Roach v. Roach, 660 F.2d 1316 (1st Cir. 1981). · Go Syfert
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Roach v. Roach, 660 F.2d 1316 (1st Cir. 1981). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
134 citation events (60 in the last 25 years) across 41 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: In re: Gary Lee Brohl, Jr. v. Soble, PLC, Plum Tree Estates, LLC & Rana Group, LLC, et al. (mieb, 2026-05-12)
Treatment trajectory · 1981 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1981 2003 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 34 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) In re: Gary Lee Brohl, Jr. v. Soble, PLC, Plum Tree Estates, LLC & Rana Group, LLC, et al.
Bankr. E.D. Mich. · 2026 · confidence medium
Co. v. Roach (In re Roach), 660 F.2d 1316, 1318-19 (9th Cir. 1981); Perez v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. (In re Perez), 556 B.R. 527, 536-37 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2016).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McCormick v. CARRINGTON MORTGAGE SERVICES, LLC
Bankr. M.D. Ga. · 2025 · confidence medium
In the Ninth Circuit case of In re Roach, 660 F.2d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1981), the foreclosing creditors published notices stating that a foreclosure would not occur on the previously set date but included a new date for the foreclosure sale during the pendency of the bankruptcy case.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Harold J. Jackson, Jr.
Bankr. E.D. Mich. · 2022 · confidence medium
Co. v. Roach (In re Roach), 660 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1981) (same); Perez v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. (In re Perez), 556 B.R. 527, 537 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2016) (same).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re: JEROME E. PERRYMAN
9th Cir. BAP · 2021 · confidence medium
First Nat'l Bank of Anchorage v. Roach (In re Roach), 660 F.2d 1316, 1318-19 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that a preconfirmation postponement of a prepetition foreclosure sale merely maintains the status quo and is consistent with the purpose of the automatic stay); Mason-McDuffie Mortg.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Matthew James Winters (2×)
Bankr. D. Utah · 2019 · confidence medium
In re Roach, 660 F.2d at 1318-19 (citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Richard D. Davis, LLP., a Texas General Partnership, Richard D. Davis, LLP, a Nevada Limited Liability Partnership and Patricia Suarez v. Sky Lakes Flyers Foundation and Carbett J. Duhon, III
Tex. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
As recognized by the court in In re Roach, 660 F.2d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1981), “the automatic stay does not necessarily prevent all activity outside the bankruptcy forum.” The purpose of the automatic stay is “to stop all collection efforts, harassment and foreclosure actions.” Id. at 1318 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rajbir Singh v. Federal National Mortgage Association
Wash. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
In In the Matter of Roach, 660 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1981), the Ninth Circuit held that the automatic stay provisions in 11 U.S.C. § 362 were not violated by a bank's continuation of the foreclosure sale to a new sale date.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Perez v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. ex rel. Certificate Holders of Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc. Trust 2003-NC10
1st Cir. BAP · 2016 · confidence medium
Id, In In re Roach, the secured creditor had commenced a non-judicial foreclosure pre-petition. 660 F.2d at 1317.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rebuild America and REO America v. Mark E. and Tammy L. Davis (2×) also: Cited "see"
W. Va. · 2015 · confidence medium
Zeoli, 148 B.R. at 701 ; Roach, 660 F.2d at 1318.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Skillforce, Inc. v. Hafer
E.D. Va. · 2014 · confidence medium
Simply put, foreclosure postponement notices “maintained the status quo, and did not harass, interfere or gain any advantage [for the creditor].” Id. at 330 (quoting Matter of Roach, 660 F.2d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir.1981)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Henson v. Bank of America, N.A. (In re Henson)
Bankr.D. Colo. · 2012 · confidence medium
In re Roach, 660 F.2d at 1318-19 (citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) County of Fresno v. Golden State Capital Corp. (In Re Golden State Capital Corp.)
Bankr. E.D. Cal. · 2004 · confidence medium
“The purpose of the automatic stay is to give the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors, to stop all collection efforts, harassment and foreclosure actions.” Matter of Roach, 660 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir.1981) citing Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, Sen.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Eskanos & Adler, P.C. v. Somkiat G. Leetien
9th Cir. · 2002 · confidence medium
First Nat’l Bank v. Roach (In re Roach), 660 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1981); Mason-McDuffie Mortg.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Atlas MacHine & Iron Works, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. (In Re Atlas MacHine & Iron Works, Inc.) (4×)
Bankr. E.D. Va. · 1998 · confidence medium
In re Roach, 660 F.2d at 1319; see, e.g., Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf 516 U.S. at 21 , 116 S.Ct. 286 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Washington Mutual v. Fritz (In Re Fritz)
E.D. Wash. · 1998 · confidence medium
In addition, they argue that his ruling is contrary to public policy because it would make the process of foreclosing on deeds of trust in this state unduly expensive and time consuming. *220 In First Nat’l Bank of Anchorage v. Roach (In re Roach), 660 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1981), the Ninth Circuit held that a creditor who published notice postponing a foreclosure sale did not violate the automatic stay because doing so “merely maintained the status quo_” Judge Klobucher acknowledged that Roach is the law of this circuit, but questioned whether the circuit court would extend that cas…
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re John Jeffrey Peters, Debtor. Mason-Mcduffie Mortgage Corporation v. John Jeffrey Peters
9th Cir. · 1996 · confidence medium
First Nat’l Bank of Anchorage v. Roach (In re Roach), 660 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir.1981).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Barry v. BA Properties, Inc. (In Re Barry)
C.D. Cal. · 1996 · confidence medium
First Nat’l Bank of Anchorage v. Roach (In re Roach), 660 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir.1981).
cited Cited as authority (rule) WORKINGMEN'S SAV. & LOAN ASS'N. v. Kestner
Pa. Super. Ct. · 1994 · confidence medium
Matter of Roach, 660 F.2d 1316, 1318-1319 (9th Cir.1981); Zeoli v. RIHT Mortgage Corp., supra at 702; BAM Investments, Inc. v. Roberts, 172 Ariz. 602 , 838 P.2d 1363, 1365 (App.1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Workingmen's Savings & Loan Ass'n of Dellwood Corp. v. Kestner
