Rabb v. Amatex Corp., 769 F.2d 996 (4th Cir. 1985)
A district court's finding that a party deliberately disregarded a pretrial order is a factual finding of fault reviewable only for clear error, supporting discovery sanctions.
An executor of an asbestosis plaintiff's estate sued multiple asbestos manufacturers in federal court. The district court entered a pretrial order governing discovery in all asbestosis cases, and the plaintiff's counsel repeatedly missed its deadlines. The court precluded the plaintiff's late evidence and granted summary judgment to defendants. On appeal, the court considers whether the pretrial order violated the federal rules or due process, and whether the sanction was proper. The court holds the order was valid and that the sanction was authorized under the discovery sanctions rule, since counsel's willful disregard of the order supported the required fault finding. The judgment is affirmed.
At page 1000Precluding evidence for failure to comply with discovery orders21 citing cases“The district court’s finding that [a party] deliberately disregarded [a] pre-trial order is a factual finding of fault . . . that can be overturned by this court only if clearly erroneous”
- Cournoyer, No. 24-02010 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Apr. 3, 2026).A lower “court’s finding that [a party] deliberately disregarded [a] pre-trial order is a factual finding. . . that can be overturned [on appeal] only if clearly erroneous.” Rabb v. Amatex Corp., 769 F.2d 996, 1000 (4th Cir. 1985). . . .
- Matthew Smith v. Ronald Devine, 126 F.4th 331 (4th Cir. 2025).publishedA lower “court’s finding that [a party] deliberately disregarded [a] pre-trial order is a factual finding . . . that can be overturned by this [C]ourt only if clearly erroneous.” Rabb v. Amatex Corp., 769 F.2d 996, 1000 (4th Cir. 1985).
- Devine v. Smith, No. 3:23-cv-00001 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 5, 2024).“The [bankruptcy] court's finding that [a party] deliberately disregarded [a] pre-trial order is a factual finding of fault . . . that can be overturned by this court only if clearly erroneous.” Rabb v. Amatex Corp., 769 F.2d 996, 1000 (4t…
- Advanced Training Grp. Worldwide, Inc. v. Pro-Active Tech., Inc., No. 22-1945 (4th Cir. Dec. 28, 2023).unpublished“can be overturned by this court only if clearly erroneous”
- Diana Mey v. Music City Ventures, Inc., No. 22-1859 (4th Cir. June 23, 2023).published “The district court’s finding that [a party] deliberately disregarded [a] pre-trial order is a factual finding of fault . . . that can be overturned by this court only if clearly erroneous”
- Diana Mey v. Judson Phillips, 71 F.4th 203 (4th Cir. 2023).published “The district court’s finding that [a party] deliberately disregarded [a] pre-trial order is a factual finding of fault . . . that can be overturned by this court only if clearly erroneous”
- Atl. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Bindea, No. 3:21-cv-00002 (W.D. Va. Apr. 26, 2023).Va. Nov. 30, 2018) (quoting Rabb v. Amatex Corp., 769 F.2d 996, 1000 (4th Cir. 1985)).
- Sines v. Kessler, No. 3:17-cv-00072 (W.D. Va. June 23, 2021).“In the Fourth Circuit, bad faith includes willful conduct, where the party ‘clearly should have understood his duty to the court’ but nonetheless ‘deliberately disregarded’ it.” Brooks Sports, 2018 WL 7488924 , at *16 (quoting Rabb v. Ama…
- Sines v. Kessler, No. 3:17-cv-00072 (W.D. Va. Mar. 25, 2021).Va. July 25, 2019) (“In the Fourth Circuit, bad faith includes willful conduct, where the party ‘clearly should have understood his duty to the court’ but nonetheless ‘deliberately disregarded’ it.” (quoting Rabb v. Amatex Corp., 769 F.2d…
- North Carolina State Conf. of the NAACP v. Cooper, No. 1:18-cv-01034 (M.D.N.C. May 4, 2020).(affirming “finding of willful disregard,” “[i]n light of counsel’s conceded full awareness of and utter disregard for the district court’s discovery timetable set forth in the pre-trial order)
Show 10 more citing cases
- Royster v. Food Lion Inc, No. 94-2360, 1998 WL 322682 (4th Cir. June 4, 1998).unpublished (hold- ing that failure to comply with a discovery order warrants dismissal)
- United States v. One Tract of Real Prop. & All Appurtenances & Improvements Thereto, 107 F.3d 868 (4th Cir. 1997).unpublished Rabb v. Amatex Corp., 769 F.2d 996, 999-1000 (4th Cir.1985).
