Wisconsin Gas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n
Irreparable harm must be certain, great, actual, and imminent, and recoverable economic loss does not constitute irreparable harm unless it threatens the very existence of the business.
Interstate natural gas pipelines seek a stay of Federal Energy Regulatory Commission orders eliminating variable costs from minimum commodity bills and minimum take provisions. The court addresses whether the petitioners demonstrate irreparable harm to warrant equitable relief. The court applies the rule that irreparable injury must be certain, great, and actual rather than theoretical, and that economic loss does not constitute irreparable harm unless it threatens the very existence of the business. Because the petitioners rely on speculative, unsubstantiated allegations of recoverable monetary loss without proof that such loss is imminent or unrecoverable, the court finds no irreparable harm. The court denies the motions for stay, noting that filing such frivolous applications abuses the judicial process.
758 F.2d at 674Showing irreparable harm requires actual, not theoretical, injury288 citing casesIt is ... well settled that economic loss does not, in and of itself, constitute irreparable harm.
- Serv. Employees Int'l Union Nat'l Indus. Pension Fund v. Vistacare LLC, No. 2023-0763 (D.D.C. Feb. 6, 2026).published(The possibility that adequate compensatory . . . will be available at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.)
- Mid-Atl. Equity Consortium, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Educ., 793 F. Supp. 3d 166 (D.D.C. 2025).published(economic loss does not, in and of itself, constitute irreparable harm.)
- Dunlap v. Presidential Advisory Comm'n on Election Integrity, No. 2017-2361 (D.D.C. June 21, 2019).published([T]he movant must show that the alleged harm will directly result from the action which the movant seeks to enjoin.)
- Dunlap v. Presidential Advisory Comm'n On Election Integrity, 390 F. Supp. 3d 128 (D.C. Cir. 2019).published([T]he movant must show that the alleged harm will directly result from the action which the movant seeks to enjoin.)
- Safari Club Int'l v. Jewell, 47 F. Supp. 3d 29 (D.D.C. 2014).published (It is ... well settled that economic loss does not, in and of itself, constitute irreparable harm.)
- United States v. Sum of $70,990,605, 991 F. Supp. 2d 154 (D.D.C. 2013).published (Recoverable monetary loss may constitute irreparable harm only where the loss threatens the very existence of the movant’s business.)
- Am. Meat Inst. v. United States Dep't of Agric., 968 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2013).published (Recoverable monetary loss may constitute irreparable harm only where the loss threatens the very existence of the movant’s business.)
- Holiday CVS, L.L.C. v. Holder, 839 F. Supp. 2d 145 (D.D.C. 2012).published (It is ... well settled that economic loss does not, in and of itself, constitute irreparable harm.)
- Cardinal Health, Inc. v. Holder, 846 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D.D.C. 2012).published (It is ... well settled that economic loss does not, in and of itself, constitute irreparable harm.)
- Sterling Com. Credit-Michigan, LLC v. Phoenix Indus. I, LLC, 762 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 2011).published (It is ... well settled that economic loss does not, in and of itself, constitute irreparable harm.)
Show 174 more citing cases
- St. Croix Chippewa Indians of Wis. v. Kempthorne, 535 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2008).published (Mere injuries, however substantial, in terms of money, time and energy necessarily expended in the absence of a stay are not enough.)
- An opinion was released in case 24-5205 v. C.F.T.C., 119 F.4th 58 (D.C. Cir. 2024).published See Wisconsin Gas Co. v. FERC, 758 F.2d 669 , 674 (D.C.
- Gray Cas. & Sur. Co. v. 3i Contracting LLC, No. 3:23-cv-02511 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2024).Agency, 829 F.3d 405, 434 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Wisconsin Gas Co. v. FERC, 758 F.2d 669 , 674 (D.C.