Pa. Super. Ct. · 1994 · confidence medium
Matter of Roach, 660 F.2d 1316, 1318-1319 (9th Cir.1981); Zeoli v. RIHT Mortgage Corp., supra at 702; BAM Investments, Inc. v. Roberts, 172 Aiz. 602, 838 P.2d 1363, 1365 (App.1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Zeoli v. RIHT Mortgage Corp. (2×)
D.N.H. · 1993 · confidence medium
Id. at 1319.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tome v. Baer (In Re Tome)
Bankr. C.D. Cal. · 1990 · confidence medium
First National Bank v. Roach (In re Roach), 660 F.2d 1316, 1318-19 (9th Cir.1981) (dictum); Martir Lugo v. de Jesus Saez (In re de Jesus Saez), 721 F.2d 848, 853 (1st Cir.1983); United Mutual Savings Bank v. Doud (In re Doud), 30 B.R. 731, 733-34 (Bankr.W.D.Wash.1983).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. American Savings & Loan Ass'n (3×) also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
9th Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
We conclude that the language and purposes of section 362(a) do not bar mere requests for payment unless some element of coercion or harassment is involved. 4 Cf. Roach, 660 F.2d at 1318-19 (bank’s notice of postponement of sale of debtor’s property specifying new date does not violate automatic stay where bank did not “harass, interfere, or gain any advantage”).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Morgan Guaranty Trust Company Of New York v. American Savings And Loan Association (3×) also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
3rd Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
We conclude that the language and purposes of section 362(a) do not bar mere requests for payment unless some element of coercion or harassment is involved. 4 Cf. Roach, 660 F.2d at 1318-19 (bank's notice of postponement of sale of debtor's property specifying new date does not violate automatic stay where bank did not "harass, interfere, or gain any advantage"). 15 Our conclusion that presentment did not violate the automatic stay prior to the enactment of subsection 362(b)(10) is buttressed by the legislative history of the subsection.
cited Cited as authority (rule) United Mutual Savings Bank v. Doud (In Re Doud)
Bankr. W.D. Wash. · 1983 · confidence medium
Matter of Roach, supra, pp 1318-19.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cel-A-Pak v. California Agricultural Labor Relations Board
9th Cir. · 1982 · confidence medium
Browder, supra, 434 U.S. at 263 n.7, 98 S.Ct. at 560 n.7; Matter of Roach, 660 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Russell, 578 F.2d 806, 807 (9th Cir. 1978). 20 Appellant concedes that ordinarily only abuse of discretion can be considered, but contends we must address the merits in this case because the post-trial motion was "addressed to the question of jurisdiction." Although review of a Rule 60(b) motion may encompass a claim that the district acted in excess of its jurisdiction, see United States v. Russell, supra, 578 F.2d at 807 , no such contention is advanced here.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Cel-A-Pak v. California Agricultural Labor Relations Board
9th Cir. · 1982 · confidence medium
Browder, supra, 434 U.S. at 263 n.7, 98 S.Ct. at 560 n.7; Matter of Roach, 660 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Russell, 578 F.2d 806, 807 (9th Cir. 1978).
discussed Cited "see" In Re Benalcazar
Bankr. N.D. Ill. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See First Nat’l Bank of Anchorage v. Roach (In re Roach), 660 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir.1981) (a creditor may postpone a foreclosure sale after the debt- or’s bankruptcy filing without violating the automatic stay).
discussed Cited "see" Valencia v. Rodriguez
Cal. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See David v. Hooker, Ltd., 560 F.2d 412, 417-18 (9th Cir 1977) (automatic stay under old bankruptcy act did not prevent trial judge in a separate case from requiring the debtor to comply with a discovery order issued prior to the filing of the insolvency petition).” (Matter of Roach (9th Cir. 1981) 660 F.2d 1316 , 1318-1319.) In Tully v. World Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 654 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 545 ] the plaintiffs sought to set aside a nonjudicial foreclosure sale.
cited Cited "see" Willman v. Pollard (In Re Willman)
Bankr. D. Ariz. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See, In re Roach, 660 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir.1981).
cited Cited "see" Peters v. Mason-McDuffie Mortgage Corp. (In Re Peters)
9th Cir. BAP · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Decker, 465 F.2d 294, 297 (3d Cir.1972) (stay provisions of old act were designed to maintain status quo). 660 F.2d at 1318-19 (alteration in original).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Universal Life Church (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
E.D. Cal. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
No. 595 at 125-26, 342, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.News 6086-87, 6298; see Roach, 660 F.2d at 1318 ; Brown v. Pennsylvania State Employees Credit Union (In re Brown) 49 B.R. 558, 561 (Bankr.M.D.Penn.1985).
cited Cited "see" Pelican Production Corporation, a Louisiana Corporation Brent Baker Oil & Gas, Inc. And Harvey H. Holman v. John L. Marino C.W. Culpepper, an Individual Saturn Oil and Gas Company, Inc. Wishbone Oil and Gas Mar-Sher Exploration, Inc. Mary Culpepper, an Individual Sherrye K. Harvey, an Individual Terri Lunday, an Individual Lisa L. Smith, an Individual Jeff S. Gray, an Individual Eddie Vossler, an Individual W.D. Hart, Sr., an Individual Jack Hart, an Individual, Pelican Production Corporation, a Louisiana Corporation Brent Baker Oil & Gas, Inc. And Harvey H. Holman v. John L. Marino C.W. Culpepper, an Individual Saturn Oil and Gas Company, Inc. Wishbone Oil and Gas Mar-Sher Exploration, Inc. Mary Culpepper, an Individual Sherrye K. Harvey, an Individual Terri Lunday, an Individual Lisa L. Smith, an Individual Jeff S. Gray, an Individual
10th Cir. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Roach, 660 F.2d 1316 , 1318 (9th Cir.1981).
cited Cited "see" Pelican Production Corp. v. Marino
10th Cir. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Roach, 660 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir.1981).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Four Star Enterprises Ltd. Partnership v. Council of Unit Owners of Carousel Center Condominium, Inc.
Md. Ct. Spec. App. · 2000 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Anchorage v. Roach (In re Roach), 660 F.2d 1316 , 1318 — 19 (9 th Cir. 1981) ("The purpose of the automatic stay is to give the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors---- The automatic stay also prevents piecemeal diminution of the debtor's estate.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In the Matter of Hillard T. Roach, A/K/A H.T. Roach, Debtor. The First National Bank of Anchorage and Alaska Title Guaranty Company
v.
Hillard T. Roach
80-3435.
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
Oct 29, 1981.
660 F.2d 1316
Cited by 25 opinions  |  Published

