Perrell v. Financeamerica Corp., 726 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1984). · Go Syfert
Copy Cite Perrell v. Financeamerica Corp., 726 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1984).
Court of Appeals for the Tenth CircuitPublished opinionNo. Nos. 82-2113, 82-2155Feb 1, 1984

Perrell v. Financeamerica Corp.

Quick Summary

Under the ADEA, a plaintiff must prove age was the determining factor, without which the adverse action would not have occurred, and recovery is limited to enumerated damages.

An employee sued his employer under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act after being demoted or discharged, and the jury returned a verdict for the employee including compensatory damages for pain and suffering. The employer appealed, challenging the jury instruction on causation and the award of non-enumerated damages. The court considers whether the instruction correctly stated the standard of proof and whether damages beyond those specified in the Act may be recovered. The court holds that the instruction, which asked whether age "made a difference," was ambiguous and erroneous, that the error was not shown harmless, and that the Act permits only the damages it enumerates. The judgment is reversed.

74 citation events (13 in the last 25 years) across 11 distinct courts.
Treatment trajectory · 1984 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1984 2005 2026
Cited for
At page 656Determining factor language in age discrimination instructions25 citing cases“[N]o particular form of words is essential if the instruction as a whole conveys the correct statement of the applicable law”3 citing courts quote it · 20 listed here
  • Maxwell v. Esper, No. 2:18-cv-00824 (D.N.M. Aug. 10, 2021).
    The Law Relating to Age Discrimination 31 EEO Complaints relating to the 2017 Performance Appraisal - ARARL18JAN00105 (x0105) and the 2018 Performance Appraisal - ARARL19JAN00232 (x0232). 24 “Under the ADEA, plaintiff must prove that age w…
  • Maxwell v. Esper, No. 2:18-cv-00824 (D.N.M. July 20, 2021).
    The Law Relating to Age Discrimination “Under the ADEA, plaintiff must prove that age was a determining factor in defendant's treatment of the complaining employee.” E.E.O.C. v. Sperry Corp., 852 F.2d 503 , 507 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing Per…
  • Jones v. Oklahoma City Pub. Schs., 617 F.3d 1273 (10th Cir. 2010).published
    Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 763 F.2d 1166, 1170 (10th Cir.1985) (quoting Perrell v. Financeamerica Corp., 726 F.2d 654, 656 (10th Cir.1984)).
  • Morrison Knudsen Corp. v. Fireman's Fund Ins., 175 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 1999).published
    We have stressed that the instructions “must be read and evaluated in their entirety.” United States v. Denny, 939 F.2d 1449, 1454 (10th Cir.1991). “ ‘[N]o particular form of words is essential if the instruction as a whole conveys the cor…
  • Gilbert R. Suiter, Individual, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. Mitchell Motor Coach Sales, Inc., a Florida Corp., & Robert E. Desbien Norma J. Desbien v. Blue Bird Body Co., Inc., a Georgia Corp., Third-Party-Defendant-Appellee, 151 F.3d 1275 (3d Cir. 1998).published
    As this court has recognized, " '[n]o particular form of words is essential if the instruction as a whole conveys the correct statement of the applicable law.' " Faulkner v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 3 F.3d 1419, 1424 (10th Cir.1993) (quoti…
  • Marx v. Schnuck Markets, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 1489 (D. Kan. 1994).published
    E.E.O.C. v. Sperry Corp., 852 F.2d 503 , 507 (10th Cir.1988); Perrell v. Financeamerica Corp., 726 F.2d 654, 656 (10th Cir.1984).
  • James v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 21 F.3d 989 (10th Cir. 1994).published 2 cites
    Instead, the employee must show age was also a reason for the employer’s decision, and “age was the factor that made a difference.” Id.; Perrell v. FinanceAmerica Corp., 726 F.2d 654, 656 (10th Cir.1984) (age must “make a difference” in th…
  • Berry v. Gen. Motors Corp., 838 F. Supp. 1479 (D. Kan. 1993).published
    E.E.O.C. v. Sperry Corp. 852 F.2d 503 , 507 (10th Cir.1988); Ferrell v. FinanceAmerica Corp., 726 F.2d 654, 656 (10th Cir.1984).
  • Faulkner v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 3 F.3d 1419 (10th Cir. 1993).published 2 cites
    “[N]o particular form of words is essential if the instruction as a whole conveys the correct statement of the applicable law”
  • Hartig v. Safelite Glass Corp., 819 F. Supp. 1523 (D. Kan. 1993).published
    Perrell v. FinanceAmerica Corp., 726 F.2d 654, 656 (10th Cir.1984).
Show 10 more citing cases
  • McEwen v. City of Norman, 926 F.2d 1539 (10th Cir. 1991).published 2 cites
    Perrell v. Financeamerica Corp., 726 F.2d 654, 656 (10th Cir.1984).
  • Punahele v. United Air Lines, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 487 (D. Colo. 1991).published
    Cooper, 836 F.2d at 1547 (quoting Perrell v. FinanceAmerica Corp., 726 F.2d 654, 656 (10th Cir.1984)).
  • Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Sperry Corp., 852 F.2d 503 (10th Cir. 1988).published 2 cites
    Perrell v. FinanceAmerica Corp., 726 F.2d 654, 656 (10th Cir.1984).
  • Joe E. Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544 (10th Cir. 1988).published
    Perrell v. FinanceAmerica Corp., 726 F.2d 654, 656 (10th Cir.1984).
  • Furr v. AT & T Tech., Inc., 824 F.2d 1537 (10th Cir. 1987).published 2 cites