- Miranda v. Alexander, No. 3:21-cv-00535 (M.D. La. Sept. 24, 2021).Plaintiff must show that the threatened harm is “more than mere speculation.” Janvey v. Alguire, 647 F.3d 585, 601 (5th Cir. 2011); see also Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 674 (1931) (“[An injunction] will not be granted again…
- Trs. of the Iam Nat'l Pension Fund v. M & K Emp. Solutions, LLC, No. 2020-0433 (D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2021).publishedGas Co. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 758 F.2d 669 , 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“It is... well settled that economic loss does not, in and of itself, constitute irreparable harm[.]”); Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974) (“{T]he tempor…
- In re Max E. Salas, No. 2018-2318 (D.D.C. July 3, 2019).published Gas Co. v. FERC, 758 F.2d 669 , 674 (D.C.Cir.1985) (per curiam)); see also In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 548 B.R. 674, 682 (Bankr.
- Comm. of 100 on the Fed. City v. Foxx, 87 F. Supp. 3d 191 (D.D.C. 2015).published See Reply at 63 (“The project will ‘also require construction-period occupancy of Virginia Avenue Park’ ”) (citing FEIS at 6-19); id. (“Access to Bridge Spot Park, a popular skate park, will also be blocked during construction”); id. (“[Aj…
- Dixie Brewing Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Vets. Affairs, 952 F. Supp. 2d 809 (E.D. La. 2013).publishedEnergy Regulatory Comm’n, 758 F.2d 669 , 674 (D.C.Cir. 1985) (“[Irreparable] injury must be both certain and great; it must be actual and not theoretical.”).
- Phang v. Blanche, No. 2026-1417 (D.D.C. June 25, 2026).published Comm’n, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C.
- Pinkerton v. Reinhardt, No. 2025-3127 (D.D.C. June 24, 2026).published “Bare allegations of what is likely to occur are of no value since the court must decide whether the harm will in fact occur”
- 14pnwdc LLC v. Zapata-Mercado, No. 2026-1342 (D.D.C. June 8, 2026).publishedIt is “well settled that economic loss does not, in and of itself, constitute irreparable harm.” Wis. Gas Co., 758 F.2d at 674.
- D.S.C.C. v. Trump, No. 2026-1114 (D.D.C. May 28, 2026).publishedWis. Gas Co., 758 F.2d at 674.13 IV.
- Council for Opportunity in Educ. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., No. 2025-3491 (D.D.C. May 27, 2026).published Wis. Gas, 758 F.2d at 674 (cleaned up).
- Wallingford v. Sallie Mae Bank, No. 2026-0961 (D.D.C. May 14, 2026).publishedCir. Dec. 15, 2025), Ms. Wallingford has not established that such harm is “certain to occur in the near future,” Wis. Gas Co., 758 F.2d at 674.
- United States v. Google LLC, No. 2020-3010 (D.D.C. May 7, 2026).publishedThe time at which any of the potential harms Google asserts will occur is therefore not imminent, see Wis. Gas Co., 758 F.2d at 674, and what those harms will be are yet “speculative,” see Chaplaincy, 454 F.3d at 298 .
- 9878866 Canada Inc. v. Intake Breathing Tech., LLC, No. 2025-2443 (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 2026).publishedFurthermore, the alleged injury “must be beyond remediation”; in other words, the party alleging irreparable injury must establish that “[t]he possibility [of] adequate compensatory or other corrective relief . . . at a later date . . . we…
- Adya LLC v. Cole, No. 2026-0141 (D.D.C. Mar. 23, 2026).published(economic harm)
- Council for Opportunity in Educ. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., No. 2025-3514 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 2026).publishedAnd, as the Department correctly points out, TRIO Case Def.’s Mot. at 40, “[r]ecoverable monetary loss may constitute irreparable harm only where the loss threatens the very existence of the movant’s business.” Wis. Gas, 758 F.2d at 674.
- League of Women Voters v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 2025-3501 (D.D.C. Nov. 17, 2025).published“both certain and great”
- Save Long Beach Island, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Com., No. 2025-2214, 2025 WL 2996157 (D.D.C. Oct. 24, 2025).published In other words, the “injury ‘must be both certain and great.’” Clevinger, 134 F.4th at 1234 (quoting Wis. Gas Co., 758 F.2d at 674).
