the appellate docket are outbalanced by pressing needs of the litiga…
- Filho v. Chinatown Cmty. Dev. Ctr., Inc., No. 3:21-cv-05664 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2022).Cal. Jan. 20, 2022); Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc. v. 21 Archer, 655 F.2d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1981). 22 DISCUSSION 23 The dismissal of Filho’s claim against Bermak with prejudice constitutes a final judgment, 24 as it was the ultimate disposit…
- United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Krawatsky, 610 F. Supp. 3d 745 (D. Md. 2022).publishedAccordingly, it “must be reserved for the unusual case in which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and overcrowding the appellate docket are outbalanced by pressing needs of the litigants for an early and separate…
- Hernandez v. Franco Am. Baking Co., No. 3:20-cv-00628 (D. Nev. June 21, 2022).Conversely, partial judgment under Rule 54(b) is inappropriate in routine 1 || docket" outweighs "pressing needs . . . for an early judgment." Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Archer, 2 || 655 F.2d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1981).
- Youngblood v. City of Georgiana, No. 2:19-cv-01072 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 29, 2022).“must be reserved for the unusual case in which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and of overcrowding the appellate docket are outbalanced by pressing needs of the litigants for an early and se…”
- Rodriguez-Flores v. United States Gov't, No. 3:19-cv-01642 (D.P.R. Apr. 25, 2022).So Rule 54(b) is reserved for the “unusual case in which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and of overcrowding the appellate docket are outbalanced by pressing needs of the litigants for an early or separate judg…
- Lemons v. Walgreen Pharmacy Servs. Midwest, LLC, No. 3:21-cv-00511 (D. Or. Apr. 18, 2022).Walgreens argues that entry of partial judgment is appropriate only if it is “necessary to avoid a harsh and unjust result.’” Resp. to Mot. for Final J. [ECF 39] at 4 (quoting Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Archer, 655 F.2d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 198…
- PG&E Corp. v. AECOM Technical Servs., Inc.., No. 4:20-cv-05381 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2021). A final judgment is “a decision upon a cognizable claim for relief” that 5 is “an ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of a multiple claims 6 action.” Curtiss-Wright Corp., 446 U.S. at 7 (citing Sears, Roebuck…
- Rubalcava v. City Of San Jose, No. 5:20-cv-04191 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2021).“[j]udgments under Rule 54(b) must 19 || be reserved for the unusual case in which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of 20 || proceedings and of overcrowding the appellate docket are outbalanced by pressing n…”
- Talavera Hair Prods., Inc. v. Taizhou Yunsung Elec. Appliance Co., LTD., No. 3:18-cv-00823, 2021 WL 3493094 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2021).Nevertheless, judgments under Rule 54(b) are not routinely granted 9 and “must be reserved for the unusual case in which the costs and risks of multiplying the 10 number of proceedings and of overcrowding the appellate docket are outbalanc…
- Mario V. v. Alisal Union Sch. Dist., No. 5:18-cv-00041 (N.D. Cal. May 20, 2021).“reserved for the unusual case in which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of 24 proceedings and of overcrowding the appellate docket are outbalanced by pressing needs of the 25 litigants for an early and sepa…”
- United States for the use & benefit of John A. Weber Co. v. Milcon Constr., No. 1:19-cv-00637 (D. Haw. Apr. 30, 2021).“must be reserved for the unusual case in which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and of overcrowding the appellate docket are outbalanced by pressing needs of the litigants for an early and se…”
- Bender v. Esper, No. 5:19-cv-00355 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 12, 2021).However, Plaintiff’s reliance here must be tempered by the expectation set forth by the Eleventh Circuit in that “Rule 54(b) certifications ‘must be reserved for the unusual case in which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of pr…
- Nat. Resources Def. Council v. Bernhardt, No. 1:05-cv-01207-DAD-EPG (E.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2020).(directing that Rule 54(b)
- Bentley v. Arizona Dep't of Child Saf., No. 2:17-cv-00966 (D. Ariz. Sept. 21, 2020).“must be reserved for the unusual case in which the costs and 6 risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and of overcrowding the appellate docket 7 are outbalanced by pressing needs of the litigants for an early an…”