660 F.2d 1316

5 Collier Bankr.Cas.2d 680, 8 Bankr.Ct.Dec. 489

In the Matter of Hillard T. ROACH, a/k/a H.T. Roach, Debtor.
The FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ANCHORAGE AND ALASKA TITLE
GUARANTY COMPANY, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
Hillard T. ROACH, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 80-3435.

United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Aug. 20, 1981.
Decided Sept. 30, 1981.
As Amended Oct. 29, 1981.

A. Lee Petersen, Anchorage, Alaska, for defendant-appellant.

John R. Beard, Anchorage, Alaska, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Alaska.

Before SKOPIL, FLETCHER and FARRIS, Circuit Judges.

FARRIS, Circuit Judge:

[*~1316]1

Roach borrowed money to finance a residential subdivision development. Within a few months, he stopped making payments when due. The Bank elected to foreclose non-judicially.

2

Public sale of the property was scheduled for February 4, 1980. On that day, Roach filed a Chapter 11 insolvency petition. The Bank published a notice of postponement of sale, and filed a complaint for relief from the automatic stay.

3

After a preliminary hearing, the bankruptcy court concluded: (1) Roach did not have an equity interest in the property; (2) the property was not necessary to an effective reorganization; (3) the Bank's interests were not and could not be adequately protected without relief from the automatic stay; and (4) there was no reasonable likelihood Roach would prevail at a final hearing. Relief from the automatic stay was granted by judgment and order dated April 21, 1980.