    Prudential, 763 F.2d at 1170 . "[N]o particular form of words is essential if the instruction as a whole conveys the correct statement of the applicable law." Id. (quoting Perrell v. Financeamerica Corp., 726 F.2d 654, 656 (10th Cir.1984)).
  • Frank LUJAN v. Harry N. WALTERS, 813 F.2d 1051 (10th Cir. 1987).published
    In Perrell v. Financeamerica Corp., 726 F.2d 654, 656 (10th Cir.1984), we observed that in instructing in ADEA cases: The essence of the correct formulation of the standard of proof is that it requires the jury to focus on the effect of th…
  • Eugene E. Smith v. Consol. Mut. Water Co., 787 F.2d 1441 (10th Cir. 1986).published 2 cites
    Id. at 656.
  • Branson v. Price River Coal Co., 627 F. Supp. 1324 (D. Utah 1986).published
    Perrell v. FinanceAmerica Corp., 726 F.2d 654, 656 (10th Cir.1984) [quoting Cancellier v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 672 F.2d 1312 , 1316 (9th Cir. cert denied, 459 U.S. 859 , 103 S.Ct. 131 , 74 L.Ed.2d 113 (1982) ].
  • Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 763 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir. 1985).published 4 cites
    “[N]o particular form of words is essential if the instruction as a whole conveys the correct statement of the applicable law”
  • Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 741 F.2d 1225 (10th Cir. 1984).published 4 cites
    “[N]o particular form of words is essential if the instruction as a whole conveys the correct statement of the applicable law”
At page 657Limiting compensatory damages under the ADEA10 citing casesdistrict court erred in allowing jury to consider items of damage other than those specifically enumerated in ADEA2 citing courts put it this way
  • Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. DolGenCorp, LLC, No. 6:21-cv-00295, 2024 WL 402921 (E.D. Okla. Feb. 2, 2024).
    And there is no reason to treat retaliation claims differently.” Brunner, 2023 WL 2474683 , at *18 (citing Perrell v. Financeamerica Corp., 726 F.2d 654, 657 (10th Cir. 1984); Bruno, 829 F.2d at 967; Marshall, 2020 WL 128054 , at *4; Vaugh…
  • McMenamy v. Belt Power, LLC <b><font color=\red\">Case Consol. for Discovery All Non-Dispositive filings to be made in Lead Case 23-cv-2015</font></b>", No. 2:23-cv-02097 (D. Kan. Sept. 21, 2023).
    “the ADEA is limited to the damages specifically enumerated”
  • Goico v. Boeing Co., 347 F. Supp. 2d 986 (D. Kan. 2004).published
    (compensatory damages for mental suffering are not allowed under the ADEA; citing eight other circuits reaching the same conclusion)
  • Villescas v. Abraham, 311 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 2002).published
    (damages not permitted for psychological pain and humiliation in ADEA cases)
  • James v. Sun Glass Hut of California, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1083 (D. Colo. 1992).published
    Bruno v. Western Electric Co., 829 F.2d 957, 966 (10th Cir.1987), (No punitive damages under ADEA); Perrell v. Financeamerica Corp., 726 F.2d 654, 657 (10th Cir.1984), (No pain and suffering or emotional distress damages under ADEA).
  • Flores Cruz v. Avon Prods., Inc., 693 F. Supp. 1314 (D.P.R. 1988).published
    Insofar as damages for pain and suffering are unavailable under ADEA, Perrell v. FinanceAmerica Corp., 726 F.2d 654, 657 (10th Cir.1984) (and cases cited therein), Congress has made its determination of how discriminatees shall be made who…
  • Bruno v. W. Elec. Co., 829 F.2d 957 (10th Cir. 1987).published
    Front Pay 38 Plaintiff specifically requested front pay--or payment for future wages--but the district court, relying on language in Perrell v. FinanceAmerica Corp., 726 F.2d 654, 657 (10th Cir.1984), held that as a matter of law front pay…
  • Oglesby v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 2d 1296 (D. Kan. 2005).published 2 cites
    (district court erred in allowing jury to consider items of damage other than those specifically enumerated in ADEA)
  • Bank v. Allied Jewish Fed'n, 4 F. Supp. 3d 1238 (D. Colo. 2013).published
    (trial court erred in instructing jury that plaintiff could recover compensatory damages including damages for pain and suffering on ADEA claim)
  • Pascoe v. Hoyle Lowdermilk, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 546 (D. Colo. 1985).published
    See, e.g., Perrell v. Financeamerica Corp., 726 F.2d 654, 657 (10th Cir.1984); Pfeiffer v. Essex Wire Corp., 682 F.2d 684, 686-88 (7th Cir.1982); Vasquez v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 107, 110-12 (1st Cir.1978).
At page 655BOHANON, Senior District Judge. Plaintiff, Carroll J. Perrell, brought this action pursuant to the provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29…1 citing caseopening of page *655 (no citing court says what it cites this page for)
Other citing cases1 with no pin cite or quoted language on record
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Carroll J. PERRELL, Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant
v.
FINANCEAMERICA CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee
Nos. 82-2113, 82-2155.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Feb 1, 1984.
Published opinion
Walter L. Reardon, Jr., Albuquerque, N.M. (James K. Hansen, Albuquerque, N.M., with him on the brief), of Walter L. Reardon, Jr., P.A., Albuquerque, N.M., for plaintiff-appellee/eross-appellant., John A. Mitchell, Santa Fe, N.M. (Leonard S. Katz and Jonathan Morse, Santa Fe, N.M., with him on the brief) of Mitchell, Alley & Rubin, Santa Fé, N.M., for defendant-appellant/cross-appellee.
Bohanon.
Cited by 46 opinions  |  Published
BOHANON, Senior District Judge.

