Kuzinich v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1982). · Go Syfert
Copy Cite Kuzinich v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1982).
Court of Appeals for the Ninth CircuitPublished opinionNo. 81-4460Oct 13, 1982

Kuzinich v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1982)

Quick Summary

Summary judgment is improper when the record presents conflicting inferences regarding whether a zoning ordinance is narrowly drawn to serve a substantial government interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression.

A business owner operating adult enterprises challenged a county zoning ordinance and the selective abatement of his businesses. The court addressed whether summary judgment was appropriate regarding the ordinance's validity and the plaintiff's equal protection claim. The court held that summary judgment is improper when evidence allows for differing inferences regarding whether a zoning ordinance serves a substantial public interest unrelated to the suppression of free speech. Furthermore, the court determined that while members of local legislative bodies enjoy absolute immunity for legislative acts, such as enacting zoning ordinances, they possess only qualified immunity for executive acts, such as directing legal counsel to initiate abatement proceedings.

191 citation events (24 in the last 25 years) across 36 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1983 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
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Cited for
At page 1349Analyzing due process and equal protection claims in zoning33 citing cases“a summary judgment is proper here only if it can be said that viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellants it appears as a matter of law that the purpose of the ordinance was to serve some substantial public interest unrelated to the suppression of free speech.”3 citing courts quote it · 31 listed here
  • Onyx Props. LLC v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 838 F.3d 1039 (10th Cir. 2016).published
    ([T]he enactment of a general zoning ordinance is a legislative act.)
  • Traweek v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 659 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Cal. 1986).published 2 cites
    (The enactment of a general zoning ordinance is a legislative act.)
  • O-Kel (Idaho Ct. App. 2011).unpublished
    Henson, 107 6 Idaho at 24, 684 P.2d at 1001 (citing Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345, 1349 (9th Cir. 1982)).
  • La Conner Assocs. LLC v. Berg, 73 F. App'x 994 (9th Cir. 2003).unpublished
    “that the enactment of a general zoning ordinance is a legislative act”
  • Baby Tam & Co, Inc. v. City of Las Vegas, 247 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2001).published
    Even though the amended ordinances were ultimately held to be constitutional, Baby Tam argues that it was lawfully in business when the invalid ordinance came into effect and contends that it was therefore entitled to continue its business…
  • Acevedo-Garcia v. Vera Monroig, 30 F. Supp. 2d 141 (D.P.R. 1998).published
    See Acevedo-Cordero v. Cordero-Santiago, 958 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir.1992); Haskell v. Washington Township, 864 F.2d 1266, 1277 (6th Cir.1988); Aitchison v. Raffiani, 708 F.2d 96, 98-100 (3rd Cir.1983); Reed v. Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 952-53…
  • Bartlett v. Cinemark USA, Inc., 908 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995).published 2 cites
    See Haskell, 864 F.2d at 1277 ; Aitchison v. Raffiani, 708 F.2d 96, 98-100 (3d Cir. 1983); Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 952-53 (7th Cir.1983); Espanola Way Corp. v. Meyerson, 690 F.2d 827, 829 (11th Cir.1982), cert. denied,…
  • Drive v. City of Mesquite, 863 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Nev. 1994).published
    “This absolute immunity extends to local legislators.” Id. (citing Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345, 1349 (9th Cir.1982)).
  • Manders v. Brown, 643 A.2d 931 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994).published
    Thus, for example, failure to comply with a court order to supply annexed parcels with sewer service was “zoning enforcement,” Town of Front Royal, 865 F.2d at 79 ; ordering the institution of an action against a specific individual enforc…
  • Trevino ex rel. Cruz v. Gates, 23 F.3d 1480 (9th Cir. 1994).published 4 cites
    See Bateson, 857 F.2d at 1304 (city council members enjoy no absolute immunity for determinations on building permits, because budding permits do not apply to the general community or involve the promulgation of legislative policy, but are…
Show 21 more citing cases
  • Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande, 17 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1994).published
    Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345, 1349-50 (9th Cir.1982).
  • F.R.Y. v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, 837 F. Supp. 330 (D. Colo. 1991).published
    See, Haskell v. Washington Township, 864 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir.1988); Aitchison v. Raffiani, 708 F.2d 96, 98-99 (3d Cir.1983); Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 952-53 (7th Cir.1983); Espanola Way Corp. v. Meyerson, 690 F.2d 827, 82…