- Hastings v. Advanced Corr. Healthcare Inc, No. 2:20-cv-00002 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 10, 2020).While the district court is authorized to certify a judgment under Rule 54(b) in the sound exercise of its discretion, the Eleventh Circuit has cautioned that Rule 54(b) certifications should be reserved for those cases “in which the costs…
- Perry v. Cnty. of Kern, No. 1:17-cv-01097 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2019).(directing 22 that Rule 54(b)
- Allison v. Engel, 2017 COA 43, 395 P.3d 1217.published(Certification “must be reserved for the unusual case in which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and of overcrowding the appellate docket are outbalanced by pressing needs of the litigants for…)
- Jewel v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 810 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2015).publishedAlthough we. encourage district courts to make factual findings and to explain their reasons for certifying under Rule 54(b) in order to facilitate appellate review, see Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Archer, 655 F.2d 962, 965 (9th Cir.1981), we…
- James Dean v. Cnty. of Gage, 807 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2015).publishedCo., 782 F.2d 58, 62 (6th Cir.1986) and Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Archer, 655 F.2d 962, 965 (9th Cir.1981))).
- James Dean v. Cnty. of Gage, 800 F.3d 945 (8th Cir. 2015).publishedCo., 782 F.2d 58, 62 (6th Cir.1986) and Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Archer, 655 F.2d 962, 965 (9th Cir.1981))).
- Cochran v. Five Points Temporaries, LLC, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1260 (N.D. Ala. 2012).publishedTherefore, “Rule 54(b) certifications must be reserved for the unusual case in which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and of overcrowding the appellate docket are outbalanced by pressing needs of the litigants f…
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At page 966Criteria for interlocutory appeal under rule 1292(b)8 citing cases“[o]ne of the principal reasons a Court of Appeals will exercise its discretion not to grant applications under section 1292(b) is the likelihood or probability of the appellate court’s having to issue multiple opinions on the same or closely related issues of law or fact in the case”
- Ehart v. Lahaina Divers, Inc., No. 1:21-cv-00475 (D. Haw. July 13, 2022).“[o]ne of the principal reasons a Court of Appeals will exercise its discretion not to grant applications under section 1292(b) is the likelihood or probability of the appellate court’s having to issue multiple opinions…”
- Chahram Pahlavi v. Petros A. Palandjian, 744 F.2d 902 (1st Cir. 1984).published
- Aged Hawaiians v. Hawaiian Homes Comm'n, 891 P.2d 279 (Haw. 1995).published
- In re Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 275 B.R. 1 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002).published
- Reese v. BP Expl. (Alaska) Inc., 643 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2011).published
- Jose Demelo v. Woolsey Marine Indus., Inc., 677 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1982).published
- Astro-Med, Inc. v. R. Moroz, Ltd., 811 A.2d 1154 (R.I. 2002).published
- Int'l Longshore & Warehouse Union v. ICTSI Oregon, Inc., 863 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2017).published
v.
J. D. ARCHER and Elizabeth B. Archer, as individuals and as trustees of the Elizabeth Daly Archer Trust, Defendants-Counterclaimants-Appellants
Lead Opinion
This case involves a routine dispute over whether a summary judgment was correct, but it also requires us to discuss the requirements that must be observed by a district court before it orders the entry of a separate judgment under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We recite only the bare outline of a controversy which involves other events and technical details that are unnecessary for the purposes of this opinion. Morrison-Knudsen Co. (M-K) formerly owned rights to mine coal from an area known as the Elk River Project in British Columbia. By a letter agreement dated October 6, 1969, M-K granted J. D. Archer, and certain other parties, all referred to here as “Archer,” a 15 percent interest in the profits from the sale of that coal, in recognition of Archer’s efforts in arranging the successful purchase of the reserves. The agreement conditioned the grant upon the provision that Archer contribute 15 percent of all expenses incurred in developing the project. Later, a dispute arose between the parties as to their respective rights under the agreement, in particular Archer’s duty to pay his share of the expenses in developing the coal reserves. In 1973 a declaratory judgment was rendered setting forth certain rights and obligations of the parties. That judgment is final and was not appealed. The judgment confirmed that M — K had the right of ownership and control over the deposits and that Archer was obligated to contribute 15 percent of all costs and expenses.