Plaintiff, Carroll J. Perrell, brought this action pursuant to the provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (hereinafter ADEA). Suing his employer FinanceAmerica Corporation (hereinafter FinanceAmerica), Mr. Perrell alleged that he was subjected to age discrimination that resulted in an employment alternative of accepting a demotion or being discharged by the employer.

Upon trial to a jury a verdict was returned for Mr. Perrell awarding damages for lost wages, pain and suffering, incidental expenses and liquidated damages in the total amount of $268,069.

FinanceAmerica appeals. Although the appellant raises numerous allegations of error, only two address fundamental error given the facts of this case. First, Finan-ceAmerica claims that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the standard of proof to be used in determining liability under the ADEA; and second, it is claimed that the district court erred in allowing the awarding of “compensatory damages” (i.e. pain and suffering) in an ADEA action.

I. Standard of Proof

In charging the jury on the standard of proof required of the plaintiff to prevail in an ADEA action, the trial court gave the following instruction:

“When I say that the plaintiff must prove that he was demoted or discharged because of his age, I do not mean that the Plaintiff has to establish that his age was the only reason for his demotion or discharge. There may have been many reasons for his demotion or discharge. However, if you find that his age was one reason and that in fact his age made a difference in determining whether or not he was to be demoted or discharged, then you should find for the Plaintiff and determine the amount of damages, if any, Carroll- Perrell has sustained. On the other hand, if you find that his age was not a reason for his demotion or discharge and that -it made no difference in determining whether or not he was to be[*656] demoted or discharged, then you should find for the Defendant.” (emphasis added)

This “made a difference” language has been addressed by other courts, and some have found it to be lacking in its statement of the applicable law. In Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir.1979) the court made the following comment:

“Plaintiff’s brief apparently concedes that he was required to prove that age was the determining factor, but argues that this was conveyed by instructing that age had to have ‘made a difference.’ We agree with defendants, however, that the court’s statement was inadequate to convey to the jury the legal standard it should follow. To find that age was a factor that affected the decision is not equivalent to finding that age was a determinative factor, yet proof that it was a determinative factor is, as both parties recognize, essential to recovery under the ADEA. (footnote omitted)
We do not quarrel with the court’s statement that age did not have to be the sole factor motivating defendants to act; we do think, however, that the court should have instructed the jury that for plaintiff to prevail he had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his age was the ‘determining factor’ in his discharge in the sense that, ‘but for’ his employer’s motive to discriminate against him because of age, he would not have been discharged.” (citations omitted)

600 F.2d at 1019.[1] See also Golomb v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 688 F.2d 547 (7th Cir.1982).

However, other courts have found the “made a difference” formulation to constitute a satisfactory explanation of the applicable law. See Kelly v. American Standard, Inc., 640 F.2d 974, 984 (9th Cir.1981); Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 317 (6th Cir.1975).