- Lukezic v. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., Inc., No. 2025-0623 (D.D.C. Aug. 10, 2025).published Gas Co., 758 F.2d at 674, “especially when it is nothing more than speculation about how third parties might respond to routine regulatory investigations,” John Doe Co., 849 F.3d at 1134–35.
- Ahmed v. Noem, No. 2025-1351 (D.D.C. Aug. 8, 2025).published Furthermore, the alleged injury “must be beyond remediation”; in other words, the party alleging irreparable injury must establish that there is no “ possibility [of] adequate compensatory or other corrective relief . . . at a later date .…
- Sierra Club v. Env't Prot. Agency, No. 2025-1112 (D.D.C. July 9, 2025).publishedIt is “well settled that economic loss does not, in and of itself, constitute irreparable harm.” Wis. Gas Co., 758 F.2d at 674.
- Rural Dev. Innovations Ltd. v. Marocco, No. 2025-1631 (D.D.C. July 1, 2025).published Wis. Gas Co., 758 F.2d at 674.
- Susman Godfrey LLP v. Exec. Off. of the President, No. 2025-1107 (D.D.C. June 27, 2025).publishedIn many instances, “economic loss does not, in and of itself, constitute irreparable harm.” Wis. Gas Co., 758 F.2d at 674.
- Scotts Valley Band of Pomo Indians v. Burgum, No. 2025-0958 (D.D.C. June 10, 2025).published Wis. Gas Co., 758 F.2d at 674.
- rfe/rl, Inc. v. Lake, No. 2025-0799, 2025 WL 1232863 (D.D.C. Apr. 29, 2025).publishedBased on this significant and comprehensive showing of harm amounting to a complete gutting of RFE/RL’s infrastructure, the Court concludes that RFE/RL has demonstrated likely irreparable harm by showing that the defendants’ actions “threa…
- Widakuswara v. Lake, No. 2025-1015 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 2025).published While the defendants are correct that “ordinary economic injuries are usually insufficient to require injunctive relief,” Wis. Gas, 758 F.2d at 674, it is also true that “financial harm can ‘constitute irreparable harm . . . where the loss…
- Hinge v. Lyons, No. 2025-1097 (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 2025).publishedFurthermore, the alleged injury “must be beyond remediation”; in other words, the party alleging irreparable injury must establish that “[t]he possibility [of] adequate compensatory or other corrective relief . . . at a later date . . . we…
- Aviel v. Gor, 780 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2025).publishedIt must also “be beyond remediation,” meaning that “[t]he possibility [of] adequate compensatory or other corrective relief . . . at a later date . . . weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.” Id. at 297-98 (quoting Wis. Gas Co…
- Nat'l Council of Nonprofits v. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, No. 2025-0239 (D.D.C. Feb. 25, 2025).published It must also “be beyond remediation,” meaning that “[t]he possibility [of] adequate 35 compensatory or other corrective relief . . . at a later date . . . weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.” Id. at 297-98 (quoting Wis. Gas…
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- Brown v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 386 F. Supp. 3d 16 (D.C. Cir. 2019).published
- Stimlabs, LLC v. Becerra, No. 2022-1988, 2022 WL 13840218 (D.D.C. Oct. 21, 2022).published
- Stimlabs, LLC v. Becerra, 651 F. Supp. 3d 56 (D.D.C. 2023).published
- Clevinger v. Advocacy Holdings, Inc., No. 2023-1159 (D.D.C. July 15, 2023).published
- Novartis Pharm. Corp. v. Becerra, No. 2024-2234 (D.D.C. Aug. 13, 2024).published
- Mahoney v. United States Capitol Police Bd., No. 2021-2314 (D.D.C. Oct. 16, 2024).published
- Democracy Forward Found. v. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, No. 2025-0858 (D.D.C. Apr. 9, 2025).published
- Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, No. 2025-1248 (D.D.C. May 29, 2025).published
At page 354“must be both certain and great; it must be actual and not theoretical.”8 citing cases
- An opinion was released in case 24-5205 v. C.F.T.C., 119 F.4th 58 (D.C. Cir. 2024).published “we believe that analysis of the second factor disposes of the stay motions and, therefore, address only whether the petitioners have demonstrated that in the absence of a stay, they will suffer irreparable harm.”