  • Zamsky v. Hansell, 933 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1991).published 2 cites
    Id. at 578 (citing Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345, 1349 (9th Cir.1982)). 8 Nor do the LCDC Commissioners act in a judicial capacity.
  • Bateson v. Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1988).published 2 cites
    Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345, 1349-50 (9th Cir.1982).
  • Gutierrez v. Mun. Court of the Se. Jud. Dist., 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1988).published 4 cites
    See Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 731-33 , 100 S.Ct. 1967, 1974-75 , 64 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980); Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 405 , 99 S.Ct. 1171, 1179 , 59 L.Ed.2d 401 (197…
  • Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697 (1986).published 2 cites
    That a bookstore might meet the heavy burden of proving selective prosecution, see ante, at 707, n. 4; ante, at 708 (O’CONNOR, J., concurring); see also Wayte v. United States, 470 U. S. 598, 607-610 (1985); Kuzinich v. County of Santa Cla…
  • Paul A. Stern v. Tarrant Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. George J. Luibel, 755 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1985).published
    This was changed in 1981 to the Accreditation Committee 3 Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 4495b, Subchapter A, Sec. 1.02(9) (Vernon Supp.1984) 4 Id 5 273 U.S. 414 , 47 S.Ct. 363 , 71 L.Ed. 714 (1927) 6 600 F.2d 466 (5th Cir.1979) 7 But see Dool…
  • Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1984).published 2 cites
    “that members of local legislative bodies have complete immunity from suits based on their legislative acts”
  • United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, 728 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1984).unpublished
    See Hernandez v. City of LaFayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1192-94 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907 , 102 S.Ct. 1251 , 71 L.Ed.2d 444 (1982); Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607, 611-15 (8th Cir.1980); see also Reed v. Villa…
  • Preston Guillory v. Cnty. of Orange, 731 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1984).published
    S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886); Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345, 1349 (9th Cir.1983).
  • Abraham v. Pekarski, 728 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1984).published
    See Hernandez v. City of LaFayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1192-94 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907 , 102 S.Ct. 1251 , 71 L.Ed.2d 444 (1982); Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607, 611-15 (8th Cir.1980); see also Reed v. Villa…
  • Lockary v. Kayfetz, 587 F. Supp. 631 (N.D. Cal. 1984).published
    Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345, 1349 (9th Cir.1982); Gorman Towers v. Bugoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607 , 612-614 (8th Cir.1980).
  • Heiar v. Crawford Cnty., Wis., 558 F. Supp. 1175 (W.D. Wis. 1983).published
    Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272, 279 (4th Cir.1980); Hernandez v. City of LaFayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1193 (5th Cir.1981) cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907 , 611-612, 102 S.Ct. 1251 , 71 L.Ed.2d 444 (1982); Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogloslavsky, 626 F.…
  • United States v. Danny C. Christopher, 700 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1983).published
    Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 , 6 S.Ct. 1064, 1072-73 , 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886); Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345, 1349 (9th Cir.1982).
  • Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (S.D. Cal. 2010).published 2 cites
    (applying this test to a claim of “selective prosecution” in zoning decision context)
  • Robert P. Sheley v. Richard L. Dugger, 824 F.2d 1551 (11th Cir. 1987).published
  • Mahiai v. Suwa, 742 P.2d 359 (Haw. 1987).published
  • Thunderbird Hotels, LLC v. City of Portland, 670 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (D. Or. 2009).published
  • Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 758 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1985).published
  • Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 747 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1984).published
  • Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 758 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1984).published
At page 1350Determining immunity for executive versus legislative acts15 citing casesissues litigated in a preliminary injunction action are not res judicata and do not form a basis for collateral estoppel2 citing courts put it this way · 13 listed here
  • Malahoff v. Saito, 140 P.3d 401 (Haw. 2006).published 2 cites
    (issues litigated in a preliminary injunction action are not res judicata and do not form a basis for collateral estoppel)
  • Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. John R. Block, 749 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1984).published
    (issues litigated in a preliminary injunction action are not res judicata and do not form a basis for collateral estoppel)