- United States v. One Tract Real Prop, No. 95-1282 (4th Cir. Feb. 20, 1997).unpublished P. 37(b)(2)(C) dismissal." Id. at 1000 (citations omitted).
- T. N. Taylor v. Specialty Mktg., Inc., 985 F.2d 553 (4th Cir. 1993).unpublished (In light of counsel's conceded full awareness of and utter disregard for the district court's discovery timetable," grant of summary judgment was not an abuse of discretion.)
- Litton Indus., Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, 734 F. Supp. 1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).publishedSee, e.g., Hull v. Eaton Corp., 825 F.2d 448, 452 (D.C.Cir.1987); Rabb v. Amatex Corp., 769 F.2d 996, 1000 (4th Cir.1985); Spray-Rite Serv.
- Mut. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Richards & Assocs., Inc., 872 F.2d 88 (4th Cir. 1989).published McKenna correctly recited and applied the Wilson factors 14 See Rabb v. Amatex Corp., 769 F.2d 996, 1000 (4th Cir.1985) 15 At oral argument on March 7, 1989, it was disclosed that R & A had yet to pay the costs and attorney's fees awarded…
- Robert J. Crowley v. Prince George's Cnty. Police Dep't, 836 F.2d 545 (4th Cir. 1987).unpublished See Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles Et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 207 (1958); Rabb v. Amatex Corp., 769 F.2d 996, 999-1000 (4th Cir.1985).
- McKenna v. Sovran Bank NA, 836 F.2d 546 (3d Cir. 1987).unpublishedSee Rabb v. Amatex Corp., 769 F.2d 996, 1000 (4th Cir.1985).
- Cyrus H. Khabiri, Priscilla J. Khabiri, Zhaleh S. Khabiri v. John S. Toll, Individually & as a Sch. Off. Robert L. Gluckstern, Individually & as a Sch. Off. William L. Thomas, Jr., Individually & as a Sch. Off. George J. Funaro, Individually & as a Sch. Off. John R. Beaton, Individually & as a Sch. Off. Betty F. Smith, Individually & as a Sch. Off. John N. Ruth, Individually & as a Sch. Instructor Vincent M. Brannigan, Individually & as a Sch. Instructor Gary M. Pavela, Individually & as a Sch. Off. the Bd. of Regents Peter F. O'malley, Individually & as an Off. Agent of the Members of the Bd. of Regents, Cyrus H. Khabiri, Zhaleh S. Khabiri, Priscilla J. Khabiri v. John S. Toll, Individually & as a Sch. Off. Robert L. Gluckstern, Individually & as a Sch. Off. William L. Thomas, Jr., Individually & as a Sch. Off. George J. Funaro, Individually & as a Sch. Off. John R. Beaton, Individually & as a Sch. Off. Betty F. Smith, Individually & as a Sch. Off. John N. Ruth, Individually & as a Sch. Instructor Vincent M. Brannigan, Individually & as a Sch. Instructor Gary M. Pavela, Individually & as a Sch. Off. the Bd. of Regents Peter F., O'malley, Individually & as an Off. Agent of the Members of the Bd. of Regents, Cyrus H. Khabiri, Zhaleh S. Khabiri, Priscilla J. Khabiri v. John S. Toll, Individually & as a Sch. Off. Robert L. Gluckstern, Individually & as a Sch. Off. William L. Thomas, Jr., Individually & as a Sch. Off. George J. Funaro, Individually & as a Sch. Off. John R. Beaton, Individually & as a Sch. Off. Betty F. Smith, Individually & as a Sch. Off. John N. Ruth, Individually & as a Sch. Instructor Vincent M. Brannigan, Individually & as a Sch. Instructor Gary M. Pavela, Individually & as a Sch. Off. the Bd. of Regents Peter F. O'malley, Individually & as an Off. Agent of the Members of the Bd. of Regents, 828 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1987).unpublishedSee Rabb v. Amatex Corp., 769 F.2d 996, 1000 (4th Cir. 1985). 4 The district court properly granted summary judgment against Cyrus and Priscilla Khabiri on the grounds that they lacked standing to pursue their daughter's claims, see, e.g.,…