- Gray Cas. & Sur. Co. v. 3i Contracting LLC, No. 3:23-cv-02511 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2024).(Recoverable monetary loss may constitute irreparable harm only where the loss threatens the very existence of the movant’s business.)
- California Valley Miwok Tribe v. Haaland, No. 2022-1740 (D.D.C. Nov. 17, 2023).published“the party seeking injunctive relief must show that the injury complained of is of such imminence that there is a clear and present need for equitable relief to prevent irreparable harm.”
- Miranda v. Alexander, No. 3:21-cv-00535 (M.D. La. Sept. 24, 2021).([T]he injury must be both certain and great; it must be actual and not theoretical.)
- Trs. of the Iam Nat'l Pension Fund v. M & K Emp. Solutions, LLC, No. 2020-0433 (D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2021).published(It is... well settled that economic loss does not, in and of itself, constitute irreparable harm[.])
- Cayuga Nation v. Zinke, No. 2017-1923 (D.D.C. Mar. 27, 2018).published“the movant must show that the alleged harm will directly result from the action which the movant seeks to enjoin.”
- Nation v. Zinke, 302 F. Supp. 3d 362 (D.C. Cir. 2018).published“the movant must show that the alleged harm will directly result from the action which the movant seeks to enjoin.”
- Dixie Brewing Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Vets. Affairs, 952 F. Supp. 2d 809 (E.D. La. 2013).published([Irreparable] injury must be both certain and great; it must be actual and not theoretical.)
758 F.2d at 675[N]either petitioner has alleged that in the interim they will be forced out of business by the loss. Instead, they have merely speculated that they will suffer a financial loss. This is the type of ‘mere economic loss’ which will not support a finding of irreparable injury.6 citing cases
- Meta Platforms, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 723 F. Supp. 3d 64 (D.D.C. 2024).published ([N]either petitioner has alleged that in the interim they will be forced out of business by the loss. Instead, they have merely speculated that they will suffer a financial loss. This is the type of ‘mere economic loss…)
- Holiday CVS, L.L.C. v. Holder, 839 F. Supp. 2d 145 (D.D.C. 2012).published Gas, 758 F.2d at 674 (“It is ... well settled that economic loss does not, in and of itself, constitute irreparable harm.”).
- Mylan Labs. Ltd. v. Food & Drug Admin., 910 F. Supp. 2d 299 (D.D.C. 2012).published
- Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 540 F. Supp. 3d 45 (D.D.C. 2021).published
- State of Ohio v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 812 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1987).published
758 F.2d at 673Determining scope of agency's regulatory authority6 citing caseslisting the relevant considerations
- Population Inst. v. McPherson, 797 F.2d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1986).published
- Iowa Utils. Bd. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 109 F.3d 418 (8th Cir. 1996).published
- Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc. v. J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 794 (N.D. Iowa 1999).published
- Atlanta Coll. of Med. & Dental Careers, Inc. v. Riley, 987 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1993).published
the movant must show that the alleged harm will directly result from the action which the movant seeks to enjoin.
- Cayuga Nation v. Zinke, No. 2017-1923 (D.D.C. Mar. 27, 2018).published(the movant must show that the alleged harm will directly result from the action which the movant seeks to enjoin.)
- Nation v. Zinke, 302 F. Supp. 3d 362 (D.C. Cir. 2018).published(the movant must show that the alleged harm will directly result from the action which the movant seeks to enjoin.)
At page 352“petitioners have made allegations of irreparable injury which are speculative, unsubstantiated and of a nature which clearly does not warrant the issuance of a stay.”1 citing case
- Berne Corp. v. Gov't of the Virgin Islands, 50 V.I. 681 (D.V.I. 2008).published “petitioners have made allegations of irreparable injury which are speculative, unsubstantiated and of a nature which clearly does not warrant the issuance of a stay.”
v.