M-K subsequently billed Archer for his share of the project costs, and when he failed to pay, M-K filed suit to recover the sums. During the course of the dispute over these sums, M-K sold the Elk River Project mining interests to an entity here called Elco. M — K retained a 4 percent royalty. M-K, allegedly in connection with the sale, also negotiated with Elco three service contracts pertaining to the development of the project. Archer then filed counterclaims against M-K alleging injury as a result of the sale. Archer claimed M-K failed to consult Archer or obtain his consent to the sale, violated its duty to exercise good faith business judgment, and breached its fiduciary duty to Archer. The parties apparently dispute, in a part of the litigation not before us here, whether Archer is entitled to receive 15 percent of the royalty payments M-K eventually derives from the sale agreement; they further dispute, for purposes here material, whether Archer is entitled to any of the profits M-K derives from the three service contracts.
M-K filed a motion for summary judgment on each of the counterclaims, relying heavily on the earlier declaratory judgment, which set forth the rights of the parties. The district court granted summary judgment for M-K and against Archer on the counterclaims which alleged that M-K[*964] breached its fiduciary duty in making the sale and that M — K failed to exercise its good faith business judgment in obtaining the highest price for the sale. In a further ruling, which gives rise to the procedural difficulty we discuss at length, the district court ordered entry of judgment for M-K on those claims under Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). The court reserved for trial Archer’s counterclaim to establish an interest in the three service contracts. As discussed below, there is a triable issue of fact as to the dismissed counterclaims, but our analysis reveals also a procédural error in the entry of separate judgment.
In granting summary judgment, the trial court proceeded on the assumption that M-K had the duty to use its business judgment, in good faith, in the sale or other disposition of the mining interests. We agree with that conclusion as a reasonable, in fact necessary, interpretation of the declaratory judgment that is the law of this case.[1] We decide further, however, that Archer has identified a narrow inquiry which does present a triable issue of fact, and summary judgment should not have been used to foreclose that factual inquiry. The three contracts by which M — K agreed to render consulting and other services were negotiated at or about the time of the sale. The district court expressly reserved for trial the question whether Archer has an interest in those contracts, an inquiry which will entail some factual exploration. That determination may in turn bear on the question of whether M — K breached its duty to use good faith business judgment in sale negotiations. Specifically, if Archer does not share in the proceeds of the three contracts, it may be argued that M-K accepted a lower royalty to be shared with Archer because it was able to secure profitable service contracts, not subject to Archer’s percentage of profits. Under such circumstances, M — K would have acted to prejudice Archer’s interest without a good faith business justification for doing so. The issue is a narrow one. Archer’s interest was in mining operations, and it is unlikely that the intent of the parties was to include him in any consultation or construction contract made with third persons who were to develop the deposits, provided that such contracts were entered into upon terms that were commercially reasonable and were not procured as part of the quid pro quo in making the sale. Nevertheless, as the trial court acknowledged, the interplay between the three contracts and the sale of the interests requires further factual determinations. We cannot say now, in the probable event Archer was excluded from the three contracts, that M-K necessarily was justified in making them contemporaneously with the sale of the interest.[2]
Our analysis of the close relation between the questions pertaining to the purpose and effect of the three contracts, on the one hand, and the question whether the sale transaction was an exercise of good faith business judgment, on the other, reveals a further error in these proceedings that should be explained in order to assist the district courts of this Circuit in the correct use of separate judgments as to less[*965] than all parties or claims under Fed.R. Civ.P. 54(b). As we have shown, the construction of the three contracts and their interpretation may bear directly upon whether M-K exercised its business judgment properly and whether or not it discharged properly any fiduciary duties it might have to Archer in this regard. Thus, the counterclaim that the court reserved for trial and the counterclaims upon which the court granted summary judgment were logically related, both from a factual and a legal standpoint. In such instances, it is not proper to direct entry of a separate judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b).