- Lolatchy v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 816 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1987).publishedSee also Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 763-64 , 100 S.Ct. 2455, 2562-63 , 65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980). 39 The facts of today's case are also similar to those before this circuit in Rabb v. Amatex Corp., 769 F.2d 996 (4th Cir.1985…
At page 999Determining court power regarding discovery noncompliance20 citing cases“Rule 16 and Rules 26 through 37 are aimed at a common goal – providing the parties with enough information so that they may fully prepare themselves for trial[.]”
- London v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. 8:21-cv-01497 (D. Md. May 30, 2023).“Rule 16 and Rules 26 through 37 are aimed at a common goal – providing the parties with enough information so that they may fully prepare themselves for trial[.]”
- Cahoon v. Edward Orton Jr. Ceramic Found., No. 2:17-cv-00063 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 24, 2020). See S. States Rack & Fixture, 867 F.3d at 595-96 ; cf, Saudi v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 427 F.3d 271, 279 (4th Cir. 2005); Rabb v. Amatex Corp., 769 F.2d 996, 999-1000 (4th Cir. 1985).
- Griffin v. Wright Med. Tech., Inc., No. 1:18-cv-01959, 2020 WL 92208 (D. Md. Jan. 8, 2020).Rabb v. Amatex Corp., 769 F.2d 996, 999 (4th Cir. 1985).
- LeCompte v. Manekin Constr., LLC, 573 B.R. 187 (D. Md. 2017).publishedRabb v. Amatex Corp., 769 F.2d 996, 999 (4th Cir. 1985).
- Dawn Flores v. Ethicon, Inc., 563 F. App'x 266 (4th Cir. 2014).unpublishedSee Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(f); Rabb v. Amatex Corp., 769 F.2d 996, 999-1000 (4th Cir.1985).
- United States v. One Tract of Real Prop. & All Appurtenances & Improvements Thereto, 107 F.3d 868 (4th Cir. 1997).unpublished Rabb v. Amatex Corp., 769 F.2d 996, 999-1000 (4th Cir.1985).
- Hatton v. Spencer (In re Hatton), 204 B.R. 477 (E.D. Va. 1997).published“provid[ing] some necessary order and clarity to the pretrial process”
- King v. Coppin State Coll., 42 F.3d 1386 (4th Cir. 1994).unpublishedArdey v. United Parcel Service, 798 F.2d 679 , 682 (4th Cir.1986) (citing Rabb v. Amatex Corp. 769 F.2d 996, 999 (4th Cir.1985)).
- Nu-Life Env't, Inc., & Cumberland Cnty., a Political Subdivision of the State of North Carolina v. Shred Pax Corp., Al Kaczmarek, Nu-Life Env't, Inc., & Cumberland Cnty., a Political Subdivision of the State of North Carolina v. Shred Pax Corp., Al Kaczmarek, Nu-Life Env't, Inc., & Cumberland Cnty., a Political Subdivision of the State of North Carolina v. Shred Pax Corportion, Al Kaczmarek, 940 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1991).unpublishedRabb v. Amatex Corp., 769 F.2d 996, 999-1000 (4th Cir.1985).