4

Roach responded with a motion for a new trial and stay of judgment. Roach contended a communications gap between himself and his attorney had prevented effective representation. This motion was denied on April 30, and the sale occurred the following day.

5

On the day after sale Roach filed a motion for relief from the April 21 judgment and for an order invalidating the sale. Roach's sole contention was that the Bank had repeatedly violated the automatic stay provision by publishing several successive notices of postponement of sale. Each notice had (1) indicated that the sale would not take place on a previously announced date, and (2) specified a date when the sale would take place. Roach's motion was denied on May 21.

6

Roach appealed to the district court. Although expressly appealing only the May 21 order, Roach also argued that the April 21 judgment and order granting relief from the automatic stay was clearly erroneous, and that the April 30 order denying a new trial was an abuse of discretion. The district court considered all the arguments raised, and affirmed the May 21 order.

7

Roach now appeals the decision of the district court. We affirm.

ANALYSIS

8

Roach's motion for relief from the April 21 judgment was in the nature of a Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion, made applicable to bankruptcy cases by Fed.R.Bankr.P. 924. The standard of review is abuse of discretion. Browder v. Director, Department of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 263 n.7, 98 S.Ct. 556, 560 n.7, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978); United States v. Russell, 578 F.2d 806, 807 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).

9

(1) The April 21 judgment and order for relief from the automatic stay was not clearly erroneous.

10

An appeal from a denial of a Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion does not bring up the underlying judgment for review. Browder v. Director, Department of Corrections, 434 U.S. at 263 n.7, 98 S.Ct. at 560 n.7; Hayward v. Britt, 572 F.2d 1324, 1325 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).

[*~1317]11

Roach argues as if he had appealed and the district court had affirmed the underlying judgment granting relief from the automatic stay. In fact, Roach appealed only the May 21 denial of his motion for relief from judgment. A notice of appeal from the underlying judgment had been filed, but had been dismissed on Roach's motion before being docketed. Dismissal by the bankruptcy court was proper. Fed.R.Bankr.P. 801(b) (applicable pursuant to Interim Bankr.R. 8003, adopted for the bankruptcy court for the District of Alaska by district court order dated September 28, 1979).

12

Roach's argument that he intended to include the underlying judgment in his appeal to the district court is unavailing. The time for appeal from the underlying judgment had expired. Fed.R.Bankr.P. 802(a) (10 days). See Daily Mirror, Inc. v. New York News, Inc., 533 F.2d 53, 56 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 862, 97 S.Ct. 166, 50 L.Ed.2d 140 (1976).

13

Further, the bankruptcy court's conclusion that Roach did not have an equity interest in the subject property was not clearly erroneous. The property was encumbered by liens totalling approximately $625,000, and though the bankruptcy court heard conflicting testimony regarding the value of the property, one appraiser testified the value was not greater than $480,000. In addition, the bankruptcy court also concluded that the Bank lacked adequate protection of its interests in the property, and Roach has not challenged this independent basis for the judgment.

14

(2) The April 30 denial of Roach's motion for a new trial was not an abuse of discretion.

15

Roach's argument that a communications gap between himself and his then attorney prevented the attorney from representing him effectively and caused certain relevant evidence not to be presented to the bankruptcy court may fall within the scope of Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). However, the argument is unpersuasive. The record shows that Roach was adequately represented during the preliminary hearing. Additionally, there was ample evidence to support the bankruptcy judge's conclusion that Roach's request for new counsel was just "further delaying tactics."

16

(3) Notices of postponement of sale do not constitute violations of the automatic stay.

17

Postponement notices which specify a new sale date do not violate 11 U.S.C. § 362.

18

The purpose of the automatic stay is to give the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors, to stop all collection efforts, harassment and foreclosure actions. Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, Sen.Rep.No.989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in (1978) U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5787, 5840. The automatic stay also prevents piecemeal diminution of the debtor's estate. See Bohack Corp. v. Borden, Inc., 599 F.2d 1160, 1167 (2d Cir. 1979). The automatic stay does not necessarily prevent all activity outside the bankruptcy forum. See David v. Hooker, Ltd., 560 F.2d 412, 417-18 (9th Cir. 1977) (automatic stay under old bankruptcy act did not prevent trial judge in a separate case from requiring the debtor to comply with a discovery order issued prior to the filing of the insolvency petition).

19

Here, the Bank merely maintained the status quo, and did not harass, interfere or gain any advantage. This is consistent with the purpose of the automatic stay provision. See In re Decker, 465 F.2d 294, 297 (3d Cir. 1972) (stay provisions of old act were designed to maintain status quo).

[*~1318]20

Affirmed.