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Michigan Consolidated Gas Company, Intervenors ANR PIPELINE COMPANY v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Michigan Consolidated Gas Company, Intervenors GREAT LAKES GAS TRANSMISSION COMPANY v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Michigan Consolidated Gas Company, Intervenors TRANSWESTERN PIPELINE COMPANY v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Michigan Consolidated Gas Company, Intervenors MIDWESTERN GAS TRANSMISSION COMPANY v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Michigan Consolidated Gas Company, Intervenors TENNESSEE GAS PIPELINE COMPANY, A DIVISION OF TENNECO INC. v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Michigan Consolidated Gas Company, Intervenors CITY GAS COMPANY v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Michigan Consolidated Gas Company, Intervenors MADISON GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Michigan Consolidated Gas Company, Intervenors WISCONSIN FUEL & LIGHT COMPANY v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Michigan Consolidated Gas Company, Intervenors WISCONSIN NATURAL GAS COMPANY v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Michigan Consolidated Gas Company, Intervenors WISCONSIN POWER & LIGHT COMPANY v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Michigan Consolidated Gas Company, Intervenors WISCONSIN PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATION v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Michigan Consolidated Gas Company, Intervenors PANHANDLE EASTERN PIPE LINE COMPANY v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Michigan Gas Utilities Company, State of Michigan, Michigan Consolidated Gas Company, Consumers Power Company, Pan-Alberta Gas Ltd., Intervenors TRUNKLINE GAS COMPANY v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Michigan Gas Utilities Company, State of Michigan, Michigan Consolidated Gas Company, Consumers Power Company, Pan-Alberta Gas Ltd., Intervenors MIGC, INC. v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Michigan Consolidated Gas Company, Consumers Power Company, Pan-Alberta Gas Ltd., Intervenors TEXAS EASTERN TRANSMISSION CORPORATION v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Michigan Consolidated Gas Company, Consumers Power Company, Pan-Alberta Gas Ltd., Intervenors ARKANSAS LOUISIANA GAS COMPANY, A DIVISION OF ARKLA, INC. v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Pan-Alberta Gas Ltd., Consumers Power Company, Michigan Consolidated Gas Company, Intervenors TRANSCONTINENTAL GAS PIPE LINE CORPORATION v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Pan-Alberta Gas Ltd., Public Service Commission of the State of New York, Public Service Electric and Gas Company, Kansas State Corporation Commission, Consolidated Gas Transmission Corporation, Washington Gas Light Company, Intervenors ALGONQUIN GAS TRANSMISSION COMPANY v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Pan-Alberta Gas Ltd., Consumers Power Company, Michigan Consolidated Gas Company, Northern Illinois Gas Company, Intervenors TEXAS GAS TRANSMISSION CORPORATION v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Consumers Power Company, Pan-Alberta Gas Ltd., Northern Illinois Gas Company, Natural Gas Pipeline Company of America, Intervenors PACIFIC INTERSTATE OFFSHORE COMPANY v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Consumers Power Company, Northern Illinois Gas Company, Michigan Consolidated Gas Company, Pacific Lighting Gas Supply Company, Pan-Alberta Gas Ltd., Intervenors CASCADE NATURAL GAS CORPORATION, Northwest Natural Gas Company, Washington Natural Gas Company v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Consumers Power Company, Pan-Alberta Gas Ltd., Northern Illinois Gas Company, Michigan Consolidated Gas Company, Intervenors ARKANSAS LOUISIANA GAS CO., A DIVISION OF ARKLA, INC. v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Intervenors TRANSWESTERN PIPELINE COMPANY v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Pan-Alberta Gas Ltd., Intervenors MIGC, INC. v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Respondent ARKANSAS LOUISIANA GAS COMPANY, A DIVISION OF ARKLA, INC. v. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
Opinion Per Curiam.