- Robert J. Crowley v. Prince George's Cnty. Police Dep't, 836 F.2d 545 (4th Cir. 1987).unpublished See Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles Et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 207 (1958); Rabb v. Amatex Corp., 769 F.2d 996, 999-1000 (4th Cir.1985).
Show 9 more citing cases
- Johnson v. Hettleman, 812 F.2d 1401 (4th Cir. 1987).unpublishedDiscovery rulings are within the district court's discretion, see Rabb v. Amatex Corp., 769 F.2d 996, 999 (4th Cir.1985), and that discretion was not abused.
- Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 114 F.R.D. 57 (E.D. Mich. 1987).publishedSociete Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 207 , 78 S.Ct. 1087, 1093 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1255 (1958); Salahuddin v. Harris, 782 F.2d 1127, 1134 (2d Cir.1986); Rabb v. Amatex Corp., 769 F.2d 99…
- Tim Cheng-Chien Chang v. John Wesley Burford, 803 F.2d 714 (4th Cir. 1986).unpublishedSociete Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles Et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 207 (1958); Rabb v. Amatex Corp., 769 F.2d 996, 999-1000 (4th Cir.1985) 2 Defendant had filed on March 1, 1985 his first motion request…
- Ardrey v. United Parcel Serv., 798 F.2d 679 (4th Cir. 1986).published Rabb v. Amatex Corp., 769 F.2d 996, 999 (4th Cir.1985); Belcher v. Bassett Furniture Industries, Inc., 588 F.2d 904, 907 (4th Cir.1978); Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, 685 F.2d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir.1982), aff…
- United States v. $115,413.00 In US Currency, No. 5:20-cv-00539 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 3, 2024).Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v); see Rabb v. Amatex Corp., 769 F.2d 996, 999-1000 (4th Cir. 1985).
- Karl Linard Malloy, No. 23-33442 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Mar. 1, 2024).See Rabb v. Amatex Corp., 769 F.2d 996, 999 (4th Cir. 1985); LeCompte v. Manekin Constr., LLC, 573 B.R. 187, 193 (D.
- Clady v. Highland Paving Co., No. 5:21-cv-00169 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 14, 2022). P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v); see Rabb v. Amatex Corp » 769 F.2d 996, 999-1000 (4th Cir. 1985).
- RDLG, LLC v. Fred Leonard, Jr., 649 F. App'x 343 (4th Cir. 2016).unpublished See Rabb v. Amatex Corp., 769 F.2d 996, 999-1000 (4th Cir.1985).
- Briggs v. City of Norfolk, 42 F. App'x 585 (4th Cir. 2002).unpublishedSee Rabb v. Amatex Corp., 769 F.2d 996, 999-1000 (4th Cir.1985).
Other citing cases
- Doe v. DeWees, No. 8:18-cv-02014 (D. Md. Apr. 12, 2023).
- Cathcart v. Gen. Holding, Inc. (In re Derivium Capital, LLC), 372 B.R. 777 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2007).published
- In re Air Crash Disaster at Detroit Metro. Airport on August 16, 1987, 130 F.R.D. 652 (E.D. Mich. 1989).published
v.
AMATEX CORPORATION Empire Asbestos The Flintkote Company National Gypsum Company Nicolet, Inc. Rock Wool Manufacturing Company and Standard Asbestos Mfg. & Insulating Co., and Armstrong World Industries, Inc. Armstrong Contract and Supply (AC & S) The Celotex Corporation Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. Forty-Eight Insulation, Inc. Keene Corporation Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. H.K. Porter Company/Southern Asbestos Pittsburgh Corning Corporation and Raymark Industries, Inc., In re ASBESTOS RELATED LITIGATION. Claude Erwin RABB, of the Estate of Harry W. Rabb v. AMATEX CORPORATION Armstrong World Industries, Inc. Empire Asbestos The Flintkote Company National Gypsum Company Nicolet, Inc. Pittsburgh Corning Corporation Rock Wool Manufacturing Company and Standard Asbestos Mfg. & Insulation Co., and Armstrong Contract and Supply (AC & S) The Celotex Corporation Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. Keene Corporation Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. H.K. Porter Company/Southern Asbestos and Raymark Industries, Inc.