  • Bridgeforth v. Bronson, 584 F. Supp. 2d 108 (D.D.C. 2008).published 2 cites
    “does not amount to an adjudication of the ultimate rights in controversy”
  • Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 126 F.3d 461 (3d Cir. 1997).published
    (refusing to apply collateral estoppel to state court finding made in preliminary injunction proceeding in trial on merits of plaintiff's § 1983 claim)
  • Veale v. Marlborough, No. CV-92-355-SD (D.N.H. Aug. 30, 1995).published
    However, this court has previously determined that since said decision only involved a determination of plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits of their right-to-vote claim, the issues litigated there "'do not form the basis for co…
  • Trevino ex rel. Cruz v. Gates, 23 F.3d 1480 (9th Cir. 1994).published 4 cites
    (an order to institute an action to abate a private business is executive, not legislative)
  • New Port Largo, Inc. v. Monroe Cnty., 706 F. Supp. 1507 (S.D. Fla. 1988).published 3 cites
    See Espanola Way Corp. v. Meyerson, 690 F.2d 827, 829 (11th Cir.1982); Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1195 (5th Cir.1981); Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345, 1350 (9th Cir.1982.
  • In re Super Prem. Ice Cream Distrib. Antitrust Lit., 691 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. Cal. 1988).published
    Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345, 1350-51 (9th Cir.1982).
  • Haagen-Dazs Co. v. Double Rainbow Gourmet Ice Creams, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. Cal. 1988).published
    Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345, 1350-51 (9th Cir.1982).
  • Evers v. Cnty. of Custer, 745 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1984).published 2 cites
    Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345, 1350 (9th Cir.1982). 33 It is difficult to imagine a case in which the act complained of more clearly "implements or executes a ... decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body'…
Show 3 more citing cases
  • John A. Reed v. Vill. of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943 (7th Cir. 1983).published
    See Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607, 613-14 (8th Cir.1980); Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272, 279 (4th Cir.1980); Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1192-93 (5th Cir.1981); Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F…
  • Barnhardt v. Dist. of Columbia, 723 F. Supp. 2d 197 (D.D.C. 2010).published
    See Kuzmich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345, 1350-51 (9th Cir.1983).
  • Don King Prods., Inc. v. Douglas, 742 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).published
At page 1348Analyzing governmental interest in restricting free expression4 citing cases“while the ordinance here was said to be copied after the detroit ordinance validated in young , we find very little evidence bearing on the concentration of adult enterprises.”1 citing court quotes it · 3 listed here
At page 1347Reviewing local government's zoning and permitting actions5 citing cases3 listed here
  • G. & a. Books, Inc. v. Stern, 604 F. Supp. 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).published
    See also Schad, 452 U.S. at 71 n. 10, 72, 101 S.Ct. at 2184 n. 6, 2184; Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345, 1347-48 (9th Cir.1982); Purple Onion, Inc. v. Jackson, 511 F.Supp. 1207, 1226-27 (N.D.Ga.1981); see generally Note, P…
  • City of Las Vegas v. Foley, 747 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1984).published 2 cites
    United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 , 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1679 , 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968); accord City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2129 , 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephra…
  • Tovar v. Billmeyer, 721 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1983).published 5 cites
    We begin with the settled premise that zoning decisions may not constitutionally be made for the purpose of restricting protected first amendment speech, including that which is sexually explicit. 4 See generally Kuzinich v. County of Sant…
At page 1351“issues litigated in a preliminary injunction action are not res judicata and do not form a basis for collateral estoppel”0 citing cases3 citing courts quote it
    Other citing cases1 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
    Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
    Peter KUZINICH, Sr.
    v.
    COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA Board of Supervisors of the County of Santa Clara Rod Diridon Suzanne Wilson Dominic Cortese Dan McCorquodale Geraldine F. Steinberg
    No. 81-4460.
    Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
    Oct 13, 1982.
    Published opinion
    Amiram J. Givon, Oakland, Cal., for plaintiff-appellant., Bruce Nye, Popelka, Allard, McCowan & Jones, San Francisco, Cal., for defendantsappellees., Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.
    Choy, Norris, Smith.
    Cited by 83 opinions  |  Published
    Citation check: this opinion cites a case at a citation that does not lead to it (marked in red below).
    RUSSELL E. SMITH, District Judge:

    This is an appeal from a summary judgment denying plaintiff all relief on his claims of violations of certain constitutional rights.

    The record shows the following:

    For the last ten years the plaintiff, Kuzinich, has operated an adult movie theater, the Pink .Poodle, and an adult bookstore, the Bascom Bookcase, in Burbank, an unincorporated area in Santa Clara County, California. Kuzinich was required to have a use permit, and the first of these, containing conditions, was granted in September 1973 by the Santa Clara County Planning Commission. It expired in October 1974, and the County so notified Kuzinich in January 1976. Kuzinich applied for a second use permit that same month. Due to his failure to comply with the conditions stated in the first use permit, there was a delay in issuance of a second permit, but one was finally issued in June 1977. The second permit also required compliance with numerous conditions and was valid for two years. The conditions included items such as plans for landscaping, paving and improving the parking lot, and repair of a fence. On February 13, 1980, the County notified Kuzinich that his second use permit had expired some eight months earlier. The conditions imposed by prior permits had not been met. On April 2, 1980, Kuzinich filed an application for a new use permit. He was informed on May 2, 1980, that this application was incomplete and submitted additional information. On July 21, 1980, he was told that his application was complete. The application was placed on the Planning Commission’s agenda for October 16,1980, but it was never heard by that commission. Kuzinich has not complied with the conditions of his use permits in several particulars. On October 6, 1980, the Board of Supervisors of the County directed County counsel to file an action to enjoin the operation of the Pink Poodle and the Bascom Bookcase, and on the same day adopted as an emergency measure an amendment to the zoning ordinances which made the operation of Kuzinich’s adult businesses unlawful in the locations at which they were operating. On October 14, 1980, the County filed an action for an injunction in the Superior Court of California on the ground that Kuzinich was operating illegally since his use permit had expired in 1979. A preliminary injunction was granted but was later stayed by the California Court of Appeals.-

    As we see it, these problems appear:

    First: Was the rezoning ordinance valid?

    Second: If the ordinance was valid, was the denial of Kuzinich’s exemption as a preexisting nonconforming use invalid because of invidious selective treatment?

    Third: What effect do the doctrines of immunity have upon this case?

    Fourth: Was there a conspiracy?

    THE VALIDITY OF THE ORDINANCE

    In Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68, 101 S.Ct. 2176, 2183, 68 L.Ed.2d 671 (1981); the Court stated: “[Wjhen a zoning law infringes upon a protected liberty, it must be narrowly drawn and must further a sufficiently substantial government interest.” Within these limits zoning is a valid exercise of the police power and, under some circumstances notwithstanding the first amendment, the zoning power may extend to places dealing in that which is sexually explicit but not adjudged to be obscene. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 421 U.S. 50[incorrect citation], 96 S.Ct. 2440, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976). In Young the City of Detroit’s ordinance was designed to control the concentration of certain regulated uses which included adult motion picture theaters and adult bookstores. There was evidence that such concentration “tends to attract an undesirable quantity and quality of transients, adversely affects property values, causes an increase in crime, especially prostitution, and encourages residents and businesses to move elsewhere.” Id. at 55, 96 S.Ct. at 2445. The Detroit ordinance was enacted prior to the establishment of the theaters as adult theaters.