PER CURIAM.The petitioners, MIGC, Inc. (“MIGC”), Arkansas Louisiana Gas Company (“Ark-la”), and Transwestern Pipeline Company (“Transwestern”), have moved this court to stay the operation and effect of three orders issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (the “Commission”). This court denied the motions for stay by an order dated December 18, 1984.[1] Petitioners have made allegations of irreparable injury which are speculative, unsubstantiated and of a nature which clearly does not warrant the issuance of a stay. The filing of these motions, therefore, has been an abuse of the judicial process and has wasted the time and resources of this court. We are issuing this opinion for the guidance of the bar because many essentially frivolous stay applications are being filed. Counsel know or may easily learn the requirements for a stay. Applications that do not even arguably meet those requirements, as the present ones do not, should not be filed.
I.
The petitioners are interstate pipelines which sell natural gas under contracts, tariffs, and certificates approved by the Commission. These contracts and tariffs, and those of other interstate pipelines, often contain minimum commodity bill and minimum take provisions. A minimum commodity bill requires a pipeline customer to pay the full commodity charge for a minimum volume of gas, whether, or not the customer purchases that amount of gas. A minimum take provision requires a pipeline customer to take physically a certain amount of gas and does not offer a pipeline customer an option to pay for gas not taken. On August 25, 1983, the Commission issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking[2] pursuant to which it proposed to adopt a regulation that would eliminate variable costs from natural gas pipeline minimum commodity bill provisions. Following the submission of comments, the Commission concluded that minimum com-[*353]modify bills enable a pipeline to recover purchased gas costs in cases where the pipeline does not actually incur such costs. Additionally, the Commission found that if a customer must pay for the gas, whether or not it actually takes the gas, then the customer will not seek lower-priced gas supplies but will continue to purchase gas from the same supplier. To alleviate these problems, the Commission issued Order No. 380[3] which declares inoperative any minimum bills which allow recovery of purchased gas costs from a. customer who does not take the gas.[4] Several parties filed applications with the Commission for a rehearing and for a stay of the Order. These applications also sought clarification of the Order with respect to whether it applies to minimum take provisions. On July 30, 1984, the Commission issued Order No. 380-A[5] in which it granted a stay with respect to the application of the final rule to minimum take provisions, and denied the petitions for rehearing.[6] Several parties then petitioned this court for review of the Orders.[7] ANR Pipeline Company and Great Lakes Gas Transmission Company moved this court for a stay of the Orders. These parties argued that they would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a stay because if their customers did not meet their minimum bill obligations, then the pipelines would incur increased liability under the take-or-pay provisions[8] in their contracts with producers of natural gas. A motions panel of this court denied the motion on the ground that the petitioners had not demonstrated that in the absence of a stay they would suffer irreparable harm.[9]
On October 24, 1984, the Commission issued Order No. 380-C[10] which affirmed the application of Order No. 380 to minimum take provisions. Petitioner MIGC then moved this court to stay the effect of these Orders to the extent that they apply to the minimum bill and minimum take provisions in its contracts and tariffs. Petitioners Arkla and Transwestern have moved this court to stay the operation and effect of these Orders only to the extent that they apply to minimum take provisions.
II.
The factors to be considered in determining whether a stay is warranted are: (1) the likelihood that the party seeking the stay will prevail on the merits of the ap[*354]peal; (2) the likelihood that the moving party will be irreparably harmed absent a stay; (3) the prospect that others will be harmed if the court grants the stay; and (4) the public interest in granting the stay. Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass’n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C.Cir.1958). We believe that analysis of the second factor disposes of these motions and, therefore, address only whether the petitioners have demonstrated that in the absence of a stay, they will suffer irreparable harm.
“The basis for injunctive relief in the federal courts has always been irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal remedies.” Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 88, 94 S.Ct. 937, 952, 39 L.Ed.2d 166 (1974). Although the concept of irreparable harm does not readily lend itself to definition, the courts have developed several well known and indisputable principles to guide them in the determination of whether this requirement has been met.