Claude E. Rabb, executor of the estate of Harry W. Rabb, appeals the grant of summary judgment by the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina based upon the court’s preclusion of Rabb’s critical evidence in his asbestosis-related action for failure to comply with the court’s pre-trial order. Because we believe the district court’s Pre-trial Order Coordinating Discovery Proceedings violated neither the federal rules of civil procedure nor due process, and the district court properly imposed sanctions against Rabb for his failure to comply with the pre-trial order, we affirm.
I
Harry W. Rabb worked in shipyards in Newport News, Virginia from 1948 to 1954. On September 27, 1982, Rabb filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina against 19 manufacturers of asbestos products, claiming Rabb’s pulmonary fibrosis was proximately caused by exposure to the manufacturers’ products.
Harry Rabb died on November 11, 1982. Harry’s brother, Claude Rabb, was substituted as plaintiff in this action as executor of Harry’s estate. On March 17, 1983, the district court entered an “Initial Pre-Trial Order Coordinating Proceedings.” The pre-trial order established a discovery timetable for all pending and future asbestosis litigation in the Western District of North Carolina. The district court entered a separate order on March 17, 1983, expressly declaring Rabb’s case to be governed by the pre-trial order.
Paragraph 15 of the pre-trial order provided asbestosis plaintiffs 90 days from the filing of their complaints within which to serve on all parties a “master list” identifying the specific products and defendants claimed to have caused plaintiffs’ injuries, and revealing the specific dates and locations of exposure and the names of plaintiffs’ “exposure witnesses.” Paragraph 21 provided asbestosis plaintiffs seven months from the filing of their complaints to produce a “final master identification list” of products, defendants, exposure witnesses and dates and locations of exposure, to which the plaintiffs would be bound at trial. Paragraph 22 provided plaintiffs seven months from the date of filing their complaints in which to provide each defendant with all identification evidence, other than that designated in the paragraph 21 final master identification list, upon which plaintiffs intended to rely at trial. Paragraph 23 provided a sanction of dismissal as to particular defendants if after seven months from the filing of the complaint plaintiffs failed to come forward with product identification or exposure evidence as required in paragraphs 21 and 22. Paragraph 24 provided that compliance dates in Rabb’s action would be measured from March 3, 1983.
Rabb’s counsel disregarded the pre-trial order timetable. On June 23, 1983, counsel filed his paragraph 15 compliance three weeks late and failed to identify any exposure witnesses or verify his “master identification list” as required by the pre-trial[*998] order. On October 3, 1983, he filed his “Compliance With Paragraphs 21 and 22” on time, however this compliance did nothing more than incorporate by reference his initial June 23, 1983, filing.
During November 1983 individual defendants filed motions for dismissal and summary judgment, on the basis of Rabb’s failure to comply with the pre-trial order. On November 3, 1983, Rabb filed a “Supplemental Compliance” identifying his exposure witnesses for the first time. On November 29, 1983, Rabb filed a “Second Supplemental Compliance” that identified an additional exposure witness.
On December 6, 1983, a motion was filed on behalf of all the defendants for dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b), or, in the alternative, for preclusion of evidence pursuant to the pre-trial order. On December 14,1983, a motion was filed for summary judgment on behalf of all defendants. (This was in addition to several individual summary judgment motions by particular defendants during December 1983.)
On April 5, 1984, the district court entered an order granting defendants’ motions for preclusion and summary judgment, after first determining that Rabb had unjustifiably disregarded the pre-trial order. Rabb now appeals the judgment of the district court.
II
Rabb acknowledges on appeal his noncompliance with the pre-trial order, but argues that the district court’s pre-trial order violated the federal rules of civil procedure and the due process clause of the United States Constitution’s fifth amendment. Rabb also contends that the district court abused its discretion and violated his constitutional right to due process in precluding Rabb's use of evidence not presented in accordance with the provisions of the pretrial order and in granting summary judgment for defendants.