    It is clear, however, that zoning may not be employed for the purpose of restricting the content of speech, including that which is sexually explicit. In the Young case Justice Powell, in his concurrence with the plurality opinion, repeated the four-part test stated in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672[*1348] (1968). The third part of that test requires that the governmental interest be “unrelated to the suppression of free expression.” 427 U.S. at 79-80, 96 S.Ct. at 2456-2457. While less direct, the language in the plurality opinion to the effect that there is a need for “absolute neutrality by the government; its regulation of communication may not be affected by sympathy or hostility for the point of view being expressed by the communicator” (Id. at 67, 96 S.Ct. at 2450) expresses the same thought.

    While the ordinance here was said to be copied after the Detroit ordinance validated in Young, we find very little evidence bearing on the concentration of adult enterprises. Rather we find a concern with complaints about traffic and littering. Conclusions alone support the thesis that adult bookstores and movie theaters have any different impact upon traffic and littering than other kinds of businesses have. The law requires that an ordinance restricting first amendment rights be narrowly drawn, and it does not appear from this record why an ordinance directed at traffic and littering would not accomplish what zoning was expected to accomplish. In short, the need to be served and the public purpose to be accomplished do not appear as clearly here as they did in Young.

    There was some evidence, largely in the nature of conclusions, that the amendment to the zoning ordinance was passed for the purpose of controlling traffic and littering and that the adult businesses did have a negative effect on adjoining residential areas. But there was also evidence from which it might be inferred that the basic purpose was to control pornography. Supervisor Diridon assigned an intern, Pamela Poore, to investigate three adult enterprises in Burbank. Her report to Diridon, dated October 6, 1980, and entitled “Pink Poodle Packet,” was forwarded by him on the same day to the Board of Supervisors with a recommendation that it be adopted.

    The report contained the following:

    Following complaints regarding public display of obscene films and books and a court ruling allowing public officials to stop such displays on the basis that these exhibits constitute a “public nuisance,” Rod Diridon, in 1976, began a campaign against adult movie theaters, live adult entertainment, adult bookstores, and cardrooms. Although cardrooms in unincorporated areas of the County were closed, the efforts proved unsuccessful as applied to the Pink Poodle. After four years, some of the original conditions remain unsatisfied,

    and

    By failing to establish a reasonably moderate distance between adult entertainment facilities and residential and educational areas, the County risks perpetuating a negative influencd (sic) on young people of the County.
    A number of citizens have registered their complaints against the adult movie theaters, live entertainment theaters, and adult bookstores in the County. By failing to address the concerns of our constituents, we run the risk of alienating the public we are here to serve.

    The report recommended that the use permits of three adult enterprises, including the Pink Poodle and the Bascom Bookcase, be abated; that the Board of Supervisors, instead of the Planning Commission, have final authority over use permits for adult enterprises; that the zoning ordinances be amended to prohibit adult enterprises in certain areas; that a hearing on a zoning ordinance be scheduled for November 3, 1980; and that in the interim an emergency ordinance be adopted.

    On October 7, 1980, an emergency ordinance was adopted. By its terms it was to expire in four months. On October 14, 1980, it was amended to include an additional area, and on November 17, 1980, the emergency ordinance was adopted as final. On November 14, 1980, the Planning Commission noted its disapproval.

    A statement by Pamela Poore appears in the record to the effect that Commissioner Diridon wanted the emergency ordinance to stop the applications for the Pink Poodle and the Bascom Bookcase permits while a formal ordinance was being adopted. The following appears in the Poore report:

    The County has no means of enforcing conditions set by the ASA [Architectural Site Approval Committee], other than to deny the permit. If the conditions are satisfied by the time of inspection by the ASA, the Planning Commission will grant the permit. The County cannot enforce compliance with the original conditions once the permit is issued.