First, the injury must be both certain and great; it must be actual and not theoretical. Injunctive relief “will not be granted against something merely feared as liable to occur at some indefinite time,” Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 674, 51 S.Ct. 286, 291, 75 L.Ed. 602 (1931); the party seeking injunctive relief must show that “[t]he injury complained of [is] of such imminence that there is a ‘clear and present’ need for equitable relief to prevent irreparable harm.” Ashland Oil, Inc. v. FTC, 409 F.Supp. 297, 307 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 548 F.2d 977 (D.C.Cir.1976) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
It is also well settled that economic loss does not, in and of itself, constitute irreparable harm. As this court has noted:
The key word in this consideration is irreparable. Mere injuries, however substantial, in terms of money, time and energy necessarily expended in the absence of a stay are not enough. The possibility that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.
Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass’n v. FPC, 259 F.2d at 925. Recoverable monetary loss may constitute irreparable harm only where the loss threatens the very existence of the movant’s business. See Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Comm’n v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 843 n. 2 (D.C.Cir.1977).
Implicit in each of these principles is the further requirement that the movant substantiate the claim that irreparable injury is “likely” to occur. See Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Comm’n v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d at 843 n. 3. Bare allegations of what is likely to occur are of no value since the court must decide whether the harm will in fact occur. The movant must provide proof that the harm has occurred in the past and is likely to occur again, or proof indicating that the harm is certain to occur in the near future. Further, the movant must show that the alleged harm will directly result from the action which the movant seeks to enjoin.
III.
Despite these well-settled principles, the petitioners have premised their motions for stay upon unsubstantiated and speculative allegations of recoverable economic injury-
The petitioners’ first allegation of irreparable injury is that if their customers are not contractually obligated to purchase a minimum amount of gas, then the petitioners cannot ensure that they will be able to purchase gas on a reliable basis, and their suppliers will therefore probably refuse to contract with them for the sale of gas. In addition to the fact that it would be extremely difficult to prove that petitioners’ alleged loss of supply would be a result of the Commission’s Orders, none of the petitioners has provided any evidence that a single supplier has stated an intention to cease contracting, or even that any supplier believes that any of the petitioners is now an unreliable purchaser. Therefore, this allegation is purely hypothetical and will not be considered by this court.
[*355] Arkla and Transwestern argue next, that if their customers do not purchase a minimum volume of gas, then they may be forced to reduce their takes from suppliers and thus may be exposed to increased take- or-pay liability. In addition, Transwestern alleges that it may be exposed to liability for breach of the minimum take provisions in its contracts. Basically, each of the petitioners is arguing that if its customers reduce their takes, and if it is unable to find other customers to replace the reduced takes, and if this results in increased take- or-pay liability which the petitioner is unable to recover during the make-up period, then it will suffer irreparable injury in that it will not be able to recover the money spent on the prepayments for gas.
Even if petitioners could prove that this purely hypothetical chain of events would occur, this type of recoverable economic harm does not warrant the issuance of a stay. There are several possible means by which the petitioners could recover these prepayments. First, it is as likely as not that the pipelines will recover the payments during the make-up period. Second, neither petitioner has presented any evidence that any pipeline has ever forfeited a prepayment. Indeed, in those cases where make-up periods have expired, the parties have renegotiated their contracts so that the payment would not be forfeited.[11] Finally, the Commission has stated that the Orders do not prohibit recovery of take-or-pay costs,[12] and that it will review each case on its own facts to determine whether any liability for breach of contract is recoverable in the pipeline’s rates.[13] Thus, neither party has shown that the alleged loss is unrecoverable, and neither petitioner has alleged that in the interim they will be forced out of business by the loss. Instead, they have merely speculated that they will suffer a financial loss. This is the type of “mere economic loss” which will not support a finding of irreparable injury. See Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass’n v. FPC, 259 F.2d at 925.
The petitioners have also failed to show that the first step in this scenario is likely to occur. To prove that the injury is likely to occur, petitioners would at a minimum have to show that their customers are going radically to reduce their takes, and that the pipelines cannot mitigate this loss by selling the gas to other pipeline customers. Neither petitioner alleges that its customers have reduced their takes to such an extent that it has incurred increased take- or-pay liability or that this liability is presently a real possibility. In fact, Transwestern concedes that one of its customers is now taking more than it was obligated to purchase under its minimum take contractual provision.[14] Further, neither petitioner alleges that it has unsuccessfully attempted to find other purchasers to alleviate the possible reduced takes.
