No. 81-1928, 711 F.2d 570 (3rd Cir. 1983). · Go Syfert
No. 81-1928, 711 F.2d 570 (3rd Cir. 1983). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
50 citation events (17 in the last 25 years) across 20 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: No. 91-1617 (ca7, 1992-10-06)
Treatment trajectory · 1983 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1983 2004 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 13 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) No. 91-1617
7th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1200 (2d Cir.1991); Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 909 (3d Cir.1991); United States v. Basic Construction Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir.1983) (per curiam); United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 242 (1st Cir.1982); United States v. Koppers Co., 652 F.2d 290, 298 (2d Cir.1981); United States v. Van Riper, 154 F.2d 492 (3d Cir.1946); Developments in the Law, "Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions," 92 Harv.L.Rev. 1227, 1247-51 (1979). 41 The court clings to this principle.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. One Parcel of Land Located at 7326 Highway 45 North, Three Lakes, Oneida County
7th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
United States v. Paccione, 949 F.2d 1183, 1200 (2d Cir.1991); Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 909 (3d Cir.1991); United States v. Basic Construction Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir.1983) (per curiam); United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 242 (1st Cir.1982); United States v. Koppers Co., 652 F.2d 290, 298 (2d Cir.1981); United States v. Van Riper, 154 F.2d 492 (3d Cir.1946); Developments in the Law, “Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions,” 92 Harv.L.Rev. 1227, 1247-51 (1979).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Frank Genty v. Resolution Trust Corporation
3rd Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
See, e.g., New York Central R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 492-94 , 29 S.Ct. 304, 306-07 , 53 L.Ed. 613 (U.S.1909) (holding corporation liable for its agents' crimes); Lake Shore & Michigan Southern R.R. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 109, 111 , 13 S.Ct. 261, 263, 264 , 37 L.Ed. 97 (U.S.1893) (holding corporation liable for its agents' intentional torts); United States v. Basic Construction Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 , 104 S.Ct. 371 , 78 L.Ed.2d 330 (1983) (articulating principles of corporate criminal liability).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp.
3rd Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
See, e.g., New York Central R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 492-94 , 29 S.Ct. 304, 306-07 , 53 L.Ed. 613 (U.S.1909) (holding corporation liable for its agents’ crimes); Lake Shore & Michigan Southern R.R. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 109, 111 , 13 S.Ct. 261, 263, 264 , 37 L.Ed. 97 (U.S.1893) (holding corporation liable for its agents’ intentional torts); United States v. Basic Construction Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 , 104 S.Ct. 371 , 78 L.Ed.2d 330 (1983) (articulating principles of corporate criminal liability).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Ernesto Elias Handal-Martinez
4th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
United States v. Basic Construction Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983); United States v. Sears, 663 F.2d 896, 904 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1027 (1982). 11 The weak link here is whether such a statement would ordinarily have elicited a response under the circumstances.
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.
S.D.N.Y. · 1988 · confidence medium
Co., supra, 711 F.2d at 573.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bachmeier v. Bank of Ravenswood
N.D. Ill. · 1987 · confidence medium
It cites United States v. Basic Construction Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 , 104 S.Ct. 371 , 78 L.Ed.2d 330 (1983), but the case does not stand for the proposition the Bank cites it for.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. James Alvin Rhodes, A/K/A Mickey Rhodes, United States of America v. Garvey Martin Cheek, Jr.
4th Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
Just as an opening statement does not make admissible evidence to contradict it, see United States v. Basic Construction Co., 711 F.2d 570, 574 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 , 104 S.Ct. 371 , 527, 78 L.Ed.2d 330 (1983), neither does it call for admitting bad acts of the defendant into evidence.
discussed Cited "see" American International Group, Consol. Deriv. Lit.
Del. Ch. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See U.S. v. Basic Const. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir.1983) ("[A] corporation may be held criminally responsible for antitrust violations committed by its employees if they were acting within the scope of their authority, or apparent authority, and for the benefit of the corporation, even if ... such acts were against corporate policy or express instructions.”); U.S. v. Koppers Co., 652 F.2d 290, 298 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that imputation in antitrust cases is governed by the scope of the employee’s duties). 40 .Albert, 2005 WL 2130607 , at *11 ("Delaware law states the knowledge of an …
cited Cited "see" United States v. Potter
1st Cir. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally Basic Constr., 711 F.2d at 572; Beusch, 596 F.2d at 878 .
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Maryland and Virginia Milk Producers Cooperative Association, Inc., D/B/A Marva Maid Dairy
4th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Basic Construction Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir.) (corporation criminally responsible under the Sherman Act for antitrust violations committed by employee if employee acts within the scope of his authority, or apparent authority, and for the benefit of the corporation, even if against corporate policy), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983). 10 69 Marva Maid contends its economic data offered at trial negates any inference that Elliott intended to violate the Sherman Act.
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Singh
4th Cir. · 2008 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See id.; see also United States v. Basic Construction Co., 711 F.2d 570, 572 (4th Cir.1983); Old Monastery Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 905, 908 (4th Cir.1945). 19 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation and Leila J. Goldstein
2d Cir. · 1989 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See United States v. Koppers Co., 652 F.2d at 298 ; see also United States v. Basic Construction Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 , 104 S.Ct. 371 , 78 L.Ed.2d 330 (1983); United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004-07 (9th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 , 93 S.Ct. 938 , 35 L.Ed.2d 256 (1973).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
No. 81-1928
570.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Aug 1, 1983.
711 F.2d 570
Published

711 F.2d 570

Howard E. PFEIFER
v.
JONES & LAUGHLIN STEEL CORPORATION, owner or owner pro hac
vice of Barges 1011, 1384, 1400, 1363, and others
in a fleet, Appellant.

No. 81-1928.

United States Court of Appeals,
Third Circuit.

Aug. 1, 1983.

On remand from the United States Supreme Court.

Robert W. Murdoch, Jones, Gregg, Creehan & Gerace, Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellant.

Jerome M. Libenson, Baskin & Sears, P.C., Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellee.

Before ALDISERT, GARTH and VAN DUSEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

[*~570]1

In Pfeifer v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 678 F.2d 453 (3d Cir.1982), we affirmed the judgment of the district court, determining that the district court did not err in allowing a longshoreman proceeding under § 5(b) of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905(b), to sue his employer as owner pro hac vice of the vessel upon which the longshoreman was injured, or in applying in its damages calculations the "total offset method" of Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 491 Pa. 561, 421 A.2d 1027 (1980). Jones & Laughlin petitioned the Supreme Court for review, and the Court granted the petition for writ of certiorari. --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 50, 74 L.Ed.2d 57 (1982).

[*~572]2

On June 15, 1983, the Supreme Court held that the district court erred in considering itself bound by Kaczkowski, vacated our judgment, and remanded. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 2541, 76 L.Ed.2d 768 (1983).

[*~574]3

The judgment of the district court will be vacated and the cause remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion of the Supreme Court.