The crux of appellant’s challenge to the pre-trial order is that the terms of the Western District’s order are different from the terms of a similar order in the Eastern District of North Carolina that this court implicitly approved in Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946 (4th Cir.1984). Rabb claims that the Western District’s pre-trial order “is such an extreme distortion of the pretrial practice which was addressed in Barwick ..., that plaintiff submits it runs afoul of Federal Rule 16 and the due process clause of the United States Constitution.”
The district court in Barwick had entered a pre-trial order requiring both defendants and plaintiffs in an asbestos-related action to file statements designating the expert and exposure witnesses upon which the parties expected to rely at trial. In regard to that pre-trial order this court wrote in review that
[pjretrial orders similar to the one entered in this case have become an established part of asbestosis litigation. Experience has shown that most plaintiffs sue a broad spectrum of asbestos miners, manufacturers and distributors in the hope of not overlooking any possible defendant. A properly conducted discovery process allows the plaintiff to develop his case against the defendants who mined, manufactured and/or sold the asbestos products to which the plaintiff was exposed, and allows the other defendants to get out of the case prior to the expense of a lengthy trial.
Contrary to Rabb’s conclusions, nothing in this court’s Barwick opinion suggests that this court adopted the terms of Bar-wick ’s pre-trial order as a yardstick by which all subsequent asbestosis pre-trial orders would be measured. The Barwick pre-trial order was merely one acceptable means by which a district court could manage the pre-trial aspects of complicated asbestosis litigation. The pre-trial order employed by the district court in this case is yet another.
The district court’s pre-trial order here properly facilitated discovery in this case. Although paragraph 15 of the order placed the burden solely on the plaintiff to[*999] file a master identification list, paragraphs 17 and 18 of the order provided for interrogatories and requests to produce documents by both parties. Paragraph 14 anticipated depositions by both parties. In short, the requirements of paragraph 15 provided some necessary order and clarity to the pre-trial process without burdening plaintiff unduly or preventing plaintiff from discovering defendants’ cases through ordinary discovery techniques.
The district court complied with the federal rules of civil procedure and did not abuse its discretion in fashioning the order. Thus we deny Rabb’s legal and constitutional challenge to its terms. Fed.R.Civ.P. 16, 83.
Rabb also claims the district court abused its discretion and violated his due process rights in precluding Rabb’s evidence and granting summary judgment to defendants as a result of Rabb’s failure to comply with the pre-trial order. We agree with appellant that the district court’s action was in essence a dismissal of appellant’s action. We do not agree with appellant however that the court’s action is to be assessed for propriety under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) governing involuntary dismissals.
In Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles Et Commerciales v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 207, 78 S.Ct. 1087, 1093, 2 L.Ed.2d 1255 (1958), the Supreme Court held that
whether a court has power to dismiss a complaint because of noncompliance with a production order depends exclusively upon Rule 37, which addresses itself with particularity to the consequences of a failure to make discovery by listing a variety of remedies which a court may employ as well as by authorizing any order which is “just.” There is no need to resort to Rule 41(b) which appears in that part of the Rules concerned with trials and which lacks such specific references to discovery.
(Emphasis in original.) Although Societe Internationale dealt with the pre-1970 version of Rule 37, the Court’s reasoning applies with legal force to the present case. The current version of Rule 37 addresses with particularity the consequences of Rabb’s failure to comply with the Western District’s pre-trial order. Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) does not. Societe Internationale’s rationale for applying the more particular rule thus dictates that Rule 37 be viewed as the source of the district court’s power to impose the dismissal sanction here.
This is so even though the order disobeyed in this case was not an order to compel discovery granted on a party’s motion, but instead a Fed.R.Civ.P. 16 general pre-trial order. The 1970 advisory committee notes to Rule 37(b) indicate that the scope of the rule was broadened to include “any order ‘to provide or permit discovery,’ ” that “various rules authorize orders for discovery” and “Rule 37(b)(2) should provide comprehensively for enforcement of all these orders.” Citing Societe Internationale, 357 U.S. at 207, 78 S.Ct. at 1093 (emphasis added). Professors Wright and Miller note that
Rule 16 and Rules 26 through 37 are aimed at a common goal — providing the parties with enough information so that they may fully prepare themselves for trial. Thus, frequently courts view Rule 16 as part of the general discovery process provided for in the rules and speak of the joint purpose to be achieved by the pretrial conference and discovery.
Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1528 (1971). The consequence of this identity of purpose is, as another commentator notes, an identity of sanctions for noncompliance:
among the sanctions now authorized by Rule 16 are the penalties for violation of discovery orders contained in Rule 37(b)(2)(B), (C) and (D) and Rule 16 should thus be read in conjunction with that Rule. Among the sanctions which may be imposed are dismissal, default, preclusion of evidence or testimony, costs, and contempt for failure to comply with court orders.
3 Moore’s Federal Practice 1116.32 (1985).
Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(B) provides for the preclusion of evidence by a party failing to[*1000] provide or permit discovery pursuant to an order to provide or permit discovery. Fed. R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(C) permits dismissal against the disobedient party. A trial court may preclude evidence under Fed.R. Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(B) even if to do so is tantamount to a Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(C) dismissal. Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Cory, v. Allied Artists Pictures Cory., 602 F.2d 1062, 1065 (2d Cir.1979); Von Brimer v. Whirlpool Cory., 536 F.2d 838, 843-44 (9th Cir.1976).
In Societe Internationale however the Supreme Court noted a fifth amendment due process limitation on a district court’s power to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b). The Court held that because of constitutional concerns Rule 37 “should not be construed to authorize dismissal of [a] complaint because of petitioner’s noncompliance with a pretrial production order when it has been established that failure to comply has been due to inability, and not to willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of petitioner.” 357 U.S. at 212, 78 S.Ct. at 1096. In Cine Forty-Second Street Theatre, the Second Circuit found counsel’s negligence in failure to comply with a pre-trial discovery order sufficient to satisfy the fault requirement of Societe Internationale. 602 F.2d 1066-68. The Second Circuit concluded that failure to comply “where counsel clearly should have understood his duty to the court” constituted professional negligence of a degree amounting to “fault.” 602 F.2d at 1068. We adopt that assessment.
Rabb claims that while the record in this case “may reveal sloppiness or even negligence prior to October 3, 1983, in meeting the detailed requirements of the initial pretrial order, it does not demonstrate purposeful delay or contumaciousness [sic] on the part of plaintiff or his attorney.” In a specific finding of fact the district court essentially rejected that assessment and found instead that
counsel for the Plaintiff was made aware of the importance the Court placed on compliance with the Pre-trial Order____ The Court can find no justifiable reason excusing the Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Pre-trial Order. Assuming however that there were legitimate reasons why Plaintiff could not comply with the Pre-trial Order the proper procedure would have been for the Plaintiff to move for an extension of time within which to comply. Plaintiff made no such motion but instead chose to proceed according to his own timetable. The Court can not condone this sort of disregard for its orders.
The district court’s finding that Rabb deliberately disregarded the pre-trial order is a factual finding of fault on appellant’s part that can be overturned by this court only if clearly erroneous. Fed.R.Civ.P. 52.
In light of counsel’s conceded full awareness of and utter disregard for the district court’s discovery timetable set forth in the pre-trial order, we hold that the district court was not clearly erroneous in its finding of willful disregard and that the fault found by the district court was sufficient to satisfy the standard set forth in Societe Internationale, 357 U.S. at 212, 78 S.Ct. at 1095. Thus the district court did not abuse its discretion or violate any right to due process in precluding Rabb’s improperly-submitted evidence and granting summary judgment for defendants. Roadway Exyress, Inc. v. Piyer, 447 U.S. 752, 763-64, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 2462-63, 65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980), quoting National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643, 96 S.Ct. 2778, 2781, 49 L.Ed.2d 747 (1976).
The judgment of the district court is therefore affirmed.
AFFIRMED.