Finally, the allegations made by petitioners are so speculative and hypothetical that it would be difficult to conclude that irreparable injury would occur even if the allegations were supported by evidence. The fact that petitioners have not attempted to provide any substantiation is a clear abuse of this court’s time and resources.
Arkla and Transwestern further argue that they will suffer from wide swings in takes as a result of the Commission Orders. Transwestern alleges that it does not have the facilities to serve as a swing supplier and thus will suffer irreparable injury. Arkla does not state what harm it will incur from these wide swings. We find these allegations to be the most spe[*356]cious. They are totally unsubstantiated in the face of the common knowledge that customer takes will depend on innumerable variables including weather conditions, overall demand and the price of alternate fuels. To ask this court to find that wide swings in demand will injure the petitioners, without any evidence to support such a finding, is to ask this court to act on pure conjecture. This we refuse to do.
Petitioners have not demonstrated that they will suffer irreparable injury in the absence of a stay. Indeed, the showings made fall so far short that these petitions should not have been filed. The motions for stays are denied.
Order, Wisconsin Gas Co. v. FERC, No. 84-1358 (D.C.Cir. Dec. 18, 1984).
48 Fed.Reg. 39,238 (1983).
Final Rule, Elimination of Variable Costs from Certain Natural Gas Pipeline Minimum Commodity Bill Provisions, 27 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,318 (1984), 49 Fed.Reg. 22,778 (1984).
Order No. 380 provides in relevant part:
Any pipeline rate schedule governing the sale of natural gas shall be inoperative and of no effect at law to the extent it provides for recovery of purchased gas costs for gas not taken by the buyer.
49 Fed.Reg. 22,778, 22,792 (1984).
Order Denying Rehearing and Granting in Part Applications for Stay, 28 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,175 (1984), 49 Fed.Reg. 31,259 (1984).
The Commission decided to reconsider the minimum take question because the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Order No. 380 specifically addressed the issue of gas "not taken” by a customer and pursuant to a minimum take provision, the customer must actually take the gas.
Wisconsin Gas Co. v. FERC, No. 84-1358 (D.C. Cir. filed July 30, 1984).
Take-or-pay provisions require a pipeline to take a specified percentage of the gas which it is contractually obligated to purchase, or to pay for such gas. These provisions differ from minimum bills in several respects. First, minimum bills usually must be paid on a monthly basis, whereas take-or-pay obligations accrue on an annual basis. Second, the take-or-pay provisions often permit the purchaser to "make-up” deficient purchases over a period of years. This allows the purchaser to take the excess above his minimum contractual requirement, at a later time, to the extent that he has already paid for the gas. Finally, the pipeline is entitled to treat prudently incurred take-or-pay prepayment as an investment which may be included in a general rate increase filing under section 4 of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717c (1982).
. See Order, Wisconsin Gas Co. v. FERC, No. 84-1358 (D.C.Cir. Sept. 19, 1984).
Order on Rehearing Reaffirming Application of Rule to Minimum Take Provisions and Denying Requests for Waiver, 29 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,077 (1984), 49 Fed.Reg. 43,625 (1984).
.See, e.g., Natural Gas Supply Ass’n, Statements on Take-or-Pay Obligations, Reported in the 1983 Annual Reports of Interstate Pipelines, reprinted in Response of Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in Opposition to Stay of Commission Order Nos. 380 and 380-A (Nos. 84-1359, 84-1360), Wisconsin Gas Co. v. FERC, No. 84-1358 (D.C.Cir. filed July 30, 1984).
See Order No. 380-A, 49 Fed.Reg. 31,259, 31,262 (1984).
See Order No. 380-C, 49 Fed.Reg. 43,625, 43,633 (1984).
Motion of Transwestern Pipeline Company for Partial Stay at 19, Wisconsin Gas Co. v. FERC, No. 84-1358 (D.C.Cir. filed July 30, 1984).