Judgments under Rule 54(b) must be reserved for the unusual case in which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and of overcrowding the appellate docket are outbalanced by pressing needs of the litigants for an early and separate judgment as to some claims or parties. The trial court should not direct entry of judgment under Rule 54(b) unless it has made specific findings setting forth the reasons for its order. Those findings should include a determination whether, upon any review of the judgment entered under the rule, the appellate court will be required to address legal or factual issues that are similar to those contained in the claims still pending before the trial court. A similarity of legal or factual issues will weigh heavily against entry of judgment under the rule, and in such cases a Rule 54(b) order will be proper only where necessary to avoid a harsh and unjust result, documented by further and specific findings.
If a judgment is entered under Rule 54(b), then, assuming the judgment has the requisite aspects of finality and that the district court has made the findings and determinations we have set forth above, appellate courts , must give substantial deference to the lower court’s discretion in determining whether an immediate appeal shall lie, because the lower court is “‘the one most likely to be familiar with the case and with any justifiable reasons for delay.’ ” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 446 U.S. 1, 10, 100 S.Ct. 1460, 1466, 64 L.Ed.2d (1980) (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 437, 76 S.Ct. 895, 901, 100 L.Ed. 1297, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1956)).
In Curtiss-Wright, the Supreme Court noted in detail the factors underlying the district court’s determination to enter separate judgment under Rule 54(b) in the case there under consideration. These are instructive.
The District Court also provided a written statement of reasons supporting its decision to certify the judgment as final. It acknowledged that Rule 54(b) certification was not to be granted as a matter of course, . . . because of the overload in appellate courts which would otherwise result from appeals of an interlocutory nature. The essential inquiry was stated to be “whether, after balancing the competing factors, finality of judgment should be ordered to advance the interests of sound judicial administration and justice to the litigants.”
The District Court then went on to identify the relevant factors in the case before it. It found that certification would not result in unnecessary appellate review; that the claims finally adjudicated were separate, distinct, and independent of any of the other claims or counterclaims involved; that review of these adjudicated claims would not be mooted by any future developments in the case; and that the nature of the claims was such that no appellate court would have to decide the same issues more than once even if there were subsequent appeals.
446 U.S. at 5-6, 100 S.Ct. at 1464, 64 L.Ed.2d 1.
In the instant case, the district court did not, and on this record could not, make the findings and determinations which are predicates for an appropriate entry of a judgment under Rule 54(b). As our discussion demonstrates, the question whether M-K exercised good faith business judgment with respect to Archer’s interest cannot be resolved adequately without knowing whether the full consideration for sale of the mining interests included the service[*966] contracts, whether Archer’s interests were thereby hurt, and if so whether M-K had a business justification for negotiating the transaction in such a manner. The claims disposed of by the Rule 54(b) judgment were inseverable, both legally and factually, from claims that remained unadjudicated in the district court, and there were no unusual and compelling circumstances that otherwise dictated entry of an early, separate judgment on that part of the case. It was error, therefore, for the district court to enter the separate judgment under Rule 54(b).
There are cases, of course, when an appellate review of a particular ruling will materially advance disposition of the claims before the trial court, but in such cases the appropriate procedure for the district court is to certify its order for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Section 1292(b) provides that controlling questions of law can be certified for immediate appeal, but the mechanism permits the Court of Appeals to protect its docket by determining for itself whether to accept the issue for review. One of the principal reasons a Court of Appeals will exercise its discretion not to grant applications under section 1292(b) is the likelihood or .probability of the appellate court’s having to issue multiple opinions on the same or closely related issues of law or fact in the case. This discretion in the Court of Appeals should not be evaded by the device of an inappropriate entry of judgment by the district court under Rule 54(b).