Upon examination of the language, we would generally agree with the court in Bentley v. Stromberg-Carlson Corp., 638 F.2d 9, 11 (2nd Cir.1981) that we see “no significant difference between the ... [made a difference] formulation and the ‘determining factor’ charge enunciated in Loeb .... ” As we have stated before, no particular form of words is essential if the instruction as a whole conveys the correct statement of the applicable law. Brandt v. French, 638 F.2d 209 (10th Cir.1981). While the Loeb formulation is to be strongly preferred due to its lack of ambiguity, the “made a difference” formulation is not inherently infirm.

The essence of the correct formulation of the standard of proof is that it requires the jury to focus on the effect of the factor of age. The jury must understand that it is not enough that age discrimination figure in the decision to demote or discharge; age must “make a difference” between termination and retention of the employee in the sense that, “but for” the factor of age discrimination, the employee would not have been adversely affected. Cancellier v. Federated Dept. Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1316 (9th Cir.1982).

However, the instruction used in this case did not clearly articulate the essence of the law. To find for the defendant-employer under the instruction given in this case, the jury was required to determine that age was not a reason and that it made no difference. This formulation was more than ambiguous in that a jury member might infer that if age were any factor the defendant could not prevail. This, as noted above, is erroneous and could communicate the particular impression that must be specifically dispelled when charging the jury as to the ADEA standard of proof.

The standard of proof formulation is key to the understanding of liability under the ADEA. Thus, the erroneous instruction[*657] given in this case relates to the substantial rights of the defendant below. This error requires reversal unless this court can determine that the error was not prejudicial. McCandless v. United States, 298 U.S. 342, 56 S.Ct. 764, 80 L.Ed. 1205 (1936); see also Fillippon v. Albion View State Co., 250 U.S. 76, 39 S.Ct. 435, 63 L.Ed. 853 (1919).

In the trial below, the employer Finan-ceAmerica offered extensive evidence, if believed by the jury, that age was not the determining factor in the employment decisions relating to Mr. Perrell. The evidence is not so overwhelmingly weighted in favor of the plaintiff’s allegations of age discrimination that this court can conclusively determine that the effect of the erroneous instruction was harmless.

II. Compensatory Damages

The second allegation of the appellant which constitutes fundamental error concerns the instructions given regarding “compensatory damages.” In charging the jury on the proper method of calculating damages, the court gave the following instruction:

“In addition, plaintiff may recover damages to compensate him for losses, other than lost employment benefits, caused by the alleged discrimination. Such damages are called compensatory damages. The items of compensatory damages claimed by plaintiff are:
(1) incidental expenses caused by the curtailment of his employment.
(2) damages for pain and suffering and humiliation which resulted from plaintiff’s termination.”

While this definition of “compensatory damages” might well be challenged, the error claimed by the defendant regarding this charge is the allowance of elements of damage other than those specifically set out in the ADEA. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), (c). To date, eight of our sister circuits have been presented this issue in varying nuances. However, every time the issue of permissible scope of damages has been addressed, each circuit court has held that the ADEA is limited to the damages specifically enumerated. See Hill v. Spiegel, Inc., 708 F.2d 233 (6th Cir.1983); Pfeiffer v. Essex Wire Corp., 682 F.2d 684 (7th Cir.1982); Fiedler v. Indianhead Truck Line, Inc., 670 F.2d 806 (8th Cir.1982); Naton v. Bank of California, 649 F.2d 691 (9th Cir.1981); Slatin v. Stanford Research Inst., 590 F.2d 1292 (4th Cir.1979); Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 579 F.2d 107 (1st Cir.1978); Dean v. American Security Ins. Co., 559 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir.1977); Rogers v. Exxon Research and Engineering Co., 550 F.2d 834 (3rd Cir.1977). We find the collective reasoning as set forth in these opinions exhaustive and persuasive. We can but conclude that the trial court erred in allowing jury consideration of any items of damage except those specifically provided within the enforcement scheme of the.ADEA.

Therefore, considering the instructional errors committed by the trial court, the judgment must accordingly be

REVERSED.

1

We have previously articulated our approval of the Loeb decision although we did not address this specific issue. In Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 588, 597 (10th Cir.1980) we stated:

“The Loeb decision is overall well reasoned and we do not disagree with its reasoning.”