    A summary judgment is proper here only if it can be said that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Kuz[*1349]inich, it appears as a matter of law that the purpose of the ordinance was to serve some substantial public interest unrelated to the suppression of free speech. That cannot be said. See Board of Education v. Pico, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 2799, 73 L.Ed.2d 435 (1982), in which the Supreme Court held in a first amendment case that summary judgment was not proper where differing conclusions could be drawn from the evidence.

    THE INVIDIOUS SELECTIVE TREATMENT CLAIM

    If the zoning ordinance is ultimately held to be valid, Kuzinich would still be entitled to continue his businesses under the exception of existing nonconforming uses if he was lawfully in business at the time the ordinance was enacted. Whether he was lawfully in business depends in turn upon whether his rights to due process and equal protection were honored. Kuzinich claims that he was denied due process when the Board of Supervisors directed County counsel to commence an abatement proceeding against him without giving him prior notice. We see no due process problem and reject the unique claim that a person is entitled to a hearing before a governmental body may direct its counsel to file a lawsuit. The decision was executive, not adjudicatory.[1] None of plaintiff’s rights could be affected until he had a full opportunity to present his view in a court proceeding.

    The equal protection claim is more serious. A law, valid on its face, but so administered as to unjustly discriminate between persons in similar circumstances, may deny equal protection. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886). As of the time that the direction to abate was given, Kuzinich was one of a class of people who were required to have use permits, and he was entitled to the same consideration as others when a renewal was sought. Kuzinich claims that the policy of renewal of permits was to secure voluntary compliance and that, out of 250 businesses which were carried on without a permit, the three adult enterprises (two of which were Kuzinich’s) were singled out for abatement.[2] The defendants claim that there were sixteen abatement proceedings brought in the years between 1975 and 1980.

    On the other hand, the record does show that Kuzinich had been in constant violation of the conditions of his use permit for many years and was grossly negligent in keeping the permit current. He did not have a permit at the time of the abatement action.

    The rule as to selective prosecution was stated by this court in United States v. Scott, 521 F.2d 1188, 1195 (9th Cir. 1975), as follows:

    The second major assignment of error is that Scott was discriminatorily singled out for prosecution because of his vocal opposition to the income tax. In order to prevail in this allegation appellant must bear the burden of proving at least a prima facie case. This requires that appellant first demonstrate that others similarly situated generally have not been prosecuted for conduct similar to that for which he was prosecuted. Secondly, appellant must show that his selection was based on an impermissible ground such as race, religion or his exercise of his first amendment right to free speech.

    Even if the evidence requires a finding that the character of Kuzinich’s businesses motivated the abatement, that alone is not enough. Kuzinich must show that he was treated differently than those who were as chronically delinquent and as continually in violation as he was. From the record here differing inferences could be drawn, and a summary judgment should not have been granted. Gaines v, Haughton, 645 F.2d 761, 769 (9th Cir. 1981).

    IMMUNITY

    We hold that members of local legislative bodies have complete immunity from suits based on their legislative acts and also that the enactment of a general zoning ordinance is a legislative act. Though the question has been left open until now in this circuit (see Morrison v. Jones, 607 F.2d 1269, 1274 (9th Cir. 1979)), in so holding we follow what we believe to be the rule announced in Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 99 S.Ct. 1171, 59 L.Ed.2d 401 (1979),[*1350] and the positive declarations by the Fifth, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits in the cases of Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1981); Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272 (4th Cir. 1980); and Gorman Towers, Inc. v. Bogoslavsky, 626 F.2d 607 (8th Cir. 1980). We add only this to the decisions in those cases: the manifest need for a rule of absolute immunity is illustrated in this case. Here legislators are involved in balancing social needs against constitutional rights, the kind of balancing which often produces plurality opinions, and almost always dissenting opinions, in the Supreme Court. These legislators now find themselves sued for the total of $2,500,000.00 general damages and $5,000,000.00 punitive damages by a plaintiff whose business, as nearly as we can determine from the record, has not been shut down one day.