In the posture of this case, we have found it appropriate to formulate some of the legal issues that will almost certainly confront the court on remand, despite our conclusion that the separate judgment was improperly entered. See Brunswick Corp. v. Sheridan, 582 F.2d 175, 184-85 (2d Cir. 1978). Those considerations, moreover, bear directly on the reasons why the judgment under Rule 54(b) was improper in the first instance.
The order granting the summary judgment is vacated and the cause remanded for further proceedings. Each party will bear its own costs.
The 1973 declaratory judgment states in pertinent part:
By the terms of the October 6, 1969 agreement, it is implicit that Morrison-Knudsen Company, Inc. is to exercise its business judgments, its ability and mining expertise in the management, operation and control of the Elk River Project for the interest of the respective parties to the agreement.
Various arguments he makes on appeal, moreover, are entirely without substance. The contentions that the term “we” in the letter of October 6, 1969, refers to both M-K and Archer, and that Archer’s consent was necessary to complete the sale, are plainly unreasonable. The 1973 declaratory judgment makes it abundantly clear in several spots that Archer has no right to veto M-K’s decision to sell the mining interests. The judgment expressly stated that Archer and M-K did not have a joint partnership relationship and that Archer had no right of ownership in the coal reserves and could not exercise any control over the management of the project. A contrary construction, moreover, would be plainly inconsistent with M-K’s obligation to exercise its business judgment. We must note in addition that selective, misleading, partial quotations in the appellant’s brief give us little confidence in the merits of his case.
Concurrence
concurring:
I concur separately for the purpose of expressing my views that upon remand the trial court may wish to reconsider its grant of summary judgment to M-K in light of the nature of the fiduciary duty owed to Elk Power Enterprise. Judge Taylor, in his findings, held that M-K was to exercise its business judgment “for the interest of the respective parties to the agreement.” Under Idaho law, the scope of the duty owed depends upon the nature of the relationship. Compare Mallory v. Watt, 100 Idaho 119, 594 P.2d 629, 632 (1979) (real estate broker) with Beal v. Mars Larsen Ranch Corp., 99 Idaho 662, 586 P.2d 1378, 1383 (1978) (attorney). The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that the fiduciary duty must be divided into two parts: (1) a duty of care and (2) a duty of loyalty. See, e. g., Melgara v. Moscow Idaho Seed Co., 73 Idaho 265, 251 P.2d 546, 549-50 (1952). While Judge Taylor found that there was no joint venture, the relationship here has the characteristics of either a corporation or partnership. In the corporate context, the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that the duty of loyalty is an “undivided” one. See id. The same standard is applicable to partnerships.[1]
Here since Archer had no right to participate in management decisions, the relationship is more akin to that of a limited partnership. Yet unlike most limited partnerships, Archer was required to make contributions to the expenses of the operation. It would thus appear that the duty of loyalty owed is at least that owed by a general partner to a limited partner or that of a board of directors to the shareholders of a corporation.
With this in mind the trial court may wish to reconsider the question of triable issues of fact as to whether: (1) the deci[*967]sion to make the sale to Elko complied with the fiduciary duties or was based solely on M-K’s financial problems without consideration of Archer’s interest; (2) threats were made to Archer indicating that M-K sought to harm him by wiping out his interest in breach of the duty of loyalty; and (3) the evidence of sources of long-term contracts for sale of the coal other than Japan indicates that M-K, in making the sale to Elko, failed in its duty to exercise business judgment “for the interest of the respective parties to the agreement.”
See generally Homestake Mining Co. v. Mid-Continent Exploration Co., 282 F.2d 787, 799 (10th Cir. 1960); Tolmie v. San Diego Fruit & Produce Co., 57 Idaho 631, 68 P.2d 61, 69 (1937). Bassan v. Inv. Exch. Corp., 83 Wash.2d 922, 524 P.2d 233, 238 (1974); Crane & Brom-berg, Law of Partnership § 68, at 389 (1963); Note, Fiduciary Duties of Partners, 48 Iowa L.Rev. 902, 908 (1963).