    There is no immunity protecting the County of Santa Clara. Owens v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980); Gorman Towers, 626 F.2d at 613. Though both Owens and Gorma n Towers dealt with cities, their rationale applies to the case of counties as well.

    The individual members of the Board of Supervisors enjoy no absolute immunity from actions arising out of the order directing the County counsel to institute an action, the purpose of which was to abate Kuzmich’s businesses. The order was not a legislative act, but rather an executive one. As to such acts the supervisors enjoy a qualified rather than an absolute immunity. See Morrison v. Jones, 607 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1979).

    THE CONSPIRACY CLAIM

    The affidavits show that the defendant Diridon did not conspire with the defendant Engelbrecht, and the judgment insofar as it dismisses Count II of the complaint is affirmed.

    The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.[3]

    Following the filing of the opinion in this matter on October 13, 1982, the panel was advised that the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Three, had decided the case of County of Santa Clara v. Peter Kuzinich, Sr., A013033, 1 Civ. No. 51659, Super.Ct. No. 460801. In that case the California Court of Appeal sustained an order of the trial court denying a preliminary injunction. In so doing, it passed on the constitutionality of the ordinances in question in this language:

    It is a sufficient response to appellant’s challenge that we find the ordinance is valid on its face and that it is reasonably probable that the validity of the zoning ordinance would be sustained at a trial on the merits. (DeMott v. Board of Police Comrs. (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 296, 299-301 [175 Cal.Rptr. 879]; People v. Adult World Bookstore (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 404, 408 [166 Cal.Rptr. 519].) Accordingly, if this were the only issue before us, we would conclude that the trail court did not abuse its discretion in granting the request for a preliminary injunction.

    It is now suggested that the decision of the California Court of Appeal became final prior to the finality of the decision of this court and is therefore res judicata and the basis for collateral estoppel.

    It is settled law that, unless a state’s res judicata rules violate due process, federal courts hearing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions apply the rules of the state court from which the judgment issues. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96, 101 S.Ct. 411, 416, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980); Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., -U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1889, 1897-98, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982). In California,

    The granting or denial of a preliminary injunction does not amount to an adjudication of the ultimate rights in controversy. It merely determines that the court, balancing the respective equities of the parties, concludes that, pending a trial on the merits, the defendant should or that he should not be restrained from exercising the right claimed by him.

    Continental Baking Co. v. Katz, 68 Cal.2d 512, 528, 67 Cal.Rptr. 761, 771, 439 P.2d 889, 899 (1968) (quoting Miller & Lux v. Madera Canal & Irrigation Co., 155 Cal. 59, 62-63, 99 P. 502, 511 (1909)). As such, issues liti[*1351]gated in a preliminary injunction action are not res judicata and do not form a basis for collateral estoppel.

    In this case it is clear that the state court in County of Santa Clara v. Hayden & Kuzinich, Nos. A013032 and A013033 (Cal.Ct.App. Sept. 30, 1982), did not intend a final adjudication of the constitutionality of the ordinance as applied. Instead, although stating that the ordinance was valid on its face, the court noted only that it is “reasonably probable” that the validity of the ordinance as applied would be sustained at trial. Id. at 8. See Bomberger v. McKelvey, 35 Cal.2d 607, 220 P.2d 729 (1950).

    1

    See OPP Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Adm’r of Wage & Hour Div., Dep’t of Labor, 312 U.S. 126, 152 53, 61 S.Ct. 524, 535-536, 85 L.Ed. 624 (1941).

    2

    An adult bookstore known as “Y-Not Enterprises” was abated. It had never had a use permit.

    3

    (Page 10) We note that in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976), the Court discussed the fact that the impact of the Detroit ordinance on free speech was minimal because adult movies could operate in other parts of Detroit. The trial judge on remand should consider that problem as a part of the general balancing necessary in cases of this sort. See Keego Harbor Co. v. City of Keego Harbor, 657 F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1981); CLR Corp. v. Henline, 520 F.Supp. 760 (W.D.Mich.1981).